In the meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail from

Cenchreae with four ships, as he had intended, and arrived at Chios. On

the third day after his arrival, the Athenian ships, twenty-five in

number, sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon and Leon, who had lately

arrived with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. Late in the same

day Astyochus put to sea, and taking one Chian vessel with him sailed

to Lesbos to render what assistance he could. Arrived at Pyrrha, and

from thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned that Mitylene had

been taken, almost without a blow, by the Athenians, who had sailed up

and unexpectedly put into the harbour, had beaten the Chian ships, and

landing and defeating the troops opposed to them had become masters of

the city. Informed of this by the Eresians and the Chian ships, which

had been left with Eubulus at Methymna, and had fled upon the capture

of Mitylene, and three of which he now fell in with, one having been

taken by the Athenians, Astyochus did not go on to Mitylene, but raised

and armed Eresus, and, sending the heavy infantry from his own ships by

land under Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna, himself proceeded

alongshore thither with the ships which he had with him and with the

three Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians upon seeing them would

be encouraged to persevere in their revolt. As, however, everything

went against him in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back to

Chios; the land forces on board, which were to have gone to the

Hellespont, being also conveyed back to their different cities. After

this six of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae joined the

forces at Chios. The Athenians, after restoring matters to their old

state in Lesbos, set sail from thence and took Polichna, the place that

the Clazomenians were fortifying on the continent, and carried the

inhabitants back to their town upon the island, except the authors of

the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae became once

more Athenian.

The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade, blockading

Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, and

killed Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come with a few

men against them, and the third day after sailed over and set up a

trophy, which, as they were not masters of the country, was however

pulled down by the Milesians. Meanwhile Leon and Diomedon with the

Athenian fleet from Lesbos issuing from the Oenussae, the isles off

Chios, and from their forts of Sidussa and Pteleum in the Erythraeid,

and from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from the ships,

having on board heavy infantry from the rolls pressed to serve as

marines. Landing in Cardamyle and in Bolissus they defeated with heavy

loss the Chians that took the field against them and, laying desolate

the places in that neighbourhood, defeated the Chians again in another

battle at Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians

ceased to meet them in the field, while the Athenians devastated the

country, which was beautifully stocked and had remained uninjured ever

since the Median wars. Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are

the only people that I have known who knew how to be wise in

prosperity, and who ordered their city the more securely the greater it

grew. Nor was this revolt, in which they might seem to have erred on

the side of rashness, ventured upon until they had numerous and gallant

allies to share the danger with them, and until they perceived the

Athenians after the Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying the

thoroughly desperate state of their affairs. And if they were thrown

out by one of the surprises which upset human calculations, they found

out their mistake in company with many others who believed, like them,

in the speedy collapse of the Athenian power. While they were thus

blockaded from the sea and plundered by land, some of the citizens

undertook to bring the city over to the Athenians. Apprised of this the

authorities took no action themselves, but brought Astyochus, the

admiral, from Erythrae, with four ships that he had with him, and

considered how they could most quietly, either by taking hostages or by

some other means, put an end to the conspiracy.

While the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand Athenian heavy infantry

and fifteen hundred Argives (five hundred of whom were light troops

furnished with armour by the Athenians), and one thousand of the

allies, towards the close of the same summer sailed from Athens in

forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command of

Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and putting into Samos crossed

over and encamped at Miletus. Upon this the Milesians came out to the

number of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the Peloponnesians who had

come with Chalcideus, and some foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes,

Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry, and engaged the Athenians and

their allies. While the Argives rushed forward on their own wing with

the careless disdain of men advancing against Ionians who would never

stand their charge, and were defeated by the Milesians with a loss

little short of three hundred men, the Athenians first defeated the

Peloponnesians, and driving before them the barbarians and the ruck of

the army, without engaging the Milesians, who after the rout of the

Argives retreated into the town upon seeing their comrades worsted,

crowned their victory by grounding their arms under the very walls of

Miletus. Thus, in this battle, the Ionians on both sides overcame the

Dorians, the Athenians defeating the Peloponnesians opposed to them,

and the Milesians the Argives. After setting up a trophy, the Athenians

prepared to draw a wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus;

thinking that, if they could gain Miletus, the other towns also would

easily come over to them.

Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five ships

from Peloponnese and Sicily might be instantly expected. Of these the

Siceliots, urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates to join in

giving the finishing blow to the power of Athens, furnished

twenty-two—twenty from Syracuse, and two from Silenus; and the ships

that we left preparing in Peloponnese being now ready, both squadrons

had been entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian, to take to

Astyochus, the admiral. They now put in first at Leros the island off

Miletus, and from thence, discovering that the Athenians were before

the town, sailed into the Iasic Gulf, in order to learn how matters

stood at Miletus. Meanwhile Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa

in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which they had put

in for the night, and told them of the battle in which he had fought in

person by the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes, and advised them,

if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and their cause, to fly to the

relief of Miletus and hinder its investment.

Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning. Meanwhile

Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, had received precise intelligence

of the fleet from Leros, and when his colleagues expressed a wish to

keep the sea and fight it out, flatly refused either to stay himself or

to let them or any one else do so if he could help it. Where they could

hereafter contend, after full and undisturbed preparation, with an

exact knowledge of the number of the enemy’s fleet and of the force

which they could oppose to him, he would never allow the reproach of

disgrace to drive him into a risk that was unreasonable. It was no

disgrace for an Athenian fleet to retreat when it suited them: put it

as they would, it would be more disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose

the city not only to disgrace, but to the most serious danger. After

its late misfortunes it could hardly be justified in voluntarily taking

the offensive even with the strongest force, except in a case of

absolute necessity: much less then without compulsion could it rush

upon peril of its own seeking. He told them to take up their wounded as

quickly as they could and the troops and stores which they had brought

with them, and leaving behind what they had taken from the enemy’s

country, in order to lighten the ships, to sail off to Samos, and there

concentrating all their ships to attack as opportunity served. As he

spoke so he acted; and thus not now more than afterwards, nor in this

alone but in all that he had to do with, did Phrynichus show himself a

man of sense. In this way that very evening the Athenians broke up from

before Miletus, leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives,

mortified at their disaster, promptly sailed off home from Samos.

As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from Teichiussa

and put into Miletus after the departure of the Athenians; they stayed

one day, and on the next took with them the Chian vessels originally

chased into port with Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the

tackle which they had put on shore at Teichiussa. Upon their arrival

Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces and induced them to sail

to Iasus, which was held by his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they

suddenly attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants never imagined that

the ships could be other than Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished

themselves most in the action. Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes and a

rebel from the King, was taken alive and handed over to Tissaphernes,

to carry to the King, if he chose, according to his orders: Iasus was

sacked by the army, who found a very great booty there, the place being

wealthy from ancient date. The mercenaries serving with Amorges the

Peloponnesians received and enrolled in their army without doing them

any harm, since most of them came from Peloponnese, and handed over the

town to Tissaphernes with all the captives, bond or free, at the

stipulated price of one Doric stater a head; after which they returned

to Miletus. Pedaritus, son of Leon, who had been sent by the

Lacedaemonians to take the command at Chios, they dispatched by land as

far as Erythrae with the mercenaries taken from Amorges; appointing

Philip to remain as governor of Miletus.

Summer was now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes put Iasus in a

state of defence, and passing on to Miletus distributed a month’s pay

to all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate of an

Attic drachma a day for each man. In future, however, he was resolved

not to give more than three obols, until he had consulted the King;

when if the King should so order he would give, he said, the full

drachma. However, upon the protest of the Syracusan general Hermocrates

(for as Therimenes was not admiral, but only accompanied them in order

to hand over the ships to Astyochus, he made little difficulty about

the pay), it was agreed that the amount of five ships’ pay should be

given over and above the three obols a day for each man; Tissaphernes

paying thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships, and to the rest,

for as many ships as they had beyond that number, at the same rate.

