CHAPTER V

Second Congress at Lacedaemon—Preparations for War and Diplomatic

Skirmishes—Cylon—Pausanias—Themistocles

After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has

been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidæa, and the

events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions

of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the

fifty years’ interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning

of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in

placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home

power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of

it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during

most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the

pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by

wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer

ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its

encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but

that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon

the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the

present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds

on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians,

yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be

well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received

from him the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war,

victory would be theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with

them, whether invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their

allies again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war.

After the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress

had been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing

the Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular

the Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the

cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that

it might come too late to save Potidæa; they were present also on this

occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:

“Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having

failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but

have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for

supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private

interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common

welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by all in

other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings with the

Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The

states more inland and out of the highway of communication should

understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result

will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the

reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not

be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with

them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast

will one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the

interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply

involved in this discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate

to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not

injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured,

returning to an understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact,

they are neither intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to

take an injury for the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace.

Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights is, if you remain

inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of repose to which you

cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions from success in war is

to forget how hollow is the confidence by which you are elated. For if

many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through the still greater

fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well laid, have on the

contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with which we form our

schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation

is carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes

failure.

“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is

under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and

after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have

many reasons to expect success—first, superiority in numbers and in

military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience

in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall

be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the

moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce

their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of

Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed

to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A

single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold

out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise

ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an

equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their

superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they

cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be

removed by our practice. The money required for these objects shall be

provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous

than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing

for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and

self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit

to Athenian rapacity and see employed for our own ruin.

“We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of

their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues,

which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified

positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be

foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite

rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an

emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps

his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper

about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect that if it

was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbours,

it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a match

for our whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members;

so that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual

cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer

us divided and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound,

would, it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure and

simple; a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without

disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused by one.

Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or

that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons

in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave

to Hellas; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant

state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down

sole rulers. And we do not know how this conduct can be held free from

three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of

vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that

contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances—a

feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called

not contemptuous but contemptible.

“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further

than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide

by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it

is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must

not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in

wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want

should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for

many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and

the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part

from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god,

in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather

to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken

not by resistance but by aggression.

“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will

amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the

interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest is the

surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay not,

therefore, to assist Potidæa, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, which

is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the freedom

of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when waiting

can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it comes to be

known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves,

like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow

allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of

this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors,

but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded.

Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose

for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger. We must believe

that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been

established against all alike, with a programme of universal empire,

part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce

it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes

who are now enslaved.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having now

heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states

present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for

war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at

once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the

means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that

there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied

with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica

was invaded, and the war openly begun.

This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with

complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible,

in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first

Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the curse

of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former

generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the

Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had married a

daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now

this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to

seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus.

Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his

friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he

seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant,

thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion

appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the grand

festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which

he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. For

the Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival

of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is celebrated

outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a

number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country. However,

fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt. As soon as

the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, from the

country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But as time went

on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; the

responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with

plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment.

It must be known that at that time most political functions were

discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged

companions were distressed for want of food and water. Accordingly

Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest being hard

pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as suppliants

at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged with the

duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death in the

temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should be done

to them, led them out, and slew them. Some who as they passed by took

refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses were dispatched on the

spot. From this deed the men who killed them were called accursed and

guilty against the goddess, they and their descendants. Accordingly

these cursed ones were driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by

Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian faction; the living were driven

out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out.

For all that, they came back afterwards, and their descendants are

still in the city.

This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive

out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a care for the

honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son of

Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother’s side, and they

thought that his banishment would materially advance their designs on

Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in procuring this; they

rather thought to create a prejudice against him in the eyes of his

countrymen from the feeling that the war would be partly caused by his

misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and the

leading Athenian statesman, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in

everything, and would have no concessions, but ever urged the Athenians

on to war.

The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out the

curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot

suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them away and

slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at Sparta to

have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them to drive out

the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history of which is

as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the

Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is his first recall),

and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being again sent out in a

public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on his own

responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and

arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came ostensibly for

the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with the King, which

he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of reigning over

Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to lay the King under

an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole design, was this.

Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been taken in Byzantium,

on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the

return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the King without the

knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had

escaped from him. He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an

Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the prisoners.

