THE INVASION OF KASHGAR BY BUZURG KHAN AND YAKOOB BEG.
The Chinese were on several occasions, as we have seen, threatened in
Eastern Turkestan by the pretensions of the Khojas, and the secret or
open machinations of Khokand. But they had at all times triumphed over
every combination of circumstances, so long as they themselves were
united. The temporary success of Jehangir Khan was obliterated by the
excesses which characterized his occupation of the country, and by the
energy and large display of force, with which the Chinese pacified the
state on his flight; and the last, under Wali Khan, can scarcely be
dignified by any other appellation than that of a marauding incursion.
But a great and important change had occurred in the few years that had
elapsed since 1859. The Chinese no longer presented a collected force to
the onslaught of an assailant. In every quarter of their empire,
victorious rebels had established themselves, and had detracted in an
immeasurable degree from the effective strength of the Government. A
Mahomedan ruler swayed over the Panthays, in Yunnan, from his capital at
Ta-li-foo; the Taepings round Nankin were at the summit of their career,
just before the appearance of Colonel Gordon, when, in 1862, a fresh
danger broke out in the provinces of Kansuh and Shensi. From a remote
period there had been extensive Mussulman settlements in these
provinces, and so early as the seventeenth century they had been the
cause of trouble to the great Kanghi. The Emperor Keen-Lung, indeed, at
one time attempted to settle the question for ever by ordering the
massacre of every Mahomedan over fifteen years of age. Even this
sweeping measure did not have the desired effect, and whether
persecution was the means or not of giving vitality to the cause, it is
certain that they had become more numerous, more resolute, and more
confident in their own superiority to the other Chinese by the middle of
the present century. These Mahomedans were known as Tungani, Dungani, or
Dungans, while the Buddhist Chinese are spoken of as Khitay. Many
writers are not satisfied with this simple explanation of the name
Tungani, and will have it that they were a distinct race, who were
either transported to China at some period of Chinese conquest, or were
compelled to seek refuge there by some advancing barbarian horde. They
even assert that they can trace the name and origin of this people to a
tribe dwelling in the country of the lower waters of the Amoor; but
while there is complete uncertainty on the subject it seems simpler to
accept the signification that the word Tungani conveys to the Chinese,
and that is Mahomedan. We know, for certain, that these people had
resided in Kansuh and its neighbouring province for centuries--that they
were remarkable for a superiority in strength and activity over the
Khitay, and that they possessed the virtues of sobriety and honesty.
They were also not infected by the disease of opium smoking, and we
should imagine them to have been a quiet, contented, and agreeable
people at their most prosperous period. Their physical superiority to
the Khitay would probably be owing to their abstention from "bang" and
opium, and we need not suppose that they were the descendants of a
stronger race, who had issued from the frigid north, when we have an
explanation so much simpler and more natural at hand. They were found by
their Khitay rulers to form excellent soldiers, policemen, and other
Government servants, such as carriers, &c. In this last employment many
found their way to Hamil, thence to Turfan and Urumtsi, and their
numbers were increased by discharged soldiers, who remained as military
settlers sooner than return to Kansuh. In the course of a few
generations their numbers became much greater, until, at last, in the
cities we have named, they formed the majority of the inhabitants. In
Kuldja, too, they were very numerous, but south of the Tian Shan they do
not seem to have advanced westward of Kucha in any great force. At Aksu
the Andijan influence, supreme in Western Kashgar, presented an
impassable barrier to the Tungani, who, it must be remembered, had no
sympathy with Khokand. The Tungani were, therefore, Mahomedan subjects
of China, originating in Kansuh, but who had also, in the course of
time, spread westward into Chinese Turkestan and Jungaria. They were
employed in the service of the country without restriction, nor can we
find that they were subjected to any unfair usage, after the measures
taken against them in the earlier days of Keen-Lung. They may not have
been as highly favoured as the Sobo tribes, and they may have been
subjected to some ridicule in Kansuh; but in Jungaria they were on an
equality with all the other Chinese, and immeasurably better placed in
the political scale than the Andijanis or Tarantchis. The Chinese had
just grounds for believing that no danger to their rule in Eastern
Turkestan or Jungaria would ever be caused by the Tungani, and it is not
easy to explain how their reasonable anticipations were falsified. The
Tungani were fervent, if not the most orthodox in form of, Mahomedans,
and it would appear that they were not free from a belief in their own
superiority to the Khitay. This feeling was fostered by the "mollahs,"
or priests, who became very active within the Chinese dominions, when
these had been extended by conquest into the heart of Asia. As if in
retaliation for a Khitay conquest the Mahomedan religion was undermining
the outworks of its rival's power slowly, but surely. The impulse given
to trade by the security and patronage that accompanied Chinese rule
was, at least from a purely Chinese point of view, neutralized as an
advantage by the admission into the empire of energetic and eloquent
preachers of the superior merits of Mahomedanism. It required many
generations before the effect of their efforts became perceptible, and
it was not until the power of China fell into an extraordinary
decline--a decline which many thought, with some show of reason, was to
herald the fall, but which later events have seemed to make but the
prelude to a more vigorous life than ever--that these Mahomedan
missionaries among the Tungani knew that the time to reap what they had
sown with patience and persistency was at hand. It is impossible not to
connect this event in some degree with that unaccountable revival of
fanaticism among Mahomedans, which has produced so many important events
during the last thirty years, and of which we are now witnessing some of
the most striking results.