The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having been joined by

thirty-five more vessels from home under Charminus, Strombichides, and

Euctemon, called in their squadron at Chios and all the rest, intending

to blockade Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and an army

against Chios; drawing lots for the respective services. This intention

they carried into effect; Strombichides, Onamacles, and Euctemon

sailing against Chios, which fell to their lot, with thirty ships and a

part of the thousand heavy infantry, who had been to Miletus, in

transports; while the rest remained masters of the sea with

seventy-four ships at Samos, and advanced upon Miletus.

Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collecting the hostages

required in consequence of the conspiracy, stopped upon learning that

the fleet with Therimenes had arrived, and that the affairs of the

league were in a more flourishing condition, and putting out to sea

with ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian vessels, after a futile attack

upon Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomenae, and ordered the Athenian party

to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join the Peloponnesians, an order

in which also joined Tamos the king’s lieutenant in Ionia. This order

being disregarded, Astyochus made an attack upon the town, which was

unwalled, and having failed to take it was himself carried off by a

strong gale to Phocaea and Cuma, while the rest of the ships put in at

the islands adjacent to Clazomenae—Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Here

they were detained eight days by the winds, and, plundering and

consuming all the property of the Clazomenians there deposited, put the

rest on shipboard and sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma to join Astyochus.

While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who wished to

revolt again. With Astyochus they were successful; but the Corinthians

and the other allies being averse to it by reason of their former

failure, he weighed anchor and set sail for Chios, where they

eventually arrived from different quarters, the fleet having been

scattered by a storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left marching along

the coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and thence crossed over

with his army to Chios, where he found also about five hundred soldiers

who had been left there by Chalcideus from the five ships with their

arms. Meanwhile some Lesbians making offers to revolt, Astyochus urged

upon Pedaritus and the Chians that they ought to go with their ships

and effect the revolt of Lesbos, and so increase the number of their

allies, or, if not successful, at all events harm the Athenians. The

Chians, however, turned a deaf ear to this, and Pedaritus flatly

refused to give up to him the Chian vessels.

Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one Megarian vessel, with

another from Hermione, and the ships which had come with him from

Laconia, and set sail for Miletus to assume his command as admiral;

after telling the Chians with many threats that he would certainly not

come and help them if they should be in need. At Corycus in the

Erythraeid he brought to for the night; the Athenian armament sailing

from Samos against Chios being only separated from him by a hill, upon

the other side of which it brought to; so that neither perceived the

other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus to say that

some liberated Erythraean prisoners had come from Samos to betray

Erythrae, Astyochus at once put back to Erythrae, and so just escaped

falling in with the Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to join him;

and after inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding that the whole

story had been made up to procure the escape of the men from Samos,

they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios

and Astyochus to Miletus as he had intended.

Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell in with

three Chian men-of-war off Arginus, and gave immediate chase. A great

storm coming on, the Chians with difficulty took refuge in the harbour;

the three Athenian vessels most forward in the pursuit being wrecked

and thrown up near the city of Chios, and the crews slain or taken

prisoners. The rest of the Athenian fleet took refuge in the harbour

called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas, and from thence afterwards put

into Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification.

The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates sailed out from

Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son of

Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan vessel,

and arrived at Cnidus, which had already revolted at the instigation of

Tissaphernes. When their arrival was known at Miletus, orders came to

them to leave half their squadron to guard Cnidus, and with the rest to

cruise round Triopium and seize all the merchantmen arriving from

Egypt. Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus and sacred to Apollo. This

coming to the knowledge of the Athenians, they sailed from Samos and

captured the six ships on the watch at Triopium, the crews escaping out

of them. After this the Athenians sailed into Cnidus and made an

assault upon the town, which was unfortified, and all but took it; and

the next day assaulted it again, but with less effect, as the

inhabitants had improved their defences during the night, and had been

reinforced by the crews escaped from the ships at Triopium. The

Athenians now withdrew, and after plundering the Cnidian territory

sailed back to Samos.

About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at Miletus. The

Peloponnesian camp was still plentifully supplied, being in receipt of

sufficient pay, and the soldiers having still in hand the large booty

taken at Iasus. The Milesians also showed great ardour for the war.

Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought the first convention with

Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and more advantageous to

him than to them, and consequently while Therimenes was still there

concluded another, which was as follows:

The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King Darius

and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes for a treaty and

friendship, as follows:

1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians

shall make war against or otherwise injure any country or cities that

belong to King Darius or did belong to his father or to his ancestors;

neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians

exact tribute from such cities. Neither shall King Darius nor any of

the subjects of the King make war against or otherwise injure the

Lacedaemonians or their allies.

2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies should require any assistance

from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies,

whatever they both agree upon they shall be right in doing.

3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the Athenians and their

allies: and if they make peace, both shall do so jointly.

4. The expense of all troops in the King’s country, sent for by the

King, shall be borne by the King.

5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with the King

attack the King’s country, the rest shall stop them and aid the King to

the best of their power. And if any in the King’s country or in the

countries under the King’s rule attack the country of the

Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall stop it and help them to

the best of his power.

After this convention Therimenes handed over the fleet to Astyochus,

sailed off in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian armament had now

crossed over from Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and land

began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally strong on the land side,

provided with more than one harbour, and also not far from the city of

Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained inactive. Already defeated in so

many battles, they were now also at discord among themselves; the

execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by Pedaritus upon the

charge of Atticism, followed by the forcible imposition of an oligarchy

upon the rest of the city, having made them suspicious of one another;

and they therefore thought neither themselves not the mercenaries under

Pedaritus a match for the enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus to beg

Astyochus to assist them, which he refused to do, and was accordingly

denounced at Lacedaemon by Pedaritus as a traitor. Such was the state

of the Athenian affairs at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept

sailing out against the enemy in Miletus, until they found that he

would not accept their challenge, and then retired again to Samos and

remained quiet.

In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by the

Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus through the agency of the Megarian

Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene Timagoras, put out from Peloponnese and

sailed for Ionia about the time of the solstice, under the command of

Antisthenes, a Spartan. With them the Lacedaemonians also sent eleven

Spartans as advisers to Astyochus; Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, being

among the number. Arrived at Miletus, their orders were to aid in

generally superintending the good conduct of the war; to send off the

above ships or a greater or less number to the Hellespont to

Pharnabazus, if they thought proper, appointing Clearchus, son of

Ramphias, who sailed with them, to the command; and further, if they

thought proper, to make Antisthenes admiral, dismissing Astyochus, whom

the letters of Pedaritus had caused to be regarded with suspicion.

Sailing accordingly from Malea across the open sea, the squadron

touched at Melos and there fell in with ten Athenian ships, three of

which they took empty and burned. After this, being afraid that the

Athenian vessels escaped from Melos might, as they in fact did, give

information of their approach to the Athenians at Samos, they sailed to

Crete, and having lengthened their voyage by way of precaution made

land at Caunus in Asia, from whence considering themselves in safety

they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy along the

coast.

Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness of

Astyochus, went on sending messengers pressing him to come with all the

fleet to assist them against their besiegers, and not to leave the

greatest of the allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and overrun

and pillaged by land. There were more slaves at Chios than in any one

other city except Lacedaemon, and being also by reason of their numbers

punished more rigorously when they offended, most of them, when they

saw the Athenian armament firmly established in the island with a

fortified position, immediately deserted to the enemy, and through

their knowledge of the country did the greatest mischief. The Chians

therefore urged upon Astyochus that it was his duty to assist them,

while there was still a hope and a possibility of stopping the enemy’s

progress, while Delphinium was still in process of fortification and

unfinished, and before the completion of a higher rampart which was

being added to protect the camp and fleet of their besiegers. Astyochus

now saw that the allies also wished it and prepared to go, in spite of

his intention to the contrary owing to the threat already referred to.