He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the contents of which were

as follows, as was afterwards discovered: “Pausanias, the general of

Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of

war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your daughter, and to

make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. I may say that I

think I am able to do this, with your co-operation. Accordingly if any

of this please you, send a safe man to the sea through whom we may in

future conduct our correspondence.”

This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was pleased

with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to the sea

with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in the

satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to

Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him

the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive

from Pausanias on the King’s matters with all care and fidelity.

Artabazus on his arrival carried the King’s orders into effect, and

sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: “Thus saith

King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me across

sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house,

recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. Let

neither night nor day stop you from diligently performing any of your

promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them be

hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that their

presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I send

you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for the honour

and interest of us both.”

Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea,

Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever,

and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium

in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a

bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was quite

unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in

trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander scale.

He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a

temper to every one without exception that no one could come near him.

Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to

the Athenians.

The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the Lacedaemonians,

occasioned his first recall. And after his second voyage out in the

ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave proofs of similar

behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he

did not return to Sparta; but news came that he had settled at Colonae

in the Troad, and was intriguing with the barbarians, and that his stay

there was for no good purpose; and the ephors, now no longer

hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with orders to accompany

the herald or be declared a public enemy. Anxious above everything to

avoid suspicion, and confident that he could quash the charge by means

of money, he returned a second time to Sparta. At first thrown into

prison by the ephors (whose powers enable them to do this to the King),

soon compromised the matter and came out again, and offered himself for

trial to any who wished to institute an inquiry concerning him.

Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him—neither his enemies

nor the nation—of that indubitable kind required for the punishment of

a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high office; he

being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, Leonidas’s son,

who was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of

the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of his being

discontented with things established; all the occasions on which he had

in any way departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and

it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed on

the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as the

first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet:

The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised

This monument, that Phœbus might be praised.

At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and

inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of

the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that

Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, interpreted

by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed, gained a new

significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with his present

schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even intriguing with

the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised them freedom

and citizenship if they would join him in insurrection and would help

him to carry out his plans to the end. Even now, mistrusting the

evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent to

take any decided step against him; in accordance with their regular

custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable

resolve in the matter of a Spartan citizen without indisputable proof.

At last, it is said, the person who was going to carry to Artabazus the

last letter for the King, a man of Argilus, once the favourite and most

trusty servant of Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection

that none of the previous messengers had ever returned, having

counterfeited the seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in

his surmises, or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he

might not be discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript

that he had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death.

On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. Still,

they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own ears.

Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant, and

there built himself a hut divided into two by a partition; within which

he concealed some of the ephors and let them hear the whole matter

plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him the reason of his

suppliant position; and the man reproached him with the order that he

had written concerning him, and one by one declared all the rest of the

circumstances, how he who had never yet brought him into any danger,

while employed as agent between him and the King, was yet just like the

mass of his servants to be rewarded with death. Admitting all this, and

telling him not to be angry about the matter, Pausanias gave him the

pledge of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to set off as

quickly as possible, and not to hinder the business in hand.

The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action for

the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were preparing

to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was about to be

arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the ephors what

he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal, and betrayed

it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the temple of the

goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which was near at hand,

he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took him, and entering

into a small chamber, which formed part of the temple, to avoid being

exposed to the weather, lay still there. The ephors, for the moment

distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the chamber,

and having made sure that he was inside, shut him in, barricaded the

doors, and staying before the place, reduced him by starvation. When

they found that he was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in the

chamber, they brought him out of the temple, while the breath was still

in him, and as soon as he was brought out he died. They were going to

throw him into the Kaiadas, where they cast criminals, but finally

decided to inter him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards

ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his

death—where he now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on

a monument declares—and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to

give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House.

So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute

for Pausanias. The Athenians retorted by telling the Lacedaemonians to

drive out what the god himself had pronounced to be a curse.

To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course of

the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians

accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish

him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do so.

But he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence at

Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. So they

sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the pursuit,

persons with instructions to take him wherever they found him. But

Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese

to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But the

Corcyraeans alleged that they could not venture to shelter him at the

cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed him over to

the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung on the report

of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was compelled to stop at

the house of Admetus, the Molossian king, though they were not on

friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be indoors, but his wife, to

whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed him to take their child in

his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon afterwards Admetus came in,

and Themistocles told him who he was, and begged him not to revenge on

Themistocles in exile any opposition which his requests might have

experienced from Themistocles at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low

for his revenge; retaliation was only honourable between equals.