In 1862, a riot occurred in a small village of Kansuh; it was suppressed
with some loss of life, and people were beginning to suppose that it
possessed no significance, when a disturbance broke out on a large scale
at Houchow, or Salara. The Tungani had risen, and the unfortunate
unarmed Khitay were massacred right and left. The rising soon assumed
the proportions of a civil war, and the infection spread to the
neighbouring province of Shensi. Then ensued scenes of the most
atrocious barbarity. The Khitay, who all their lives had lived at peace
and as neighbours with the Tungani, were butchered without mercy. The
Mahomedan priests seized all the governing power into their own hands,
and set their followers the example of unscrupulous ferocity. The
movement, even if we make allowance for the difficulties besetting the
government in other regions, must be considered to have been attended by
unexpected success. It can only be accounted for by the supposition that
the Khitay were taken completely by surprise, and realized neither the
extent nor the nature of the danger to which they were exposed. Before
the end of 1862, a Tungan government was established in Kansuh, and its
jurisdiction was for a time acknowledged in Shensi. The priests formed
an administration amongst themselves, and set themselves to the task of
consolidating what they had won, and of preparing for the time when the
Chinese should come for vengeance. The events happening in Kansuh were
naturally of interest to the Tungani in the country lying beyond it, and
it was not long before the example set them was followed in Hamil,
Turfan, Urumtsi, Manas, and other cities of that district. The same
success attended the movement here as in Kansuh. The Chinese power was
subverted, the Khitay massacred with greater circumstances of cruelty,
if possible, and a new Tungan state was formed in those cities. Each
district retained a nominal independence, under the headship of a
priest, or body of priests, or of one of the native Tungan princes, and
then the movement spread with irresistible strides to Karashar, Kucha,
and Aksu. There it stopped, and south of the Tian Shan the Tungan revolt
proper never extended west of Aksu.
In Altyshahr and Kuldja for some months longer the Chinese maintained
the external show of power, but all their communications with China were
cut off, and neither in numbers nor resources had they sufficient means
to cope with the Tungani unaided. They would have accomplished as much
as could have been expected from them if they succeeded in keeping
possession of that which they still occupied. The Tungan element in
Kucha and Aksu was not predominant. It had to share power with the
Khojas, and, as we shall see later on, the Khojas of these two cities
seized the governing power for themselves. It was the appearance of the
Tungan sedition in these cities, which occupy a middle relation to the
purely Chinese cities of Hamil and Urumtsi, and the almost totally
Khokandian cities of Yarkand and Kashgar, that roused the Kashgari to a
full appreciation of the importance to themselves of this movement, and
the Chinese garrisons and settlers to an equally just realization of
their own danger. The Kashgari, not free from the fanaticism of all
their co-religionists, and naturally elated at the successes of the
Tungani, forgot, with their well proved fickleness, all the benefits
they had received from the Chinese, and waited eagerly for a favourable
opportunity to come for them to imitate the example set them by their
eastern neighbours. Nor had they long to wait, although it was not from
them that came the first spark that lighted the firebrand of civil war
and anarchy throughout the length and breadth of Altyshahr.
It will be remembered that the Khokandian government had the right to
nominate in each city, where they received dues on Mahomedan
merchandise, an agent or tax-collector to look after the proper levy of
the tax. In some of the larger cities this official would require a
considerable staff of assistants, and thus a certain number of skilled
Khokandian officials were permanently located on Kashgarian or Chinese
territory. After the failure of the expedition of Wali Khan, in which
these officials seem to have disappeared, either having become merged in
the body of his partisans or sacrificed during the massacres of that
time, a fresh batch of Khokandians was installed, and occupied, in a
legal sense, the same position as their predecessors. It would appear,
however, that the natural result of their aid to Wali Khan followed, and
that the Chinese Ambans regarded their presence with scarcely concealed
dislike, and proclaimed that these Khokandian tax-gatherers were
devoting more of their attention to the propagation of heretical
religious and political doctrines than to the collection of dues on silk
and other articles of commerce. It would require but the slightest
untoward circumstance to fan this ill-feeling into the most insatiate
hatred and hostility. The danger was rendered the more serious when the
Chinese Ambans perceived for the first time that the sympathies of a
large portion of their Tungan soldiery were estranged from them. It was
doubtful whether the Tungan regiments could be relied on against a fresh
Khoja revolt, and it was certain that they would not combine in any
repression of the Mahomedan religion, even though the sufferers should
only be Andijanis. Such was the state of the public mind in Altyshahr in
1862, when the Tungani revolted and obtained success in Kansuh and
Shensi.
As early as 1859 the hostility of the Chinese Ambans to the Andijani
tax-collectors received a forcible illustration in the town of Yarkand.
At that time Afridun Wang was governor, and, whether there was any
personal enmity at the root of the action or not, he found little
difficulty in convincing both himself and the other Chinese residents
that the Andijani agent had been stirring up discontent against them in
the town. Accordingly, as self-preservation is the first law of nature,
this Khokandian official, with his attendant, was arrested and executed.
There may have been some foundation for the accusations made by Afridun
Wang against his rival: more probably there was none; but on referring
the matter to the Viceroy of Ili for decision it was decided that the
governor should be removed. The Khokandian government sent fresh agents,
and it is not stated that any reparation was given to the families of
the sufferers. From this it would appear that the post of tax-collector
in Altyshahr for His Highness the Khan of Khokand was not a very
desirable position. Afridun Wang retired to his native town of Turfan,
where, three years later on, he contributed more than any one else to
the success of the Tungan movement. His policy, if anti-Khokandian, was
pro-Mahomedan or Tungan, and his case is very typical of the nature of
this rising. In Turfan he continued to be one of the chief men, until,
six years later on, it fell to the Athalik Ghazi.