In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival of the

twenty-seven ships with the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and Astyochus,

postponing everything to the duty of convoying a fleet of that

importance, in order to be more able to command the sea, and to the

safe conduct of the Lacedaemonians sent as spies over his behaviour, at

once gave up going to Chios and set sail for Caunus. As he coasted

along he landed at the Meropid Cos and sacked the city, which was

unfortified and had been lately laid in ruins by an earthquake, by far

the greatest in living memory, and, as the inhabitants had fled to the

mountains, overran the country and made booty of all it contained,

letting go, however, the free men. From Cos arriving in the night at

Cnidus he was constrained by the representations of the Cnidians not to

disembark the sailors, but to sail as he was straight against the

twenty Athenian vessels, which with Charminus, one of the commanders at

Samos, were on the watch for the very twenty-seven ships from

Peloponnese which Astyochus was himself sailing to join; the Athenians

in Samos having heard from Melos of their approach, and Charminus being

on the look-out off Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia, as he now heard

that they were at Caunus.

Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme, before he was heard of,

in the hope of catching the enemy somewhere out at sea. Rain, however,

and foggy weather encountered him, and caused his ships to straggle and

get into disorder in the dark. In the morning his fleet had parted

company and was most of it still straggling round the island, and the

left wing only in sight of Charminus and the Athenians, who took it for

the squadron which they were watching for from Caunus, and hastily put

out against it with part only of their twenty vessels, and attacking

immediately sank three ships and disabled others, and had the advantage

in the action until the main body of the fleet unexpectedly hove in

sight, when they were surrounded on every side. Upon this they took to

flight, and after losing six ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa

or Beet Island, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the

Peloponnesians put into Cnidus and, being joined by the twenty-seven

ships from Caunus, sailed all together and set up a trophy in Syme, and

then returned to anchor at Cnidus.

As soon as the Athenians knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all

the ships at Samos to Syme, and, without attacking or being attacked by

the fleet at Cnidus, took the ships’ tackle left at Syme, and touching

at Lorymi on the mainland sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the

Peloponnesian ships, being now all at Cnidus, underwent such repairs as

were needed; while the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred

with Tissaphernes, who had come to meet them, upon the points which did

not satisfy them in the past transactions, and upon the best and

mutually most advantageous manner of conducting the war in future. The

severest critic of the present proceedings was Lichas, who said that

neither of the treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor

that of Therimenes; it being monstrous that the King should at this

date pretend to the possession of all the country formerly ruled by

himself or by his ancestors—a pretension which implicitly put back

under the yoke all the islands—Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far

as Boeotia—and made the Lacedaemonians give to the Hellenes instead of

liberty a Median master. He therefore invited Tissaphernes to conclude

another and a better treaty, as they certainly would not recognize

those existing and did not want any of his pay upon such conditions.

This offended Tissaphernes so much that he went away in a rage without

settling anything.

CHAPTER XXV

Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War—Intrigues of

Alcibiades—Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies—Oligarchical Coup d’Etat

at Athens—Patriotism of the Army at Samos

The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the

invitation of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an island

powerful by the number of its seamen and by its land forces, and also

thinking that they would be able to maintain their fleet from their own

confederacy, without having to ask for money from Tissaphernes. They

accordingly at once set sail that same winter from Cnidus, and first

put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the Rhodian country, to the

great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants, who were not privy to the

intrigue, and who consequently fled, especially as the town was

unfortified. They were afterwards, however, assembled by the

Lacedaemonians together with the inhabitants of the two other towns of

Lindus and Ialysus; and the Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the

Athenians and the island went over to the Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the

Athenians had received the alarm and set sail with the fleet from Samos

to forestall them, and came within sight of the island, but being a

little too late sailed off for the moment to Chalce, and from thence to

Samos, and subsequently waged war against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce,

Cos, and Samos.

The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents from

the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and for eighty

days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier, before they

removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place. After the death

of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades began to be

suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received from Lacedaemon

an order from them to put him to death, he being the personal enemy of

Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of confidence. Alcibiades

in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and immediately began to

do all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth

becoming his adviser in everything, he cut down the pay from an Attic

drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; and

told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians,

whose maritime experience was of an older date than their own, only

gave their men three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent

their seamen being corrupted by being too well off, and injuring their

condition by spending money upon enervating indulgences, and also paid

their crews irregularly in order to have a security against their

deserting in the arrears which they would leave behind them. He also

told Tissaphernes to bribe the captains and generals of the cities, and

so to obtain their connivance—an expedient which succeeded with all

except the Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the

whole confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades

sent off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it

was great impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not

content with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to

risk not only their lives but their money as well in behalf of their

freedom; while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to

Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse to

contribute as much or even more now for their own selves. He also

pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at his

own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he

received remittances from the king he would give them their pay in full

and do what was reasonable for the cities.

Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry

to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the

Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more

Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same hands;

but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of one

element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to call

in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were united in one

hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow the

dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go

through with the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest

plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of

the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he would find the

Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as they did not aim at

conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon principles and with a

practice most advantageous to the King; being prepared to combine to

conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King all the Hellenes

inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had

come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the Lacedaemonians would

free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them

also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown by him in the

meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them both out at

first, and, after docking the Athenian power as much as he could,

forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the main

Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be

conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to

Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the

Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea, but

ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would

arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds in

their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had

been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war that

was too plain to be mistaken.

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he

then was, not merely because he thought it really the best, but because

he was studying means to effect his restoration to his country, well

knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day hope to persuade

the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his best chance of

persuading them lay in letting them see that he possessed the favour of

Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be right. When the Athenians at

Samos found that he had influence with Tissaphernes, principally of

their own motion (though partly also through Alcibiades himself sending

word to their chief men to tell the best men in the army that, if there

were only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally democracy that had

banished him, he would be glad to return to his country and to make

Tissaphernes their friend), the captains and chief men in the armament

at once embraced the idea of subverting the democracy.

The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from thence

reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and had an

interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first

Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they would give

up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust them. The

higher class, who also suffered most severely from the war, now

conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands,

and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to Samos the

emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly told the mass

of the armament that the King would be their friend, and would provide

them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the democracy

abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these intrigues,

were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect of the pay

from the King; and the oligarchical conspirators, after making this

communication to the people, now re-examined the proposals of

Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates. Unlike the

rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who

was still general, by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades,

he rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy than for a

democracy, and only sought to change the institutions of his country in

order to get himself recalled by his associates; while for themselves

their one object should be to avoid civil discord. It was not the

King’s interest, when the Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea,

and in possession of some of the chief cities in his empire, to go out

of his way to side with the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he

might make friends of the Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And

as for the allied states to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the

democracy was to be put down at Athens, he well knew that this would

not make the rebels come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in

their allegiance; as the allies would never prefer servitude with an

oligarchy or democracy to freedom with the constitution which they

actually enjoyed, to whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities

thought that the so-called better classes would prove just as

oppressive as the commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and

for the most part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to

the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the

confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence;

while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men.

This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and

that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the

intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his

approval.

However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their original

determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to send

Pisander and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the

restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the

city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.

Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore

Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing

after what he had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored, would

revenge himself upon him for his opposition, had recourse to the

following expedient. He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian

admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to

tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes

the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation of

the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he sought to harm

his enemy even at the expense of the interests of his country. However,

Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing Alcibiades, who, besides,

no longer ventured within his reach as formerly, went up to him and

Tissaphernes at Magnesia, communicated to them the letter from Samos,

and turned informer, and, if report may be trusted, became the paid

creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to inform him as to this and all

other matters; which was also the reason why he did not remonstrate

more strongly against the pay not being given in full. Upon this

Alcibiades instantly sent to the authorities at Samos a letter against

Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be

put to death. Phrynichus distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by

the denunciation, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having

so ill kept the secret of his previous letter, and saying that he was

now prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole

Athenian armament at Samos; giving a detailed account of the means

which he should employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that,

being in danger of his life on their account, he could not now be

blamed for doing this or anything else to escape being destroyed by his

mortal enemies. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades.

Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him

false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving

from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the army that

the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all

stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that he could

be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify Samos as

quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It will be

remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to carry out

these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work of

fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it would

otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from

Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the

enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it

being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy’s designs, and had

tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their

accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting him he

rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.

After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become

the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the

Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians,

was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his

quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of

Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians

were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original argument

of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the

Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that it

was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master of

all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his fathers.

While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an

earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian

envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at

Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of

their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were

recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have the

King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. A

number of speakers opposed them on the question of the democracy, the

enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a restoration to

be effected by a violation of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae and

Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his

banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall; when

Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and

taking each of his opponents aside asked him the following question: In

the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their

own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the

King and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians

had none left, had he any hope of saving the state, unless someone

could induce the King to come over to their side? Upon their replying

that they had not, he then plainly said to them: “This we cannot have

unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices

into fewer hands, and so gain the King’s confidence, and forthwith

restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this

about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for

the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change

afterwards whatever we do not like.”

The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an

oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was

the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised

themselves some day to change the government again, and gave way. They

accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten others and make

the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.

At the same time the people, upon a false accusation of Pisander,

dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his colleague

Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the command of

the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and

Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit for

the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander also went the round

of all the clubs already existing in the city for help in lawsuits and

elections, and urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts

for the overthrow of the democracy; and after taking all other measures

required by the circumstances, so that no time might be lost, set off

with his ten companions on his voyage to Tissaphernes.

In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined the

fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they

found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the coast

and defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against them,

withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base of operations instead

of Cos, as they could better observe from thence if the Peloponnesian

fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to Rhodes

from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that the fortification of the

Athenians was now finished, and that, unless the whole Peloponnesian

fleet came to the rescue, the cause in Chios must be lost. Upon this

they resolved to go to his relief. In the meantime Pedaritus, with the

mercenaries that he had with him and the whole force of the Chians,

made an assault upon the work round the Athenian ships and took a

portion of it, and got possession of some vessels that were hauled up

on shore, when the Athenians sallied out to the rescue, and first

routing the Chians, next defeated the remainder of the force round

Pedaritus, who was himself killed, with many of the Chians, a great

number of arms being also taken.

After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before by

land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile the

Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and

conferred with him about the proposed agreement. However, Alcibiades,

not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who feared the

Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and besides wished to wear out

both parties, as Alcibiades himself had recommended), had recourse to

the following stratagem to make the treaty between the Athenians and

Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of the magnitude of his demands. In my

opinion Tissaphernes desired this result, fear being his motive; while

Alcibiades, who now saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat

on any terms, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to

persuade Tissaphernes, but that after the latter had been persuaded and

was willing to join them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the

demands of Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were

so extravagant that the Athenians, although for a long while they

agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure: he

required the cession of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands

adjacent, besides other concessions, and these passed without

opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now feared

a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow the King

to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many

as he pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further, and

concluding that there was nothing to be done, but that they had been

deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and proceeded to Samos.

Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded

along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet back

to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh convention upon

such terms as he could get, in order not to bring matters to an

absolute breach between them. He was afraid that if many of their ships

were left without pay they would be compelled to engage and be

defeated, or that their vessels being left without hands the Athenians

would attain their objects without his assistance. Still more he feared

that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in search of

supplies. Having calculated and considered all this, agreeably to his

plan of keeping the two sides equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians

and gave them pay, and concluded with them a third treaty in words

following:

In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was

ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of the

Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes,

Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the

King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King’s, and the King

shall treat his own country as he pleases.

2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or injure the

King’s country: neither shall the King invade or injure that of the

Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the Lacedaemonians or of

their allies invade or injure the King’s country, the Lacedaemonians

and their allies shall prevent it: and if any from the King’s country

invade or injure the country of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies,

the King shall prevent it.

3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according

to the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s vessels: but after

the arrival of the King’s vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies

may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however, they choose to

receive the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it: and

the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at the end of the

war such moneys as they shall have received.

4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and

of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war jointly,

according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall

think best. If they wish to make peace with the Athenians, they shall

make peace also jointly.

This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the

Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his other

promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he was so

preparing.

Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took

Oropus by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their

accomplices in this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians

themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was

exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was necessarily a

source of great annoyance to Eretria and the rest of Euboea. Oropus

being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to Rhodes to invite the

Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter, however, were rather bent on

the relief of the distressed Chians, and accordingly put out to sea and

sailed with all their ships from Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the

Athenian fleet out at sea sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking

the other, arrived, the latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus,

seeing that it was no longer possible to relieve Chios without a

battle. And this winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of

this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan,

was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the

revolt of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while

Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at

sea by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at Rhodes

they had received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of

Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes, and

twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were

Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one Milesian, and one Leon’s

own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in mass and took up a strong

position, while thirty-six of their ships put out and engaged

thirty-two of the Athenians; and after a tough fight, in which the

Chians and their allies had rather the best of it, as it was now late,

retired to their city.

Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and

Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus

two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides hastily sailed

from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some transports carrying

heavy infantry being of the number, and defeating the Lampsacenes who

came out against him, took Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the

first assault, and making prize of the slaves and goods restored the

freemen to their homes, and went on to Abydos. The inhabitants,

however, refusing to capitulate, and his assaults failing to take the

place, he sailed over to the coast opposite, and appointed Sestos, the

town in the Chersonese held by the Medes at a former period in this

history, as the centre for the defence of the whole Hellespont.

In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and the

Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the sea-fight and

of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides, took fresh

courage. Coasting along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus took the

ships from that place, and now moved with the whole fleet upon Samos,

from whence, however, he sailed back to Miletus, as the Athenians did

not put out against him, owing to their suspicions of one another. For

it was about this time, or even before, that the democracy was put down

at Athens. When Pisander and the envoys returned from Tissaphernes to

Samos they at once strengthened still further their interest in the

army itself, and instigated the upper class in Samos to join them in

establishing an oligarchy, the very form of government which a party of

them had lately risen to avoid. At the same time the Athenians at

Samos, after a consultation among themselves, determined to let

Alcibiades alone, since he refused to join them, and besides was not

the man for an oligarchy; and now that they were once embarked, to see

for themselves how they could best prevent the ruin of their cause, and

meanwhile to sustain the war, and to contribute without stint money and

all else that might be required from their own private estates, as they

would henceforth labour for themselves alone.

After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at once

sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at

Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all

the subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the other

half in different directions to the other dependencies. Diitrephes

also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been elected to

the command of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his government, and

arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy there. Two months, however,

had not elapsed after his departure before the Thasians began to

fortify their town, being already tired of an aristocracy with Athens,

and in daily expectation of freedom from Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a

party of them (whom the Athenians had banished), with the

Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town were already making

every exertion to bring a squadron, and to effect the revolt of Thasos;

and this party thus saw exactly what they most wanted done, that is to

say, the reformation of the government without risk, and the abolition

of the democracy which would have opposed them. Things at Thasos thus

turned out just the contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators at

Athens expected; and the same in my opinion was the case in many of the

other dependencies; as the cities no sooner got a moderate government

and liberty of action, than they went on to absolute freedom without

being at all seduced by the show of reform offered by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as

had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some

heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to

Athens. Here they found most of the work already done by their

associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and secretly

assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of the commons, and mainly

responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades; Androcles being singled

out both because he was a popular leader and because they sought by his

death to recommend themselves to Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed,

to be recalled, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. There were also

some other obnoxious persons whom they secretly did away with in the

same manner. Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay should be

given except to persons serving in the war, and that not more than five

thousand should share in the government, and those such as were most

able to serve the state in person and in purse.