Besides, his opposition to the king had only affected the success of a

request, not the safety of his person; if the king were to give him up

to the pursuers that he mentioned, and the fate which they intended for

him, he would just be consigning him to certain death.

The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was

sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of

supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long

afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but

sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander’s

dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a

merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was

carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading Naxos.

In his alarm—he was luckily unknown to the people in the vessel—he told

the master who he was and what he was flying for, and said that, if he

refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a

bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no one leave the

ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise. If he complied

with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense. The master acted

as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a night out of reach

of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus.

After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he

received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at

Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and

sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes’s son, who had just come to

the throne. Its contents were as follows: “I, Themistocles, am come to

you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was

compelled to defend myself against your father’s invasion—harm,

however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his retreat,

which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the past, you are

a good turn in my debt”—here he mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes

from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the bridges unbroken,

which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him—“for the present, able

to do you great service, I am here, pursued by the Hellenes for my

friendship for you. However, I desire a year’s grace, when I shall be

able to declare in person the objects of my coming.”

It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to do as

he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he could in

the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country.

Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to very high

consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed before or

since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the hopes

which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of Hellas, but

principally by the proof which experience daily gave of his capacity.

For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of

genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration

quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike

unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in

those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and

the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities.

An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his

practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment

in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently

divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine,

whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness

of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have

surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an

emergency. Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a

story of his having ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable

to fulfil his promises to the king. However this may be, there is a

monument to him in the marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor

of the district, the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in

fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be

the richest wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His

bones, it is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance

with his wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without

the knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in

Attica an outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and

Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men

of their time in Hellas.

To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy,

the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked,

concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related

already. It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the

siege of Potidæa, and to respect the independence of Aegina. Above all,

it gave her most distinctly to understand that war might be prevented

by the revocation of the Megara decree, excluding the Megarians from

the use of Athenian harbours and of the market of Athens. But Athens

was not inclined either to revoke the decree, or to entertain their

other proposals; she accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation

into the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on the border, and

of harbouring her runaway slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the

Lacedaemonian ultimatum. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and

Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old subjects; there was

simply this: “Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no

reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.”

Upon this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before

their consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all

their demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who

came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging

the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of

allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward

Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens,

ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:

“There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything,

and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I

know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded

to make war is not always retained in action; that as circumstances

change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same,

almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to

those of you who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support

the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all

credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the

course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is

why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we

expected. Now it was clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs

against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we

shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we

shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never

yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such

offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war

instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping

the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command. They order us

to raise the siege of Potidæa, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke

the Megara decree; and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to

leave the Hellenes independent. I hope that you will none of you think

that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the

Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the

revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of

self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight

cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your

resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some

greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first

instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that

they must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at

once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to

war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the

ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions

or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims

from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands before any attempt at

legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one

meaning, and that is slavery.

“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison

will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the

cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the

Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea,

from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each

other. Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning

a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence

from their homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides,

they have not command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered,

maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of

men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse.

Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no

means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted,

especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very

likely will. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may

be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on

a war against a power different in character from their own, by the

want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous

action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in

which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own

ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at

all. The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular

enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in

assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the

consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of

their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his

neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or

that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all

separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.

“But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience

from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause

delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not

be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in

Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of

fortifications to establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much

more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with Athens just as much fortified

against it as it against Athens; while a mere post might be able to do

some harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities which it

would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into

their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals

with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for

service on land, than their military skill for service at sea.

Familiarity with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you

who have been practising at it ever since the Median invasion have not

yet brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything

considerable being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population,

who will besides be prevented from practising by the constant presence

of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small squadron

they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by

numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving,

and through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and

consequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just

like anything else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being

taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the

contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.

“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to

seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would

only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by

embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in

fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we

have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among

our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the

danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would consent to

become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and

their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay.

“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the

Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have

criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can

show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail

against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the

whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of

Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except

by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the

continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a

moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more

impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible,

be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land

and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No

irritation that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle

with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would

only be succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a

reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength,

who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against

them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men’s

lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I

had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and

lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that

this at any rate will not make you submit.