His successor in the governorship of Yarkand did not interfere with the
Khokandian officials, but for this moderation he made up by the
exactions he committed on the residents, more particularly on the
Mahomedan portion of them. His extortions and cruelties had the effect
as much of disgusting his own followers as of rousing a spirit of
opposition among the oppressed. It was while things were in this
uncertain state at Yarkand that the governor received secret notice of
the Tungan revolt in Kansuh, and he at once perceived that, when this
important intelligence became known, not only would his own Tungan
troops become more openly mutinous, but that the Khojas might seize the
opportunity to assert their claim to the country once more. In this
special case, in addition to the general apprehension that would be felt
by any Chinese governor at the aspect of affairs, there was personal
fear for the unjustifiable acts of his government, and the Amban, in his
trepidation, resolved on the most strenuous precautions to avert the
danger from himself. He summoned a council of war of his Buddhist
lieutenants, and stated the exact position to them; how the Tungan
portion of their forces could not be depended on; how the Tungan
settlers would join them; and how the Andijani agents would do their
utmost to unite in one cause against themselves all those who followed
the teaching of Islam; and how all these events, which before were
possible, had been rendered probable by the Tungan successes in the
east. He dwelt on the fact that no time was to be lost in the execution
of such precautions as they thought necessary; that at any moment the
news might arrive, and then they would be in a minority; and he did not
attempt to conceal the purport of his address--that he was in favour of
sharp measures, of going to the root of the evil at once, and of
massacring every Mussulman in the town. The council of war was not
prepared to endorse such a violent proceeding without careful
consideration. There were many dissentients, and the meeting was
adjourned. It reassembled, and, on this occasion, although the
supporters of more moderate measures had decreased, it adjourned once
more before deciding. The danger evidently appeared more appalling to
the governor than to his subordinates; perhaps also there was some
personal dislike for their chief even among his Khitay following. At the
second meeting they seemed, indeed, more willing to acquiesce in his
proposed strong measures, and this may have been caused by their
observation of the state of public opinion in the interval. But even
then no final decision could be arrived at, and the Khitay never had a
chance after that of making any defence in Yarkand. The Tungan troops
were not long in hearing, through their chief officer, Mah Dalay, that
there was a plot on foot among the Khitay to disarm, or, as others said,
to massacre them, and they then learnt of the Mahomedan revolt in China
and along the road thither. They immediately determined to be beforehand
with the Amban and his lukewarm council, and no weak hesitation marred
the execution of their plot, as it had that of the Chinese governor.
The Khitay troops, unarmed, were surprised during the night, and cut
down without quarter, and the small body of survivors sought refuge in
the Yangyshahr fort. This was in August, 1863, and no fewer than 7,000
Khitay soldiers are computed to have fallen on this single occasion. The
Tungan troops were thereupon joined by the townspeople, and the question
then to be decided was, who was to be supreme, the Tungani or the
Andijan-Kashgari Mahomedans. The former were simply an unlettered and
rather savage soldiery; the latter possessed keen intellects for
manipulating a fanatical people, and for improvising an administration
of a superficial character. The balance of power was evenly distributed
until reinforcements arrived from Aksu and Kucha to the anti-Tungan
party. Two Khojas who had been banished from Kucha, for endeavouring to
promote their own interests in the name of Khokand, had fled to Aksu,
where they met the same fate. In this latter flight many of similar
principles joined them, so that when they reached Yarkand they had a
numerous force at their back. The Khojas in the first place joined their
forces to the Tungani, to storm the remaining Khitay in the Yangyshahr.
The Khitay after a gallant resistance perceived that further opposition
was impossible. Then occurred one of those deeds, which, if Europe
instead of Asia had been the scene, would have been handed down to
posterity as a rare example of military devotion and courage, but which,
although not unique even in the annals of the campaign we are entering
upon, having occurred in little-known Eastern Turkestan, is not realized
as an event that has actually taken place. It is a myth of the myth-land
to which it belongs. And yet, when we read how the Amban summoned all
his officers to his chamber, where he sat in state surrounded by his
wives, his family, and his servants; how all were silent, and yet sedate
and prepared; how, at the given signal that all were present, and that
the foe was at the gate, the aged warrior dropped his lighted pipe into
the mine beneath; how the exulting foe won after all but a barren
triumph; and how the Khitay taught the natives that if they had
forgotten how to conquer they had not how to die, we feel that there is
an under-current throughout the story, that, apart from the admiration
it must command, has claims to our own special sympathy. The Chinese, as
we did in India in the dark hours of 1857, asserted their superiority
over the semi-barbarous races under their sway, even when all hopes of a
recovery seemed to be abandoned. After the fall of the citadel the
Khoja element was supreme in Yarkand, and a priest named Abderrahman
was set up as king.
The other cities of Altyshahr promptly followed the example of Yarkand,
and the Chinese power was completely subverted on all hands. The Khitay
were massacred whenever they fell into the hands of the Mahomedans, and
the only places that still held out were the citadels, notably the
Yangyshahr of Kashgar. The inhabitants of this city appear to have been
unable to keep their advantage over the Chinese, for they appealed to
the Kirghiz to come in and assist them. These nomads, under their chief,
Sadic Beg, were nothing loth to join in expelling the Chinese, as such a
change could only increase their advantages by substituting an unsettled
for a settled government. Siege was accordingly laid to the citadel of
Kashgar, but the irregular troops of the new allies were unable to make
any impression on the fort, defended as it was by a large Khitay
garrison. If the Chinese commander had assumed a more active policy, he
might have destroyed his opponents, but he was waiting for the arrival
of reinforcements, which he expected before many months. In not relying
solely on his own resources he proved himself unable to read the changed
signs of the time; if, indeed, he was not already meditating that
surrender, which he ultimately concluded with Yakoob Beg. Sadic Beg,
finding himself unable to take the fort, and knowing that it was
uncertain how long the Kashgari would remain friendly to himself,
resolved to play the part of king-maker, and sent the embassy to
Tashkent for a Khoja to come and rule Kashgar, only he omitted to say
that Kashgar was not conquered.
