While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from the cities assembled

at Mantinea, upon the invitation of the Athenians. The conference

having begun, the Corinthian Euphamidas said that their actions did not

agree with their words; while they were sitting deliberating about

peace, the Epidaurians and their allies and the Argives were arrayed

against each other in arms; deputies from each party should first go

and separate the armies, and then the talk about peace might be

resumed. In compliance with this suggestion, they went and brought back

the Argives from Epidaurus, and afterwards reassembled, but without

succeeding any better in coming to a conclusion; and the Argives a

second time invaded Epidaurus and plundered the country. The

Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices

again proving unfavourable, they went back again, and the Argives,

after ravaging about a third of the Epidaurian territory, returned

home. Meanwhile a thousand Athenian heavy infantry had come to their

aid under the command of Alcibiades, but finding that the Lacedaemonian

expedition was at an end, and that they were no longer wanted, went

back again.

So passed the summer. The next winter the Lacedaemonians managed to

elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and sent in a garrison of three

hundred men to Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. Upon this

the Argives went to the Athenians and complained of their having

allowed an enemy to pass by sea, in spite of the clause in the treaty

by which the allies were not to allow an enemy to pass through their

country. Unless, therefore, they now put the Messenians and Helots in

Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they, the Argives, should consider

that faith had not been kept with them. The Athenians were persuaded by

Alcibiades to inscribe at the bottom of the Laconian pillar that the

Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and to convey the Helots at

Cranii to Pylos to plunder the country; but for the rest they remained

quiet as before. During this winter hostilities went on between the

Argives and Epidaurians, without any pitched battle taking place, but

only forays and ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell now

on one side and now on the other. At the close of the winter, towards

the beginning of spring, the Argives went with scaling ladders to

Epidaurus, expecting to find it left unguarded on account of the war

and to be able to take it by assault, but returned unsuccessful. And

the winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of the war ended

also.

In the middle of the next summer the Lacedaemonians, seeing the

Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the rest of Peloponnese

either in revolt or disaffected, concluded that it was high time for

them to interfere if they wished to stop the progress of the evil, and

accordingly with their full force, the Helots included, took the field

against Argos, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of

the Lacedaemonians. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of

Lacedaemon joined in the expedition. The allies from the rest of

Peloponnese and from outside mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with

five thousand heavy infantry and as many light troops, and five hundred

horse and the same number of dismounted troopers; the Corinthians with

two thousand heavy infantry; the rest more or less as might happen; and

the Phliasians with all their forces, the army being in their country.

The preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first had been known to

the Argives, who did not, however, take the field until the enemy was

on his road to join the rest at Phlius. Reinforced by the Mantineans

with their allies, and by three thousand Elean heavy infantry, they

advanced and fell in with the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia.

Each party took up its position upon a hill, and the Argives prepared

to engage the Lacedaemonians while they were alone; but Agis eluded

them by breaking up his camp in the night, and proceeded to join the

rest of the allies at Phlius. The Argives discovering this at daybreak,

marched first to Argos and then to the Nemean road, by which they

expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies would come down. However,

Agis, instead of taking this road as they expected, gave the

Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians their orders, and went along

another difficult road, and descended into the plain of Argos. The

Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians marched by another steep road;

while the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians had instructions to come

down by the Nemean road where the Argives were posted, in order that,

if the enemy advanced into the plain against the troops of Agis, they

might fall upon his rear with their cavalry. These dispositions

concluded, Agis invaded the plain and began to ravage Saminthus and

other places.

Discovering this, the Argives came up from Nemea, day having now

dawned. On their way they fell in with the troops of the Phliasians and

Corinthians, and killed a few of the Phliasians and had perhaps a few

more of their own men killed by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the

Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, advancing upon Nemea according to

their instructions, found the Argives no longer there, as they had gone

down on seeing their property ravaged, and were now forming for battle,

the Lacedaemonians imitating their example. The Argives were now

completely surrounded; from the plain the Lacedaemonians and their

allies shut them off from their city; above them were the Corinthians,

Phliasians, and Pellenians; and on the side of Nemea the Boeotians,

Sicyonians, and Megarians. Meanwhile their army was without cavalry,

the Athenians alone among the allies not having yet arrived. Now the

bulk of the Argives and their allies did not see the danger of their

position, but thought that they could not have a fairer field, having

intercepted the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to the

city. Two men, however, in the Argive army, Thrasylus, one of the five

generals, and Alciphron, the Lacedaemonian proxenus, just as the armies

were upon the point of engaging, went and held a parley with Agis and

urged him not to bring on a battle, as the Argives were ready to refer

to fair and equal arbitration whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians

might have against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace in

future.

The Argives who made these statements did so upon their own authority,

not by order of the people, and Agis on his accepted their proposals,

and without himself either consulting the majority, simply communicated

the matter to a single individual, one of the high officers

accompanying the expedition, and granted the Argives a truce for four

months, in which to fulfil their promises; after which he immediately

led off the army without giving any explanation to any of the other

allies. The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of

respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for

going away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every

side by infantry and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of

their strength. Indeed this was by far the finest Hellenic army ever

yet brought together; and it should have been seen while it was still

united at Nemea, with the Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians,

Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians and

Megarians, and all these the flower of their respective populations,

thinking themselves a match not merely for the Argive confederacy, but

for another such added to it. The army thus retired blaming Agis, and

returned every man to his home. The Argives however blamed still more

loudly the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the

people, themselves thinking that they had let escape with the

Lacedaemonians an opportunity such as they should never see again; as

the struggle would have been under the walls of their city, and by the

side of many and brave allies. On their return accordingly they began

to stone Thrasylus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all

military causes before entering the city. Thrasylus fled to the altar,

and so saved his life; his property however they confiscated.