But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the

revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the Council

of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing

that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the

speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say. Fear, and the

sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the

rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to

death in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the

murderers nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the

people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that men thought

themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their tongues.

An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also

demoralized the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city,

and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being without

means of finding out what those numbers really were. For the same

reason it was impossible for any one to open his grief to a neighbour

and to concert measures to defend himself, as he would have had to

speak either to one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did not

trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each other with

suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on,

the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever

have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who

made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the

few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.

At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no time

in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved to elect

ten commissioners with full powers to frame a constitution, and that

when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before the

people their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city.

Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the

assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile

outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this

single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity whatever

measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any who should

indict for illegality, or otherwise molest him for so doing. The way

thus cleared, it was now plainly declared that all tenure of office and

receipt of pay under the existing institutions were at an end, and that

five men must be elected as presidents, who should in their turn elect

one hundred, and each of the hundred three apiece; and that this body

thus made up to four hundred should enter the council chamber with full

powers and govern as they judged best, and should convene the five

thousand whenever they pleased.

The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout the

chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who

concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the catastrophe,

and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon, one

of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head to contrive

measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly come forward

in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill looked upon by the

multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and who yet was the one

man best able to aid in the courts, or before the assembly, the suitors

who required his opinion. Indeed, when he was afterwards himself tried

for his life on the charge of having been concerned in setting up this

very government, when the Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt

with by the commons, he made what would seem to be the best defence of

any known up to my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his

zeal for the oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was

no stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no

oligarchy was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the

enterprise, proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest

of them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of

the subverters of the democracy—a man as able in council as in debate.

Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, great

as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no light

matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred

years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been not only

not subject to any during the whole of that period, but accustomed

during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its own.

The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single

opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred

were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account

of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall

or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons

not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders were

given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about, without

making any demonstration, at some little distance from the posts, and

in case of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the arms and

put it down. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred

Carystians, and some of the settlers in Aegina come with their own arms

for this very purpose, who had received similar instructions. These

dispositions completed, the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger

concealed about his person, accompanied by one hundred and twenty

Hellenic youths, whom they employed wherever violence was needed, and

appeared before the Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and

told them to take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the

whole of the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as

they went out.

Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any

objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four

Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented

themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their

prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but afterwards

departed widely from the democratic system of government, and except

that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles, ruled the

city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, whom they

thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and banishing others.

They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say that

they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more

disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the

inconstant commons.

Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or that

the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty, but

thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be

sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion, of

which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of

the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an accommodation,

and sending for large reinforcements from Peloponnese, not long

afterwards, with these and his garrison from Decelea, descended to the

very walls of Athens; hoping either that civil disturbances might help

to subdue them to his terms, or that, in the confusion to be expected

within and without the city, they might even surrender without a blow

being struck; at all events he thought he would succeed in seizing the

Long Walls, bared of their defenders. However, the Athenians saw him

come close up, without making the least disturbance within the city;

and sending out their cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry,

light troops, and archers, shot down some of his soldiers who

approached too near, and got possession of some arms and dead. Upon

this Agis, at last convinced, led his army back again and, remaining

with his own troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the

reinforcement back home, after a few days’ stay in Attica. After this

the Four Hundred persevering sent another embassy to Agis, and now

meeting with a better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to

Lacedaemon to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace.

They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain

that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the

citizens, but for the salvation of the country at large; and that there

were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned; although, what

with their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians had never

yet assembled to discuss a question important enough to bring five

thousand of them together. The emissaries were also told what to say

upon all other points, and were so sent off immediately after the

establishment of the new government, which feared, as it turned out

justly, that the mass of seamen would not be willing to remain under

the oligarchical constitution, and, the evil beginning there, might be

the means of their overthrow.

Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered upon

a new phase, the following events having taken place just at the time

that the Four Hundred were conspiring. That part of the Samian

population which has been mentioned as rising against the upper class,

and as being the democratic party, had now turned round, and yielding

to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the Athenians

in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to the number

of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of their fellow

citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the democratic party.

Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a pestilent

fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear of his influence or

position, but because he was a rascal and a disgrace to the city; being

aided in this by Charminus, one of the generals, and by some of the

Athenians with them, to whom they had sworn friendship, and with whom

they perpetrated other acts of the kind, and now determined to attack

the people. The latter got wind of what was coming, and told two of the

generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account of the credit which they

enjoyed with the commons, were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy;

and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley,

the latter serving with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who

had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them

not to look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining

stay of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the

persons whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and

urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was

made up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of

mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing

existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their

protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves.

Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these came

to the rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and the

Samian commons gained the victory, and putting to death some thirty of

the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the ringleaders,

accorded an amnesty to the rest, and lived together under a democratic

government for the future.

The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an

Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now

without loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to

report what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power

not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred

immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel

from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep guard

round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as soon as

he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a picture to the

soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which everything was

exaggerated; saying that all were punished with stripes, that no one

could say a word against the holders of power, that the soldiers’ wives

and children were outraged, and that it was intended to seize and shut

up the relatives of all in the army at Samos who were not of the

government’s way of thinking, to be put to death in case of their

disobedience; besides a host of other injurious inventions.

On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the

chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned.

Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of

moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their

cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After this,

Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders in the

revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the

government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most

tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any, to

accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively the

war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and

to hold no communication with them. The same oath was also taken by all

the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated the Samians in all

their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers, having the conviction

that there was no way of escape for themselves or for them, but that

the success of the Four Hundred or of the enemy at Miletus must be

their ruin.

The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon

the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. Meanwhile

the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they deposed the

former generals and any of the captains whom they suspected, and chose

new captains and generals to replace them, besides Thrasybulus and

Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also stood up and encouraged

one another, and among other things urged that they ought not to lose

heart because the city had revolted from them, as the party seceding

was smaller and in every way poorer in resources than themselves. They

had the whole fleet with which to compel the other cities in their

empire to give them money just as if they had their base in the

capital, having a city in Samos which, so far from wanting strength,

had when at war been within an ace of depriving the Athenians of the

command of the sea, while as far as the enemy was concerned they had

the same base of operations as before. Indeed, with the fleet in their

hands, they were better able to provide themselves with supplies than

the government at home. It was their advanced position at Samos which

had throughout enabled the home authorities to command the entrance

into Piraeus; and if they refused to give them back the constitution,

they would now find that the army was more in a position to exclude

them from the sea than they were to exclude the army. Besides, the city

was of little or no use towards enabling them to overcome the enemy;

and they had lost nothing in losing those who had no longer either

money to send them (the soldiers having to find this for themselves),

or good counsel, which entitles cities to direct armies. On the

contrary, even in this the home government had done wrong in abolishing

the institutions of their ancestors, while the army maintained the said

institutions, and would try to force the home government to do so

likewise. So that even in point of good counsel the camp had as good

counsellors as the city. Moreover, they had but to grant him security

for his person and his recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to

procure them the alliance of the King. And above all if they failed

altogether, with the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of

places to retire to in which they would find cities and lands.

Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner, they

pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten envoys

sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood while

they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.