We can now return to Buzurg Khan and his commander-in-chief. When they
left Tashkent they had only a following of six, among whom were Abdulla,
Pansad; Mahomed Kuli, Shahawal; and Khoja Kulan, Hudaychi. All of these
played a very prominent part under Yakoob Beg. From Tashkent they went
to Khokand, where their numbers rose to sixty-eight. Here the final
preparations were made, and during the first days of January, 1865, this
band of adventurers crossed the Khokand frontier into Eastern Turkestan.
The mountain forts seem to have been deserted, for no opposition was
encountered in the passage of the Terek defile. Several small bodies of
troops joined them, and they reached Mingyol in the neighbourhood of
Kashgar with increased numbers and confidence. Sadic Beg had conceived a
more sanguine view of his situation by this time, and half repented that
he had invited the Khojas in at all, more particularly when he found
that the Khoja had a following of his own, and a skilled commander and
minister in Yakoob Beg. He then strove to dissuade Buzurg Khan from
proceeding further with an enterprise fraught with great peril, for he
represented the Chinese as sure to return, when summary vengeance would
be exacted. But his arguments were unavailing. Either Buzurg Khan or his
adviser, Yakoob Beg, was deaf to all entreaty. The enterprise they had
embarked on must be continued to the bitter end. They could not think of
returning to Khokand with nothing accomplished, with the stigma
attaching to them of a retreat when there had been no foe. Sadic Beg
could not but submit with the best grace possible; and Buzurg Khan was
accordingly placed on the throne of his ancestors.
In his "_orda_" or palace he administered justice and received the
congratulations of his own followers and of the Andijani townspeople.
The court rules were drawn up on the model of those in use in Khokand,
and while the expedition had but established itself, in an uncertain
manner, in one city it was thought necessary that etiquette should be as
strictly defined and enforced as if all this were taking place in a
brilliant and luxurious capital. In a few days Sadic Beg, on finding
that he played but a secondary part, revolted, and set himself up as
ruler at Yangy Hissar. It was now that Yakoob Beg came to the front,
and assumed the control of affairs until the fall of the contemptible
Buzurg. With great difficulty after the desertion of their Kirghiz
allies was a force of 3,000 men collected around the new Khoja in
Kashgar. Sadic Beg advanced on the capital with a much larger army, and
Yakoob Beg had for a time to remain on the defensive. Each day, however,
brought in recruits to his camp, while, the army of the Kirghiz leader
presenting no object of sympathy to the people, his rival's remained
stationary, if it did not decrease. An encounter at last commenced
between the two forces which was made general by the intrepidity of
Abdulla. The Kirghiz levies of Sadic were unable to withstand the
vigorous charges that were led against them, and broke after a short
combat into headlong flight. In the mountains the Kirghiz gathered
around their chieftain in force, and, hovering on the northern districts
of Kashgar, presented a danger that must be removed by Yakoob Beg before
he could advance farther. His troops were therefore directed to proceed
against the Kirghiz in their fastnesses, and it was not long before the
Kirghiz, driven into a corner, turned at bay on their pursuer. The
forces on either side were about equal, some 5,000 men in either army.
But, as is customary in the East, the Kirghiz army put forth a champion,
Suranchi by name, who had obtained great renown for his extraordinary
height and strength. The challenge did not remain unanswered, for
Abdulla stepped forward to the encounter. The fight, though furious, was
short, and the smaller Khokandian warrior was victorious over his more
ponderous antagonist. The Kirghiz power after this reverse was broken
up, and Sadic Beg took refuge with Alim Kuli at Tashkent. Yakoob Beg's
first campaign against the Kirghiz, who had sworn alliance with him, and
by whose invitation he was present in Kashgar, had thus ended
victoriously, and he was now able to resume the main purpose of
conquering Kashgar. Having rendered Kashgar secure from surprise on the
north, and leaving a force to maintain their hold on it, and to keep in
check the Khitay garrison, Buzurg and Yakoob proceeded south to occupy
Yangy Hissar. The town was occupied without difficulty, but an attempt
to storm the citadel in which the Khitay had taken refuge was repulsed
with loss. Sending Buzurg Khan back to Kashgar, Yakoob Beg resolved to
go on to Yarkand and endeavour to bring that city under their immediate
influence.
At this period he loudly proclaimed that there should be no differences
among the Tungani, or Mahomedans, in their war with the Buddhists, and
that Khojas and Tungani had but one interest in common. As we have seen,
the Tungan disturbances broke out first in Yarkand of any city of
Altyshahr, and accordingly an earlier settlement founded on a compromise
had been attained there, than was the case in its northern neighbours,
Kashgar and Yangy Hissar, where an ambitious Kirghiz chief had sought to
carve a kingdom for himself. After Abderrahman Khoja had been made king
or ruler in Yarkand, and after the Khitay had been destroyed with their
citadel, a fresh arrangement was agreed upon between the Tungani and the
Khoja party. By its terms the Tungani maintained possession of the
citadel, and the Khojas held jurisdiction in the city. Neither of them
would be disposed to view with any friendly eye the appearance of a
claimant to supremacy in the person of a Khoja sovereign of the whole
country, and it was as the representative of such a person that Yakoob
Beg resolved to visit Yarkand. His march was delayed as much as
possible, and it was not without some difficulty that he at last
obtained admittance with his small following into the city. Yakoob Beg
was naturally incensed at this inimical treatment from his
fellow-religionists, and he soon set himself to the task of humbling the
dominant Khojas of Yarkand. During a street riot that was probably
instigated by the wily Khokandian, the leading Khojas were seized, and
their followers expelled from the city. With a force of only a few
hundred men, Yakoob Beg had established himself as master in the largest
city of the country; his success on this occasion was very temporary. As
ill fortune would have it for him, a fresh army of 2,000 men from Kucha
had arrived at Tagharchi, and, there joined by the forces from Yarkand
and the neighbourhood, presented a very formidable appearance. They
marched on the city at once with complete confidence in their superior
numbers, and Yakoob Beg, always in favour of the boldest course, marched
out to meet them. In a skirmish, however, the detachment under Abdulla
was badly cut up owing to the rashness of that officer, and Yakoob Beg
at once recognized the necessity for a prompt retreat. During the
following night he made a forced march and arrived the next day at Yangy
Hissar with no very great loss in men, but without any baggage whatever.