After this arrived a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and three hundred

horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus; whom the Argives,

being nevertheless loath to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians,

begged to depart, and refused to bring before the people, to whom they

had a communication to make, until compelled to do so by the entreaties

of the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still at Argos. The Athenians,

by the mouth of Alcibiades their ambassador there present, told the

Argives and the allies that they had no right to make a truce at all

without the consent of their fellow confederates, and now that the

Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war ought to be resumed. These

arguments proving successful with the allies, they immediately marched

upon Orchomenos, all except the Argives, who, although they had

consented like the rest, stayed behind at first, but eventually joined

the others. They now all sat down and besieged Orchomenos, and made

assaults upon it; one of their reasons for desiring to gain this place

being that hostages from Arcadia had been lodged there by the

Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall

and the numbers of the enemy, and at the risk they ran of perishing

before relief arrived, capitulated upon condition of joining the

league, of giving hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and giving

up those lodged with them by the Lacedaemonians. Orchomenos thus

secured, the allies now consulted as to which of the remaining places

they should attack next. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreum; the

Mantineans for Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians giving their

support to the Mantineans, the Eleans went home in a rage at their not

having voted for Lepreum; while the rest of the allies made ready at

Mantinea for going against Tegea, which a party inside had arranged to

put into their hands.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, upon their return from Argos after

concluding the four months’ truce, vehemently blamed Agis for not

having subdued Argos, after an opportunity such as they thought they

had never had before; for it was no easy matter to bring so many and so

good allies together. But when the news arrived of the capture of

Orchomenos, they became more angry than ever, and, departing from all

precedent, in the heat of the moment had almost decided to raze his

house, and to fine him ten thousand drachmae. Agis however entreated

them to do none of these things, promising to atone for his fault by

good service in the field, failing which they might then do to him

whatever they pleased; and they accordingly abstained from razing his

house or fining him as they had threatened to do, and now made a law,

hitherto unknown at Lacedaemon, attaching to him ten Spartans as

counsellors, without whose consent he should have no power to lead an

army out of the city.

At this juncture arrived word from their friends in Tegea that, unless

they speedily appeared, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives

and their allies, if it had not gone over already. Upon this news a

force marched out from Lacedaemon, of the Spartans and Helots and all

their people, and that instantly and upon a scale never before

witnessed. Advancing to Orestheum in Maenalia, they directed the

Arcadians in their league to follow close after them to Tegea, and,

going on themselves as far as Orestheum, from thence sent back the

sixth part of the Spartans, consisting of the oldest and youngest men,

to guard their homes, and with the rest of their army arrived at Tegea;

where their Arcadian allies soon after joined them. Meanwhile they sent

to Corinth, to the Boeotians, the Phocians, and Locrians, with orders

to come up as quickly as possible to Mantinea. These had but short

notice; and it was not easy except all together, and after waiting for

each other, to pass through the enemy’s country, which lay right across

and blocked up the line of communication. Nevertheless they made what

haste they could. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians with the Arcadian allies

that had joined them, entered the territory of Mantinea, and encamping

near the temple of Heracles began to plunder the country.

Here they were seen by the Argives and their allies, who immediately

took up a strong and difficult position, and formed in order of battle.

The Lacedaemonians at once advanced against them, and came on within a

stone’s throw or javelin’s cast, when one of the older men, seeing the

enemy’s position to be a strong one, hallooed to Agis that he was

minded to cure one evil with another; meaning that he wished to make

amends for his retreat, which had been so much blamed, from Argos, by

his present untimely precipitation. Meanwhile Agis, whether in

consequence of this halloo or of some sudden new idea of his own,

quickly led back his army without engaging, and entering the Tegean

territory, began to turn off into that of Mantinea the water about

which the Mantineans and Tegeans are always fighting, on account of the

extensive damage it does to whichever of the two countries it falls

into. His object in this was to make the Argives and their allies come

down from the hill, to resist the diversion of the water, as they would

be sure to do when they knew of it, and thus to fight the battle in the

plain. He accordingly stayed that day where he was, engaged in turning

off the water. The Argives and their allies were at first amazed at the

sudden retreat of the enemy after advancing so near, and did not know

what to make of it; but when he had gone away and disappeared, without

their having stirred to pursue him, they began anew to find fault with

their generals, who had not only let the Lacedaemonians get off before,

when they were so happily intercepted before Argos, but who now again

allowed them to run away, without any one pursuing them, and to escape

at their leisure while the Argive army was leisurely betrayed. The

generals, half-stunned for the moment, afterwards led them down from

the hill, and went forward and encamped in the plain, with the

intention of attacking the enemy.

The next day the Argives and their allies formed in the order in which

they meant to fight, if they chanced to encounter the enemy; and the

Lacedaemonians returning from the water to their old encampment by the

temple of Heracles, suddenly saw their adversaries close in front of

them, all in complete order, and advanced from the hill. A shock like

that of the present moment the Lacedaemonians do not ever remember to

have experienced: there was scant time for preparation, as they

instantly and hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, their king,

directing everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in the

field all commands proceed from him: he gives the word to the

Polemarchs; they to the Lochages; these to the Pentecostyes; these

again to the Enomotarchs, and these last to the Enomoties. In short all

orders required pass in the same way and quickly reach the troops; as

almost the whole Lacedaemonian army, save for a small part, consists of

officers under officers, and the care of what is to be done falls upon

many.