About this time a cry arose a Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that

Astyochus and Tissaphernes were ruining their cause. Astyochus had not

been willing to fight at sea—either before, while they were still in

full vigour and the fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the

enemy was, as they were informed, in a state of sedition and his ships

not yet united—but kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from

Tissaphernes, which had only a nominal existence, at the risk of

wasting away in inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring

up the fleet in question, but was ruining their navy by payments made

irregularly, and even then not made in full. They must therefore, they

insisted, delay no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The

Syracusans were the most urgent of any.

The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had already

decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the news

reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with all

their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the Milesians

to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians with the

eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at Glauce in

Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the continent; and,

seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired into

Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong enough to stake their

all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from Miletus of the wish of

the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be joined from the

Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had been already

dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to Abydos. The

Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the Peloponnesians put in

at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces of the Milesians and the

people of the neighbourhood. The next day they were about to sail

against Samos, when tidings reached them of the arrival of

Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, upon which they

immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians, thus reinforced, now

in their turn sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships,

wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as no one put out to meet

them, sailed back to Samos.

CHAPTER XXVI

Twenty-first Year of the War—Recall of Alcibiades to Samos—Revolt of

Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred—Battle of Cynossema

In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians having

refused to fight with their fleet united, through not thinking

themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where to look for

money for such a number of ships, especially as Tissaphernes proved so

bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of Ramphias, with forty ships

to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original instructions from

Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being prepared to furnish

pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to revolt to them. These

Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the open sea, in order to

escape the observation of the Athenians, and being overtaken by a

storm, the majority with Clearchus got into Delos, and afterwards

returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus proceeded by land to the

Hellespont to take the command: ten, however, of their number, under

the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage to the Hellespont, and

effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this, the commanders at Samos

were informed of it, and sent a squadron against them to guard the

Hellespont; and an encounter took place before Byzantium between eight

vessels on either side.

Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who from the

moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly resolved

to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the mass of

the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and amnesty, sailed

over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to Samos, being convinced

that their only chance of salvation lay in his bringing over

Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly was

then held in which Alcibiades complained of and deplored his private

misfortune in having been banished, and speaking at great length upon

public affairs, highly incited their hopes for the future, and

extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes. His object

in this was to make the oligarchical government at Athens afraid of

him, to hasten the dissolution of the clubs, to increase his credit

with the army at Samos and heighten their own confidence, and lastly to

prejudice the enemy as strongly as possible against Tissaphernes, and

blast the hopes which they entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out

to the army such extravagant promises as the following: that

Tissaphernes had solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the

Athenians they should never want for supplies while he had anything

left, no, not even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and

that he would bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the

Athenians instead of to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only

trust the Athenians if Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for

them.

Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once elected

him general together with the former ones, and put all their affairs

into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who would have

exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon the Four

Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they had been

told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them, and to

sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus, leaving

their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed the most

positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted upon it, saying

that now that he had been elected general he would first sail to

Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for carrying on the war.

Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he immediately took his

departure in order to have it thought that there was an entire

confidence between them, and also wishing to increase his consideration

with Tissaphernes, and to show that he had now been elected general and

was in a position to do him good or evil as he chose; thus managing to

frighten the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the

Athenians.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of

Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far

more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go out

and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before Miletus,

Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and even

before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had been on the

increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers and some

persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon up how

they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they did

receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and that

unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station where

they could get supplies, the ships’ crews would desert; and that it was

all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own

private advantage.

The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following

disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the

Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews

in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus and

demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and

threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even

went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the

mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike Astyochus.

He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an altar; and they

were thus parted without his being struck. Meanwhile the fort built by

Tissaphernes in Miletus was surprised and taken by the Milesians, and

the garrison in it turned out—an act which met with the approval of the

rest of the allies, and in particular of the Syracusans, but which

found no favour with Lichas, who said moreover that the Milesians and

the rest in the King’s country ought to show a reasonable submission to

Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until the war should be happily

settled. The Milesians were angry with him for this and for other

things of the kind, and upon his afterwards dying of sickness, would

not allow him to be buried where the Lacedaemonians with the army

desired.

The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had reached

this pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus

as admiral, and assumed the command. Astyochus now set sail for home;

and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants, Gaulites, a

Carian, who spoke the two languages, to complain of the Milesians for

the affair of the fort, and at the same time to defend himself against

the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, on their way to Sparta

chiefly to denounce his conduct, and had with them Hermocrates, who was

to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades to ruin the

Peloponnesian cause and of playing a double game. Indeed Hermocrates

had always been at enmity with him about the pay not being restored in

full; and eventually when he was banished from Syracuse, and new

commanders—Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus—had come out to Miletus to

the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder than ever

upon him in his exile, and among other charges against him accused him

of having once asked him for money, and then given himself out as his

enemy because he failed to obtain it.

While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for

Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

After his return the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has been

mentioned above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at Samos,

arrived from Delos; and an assembly was held in which they attempted to

speak. The soldiers at first would not hear them, and cried out to put

to death the subverters of the democracy, but at last, after some

difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon this the envoys

proceeded to inform them that the recent change had been made to save

the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over to the enemy, for

they had already had an opportunity of doing this when he invaded the

country during their government; that all the Five Thousand would have

their proper share in the government; and that their hearers’ relatives

had neither outrage, as Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor other

ill treatment to complain of, but were all in undisturbed enjoyment of

their property just as they had left them. Besides these they made a

number of other statements which had no better success with their angry

auditors; and amid a host of different opinions the one which found

most favour was that of sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades

for the first time did the state a service, and one of the most signal

kind. For when the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against

their countrymen, in which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most

certainly at once have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades

it was who prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have

been able to hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended

expedition, and rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt, on

personal grounds, against the envoys; he dismissed them with an answer

from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government of

the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be deposed

and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: meanwhile any

retrenchments for economy, by which pay might be better found for the

armament, met with his entire approval. Generally, he bade them hold

out and show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city were saved

there was good hope that the two parties might some day be reconciled,

whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos, or that at

Athens, there would no longer be any one to be reconciled to. Meanwhile

arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers of support to the Athenian

commons at Samos: these were thanked by Alcibiades, and dismissed with

a request to come when called upon. The Argives were accompanied by the

crew of the Paralus, whom we left placed in a troopship by the Four

Hundred with orders to cruise round Euboea, and who being employed to

carry to Lacedaemon some Athenian envoys sent by the Four

Hundred—Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias—as they sailed by Argos

laid hands upon the envoys, and delivering them over to the Argives as

the chief subverters of the democracy, themselves, instead of returning

to Athens, took the Argive envoys on board, and came to Samos in the

galley which had been confided to them.

The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled with

the general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the

discontent of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any doubt

of his having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it would

seem, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go after

the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and invited Lichas to go with him;

saying that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to provide pay for

the armament during his own absence. Accounts differ, and it is not

easy to ascertain with what intention he went to Aspendus, and did not

bring the fleet after all. That one hundred and forty-seven Phoenician

ships came as far as Aspendus is certain; but why they did not come on

has been variously accounted for. Some think that he went away in

pursuance of his plan of wasting the Peloponnesian resources, since at

any rate Tamos, his lieutenant, far from being any better, proved a

worse paymaster than himself: others that he brought the Phoenicians to

Aspendus to exact money from them for their discharge, having never

intended to employ them: others again that it was in view of the outcry

against him at Lacedaemon, in order that it might be said that he was

not in fault, but that the ships were really manned and that he had

certainly gone to fetch them. To myself it seems only too evident that

he did not bring up the fleet because he wished to wear out and

paralyse the Hellenic forces, that is, to waste their strength by the

time lost during his journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly

balanced by not throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to

finish the war, he could have done so, assuming of course that he made

his appearance in a way which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up

the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the

Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was, faced the Athenian more as

an equal than as an inferior. But what convicts him most clearly, is

the excuse which he put forward for not bringing the ships. He said

that the number assembled was less than the King had ordered; but

surely it would only have enhanced his credit if he spent little of the

King’s money and effected the same end at less cost. In any case,

whatever was his intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and saw the

Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a Lacedaemonian

called Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet.

Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself

sailed thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and certain

service to the Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring the

Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at all events prevent its joining

the Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known that

Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to

compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians

through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, and thus

in a manner to oblige him to join their side.

While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for

Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos

arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from Alcibiades,

telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the enemy, and

saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the army and of

overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members of the

oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much inclined to

be quit of the business in any safe way that they could, were at once

greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded together and

strongly criticized the administration, their leaders being some of the

principal generals and men in office under the oligarchy, such as

Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, and others;

who, although among the most prominent members of the government (being

afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos, and most especially of

Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedaemon

might do the state some harm without the authority of the people),

without insisting on objections to the excessive concentration of power

in a few hands, yet urged that the Five Thousand must be shown to exist

not merely in name but in reality, and the constitution placed upon a

fairer basis. But this was merely their political cry; most of them

being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so surely

fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once

pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his

fellows; while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his

defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten

by his equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the

power of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability

of the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should

first become the leader of the commons.

Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed to a

democratic form of government—Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with

Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the bitter and

inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and Antiphon and others

of the chiefs who already as soon as they entered upon power, and again

when the army at Samos seceded from them and declared for a democracy,

had sent envoys from their own body to Lacedaemon and made every effort

for peace, and had built the wall in Eetionia—now redoubled their

exertions when their envoys returned from Samos, and they saw not only

the people but their own most trusted associates turning against them.

Alarmed at the state of things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off

in haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to

make peace with Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that should

be at all tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever

with the wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to

Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of

Samos, in case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be

able to let in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For

Eetionia is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of the

harbour, and was now fortified in connection with the wall already

existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be able

to command the entrance; the old wall on the land side and the new one

now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending in one of

the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the harbour. They also

walled off the largest porch in Piraeus which was in immediate

connection with this wall, and kept it in their own hands, compelling

all to unload there the corn that came into the harbour, and what they

had in stock, and to take it out from thence when they sold it.

These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when

the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any general

pacification, he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the ruin of

the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Peloponnese, including

some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum, had been

invited over by the Euboeans and were already riding off Las in Laconia

preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command of Agesandridas,

son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now affirmed that this squadron

was destined not so much to aid Euboea as the party fortifying

Eetionia, and that unless precautions were speedily taken the city

would be surprised and lost. This was no mere calumny, there being

really some such plan entertained by the accused. Their first wish was

to have the oligarchy without giving up the empire; failing this to

keep their ships and walls and be independent; while, if this also were

denied them, sooner than be the first victims of the restored

democracy, they were resolved to call in the enemy and make peace, give

up their walls and ships, and at all costs retain possession of the

government, if their lives were only assured to them.

For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work with

posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy, being eager

to have it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against them were at

first confined to a few persons and went on in secret, until

Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was laid

wait for and stabbed in full market by one of the Peripoli, falling

down dead before he had gone far from the council chamber. The assassin

escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put to the

torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to extract from

him the name of his employer, or anything further than that he knew of

many men who used to assemble at the house of the commander of the

Peripoli and at other houses. Here the matter was allowed to drop. This

so emboldened Theramenes and Aristocrates and the rest of their

partisans in the Four Hundred and out of doors, that they now resolved

to act. For by this time the ships had sailed round from Las, and

anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and Theramenes asserted

that, being bound for Euboea, they would never have sailed in to Aegina

and come back to anchor at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited to

come to aid in the designs of which he had always accused the

government. Further inaction had therefore now become impossible. In

the end, after a great many seditious harangues and suspicions, they

set to work in real earnest. The heavy infantry in Piraeus building the

wall in Eetionia, among whom was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own

tribe, laid hands upon Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy and the

devoted adherent of the cabal, and took him into a house and confined

him there. In this they were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the

Peripoli in Munychia, and others, and above all had with them the great

bulk of the heavy infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four

Hundred, who happened to be sitting in the council chamber, all except

the disaffected wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were,

and menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and

said that he was ready immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles;

and taking with him one of the generals belonging to his party, went

down to Piraeus, followed by Aristarchus and some young men of the

cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined

that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put to death, while

those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the party in

the city. The older men, however, stopped the persons running up and

down the town and making for the stands of arms; and Thucydides the

Pharsalian, proxenus of the city, came forward and threw himself in the

way of the rival factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the state,

while the enemy was still at hand waiting for his opportunity, and so

at length succeeded in quieting them and in keeping their hands off

each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down to Piraeus, being himself

one of the generals, and raged and stormed against the heavy infantry,

while Aristarchus and the adversaries of the people were angry in right

earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, however, went on with the business

without faltering, and asked Theramenes if he thought the wall had been

constructed for any good purpose, and whether it would not be better

that it should be pulled down. To this he answered that if they thought

it best to pull it down, he for his part agreed with them. Upon this

the heavy infantry and a number of the people in Piraeus immediately

got up on the fortification and began to demolish it. Now their cry to

the multitude was that all should join in the work who wished the Five

Thousand to govern instead of the Four Hundred. For instead of saying

in so many words “all who wished the commons to govern,” they still

disguised themselves under the name of the Five Thousand; being afraid

that these might really exist, and that they might be speaking to one

of their number and get into trouble through ignorance. Indeed this was

why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, nor to

have it known that they did not exist; being of opinion that to give

themselves so many partners in empire would be downright democracy,

while the mystery in question would make the people afraid of one

another.

The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless assembled

in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus, after

having released their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the

fortification, went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus, close

to Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they decided to march

into the city, and setting forth accordingly halted in the Anaceum.

Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four Hundred, who

reasoned with them one by one, and persuaded those whom they saw to be

the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to keep in the rest;

saying that they would make known the Five Thousand, and have the Four

Hundred chosen from them in rotation, as should be decided by the Five

Thousand, and meanwhile entreated them not to ruin the state or drive

it into the arms of the enemy. After a great many had spoken and had

been spoken to, the whole body of heavy infantry became calmer than

before, absorbed by their fears for the country at large, and now

agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly in the theatre of

Dionysus for the restoration of concord.

When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were upon

the point of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships under

Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. The

people to a man now thought that it was just what Theramenes and his

party had so often said, that the ships were sailing to the

fortification, and concluded that they had done well to demolish it.

But though it may possibly have been by appointment that Agesandridas

hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he would also naturally

be kept there by the hope of an opportunity arising out of the troubles

in the town. In any case the Athenians, on receipt of the news

immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing themselves threatened

by the enemy with a worse war than their war among themselves, not at a

distance, but close to the harbour of Athens. Some went on board the

ships already afloat, while others launched fresh vessels, or ran to

defend the walls and the mouth of the harbour.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium

anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at

Oropus. The Athenians, with revolution in the city, and unwilling to

lose a moment in going to the relief of their most important possession

(for Euboea was everything to them now that they were shut out from

Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste and with untrained

crews, and sent Thymochares with some vessels to Eretria. These upon

their arrival, with the ships already in Euboea, made up a total of

thirty-six vessels, and were immediately forced to engage. For

Agesandridas, after his crews had dined, put out from Oropus, which is

about seven miles from Eretria by sea; and the Athenians, seeing him

sailing up, immediately began to man their vessels. The sailors,

however, instead of being by their ships, as they supposed, were gone

away to purchase provisions for their dinner in the houses in the

outskirts of the town; the Eretrians having so arranged that there

should be nothing on sale in the marketplace, in order that the

Athenians might be a long time in manning their ships, and, the enemy’s

attack taking them by surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just

as they were. A signal also was raised in Eretria to give them notice

in Oropus when to put to sea. The Athenians, forced to put out so

poorly prepared, engaged off the harbour of Eretria, and after holding

their own for some little while notwithstanding, were at length put to

flight and chased to the shore. Such of their number as took refuge in

Eretria, which they presumed to be friendly to them, found their fate

in that city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while those who fled

to the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the vessels which

got to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two

Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the crews, set up a

trophy, and not long afterwards effected the revolt of the whole of

Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians themselves), and

made a general settlement of the affairs of the island.