The enterprise to Yarkand then appeared in its true light as a rash
venture.
The Khitay in the fort of Yangy Hissar still held out, and Yakoob Beg
resolved to overcome them before he attempted any fresh enterprise. He
called up reinforcements from Kashgar, and pressed the siege with
renewed vigour, and alter strictly environing it for forty days the
garrison surrendered. Although Yakoob Beg himself seemed desirous of
showing moderation to the prisoners, more than 2,000 Chinese were
massacred. During all these petty events, which had not produced even
the results of past Khoja enterprises, there had been discontent and
division within, as well as opposition from without. At this time a
fresh danger was appearing on the horizon. A Badakshi army was advancing
with hostile intent on Sirikul, and although Yakoob Beg disregarded its
approach while he pressed on the works against the citadel of Yangy
Hissar, when that fort fell it attracted his attention once more. The
Khitay garrison in the Yangyshahr of Kashgar was also a source of danger
to the newly founded dynasty, and, although its inactivity had continued
for a long period, it was uncertain at what moment it might pass off. We
can only account for the extraordinary lethargy of the Chinese commander
by supposing that he was in complete ignorance of what was passing in
the country. At many moments it must seem to an observer of the facts
that the Chinese governor, who had under him 6,000 or 7,000 disciplined
troops, could have crushed all the opposition of such heterogeneous
crowds as those fighting under or against Yakoob Beg were up to this
time. With the destruction of the Yangy Hissar garrison the prospects of
Yakoob Beg greatly improved, and less opportunity was left to the
Chinese governor for assuming the offensive, than when he possessed an
ally in so close a position as Yangy Hissar. Yakoob Beg also resolved to
press the Khitay still more in this their last stronghold, and before he
encountered other opponents to crush the Khitay, as he already had the
Kirghiz. At this point Sadic Beg reappears in Kashgar at the head of a
Kirghiz force to oppose Yakoob Beg, and for a moment it seemed as if he
were to have better fortune on this occasion. But Abdulla, the most
trusted as well as the most courageous of Yakoob Beg's lieutenants,
collected such forces as he could, boldly threw himself in his path,
and, having routed Sadic in a sanguinary engagement, prepared to press
that unfortunate chieftain into flight or ruin. Yakoob Beg, in want of
allies and soldiers however, interfered and suggested an alliance
instead of a war _a outrance_. The thwarted Sadic was only too glad to
get off on such favourable terms, and joined his forces to those of his
late enemy now besieging the Khitay with renewed vigour. This merciful
termination of a difficulty, that might have become serious had it not
been cured in time, was a performance very creditable in a diplomatic
sense to Yakoob Beg. In a small way it may be compared with Frederick
the Great's action at Pirna, where he received the services of 40,000
Saxon troops. But, perhaps, still more remarkable was the manner in
which Yakoob Beg averted the danger from the Badakshi army. The
Badakshi, like their kinsmen the Afghans, may be considered, _caeteris
paribus_, to be superior soldiers, on account of their larger build and
more active habits, to other Asiatics, so that Yakoob Beg with his
half-disciplined followers would have had some difficulty and must have
incurred considerable loss in overcoming these new invaders. He made
overtures to them, and the Badakshi, seeing that he was likely to give
them exciting and profitable employment, entered into negotiations with
him. The result was that they took service under him; and Yakoob Beg for
the first time found himself at the head of a large army, composed of
Khokand, Kashgar, Kirghiz, and Badakshan levies. It was fortunate for
himself that he had been able to arrange his affairs so satisfactorily,
for a fresh danger was approaching from the east.