In this battle the left wing was composed of the Sciritae, who in a

Lacedaemonian army have always that post to themselves alone; next to

these were the soldiers of Brasidas from Thrace, and the Neodamodes

with them; then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, company after

company, with the Arcadians of Heraea at their side. After these were

the Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans with a few of the

Lacedaemonians at the extremity; their cavalry being posted upon the

two wings. Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. That of their

opponents was as follows: On the right were the Mantineans, the action

taking place in their country; next to them the allies from Arcadia;

after whom came the thousand picked men of the Argives, to whom the

state had given a long course of military training at the public

expense; next to them the rest of the Argives, and after them their

allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneans, and lastly the Athenians on the

extreme left, and lastly the Athenians on the extreme left, and their

own cavalry with them.

Such were the order and the forces of the two combatants. The

Lacedaemonian army looked the largest; though as to putting down the

numbers of either host, or of the contingents composing it, I could not

do so with any accuracy. Owing to the secrecy of their government the

number of the Lacedaemonians was not known, and men are so apt to brag

about the forces of their country that the estimate of their opponents

was not trusted. The following calculation, however, makes it possible

to estimate the numbers of the Lacedaemonians present upon this

occasion. There were seven companies in the field without counting the

Sciritae, who numbered six hundred men: in each company there were four

Pentecostyes, and in the Pentecosty four Enomoties. The first rank of

the Enomoty was composed of four soldiers: as to the depth, although

they had not been all drawn up alike, but as each captain chose, they

were generally ranged eight deep; the first rank along the whole line,

exclusive of the Sciritae, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight

men.

The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each contingent received

some words of encouragement from its own commander. The Mantineans

were, reminded that they were going to fight for their country and to

avoid returning to the experience of servitude after having tasted that

of empire; the Argives, that they would contend for their ancient

supremacy, to regain their once equal share of Peloponnese of which

they had been so long deprived, and to punish an enemy and a neighbour

for a thousand wrongs; the Athenians, of the glory of gaining the

honours of the day with so many and brave allies in arms, and that a

victory over the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would cement and extend

their empire, and would besides preserve Attica from all invasions in

future. These were the incitements addressed to the Argives and their

allies. The Lacedaemonians meanwhile, man to man, and with their

war-songs in the ranks, exhorted each brave comrade to remember what he

had learnt before; well aware that the long training of action was of

more saving virtue than any brief verbal exhortation, though never so

well delivered.

After this they joined battle, the Argives and their allies advancing

with haste and fury, the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the music of many

flute-players—a standing institution in their army, that has nothing to

do with religion, but is meant to make them advance evenly, stepping in

time, without break their order, as large armies are apt to do in the

moment of engaging.

Just before the battle joined, King Agis resolved upon the following

manoeuvre. All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get

forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap

with this adversary’s left; because fear makes each man do his best to

shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the

right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the

better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is

the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from

the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest

follow him. On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their

wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still

farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. Agis,

afraid of his left being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans

outflanked it too far, ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move out

from their place in the ranks and make the line even with the

Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to fill

up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it with two

companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would

still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the

Mantineans would gain in solidity.

However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at

short notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not

move over, for which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta,

as having been guilty of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed

before the Sciritae (whom Agis on seeing that the two companies did not

move over ordered to return to their place) had time to fill up the

breach in question. Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians,

utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as superior in

point of courage. As soon as they came to close quarters with the

enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and,

bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the

unclosed breach in their line, cut up and surrounded the

Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some

of the older men on guard there. But the Lacedaemonians, worsted in

this part of the field, with the rest of their army, and especially the

centre, where the three hundred knights, as they are called, fought

round King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives and the five

companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the

Athenians next them, and instantly routed them; the greater number not

even waiting to strike a blow, but giving way the moment that they came

on, some even being trodden under foot, in their fear of being

overtaken by their assailants.

The army of the Argives and their allies, having given way in this

quarter, was now completely cut in two, and the Lacedaemonian and

Tegean right simultaneously closing round the Athenians with the troops

that outflanked them, these last found themselves placed between two

fires, being surrounded on one side and already defeated on the other.

Indeed they would have suffered more severely than any other part of

the army, but for the services of the cavalry which they had with them.

Agis also on perceiving the distress of his left opposed to the

Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered all the army to advance to

the support of the defeated wing; and while this took place, as the

enemy moved past and slanted away from them, the Athenians escaped at

their leisure, and with them the beaten Argive division. Meanwhile the

Mantineans and their allies and the picked body of the Argives ceased

to press the enemy, and seeing their friends defeated and the

Lacedaemonians in full advance upon them, took to flight. Many of the

Mantineans perished; but the bulk of the picked body of the Argives

made good their escape. The flight and retreat, however, were neither

hurried nor long; the Lacedaemonians fighting long and stubbornly until

the rout of their enemy, but that once effected, pursuing for a short

time and not far.

Such was the battle, as nearly as possible as I have described it; the

greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes,

and joined by the most considerable states. The Lacedaemonians took up

a position in front of the enemy’s dead, and immediately set up a

trophy and stripped the slain; they took up their own dead and carried

them back to Tegea, where they buried them, and restored those of the

enemy under truce. The Argives, Orneans, and Cleonaeans had seven

hundred killed; the Mantineans two hundred, and the Athenians and

Aeginetans also two hundred, with both their generals. On the side of

the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer any loss worth speaking

of: as to the Lacedaemonians themselves it was difficult to learn the

truth; it is said, however, that there were slain about three hundred

of them.