“I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you can

consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of

the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving yourselves in other

dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the

enemy’s devices. But these matters shall be explained in another

speech, as events require; for the present dismiss these men with the

answer that we will allow Megara the use of our market and harbours,

when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in favour of us and

our allies, there being nothing in the treaty to prevent either one or

the other: that we will leave the cities independent, if independent we

found them when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians grant

to their cities an independence not involving subservience to

Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each severally may desire: that we

are willing to give the legal satisfaction which our agreements

specify, and that we shall not commence hostilities, but shall resist

those who do commence them. This is an answer agreeable at once to the

rights and the dignity of Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that

war is a necessity; but that the more readily we accept it, the less

will be the ardour of our opponents, and that out of the greatest

dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not

our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from

ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by

wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they

beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present

height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in

any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our

posterity unimpaired.”

Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the wisdom

of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as

he recommended, both on the separate points and in the general; they

would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to have the complaints

settled in a fair and impartial manner by the legal method, which the

terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys departed home and did not

return again.

These were the charges and differences existing between the rival

powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus

and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual

communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not without

suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a breach

of the treaty and matter for war.

BOOK II

CHAPTER VI

Beginning of the Peloponnesian War—First Invasion of Attica—Funeral

Oration of Pericles

The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on

either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except through

the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced and

prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the chronological

order of events by summers and winters.

The thirty years’ truce which was entered into after the conquest of

Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth

year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of

Aenesias at Sparta, in the last month but two of the archonship of

Pythodorus at Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidæa, just

at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three hundred

strong, under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of

Phyleides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first watch of

the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of Boeotia in

alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them by a Plataean

called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them in, meaning to

put to death the citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city to

Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves. This was arranged through

Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes.

For Plataea had always been at variance with Thebes; and the latter,

foreseeing that war was at hand, wished to surprise her old enemy in

time of peace, before hostilities had actually broken out. Indeed this

was how they got in so easily without being observed, as no guard had

been posted. After the soldiers had grounded arms in the market-place,

those who had invited them in wished them to set to work at once and go

to their enemies’ houses. This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but

determined to make a conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come

to a friendly understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly

invited any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of

their countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in

this way the city would readily join them.

On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates,

and of the sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in

their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the night

preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms and,

accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the Thebans

offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other, during the

negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and

decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass of

the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At all events they

resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party walls of the houses,

they thus managed to join each other without being seen going through

the streets, in which they placed wagons without the beasts in them, to

serve as a barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed convenient

for the occasion. When everything had been done that circumstances

permitted, they watched their opportunity and went out of their houses

against the enemy. It was still night, though daybreak was at hand: in

daylight it was thought that their attack would be met by men full of

courage and on equal terms with their assailants, while in darkness it

would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a

disadvantage from their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made

their assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they

could.

The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to

repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back their

assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves

screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with stones and

tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and so at last

their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through the town. Most

of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and this,

with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her last

quarter, and the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and

could easily stop their escape, proved fatal to many. The only gate

open was the one by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of

the Plataeans driving the spike of a javelin into the bar instead of

the bolt; so that even here there was no longer any means of exit. They

were now chased all over the town. Some got on the wall and threw

themselves over, in most cases with a fatal result. One party managed

to find a deserted gate, and obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through

the bar; but as they were soon observed only a few succeeded in getting

out. Others were cut off in detail in different parts of the city. The

most numerous and compact body rushed into a large building next to the

city wall: the doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and

the Thebans fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that

there was a passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing

their enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to

the building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was

anything else that they could do with them; until at length these and

the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town agreed

to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to the

Plataeans.

While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the

Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before

daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had

entered, received the news of the affair on the road, and pressed

forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from

Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the

night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and

so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the

river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain or

captive. When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a

design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had been

made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were of

course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if possible

to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen in the

town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was their plan.

But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost before it was

formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens outside the

town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for their

unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and warning

them against any outrage on those outside. Should the warning be

disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they had in their

hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their territory,

they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This is the Theban

account of the matter, and they say that they had an oath given them.

The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any promise of an

immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon subsequent

negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it may, upon the

Thebans retiring from their territory without committing any injury,

the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the country and

immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a hundred and

eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the traitors had

negotiated, being one.