The reader may have observed that we have said little of Buzurg Khan
during the operations of the campaign up to this point. Indeed, there is
little or nothing to say of the movements of that prince, for he had
been mainly stationary at Kashgar, where he passed his time in his
harem, or besotted under the use of drugs. Yakoob Beg had from the very
commencement come to the front as responsible chief, and as events
progressed the people and the army came to look upon him as their future
ruler. But Yakoob Beg, it would seem, was really in earnest in
supporting the Khoja prince, for on several occasions not only did he
give Buzurg the most salutary advice, but he also compelled him to take
an active part in the public business. Such fits of action were most
distasteful to the effeminate prince, and he always returned with
renewed zest to the illicit pleasures in which he indulged. One of the
occasions on which Yakoob Beg endeavoured to instil into his sovereign
some idea of the responsibilities of his office was this invasion by the
Khoja-Tungani power of Altyshahr. Early in the summer a large force,
estimated at 40,000 men, collected by the cities of Aksu, Kucha, and
Turfan, appeared at Maralbashi, whence it equally threatened Kashgar or
protected Yarkand. Yakoob Beg's utmost efforts, if we are to credit the
native report, only availed to bring some 2,500 men into the field; but
it is more reasonable to suppose, that, with his Kirghiz, Kipchak, and
Badakshi auxiliaries, he had many more troops under him, perhaps 12,500
instead of 2,500 men. Be the exact numbers of the forces what they may,
however, it is certain that he was greatly outnumbered by the invader,
and that the diverse elements of his army detracted very much from its
effective strength. The Tungan army advanced from Maralbashi on Yangy
Hissar, where Yakoob Beg had concentrated his army. He had drawn Buzurg
Khan and such of the court followers as he could from their ignominious
inaction in the capital to encounter the dangers and risks of a field of
battle. Both sides were eager for the encounter, which took place in the
neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar. The tactical disposition made by Yakoob
Beg of his forces was such as would command the approval of skilled
officers, and, having done all that mortal man could do to insure the
result, he commended himself and his cause to Allah. The battle was long
and stoutly contested. During hours it was impossible to say to which
side the balance of victory was inclining; at last the Kirghiz troops,
half-hearted in their fighting, were driven from the field, and the
Badakshi division, which had up to that moment stubbornly held its
ground, immediately followed the shameful example thus set it. There now
only remained the division under the immediate orders of Yakoob Beg to
withstand the onset of a whole army victorious in two different quarters
of the field. The situation, on which the fate of the whole enterprise
depended, might have filled the boldest heart with momentary despair.
Yakoob Beg had, however, so braced himself to the effort, that no more
than ordinary emotion was permitted to betray the disturbed mind within,
and with the exclamation that "Victory is the gift of God," he inspired
his soldiery to continue the fight throughout the afternoon. The enemy,
dismayed at the dauntless courage shown by this mere handful of men, and
having incurred great loss in his effort to crush them, drew off his
weakened forces towards evening; and Yakoob Beg, boldly seizing the
opportunity for assuming the offensive, drove them from the field in
disorder and with considerable loss. In addition to the loss in killed
and wounded, more than 1,000 Tungan soldiers enlisted under the standard
of Yakoob Beg, and that general found himself on the morrow of one of
his greatest battles, with a greater force under his command than he had
just before it commenced. This great triumph gave fresh lustre to the
Khoja family, and redounded to the military renown of Yakoob Beg. Nor
should it be forgotten that on this occasion he showed that he
possessed, besides military genius of some merit, qualities of an
estimable character. For the first time in the annals of these wars the
prisoners were treated with some consideration. For some reason or other
this victory was not followed up, and the defeated Kucha army retired on
Maralbashi, which it continued to hold for some months longer. The
indirect results of this victory were scarcely less important, however,
than the immediate and direct consequences of it.
Buzurg Khan, who had been present at this battle, was among the first to
seek refuge in flight; and when he received intelligence of the final
success his satisfaction was almost eclipsed by his personal chagrin and
mortification. Up to this event he had been content to let Yakoob Beg
act the king so long as he could indulge undisturbed in his
debaucheries; but from this date there became mingled with his wounded
vanity a conviction that Yakoob Beg was becoming so powerful and so
popular that he might prove a dangerous subject. The weak-minded prince
then permitted himself to be made the tool of every rival that the
success of Yakoob Beg had raised up for himself either in the court or
in the camp, and listened to tales brought him of his lieutenant's
plots, when the conspirators most to be feared by himself were the
ambitious chieftains in whose power he was placing his person and his
crown. After the defeat of the Kucha army, the ruling parties in Yarkand
thought it would be wise to come to terms with their victorious and
aggressive neighbour, and accordingly an embassy was despatched to Yangy
Hissar by the Khojas of Yarkand to tender their submission to the
sovereign of Kashgar, and to ask to be favoured by the nomination of a
city governor, who would be agreeable to Buzurg Khan and his vizier,
Yakoob Beg. It is suggestive to watch how the name of the vizier
occupies almost as prominent place in all their addresses as that of his
master. The Tungan governor in the Yarkand Yangyshahr, not to be
behindhand in his worship of the rising sun, immediately sent a similar
expression of obedience to Kashgar.
The course of events once more takes us back to Kashgar, where the
Chinese still held the citadel against all comers. But with each fresh
success of Yakoob Beg over his numerous opponents, and with the spread
of the Tungan power into Jungaria, hope almost completely deserted the
unfortunate Khitay, who, in this solitary fort, alone maintained the
name of Chinese authority. Treason, within the walls, was now to aid the
efforts from without. Kho Dalay, the superior officer in the citadel,
although not the commandant, came to an arrangement with Yakoob Beg, by
which honourable terms were conceded to the garrison; and 3,000 Khitay
troops surrendered and settled in Kashgar. They were required to
acknowledge formally the supremacy of the Khoja, and to make a
profession of Islamism. But they were never really interfered with in
the observance of their own rites among themselves, and had nothing to
complain of in their duty. They were called after their recantation
"Yangy Mussulmans," or "New Mussulmans." These were the last Khitay
troops who surrendered to the new conquerors, and with them every
vestige of Chinese authority disappeared from every part of Jungaria and
Eastern Turkestan. Even among this garrison, reduced by a long siege and
its attendant deprivations to despair, there was a small minority who
preferred death to the dishonour involved in surrender. Chang Tay, the
commandant, refused to be any party to the arrangement made between Kho
Dalay and Yakoob Beg. When the day approached for the entry of the
Kashgarian army, this resolute Amban withdrew to his palace, and having
collected his family and dependents around him blew them all up with the
explosion of a mine that he had constructed underneath. In the confusion
that arose from this incident, the enemy broke into the fort, and it was
not for some hours that Yakoob Beg succeeded in obtaining control over
them once more. During that interval of insubordination many Khitay were
murdered, but not without resistance. Kho Dalay and almost 3,000 men
remained to take service in the conquering army, as already explained.