While the battle was impending, Pleistoanax, the other king, set out

with a reinforcement composed of the oldest and youngest men, and got

as far as Tegea, where he heard of the victory and went back again. The

Lacedaemonians also sent and turned back the allies from Corinth and

from beyond the Isthmus, and returning themselves dismissed their

allies, and kept the Carnean holidays, which happened to be at that

time. The imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time,

whether of cowardice on account of the disaster in the island, or of

mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this single

action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men

themselves were the same as ever.

The day before this battle, the Epidaurians with all their forces

invaded the deserted Argive territory, and cut off many of the guards

left there in the absence of the Argive army. After the battle three

thousand Elean heavy infantry arriving to aid the Mantineans, and a

reinforcement of one thousand Athenians, all these allies marched at

once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians were keeping the

Carnea, and dividing the work among them began to build a wall round

the city. The rest left off; but the Athenians finished at once the

part assigned to them round Cape Heraeum; and having all joined in

leaving a garrison in the fortification in question, they returned to

their respective cities.

Summer now came to an end. In the first days of the next winter, when

the Carnean holidays were over, the Lacedaemonians took the field, and

arriving at Tegea sent on to Argos proposals of accommodation. They had

before had a party in the town desirous of overthrowing the democracy;

and after the battle that had been fought, these were now far more in a

position to persuade the people to listen to terms. Their plan was

first to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, to be followed by an

alliance, and after this to fall upon the commons. Lichas, son of

Arcesilaus, the Argive proxenus, accordingly arrived at Argos with two

proposals from Lacedaemon, to regulate the conditions of war or peace,

according as they preferred the one or the other. After much

discussion, Alcibiades happening to be in the town, the Lacedaemonian

party, who now ventured to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept

the proposal for accommodation; which ran as follows:

The assembly of the Lacedaemonians agrees to treat with the Argives

upon the terms following:

1. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians their children, and to

the Maenalians their men, and shall restore the men they have in

Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians.

2. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there. If

the Athenians refuse to withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared

enemies of the Argives and of the Lacedaemonians, and of the allies of

the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives.

3. If the Lacedaemonians have any children in their custody, they shall

restore them every one to his city.

4. As to the offering to the god, the Argives, if they wish, shall

impose an oath upon the Epidaurians, but, if not, they shall swear it

themselves.

5. All the cities in Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be

independent according to the customs of their country.

6. If any of the powers outside Peloponnese invade Peloponnesian

territory, the parties contracting shall unite to repel them, on such

terms as they may agree upon, as being most fair for the

Peloponnesians.

7. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be on the

same footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall

be on the same footing as the Argives, being left in enjoyment of their

own possessions.

8. This treaty shall be shown to the allies, and shall be concluded, if

they approve; if the allies think fit, they may send the treaty to be

considered at home.

The Argives began by accepting this proposal, and the Lacedaemonian

army returned home from Tegea. After this intercourse was renewed

between them, and not long afterwards the same party contrived that the

Argives should give up the league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and

Athenians, and should make a treaty and alliance with the

Lacedaemonians; which was consequently done upon the terms following:

The Lacedaemonians and Argives agree to a treaty and alliance for fifty

years upon the terms following:

1. All disputes shall be decided by fair and impartial arbitration,

agreeably to the customs of the two countries.

2. The rest of the cities in Peloponnese may be included in this treaty

and alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment of what

they possess, all disputes being decided by fair and impartial

arbitration, agreeably to the customs of the said cities.

3. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be upon

the same footing as the Lacedaemonians themselves, and the allies of

the Argives shall be upon the same footing as the Argives themselves,

continuing to enjoy what they possess.

4. If it shall be anywhere necessary to make an expedition in common,

the Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon it and decide, as may

be most fair for the allies.

5. If any of the cities, whether inside or outside Peloponnese, have a

question whether of frontiers or otherwise, it must be settled, but if

one allied city should have a quarrel with another allied city, it must

be referred to some third city thought impartial by both parties.

Private citizens shall have their disputes decided according to the

laws of their several countries.

The treaty and above alliance concluded, each party at once released

everything whether acquired by war or otherwise, and thenceforth acting

in common voted to receive neither herald nor embassy from the

Athenians unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from

Peloponnese, and also to make neither peace nor war with any, except

jointly. Zeal was not wanting: both parties sent envoys to the Thracian

places and to Perdiccas, and persuaded the latter to join their league.

Still he did not at once break off from Athens, although minded to do

so upon seeing the way shown him by Argos, the original home of his

family. They also renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and took

new ones: the Argives, besides, sent ambassadors to the Athenians,

bidding them evacuate the fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing

their own men outnumbered by the rest of the garrison, sent Demosthenes

to bring them out. This general, under colour of a gymnastic contest

which he arranged on his arrival, got the rest of the garrison out of

the place, and shut the gates behind them. Afterwards the Athenians

renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and by themselves gave up

the fortress.

After the defection of Argos from the league, the Mantineans, though

they held out at first, in the end finding themselves powerless without

the Argives, themselves too came to terms with Lacedaemon, and gave up

their sovereignty over the towns. The Lacedaemonians and Argives, each

a thousand strong, now took the field together, and the former first

went by themselves to Sicyon and made the government there more

oligarchical than before, and then both, uniting, put down the

democracy at Argos and set up an oligarchy favourable to Lacedaemon.