When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic

ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in

Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much

alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships

or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and might at

any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on

the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of all

Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not occur

without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile their

greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the enemy,

emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and sail

against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and every

moment they expected him to arrive. This, with a little more courage,

he might easily have done, in which case he would either have increased

the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had stayed to

besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although the enemy of

the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and of their

relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of the

Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as Euboea, or,

to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But here, as on so many

other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people

in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference

between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the

Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their

opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime

empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were

most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in

combating them.

Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned twenty

ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx, where they

had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred and voted

to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of which body all who

furnished a suit of armour were to be members, decreeing also that no

one should receive pay for the discharge of any office, or if he did

should be held accursed. Many other assemblies were held afterwards, in

which law-makers were elected and all other measures taken to form a

constitution. It was during the first period of this constitution that

the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever

did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was

effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to

raise up her head after her manifold disasters. They also voted for the

recall of Alcibiades and of other exiles, and sent to him and to the

camp at Samos, and urged them to devote themselves vigorously to the

war.

Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and Alexicles

and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to Decelea, with

the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the generals, who hastily

took some of the most barbarian of the archers and marched to Oenoe.

This was a fort of the Athenians upon the Boeotian border, at that

moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated by the loss of a party

returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by the garrison. The

Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and had called upon the

Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with them, Aristarchus

deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them that their countrymen in

the city had compounded with the Lacedaemonians, and that one of the

terms of the capitulation was that they must surrender the place to the

Boeotians. The garrison believed him as he was general, and besides

knew nothing of what had occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated

the fort under truce. In this way the Boeotians gained possession of

Oenoe, and the oligarchy and the troubles at Athens ended.

To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming from

any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon his

departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes

showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been sent with him,

and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to

Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not coming at all, and that

they were being grossly abused by Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus

was inviting them to come, and making every effort to get the fleet

and, like Tissaphernes, to cause the revolt of the cities in his

government still subject to Athens, founding great hopes on his

success; until at length, at about the period of the summer which we

have now reached, Mindarus yielded to his importunities, and, with

great order and at a moment’s notice, in order to elude the enemy at

Samos, weighed anchor with seventy-three ships from Miletus and set

sail for the Hellespont. Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded

him in the same summer, and had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being

caught in a storm, Mindarus was compelled to run in to Icarus and,

after being detained five or six days there by stress of weather,

arrived at Chios.

Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus, and

immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to

arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at Chios,

and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in Lesbos and

on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving without his

knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders to

prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to attack them from Lesbos

in the event of their remaining for any length of time at Chios.

Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town in Lesbos which

had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some of the principal

Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty heavy infantry, their

sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others from the continent, so

as to make up three hundred in all, chose Anaxander, a Theban, to

command them, on account of the community of blood existing between the

Thebans and the Lesbians, and first attacked Methymna. Balked in this

attempt by the advance of the Athenian guards from Mitylene, and

repulsed a second time in a battle outside the city, they then crossed

the mountain and effected the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly

determined to go there with all his ships and to attack the place.

Meanwhile Thrasybulus had preceded him thither with five ships from

Samos, as soon as he heard that the exiles had crossed over, and coming

too late to save Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here

they were joined also by two vessels on their way home from the

Hellespont, and by the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total

of sixty-seven vessels; and the forces on board now made ready with

engines and every other means available to do their utmost to storm

Eresus.

In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after

taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of

money for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in haste

from the island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships at Eresus,

they did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on their left,

sailed for the continent. After touching at the port of Carteria, in

the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the Cumaean coast and

supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against Mitylene. From

thence they continued their voyage along the coast, although it was

late in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the continent opposite

Methymna, dined there; and swiftly passing Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus,

and the neighbouring towns, arrived a little before midnight at

Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also

put in at Sigeum and at other places in the neighbourhood.

Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase in

the number of fires on the enemy’s shore informed the eighteen Athenian

ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet. That very

night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging the shore

of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail out into

the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy.

After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had

nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the

alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet of

Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get away;

the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while four of

the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was stranded

opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its crew, two

others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on the shore of

Imbros and burned by the enemy.

After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from Abydos,

which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six vessels; they

spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and then sailed back

to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their scouts, and never

dreaming of the enemy’s fleet getting by undetected, were tranquilly

besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news they instantly

abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the Hellespont, and after

taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which had been carried out too

far into the open sea in the ardour of the pursuit and now fell in

their way, the next day dropped anchor at Elaeus, and, bringing back

the ships that had taken refuge at Imbros, during five days prepared

for the coming engagement.

After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in

column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which the

Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that a

battle was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the

Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with seventy-six

ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with eighty-six. The

Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the Syracusans, their left by

Mindarus in person with the best sailers in the navy; the Athenian left

by Thrasyllus, their right by Thrasybulus, the other commanders being

in different parts of the fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage

first, and outflanking with their left the Athenian right sought to cut

them off, if possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive

their centre upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians

perceiving their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them,

while their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This,

however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially as

they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point

Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was

going on on the other side of it.

The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the ships

of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No help

could be given to the centre either by the squadron of Thrasybulus on

the right, on account of the number of ships attacking him, or by that

of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the point of Cynossema hid what

was going on, and who was also hindered by his Syracusan and other

opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to his own. At length,

however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of victory began to

scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and allowed a

considerable part of their fleet to get into disorder. On seeing this

the squadron of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral movement and,

facing about, attacked and routed the ships opposed to them, and next

fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the victorious Peloponnesian

division, and put most of them to flight without a blow. The Syracusans

also had by this time given way before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and

now openly took to flight upon seeing the flight of their comrades.

The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for refuge

first to the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few ships

were taken by the Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the

Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless

nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory. Up

to this time they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a number

of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but they now ceased to

mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies good for

anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight Chian

vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one Leucadian,

Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen of their own.

After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing the wrecks,

and restoring to the enemy his dead under truce, they sent off a galley

to Athens with the news of their victory. The arrival of this vessel

with its unhoped-for good news, after the recent disasters of Euboea,

and in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh courage to the Athenians,

and caused them to believe that if they put their shoulders to the

wheel their cause might yet prevail.

On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having

hastily refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had

revolted. Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight

vessels from Byzantium, and, sailing up and routing the troops on

shore, took the ships, and then went on and recovered the town of

Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from the citizens. In

the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and

recovered such of their captured galleys as were still uninjured, the

rest having been burned by the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates and

Epicles to Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island.

About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from

Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented the

Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made

Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades now

manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of money from the

Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and placing a

governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had

sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from

Aspendus, and made all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were in

the Hellespont, the Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction,

conveyed by land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and

introduced them into the town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces, the

Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same Arsaces had, upon

pretence of a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians to

undertake military service (these were Delians who had settled at

Atramyttium after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians

for the sake of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from their

town as his friends and allies, had laid wait for them at dinner, and

surrounded them and caused them to be shot down by his soldiers. This

deed made the Antandrians fear that he might some day do them some

mischief; and as he also laid upon them burdens too heavy for them to

bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in

addition to what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his

garrisons had been also expelled, now saw that the breach between them

was serious; and fearing further injury from them, and being also vexed

to think that Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less time and at

less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens than he had done,

determined to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to complain of

the events at Antandros and excuse himself as best he could in the

matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges against him.

Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to

Artemis....

[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year of

this war will be completed. ]

THE END