The new alliance was cemented by the marriage of Yakoob Beg to the
beautiful daughter of Kho Dalay, by whom he has had several children,
too young as yet to take any part in public affairs. Perhaps Yakoob
Beg's moderation to the Khitay is to be explained by this circumstance,
and it is certain that down to the very end his Khitay wife exercised
great influence over her husband.
This was in September, 1865, nine months after his first arrival in
Altyshahr, and in that period he had worked, if not very rapidly, with
considerable thoroughness. The Khitay destroyed, the Kirghiz subdued,
and the Tungan influence checked in its aggression against Western
Kashgar, such was the tale of his achievements. Several battles and
sieges successfully brought to an issue, and a numerous army formed out
of the diverse fragments of conquered and conquerors. Personally, too,
Yakoob Beg had done much towards preparing the public mind for the
assumption of power by himself, and the reigning chief had done still
more by his neglect of duty and abandonment to pleasure. Buzurg Khan
might stand for the typical _roi faineant_, and Yakoob Beg was a more
than ordinarily resolute and determined _maire du palais_.
The citadel of Kashgar had not long surrendered when messengers arrived,
reporting the near approach of a large body of men from Khokand, but who
they were, or with what intention they came, none knew. These were the
unsuccessful conspirators against Khudayar Khan, who, after the death of
Alim Kuli, had obtained his power once more; and these having been
driven out of Khokand by his armies, were compelled to seek refuge in
Kashgar. Yakoob Beg sent them the laconic message, while they were
hovering on the frontier, that "if they came as friends, they were
welcome; if as foes, he was ready to fight them." Until the arrival of
this declaration there appears to have been some hesitation among the
Khokandians what to do, as some were wishing to attempt the conquest of
Kashgar in their own interests; but when so clear a statement was sent
them by Yakoob Beg, and when they learnt more definitely of the
permanence of his success, they threw off their reserve and joined the
confederacy of Kashgar. In the meanwhile fresh disturbances were
breaking out in Yarkand, and thither he proceeded in the later months of
1865 to quell them, taking Buzurg Khan with him. On his arrival before
the town both the Khojas and the Tungani hastened to profess the
greatest desire to fulfil his wishes, although they kept him outside
their gates. It is probable that neither party could have offered any
prolonged resistance to him, had they not been encouraged to do so by
Buzurg Khan. That prince had for some time been fretting against the
iron will of his lieutenant, and, now, in an ill humour at being carried
from his amusements and idleness at Kashgar to suffer the deprivations
of a camp life before Yarkand, broke loose from all control, and plotted
in his own camp, and in the enemy's, to free himself from his
troublesome general. The plot among the Tungan soldiery had assumed
alarming proportions, and all was ready to put an end to the career of
Yakoob, when it was fortunately discovered by his faithful friend
Abdulla. Precautions were taken, and the plot in the camp was
effectually thwarted; but Yakoob Beg was not strong enough then to show
his resentment. This danger was only removed to give place to another.
The Tungani soldiers in Yakoob's service now opened up communications
with their kinsmen in the Yangy-Shahr, and they formed the following
plan to destroy the remaining portion of the Kashgarian forces. The
garrison was to simulate a desire to yield into the hands of Yakoob Beg
both their own persons and the fort, and when he, unsuspecting any
covert design, should be lulled into a false sense of security, the
Tungani in his service could join the Tungani in the fort in making a
night attack on the other forces. The plan promised well. Yakoob Beg was
deceived by the friendly overtures of the Tungani, and relaxed his
precautions, and, during the night that was to precede the surrender of
the Tungani, the conspirators marched out of the fort, and being joined,
as had been arranged, by the other confederates, surprised Yakoob Beg
and his immediate followers. A desperate resistance was offered by the
half-armed men, but the Tungani were victorious, and Yakoob Beg had much
difficulty in collecting around him on the morrow a few hundred
soldiers. Among those, however, was Abdulla and some of his more trusted
companions. The Kirghiz under Sadic Beg could not be trusted, and it
seemed that that chief was still inclined to play for his own hand. At
this, the most critical period of his life, Yakoob Beg's tact and
resolution were most conspicuous. When he was surrounded on every hand
by hostile factions, and could count on the fidelity of scarce five
hundred men, he triumphed over every obstacle, and rose omnipotent over
the petty jealousies and dissensions of those who sought to crush him.
Buzurg Khan seized the moment of this disaster to draw off into a
separate camp with a large body of troops and all the Kirghiz, and it is
very possible, as has been asserted, that he instigated the successful
Tungan _coup_. There is no evidence that he did, and I am personally of
opinion that it originated among the Tungani themselves, and that Buzurg
Khan only rejoiced at its occurrence, as he would have done at any other
reverse to Yakoob. The position now was as follows:--In the citadel were
the victorious Tungani, and in the town they shared the distribution of
power with the townspeople. Outside in one part was Buzurg Khan, with a
force that was equivocal in its sympathies, and that might at any moment
become hostile, to Yakoob Beg; and in another part was Yakoob Beg
himself and his attenuated following. Affairs could not look less
hopeful, and if the three parties could have accommodated their own
differences for but the short space of twenty-four hours, Yakoob Beg
must infallibly have been destroyed: as it was, they did nothing with an
enemy like Yakoob Beg in their proximity, and permitted him to redeem
all he had lost by his too great credulity in the good faith of his
brother Mussulmans. Let us now see how he saved himself. The first point
to do was to restore the courage and self-confidence of his own
soldiers, and to do that, it was necessary to strike a sharp blow that
was sure of success. The fort could not be taken by a _coup de main_,
but the city, large and straggling, presented a more inviting aspect for
such an attempt. Abdulla, the Murat of the army of Kashgar, with the
most determined intrepidity, carried it by assault, although here again
he attacked without awaiting the arrival of the other contingents. Like
Edward Bruce,
"Such was his wonted reckless mood,
Yet desperate valour oft made good,
Even by its daring, venture rude,
Where prudence might have failed."