These events occurred at the close of the winter, just before spring;

and the fourteenth year of the war ended. The next summer the people of

Dium, in Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the

Lacedaemonians settled affairs in Achaea in a way more agreeable to the

interests of their country. Meanwhile the popular party at Argos little

by little gathered new consistency and courage, and waited for the

moment of the Gymnopaedic festival at Lacedaemon, and then fell upon

the oligarchs. After a fight in the city, victory declared for the

commons, who slew some of their opponents and banished others. The

Lacedaemonians for a long while let the messages of their friends at

Argos remain without effect. At last they put off the Gymnopaediae and

marched to their succour, but learning at Tegea the defeat of the

oligarchs, refused to go any further in spite of the entreaties of

those who had escaped, and returned home and kept the festival. Later

on, envoys arrived with messages from the Argives in the town and from

the exiles, when the allies were also at Sparta; and after much had

been said on both sides, the Lacedaemonians decided that the party in

the town had done wrong, and resolved to march against Argos, but kept

delaying and putting off the matter. Meanwhile the commons at Argos, in

fear of the Lacedaemonians, began again to court the Athenian alliance,

which they were convinced would be of the greatest service to them; and

accordingly proceeded to build long walls to the sea, in order that in

case of a blockade by land; with the help of the Athenians they might

have the advantage of importing what they wanted by sea. Some of the

cities in Peloponnese were also privy to the building of these walls;

and the Argives with all their people, women and slaves not excepted,

addressed themselves to the work, while carpenters and masons came to

them from Athens.

Summer was now over. The winter following the Lacedaemonians, hearing

of the walls that were building, marched against Argos with their

allies, the Corinthians excepted, being also not without intelligence

in the city itself; Agis, son of Archidamus, their king, was in

command. The intelligence which they counted upon within the town came

to nothing; they however took and razed the walls which were being

built, and after capturing the Argive town Hysiae and killing all the

freemen that fell into their hands, went back and dispersed every man

to his city. After this the Argives marched into Phlius and plundered

it for harbouring their exiles, most of whom had settled there, and so

returned home. The same winter the Athenians blockaded Macedonia, on

the score of the league entered into by Perdiccas with the Argives and

Lacedaemonians, and also of his breach of his engagements on the

occasion of the expedition prepared by Athens against the Chalcidians

in the direction of Thrace and against Amphipolis, under the command of

Nicias, son of Niceratus, which had to be broken up mainly because of

his desertion. He was therefore proclaimed an enemy. And thus the

winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war ended with it.

CHAPTER XVII

Sixteenth Year of the War—The Melian Conference—Fate of Melos

The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized

the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the

number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the

neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an

expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own,

six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry,

three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and

about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders.

The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the

Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and

took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using

violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open

hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus,

the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament,

before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These

the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the

object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the

Athenian envoys spoke as follows:

Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people,

in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without

interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive

arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that this is

the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit

there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech

yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that

before going any farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours

suits you.

The Melian commissioners answered:

Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you

propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are

too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to

be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from

this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and

refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.

Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future,

or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon

the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will

go on.

Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn

more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question

in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the

discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose.

Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious

pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we

overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you

have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in

return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying

that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or

that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding

in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do

that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in

power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they

must.

Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are

obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of

interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the

privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right,

and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got

to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your

fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for

the world to meditate upon.

Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten

us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real

antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by

themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk

that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we

are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what

we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we

would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you

preserved for the good of us both.

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as

for you to rule?

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before

suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends

instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your

friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and

your enmity of our power.

Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have

nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most

of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?

Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the

other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they

are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are

afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security

by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than

others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed

in baffling the masters of the sea.

Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy

which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about

justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours,

and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you

avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case

from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this

but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force

others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?

Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but

little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their

taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves,

outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be

the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into

obvious danger.

Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your

subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice

in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried,

before submitting to your yoke.

Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal

one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question

of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger

than you are.

Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more

impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose;

to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still

preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.

Athenians. Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who

have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without

ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as

to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when

they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to

guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case

with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be

like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still

afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible,

to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men

with hopes to their destruction.

Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the

difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the

terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good

as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what

we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians,

who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their

kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly

irrational.

Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly

hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct

being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise

among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a

necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is

not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when

made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for

ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and

everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as

we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no

reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to

your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that

shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not

envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their

country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their

conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it

could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they

are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and

what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much

for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.

Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their

respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians,

their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in

Hellas and helping their enemies.

Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with

security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger;

and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible.

Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even

danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our

nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common

blood ensures our fidelity.

Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the

goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power

for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others.

At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is

only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it

likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an

island?

Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide

one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept

others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And

should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your

land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach;

and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for

your own country and your own confederacy.

Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day

experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians

never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck

by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your

country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men

might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments

depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too

scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out

victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment,

unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more

prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of

disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time

too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many

cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are

rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a

seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so

enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless

disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of

error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are

well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it

dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes

you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing

to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice

given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose

the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their

equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards

their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter,

therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is

for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than

one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or

ruin.

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left

to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had

maintained in the discussion, and answered: “Our resolution, Athenians,

is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of

freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but

we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it

until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and

so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us

to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our

country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.”

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from

the conference said: “Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from

these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is

before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as

already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted

most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you

be most completely deceived.”

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing

no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to

hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians,

dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the

Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a

certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by

land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place.

About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and

lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive

exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the

Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from

breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed

that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The

Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private

quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet.

Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the

Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and

brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and

so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep

better guard in future.

Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to

invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the

sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This

intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their

fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped

them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the

Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements

afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of

Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and

some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at

discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom

they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently

sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.

BOOK VI

CHAPTER XVIII

Seventeenth Year of the War—The Sicilian Campaign—Affair of the

Hermae—Departure of the Expedition

The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a

greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if

possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its

size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and

of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that

against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a

merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the

island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being

mainland.

It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied it

are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the

country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what

race they were, or whence they came or whither they went, and must

leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to what may be

generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to have been the

next settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of all and

aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven by the

Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them that the

island, before called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania, and to the

present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some

of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and

settled next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their

towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the

Phocians carried on their way from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and

afterwards from thence to Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily

from their first home Italy, flying from the Opicans, as tradition says

and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched till the wind set

down the strait to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have

sailed over in some other way. Even at the present day there are still

Sicels in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a

king of the Sicels, so called. These went with a great host to Sicily,

defeated the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the south

and west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily instead of

Sicania, and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the richest

parts of the country for near three hundred years before any Hellenes

came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north of the

island. There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who had

occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets adjacent for

the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to

arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most

of their stations, and drawing together took up their abode in Motye,

Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because they confided in

their alliance, and also because these are the nearest points for the

voyage between Carthage and Sicily.

These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the

Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with

Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to

Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which

the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily.

Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the

Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the

island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer

surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was taken

within the walls and became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the

Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation

of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and

afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their

founder.

About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara,

and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas,

and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians

at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his

death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place

called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the

place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred and

forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and the

country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however,

a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out Pamillus

and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to

join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes

and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the

forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its

name from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and

which was first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which

they adopted were Dorian. Near one hundred and eight years after the

foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called

from the river of that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their

founders; giving their own institutions to the colony. Zancle was

originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the

country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large numbers came from

Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the place; the

founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis

respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels,

because the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call

zanclon; but upon the original settlers being afterwards expelled by

some Samians and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the

Medes, and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas,

tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him colonized with a mixed

population, and its name changed to Messina, after his old country.

Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of

those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined

by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the

Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the

institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae and Casmenae

were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse,

Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded by the

Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the

building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But the

Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having

revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their

land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina,

himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by

Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by the Geloans.

Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting

Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were

now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the

whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring their

kindred and other allies in the island. But they were especially

incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their

aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their

neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed

territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance of the

Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans now

reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches,

during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to

their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a

capital argument that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished

for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to

Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the island into their

hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large

force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as

colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and

joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would,

therefore, do well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to

make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the

Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war. The

Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their

assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send

envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked

of in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in

what posture was the war with the Selinuntines.

The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. The

same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians

excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part

of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn.

They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few

soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce for

a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives were

to injure each other’s territory, returned home with the army. Not long

afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy

infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched

out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison

escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The

next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and

went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their ships.

Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border

some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that were at

Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas. Upon this the

Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a truce with

Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in

the war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it

ended the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the

historian.

Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived

from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of

uncoined silver, as a month’s pay for sixty ships, which they were to

ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after

hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as

attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and

in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was

abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to

Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of

Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with

full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines,

to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order

all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests

of Athens. Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider

the speediest means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else

might be required by the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who

had been chosen to the command against his will, and who thought that

the state was not well advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext

was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to

achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the

enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:

“Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be

made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have

still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the

ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to

a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners

into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. And yet,

individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little as

other men for my person—not that I think a man need be any the worse

citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the

contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of

his country more than others—nevertheless, as I have never spoken

against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now,

but shall say what I think best. Against your character any words of

mine would be weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you

have got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages which

are dubious in themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will,

therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of

season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.

“I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go

yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the

treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue

to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet—for nominal it has

become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta—but

which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay

our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was

forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to

us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points

that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have

never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open

war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are

restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too

probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to

divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose

alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few

others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to

think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of

grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have

already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years

in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the

continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans,

our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the

rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.

“And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the

Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be

ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could

not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a

very different position from that which we occupied before the

enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present,

in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the

Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than

before. At present they might possibly come here as separate states for

love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack

another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they

could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same

way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there

at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away

again as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off,

and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of

admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down

upon us, and would join our enemies here against us. You have

yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their

allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared

at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire

to the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the

misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their

spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand

that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace

is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their

dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest

study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the

barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most

effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.

“We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from

a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates

and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own

behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest

it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves

and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show no

proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with

them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to

command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his

own—specially if he be still too young to command—who seeks to be

admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses

hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such a one to

maintain his private splendour at his country’s risk, but remember that

such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own,

and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to

decide or hastily to take in hand.

“When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same

individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn,

summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next

him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a

coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success

is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad

dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened

by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other

side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing

between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the

coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their

own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestaeans,

for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the

war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the

future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with

people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help us in

ours.

“And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the

commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the

question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the

Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that

a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many

abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and

that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their country

as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can avoid.”

Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward

spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had been

voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the warmest

advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias,

who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also

because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was,

besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce

Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by

means of his successes. For the position he held among the citizens led

him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both

in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on

had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at

the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the

ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the

mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and

became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as

good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to

every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus

before long to ruin the city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave

the following advice to the Athenians:

“Athenians, I have a better right to command than others—I must begin

with this as Nicias has attacked me—and at the same time I believe

myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame

to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit besides. The

Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded

it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of the magnificence

with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into the

lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private

person, and won the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took

care to have everything else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom

regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without

leaving behind them an impression of power. Again, any splendour that I

may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is

naturally envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners

has an air of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless

folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits not himself only,

but his city: nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his

position should refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is

badly off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we do not see men

courted in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept the

insolence of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure

to all, and then demand to have it meted out to him. What I know is

that persons of this kind and all others that have attained to any

distinction, although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their

relations with their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave

to posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without

any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not

as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such

are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the

question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do.

Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great

danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their

all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious

in the battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence.

“Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments

to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win

their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but

while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail

yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both. Neither rescind

your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would be

going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by

motley rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones

in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any

feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons,

and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man

thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain

something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe

settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly.

From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel

or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they

get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are

told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they

boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each

state reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers,

and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this

war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be

found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we

shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the

Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home

prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very

adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we

sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire,

depending solely on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had

never so little hope against us as at present; and let them be ever so

sanguine, although strong enough to invade our country even if we stay

at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our

own behind us that is a match for them.

“In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for

holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for

not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist

them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not take

them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but that they

might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming

over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won, both

by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to

support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance;

since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought

to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil

those we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the

attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the

attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our

empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be

content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease

to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you

look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are

prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.

“Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this

adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the

pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them

see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at

the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of

the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or

in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves

and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning,

will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to

all the Siceliots put together. And do not let the do-nothing policy

which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old,

turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our

fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our

affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance

them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the

one without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate

judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction,

the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in

everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh

experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in

deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature

could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting

such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one’s

character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to

them as closely as one can.”

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans

and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their

oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager

for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would be now

useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking

that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his

estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

“I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition,

and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to

give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we

are going against cities that are great and not subject to one another,

or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude

to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our rule in

exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are

very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect

to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are seven others

armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and

Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of heavy

infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to

man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons,

partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from

some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies

in the number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their

corn at home instead of importing it.

“Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak

naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with

us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be

shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the

cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without

friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend

ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have to retire under

compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of

reflection at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent

force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon

an expedition not like any which you may undertaken undertaken the

quality of allies, among your subject states here in Hellas, where any

additional supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly

territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land

entirely strange, from which during four months in winter it is not

even easy for a messenger get to Athens.

“I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy

infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from our

subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money in

Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to make

head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming

superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in what we

want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to

say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to

serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that in case of our

being weather-bound the armament may not want provisions, as it is not

every city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours. We must

also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not

to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from

home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at

Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.

“Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of

the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even

at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to

conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise from ourselves

that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he who

undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master of

the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find

everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have

need of much good counsel and more good fortune—a hard matter for

mortal man to aspire to—I wish as far as may be to make myself

independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as

safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest for the

country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If

any one thinks differently I resign to him my command.”

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the

Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail

on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. The

Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken

away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for

it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had

thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the

expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love

with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either

subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events,

with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of

life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt

that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common

people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make

conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future.

With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared

to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept

quiet.

At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and

told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at

once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon

this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that

matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could

see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys—the

Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and

sending for others from the allies—not less than five thousand heavy

infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the

rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from Crete,

and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready

by the generals and taken with them.

Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should

have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the

expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of

Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being sent to the

allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had just

recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young men

had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce,

everything was the more easily provided.

In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city of

Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common in the

doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most of them

their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large public

rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was further voted that

any one who knew of any other act of impiety having been committed

should come and give information without fear of consequences, whether

he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken up the more

seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part

of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy.

Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body

servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of

other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock

celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses.

Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by

those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their

obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that

if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. These

accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair

of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel

of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this

had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general

and undemocratic licence of his life and habits.

Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also

before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now

complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he

was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found

guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he protested

against their receiving slanders against him in his absence, and begged

them rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty, and pointed

out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so large an army,

with so serious a charge still undecided. But his enemies feared that

he would have the army for him if he were tried immediately, and that

the people might relent in favour of the man whom they already caressed

as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining in the

expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected,

putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to sail

and not delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return

within a fixed number of days; their plan being to have him sent for

and brought home for trial upon some graver charge, which they would

the more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that

he should sail.

After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about

midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller

craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received orders to

muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in a body to the

Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and such of their

allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus upon a day

appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting out to

sea. With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the

city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each

escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their relatives,

or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they

thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends

whom they might never see again, considering the long voyage which they

were going to make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when

they were now upon the point of parting from one another, the danger

came more home to them than when they voted for the expedition;

although the strength of the armament, and the profuse provision which

they remarked in every department, was a sight that could not but

comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they

simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief.

Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly

and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single

city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that

against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against

Potidæa under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as it did four

thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred

galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies

besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty

equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of a long

term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and

troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet had been

elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the state; the

treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty

ships, sixty men-of-war and forty transports, and manning these with

the best crews obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in addition

to the pay from the treasury to the thranitae and crews generally,

besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and equipments, and one and

all making the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel in

beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from

the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great

attention to their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted

not only a rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but

an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of

power and resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one

had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private

outlay of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had

already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of

the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their

personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still

to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey

money which each was likely to have provided himself with,

independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such

length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose

of exchange—it would have been found that many talents in all were

being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not less

famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its

appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the

peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was

the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most

ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who

undertook it.

The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they

meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary

before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but

by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed

through all the armament, and libations made by the soldiers and their

officers in gold and silver goblets. In their prayers joined also the

crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished them well. The

hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first

out in column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so hastened

to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied forces were also

assembling.