This achievement put an end to the rejoicings among the Tungani, and
compelled them to recognize what a terribly energetic and enterprising
foe they had to deal with. But, at this moment, a severe mishap occurred
which almost neutralized the advantage thus gained. Buzurg Khan, unable
either to crush Yakoob Beg or to enjoy the indulgences to which he had
enslaved himself, resolved to secure the latter, happen what might. He
accordingly fled from Yarkand with many followers, and retired to his
palace at Kashgar. There, not content with pillaging the palace of
Yakoob Beg, he proclaimed him a traitor and rebel, and offered a reward
to whomsoever should bring him his head. Another general was appointed
to the command of the army, and preparations were made for defending
Kashgar against any attempt of Yakoob Beg to attack it. But fortunately
the Tungani in the citadel of Yarkand were not aware of this dissension
among the Kashgari, and as they were struck with admiration for the
valour of Yakoob Beg, they surrendered to him soon after the flight of
Buzurg. He was then able to turn his undivided attention to his
refractory chief. Yakoob Beg had always, as we have said, befriended the
church; he was now to experience some benefit for that very commendable
respect. Among the first means of crushing Yakoob Beg that Buzurg Khan
had employed was an appeal to the Sheikh-ul-islam of Kashgar to proclaim
his Baturbashi outside the pale of the law. This the ecclesiastic
refused to do, and asserted, on the contrary, that Yakoob Beg had
deserved well both of his country and of the Mahomedan world. Foiled in
his effort to stir up a religious feeling against his general, Buzurg
Khan was reduced to the more cogent, but in his hands quite useless,
argument of the sword. Nor was the field, limited as it must appear to
us, free from other pretenders. Sadic Beg, instead of coalescing with
Buzurg Khan, set up his own pretensions to rule the country; and the
Kucha Khojas and Tungani began to collect troops in view of possible
eventualities.
The army of Buzurg Khan, which had marched out to oppose the entry of
Yakoob Beg, was outflanked and defeated by Abdulla in the country
between Yangy Hissar and the capital; and Yakoob Beg, pressing on with
irresistible strides, was received in Kashgar with the acclamations of
the people and of his soldiers. He was then publicly proclaimed ruler,
and his friend the Sheikh-ul-islam ratified the people's choice. Buzurg
Khan, who had taken refuge in the Yangy-Shahr, was seized in his palace
there, after a very slight resistance. Some of the more prominent of
Yakoob Beg's rivals were executed, and Buzurg Khan himself was placed in
a state of honourable confinement. He still persisted in futile
intrigues, and so long as he remained in Kashgar was a source of endless
trouble to the new government. For more than eighteen months he was
permitted to remain however, and then, being detected in instigating the
murder of Yakoob Beg, was banished to Tibet. After wandering for some
years, he found his way to Khokand, where he is believed to be still
residing with a large family. He may be considered to have been the last
Khoja prince ruling Kashgar, for it is scarcely probable that, in any
future settlement of that country, a restoration of the old reigning
family will be supported by any one. He is no exaggerated type of the
rule among Central Asian despots, who present to our gaze a long series
of petty tyrants and debauchees, until for a few years they are
displaced by a successful soldier such as the Athalik Ghazi, or by a
skilful minister such as Mussulman Kuli was in Khokand.
The Kirghiz chief, Sadic Beg, did not long hold out against the
consolidated power of Yakoob Beg; and the Kucha movements were
suspended. In a little more than twelve months Yakoob Beg had occupied
Kashgar, Yangy Hissar, and Yarkand. Sirikul and Khoten also acknowledged
his rule; but his further operations against them will be narrated
by-and-by. He felt now so secure in his seat that he permitted the
Badakshi contingent to return home, presenting each soldier with a large
present. Ever since that time Yakoob Beg seems to have maintained some
influence in Badakshan, and to have been inclined on several occasions
to compete with Shere Ali of Afghanistan for the possession of that
province. His ambition was never fully revealed in this quarter; but it
is certain that Shere Ali regarded him with scarcely concealed suspicion
and dislike.
With the assumption of personal power by Yakoob Beg, on the deposition
of the Khoja Buzurg Khan, the first part of the enterprise undertaken in
the later days of 1864 was brought to a termination. In the more
extended operations of Yakoob Beg against the Tungani and Khoten, may be
perceived the effects of events outside his immediate sphere upon, this
energetic ruler, who, until his last years, never realized the strength
of the Russians, and who had, up to the year 1870 when Kuldja was
occupied, convinced himself that he could retard the progress of the
great Northern power. It was that idea, besides a thirst for military
renown and excitement, that urged him on to the construction of what he
fondly believed might prove a formidable and extensive state. As ruler
of Kashgar, he could not be anything but a kind of vassal of the Khan of
Khokand; as monarch of Eastern Turkestan, he might treat on terms of
equality with the Czar of Russia or the Emperor of China. It was no
unworthy ambition, and Yakoob Beg, created Athalik Ghazi, Champion
Father, in 1866 by the Ameer of Bokhara, accomplished so much of it as
was possible.