CHAPTER XIX

Seventeenth Year of the War—Parties at Syracuse—Story of Harmodius and

Aristogiton—Disgrace of Alcibiades

Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the

expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed,

an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered

by different orators, believing or contradicting the report of the

Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came

forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the matter, and gave

the following counsel:

“Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been

when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know

that those who either make or repeat statements thought not worthy of

belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for their pains,

I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue when the

state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak with more

authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you wonder at it,

the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force,

naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore

Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which

once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up your

minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can best

repel them with the means under your hand, and do be taken off your

guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through

disbelieving it. Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at

the force or daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more

hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament

altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the

better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make

more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away,

disappointed of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a

moment that they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious

exploit for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few

indeed have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian,

that have gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more

numerous than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of

whom fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies

in a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the

less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the main

cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose by the

defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from

the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this

may very well be the case with us also.

“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send

and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance

of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the

danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies,

or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also think that

it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means

there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the

Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think

that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and

be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in

another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the

present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like

everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and

Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and

to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in

my opinion, to do at the present moment, is what you, with your

constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what I must

nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as

many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our

actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the Athenians at

Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before

fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the

Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on

thinking that we have a base for our defensive—for Tarentum is ready to

receive us—while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament,

which could with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage,

and would be easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small

detachments. On the other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels,

and draw together their fast sailers and with these attack us, we could

either fall upon them when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did

not choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having

crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to

it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and be

blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of

their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for

certain whether the cities would receive them. In my opinion this

consideration alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out

from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers

and whereabouts, they would let the season go on until winter was upon

them, or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up

the expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I

hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first

excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be

reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men’s

minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack,

or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,

inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the

emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at present.

They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist,

having a right to judge us severely because we did not help the

Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a

courage for which they are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by

the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power. I could wish

to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all

events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and

remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by

bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to

accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest

promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the

Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and

all but here—this is what I am sure of.”

Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at

great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had

no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said; some

asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be

repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole

affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that

believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras,

the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the

masses, came forward and spoke as follows:

“For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided

as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our

subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for

those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder

less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter themselves

that we do not see through them. The fact is that they have their

private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city into

consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by the

public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do

not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always

causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well advised, you

will not be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these

persons tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I

esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. Now it is not likely

that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they

have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war

quite as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are only too

glad that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great

cities as we are.

“However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better

able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all

points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match

for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again.

I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here,

except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force

of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will

already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly

laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required

against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity. In

fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see

how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another

city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our

frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to

them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the

ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which they

would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry.

“But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to know

are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here invent

stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first

time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, trying

by such stories and by others even more abominable to frighten your

people and get into their hands the government: it is what I see

always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they may one day

succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, may prove

too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the offenders are known,

of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is

subject to constant troubles and to contests as frequent against

herself as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and

infamous cabals. However, I will try, if you will support me, to let

nothing of this happen in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by

chastising the authors of such machinations, not merely when they are

caught in the act—a difficult feat to accomplish—but also for what they

have the wish though not the power to do; as it is necessary to punish

an enemy not only for what he does, but also beforehand for what he

intends to do, if the first to relax precaution would not be also the

first to suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the

few—the most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their

evil courses. And after all, as I have often asked, what would you

have, young men? Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a

law enacted rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you

when competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the

many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be

held unworthy of the same privileges?

“It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor

equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to

rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people,

includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best

guardians of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise,

none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these

talents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a

democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger,

and not content with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the

profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to,

but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.

“But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that I

know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or most

criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue them—even now,

if it is not a case for repentance, you may still learn wisdom, and

thus advance the interest of the country, the common interest of us

all. Reflect that in the country’s prosperity the men of merit in your

ranks will have a share and a larger share than the great mass of your

fellow countrymen, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of

being deprived of all; and desist from reports like these, as the

people know your object and will not put up with it. If the Athenians

arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy of itself; we

have moreover, generals who will see to this matter. And if nothing of

this be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into

a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen

servitude by choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look

into the matter, and will judge your words as if they were acts, and,

instead of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening

to you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have

always at hand the means of making itself respected.”

Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up

and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of

his own with reference to the matter in hand: “It is not well for

speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their hearers

to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence that we

have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as a whole

may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no need, there

is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and arms and all

other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to and order this,

and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and do all else that may

appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever we

discover shall be laid before you.” After these words from the general,

the Syracusans departed from the assembly.

In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived at

Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and

made arrangements as to the order in which they were to anchor and

encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted one

to each of their number, to avoid sailing all together and being thus

embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions at the stations which

they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally better

ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own

commander. Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find

out which of the cities would receive them, with instructions to meet

them on the way and let them know before they put in to land.

After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross

to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and

thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which

one hundred were Athenian vessels—sixty men-of-war, and forty

troopships—and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five

thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen

hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred

Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them

Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and two

hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and eighty

archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred slingers

from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and

one horse-transport carrying thirty horses.

Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the

war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden

laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and

carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by

one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides

many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament

voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and

struck across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land at

the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune,

coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets

and gates against them, and according them nothing but water and

liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they

arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy. Here at length they

reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls pitched a camp

outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a market was also

provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and kept quiet.

Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called upon

them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the

Rhegians replied that they would not side with either party, but should

await the decision of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did.

Upon this the Athenians now began to consider what would be the best

action to take in the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the

ships sent on to come back from Egesta, in order to know whether there

was really there the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.