This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead

to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed

best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having had

word of the affair sent them immediately after its occurrence, had

instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the

Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with their Theban

prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men’s death

had of course not arrived; the first messenger having left Plataea just

when the Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and

capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians sent orders in

ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the men

slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in

provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the

women and children and such of the men as were least efficient.

After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt

act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and

her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to such

other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for

assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states at

home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders to

the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build

vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city

being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of

money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit

single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part reviewed

her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more

immediately round Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and

Zacynthus—perceiving that if these could be relied on she could carry

the war all round Peloponnese.

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their

utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at

its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this

particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men

whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of

Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading

cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being

chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the

contending cities. Further, some while before this, there was an

earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes.

This was said and thought to be ominous of the events impending;

indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without

remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians,

especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No

private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was

omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not

himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens,

whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were

apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and

such the feelings with which the contest opened.

The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were the

allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except

the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only

Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was

afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians,

Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.

Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians,

Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and cavalry

by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states sent

infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of Athens

comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus,

most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some

tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea

with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns,

the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete towards the east, and

all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, ships were furnished

by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such

were the allies of either party and their resources for the war.

Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round orders

to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to prepare

troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to

invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time appointed and

assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city being two-thirds

of its whole force. After the whole army had mustered, the

Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called

together the generals of all the states and the principal persons and

officers, and exhorted them as follows:

“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within

and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not

without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger

force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are

remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we march.

We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our ancestors, or

unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and attention of all

Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its sympathy is with the

enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as the invading army may

appear to be, and certain as some may think it that our adversary will

not meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification for the

least negligence upon the march; but the officers and men of each

particular city should always be prepared for the advent of danger in

their own quarters. The course of war cannot be foreseen, and its

attacks are generally dictated by the impulse of the moment; and where

overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise

apprehension often been able to make head against superior numbers. Not

that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an

enemy’s country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of

apprehension: troops will by this combination be best inspired for

dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one. In the present

instance, the city against which we are going, far from being so

impotent for defence, is on the contrary most excellently equipped at

all points; so that we have every reason to expect that they will take

the field against us, and that if they have not set out already before

we are there, they will certainly do so when they see us in their

territory wasting and destroying their property. For men are always

exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and

on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and where least

inclined for reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The

Athenians are the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire

to rule the rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading

and ravaging their neighbours’ territory, than of seeing their own

treated in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power of the

state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the

reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our

ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to

regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey

with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so

much to the credit and safety of an army as the union of large bodies

by a single discipline.”

With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first sent

off Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she

should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually

on the march. But the Athenians did not admit into the city or to their

assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against admitting

either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after they had once

marched out.

The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered

to be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent

him had a proposition to make, they must retire to their own territory

before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort was sent with

Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he

reached the frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he departed

with these words: “This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes

to the Hellenes.” As soon as he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus

learnt that the Athenians had still no thoughts of submitting, he at

length began his march, and advanced with his army into their

territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent and

cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea with the

remainder and laid waste the country.

While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the

march before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of

the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to

take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who happened to be his

friend, might possibly pass by his estate without ravaging it. This he

might do, either from a personal wish to oblige him, or acting under

instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of creating a prejudice

against him, as had been before attempted in the demand for the

expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly took the precaution of

announcing to the Athenians in the assembly that, although Archidamus

was his friend, yet this friendship should not extend to the detriment

of the state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses and

lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave

them up to be public property, so that they should not bring him into

suspicion. He also gave the citizens some advice on their present

affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war,

and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go

out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready

their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a

tight rein on their allies—the strength of Athens being derived from

the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending

principally upon conduct and capital, had no reason to despond. Apart

from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents

of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were

still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of

nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the

money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public

buildings, and for Potidæa. This did not include the uncoined gold and

silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels for the

processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar resources to the

amount of five hundred talents. To this he added the treasures of the

other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly

be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might

take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue

contained forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This

might be used for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be

restored. Such was their financial position—surely a satisfactory one.

Then they had an army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides

sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This

was at first the number of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it

was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens

who had heavy armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it

joined that round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard,

although part of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long

Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a

distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned.

Lastly, the circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven

miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles

also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including mounted

archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred

galleys fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens in the

different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and

hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged his usual

arguments for expecting a favourable issue to the war.

The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives

and children from the country, and all their household furniture, even

to the woodwork of their houses which they took down. Their sheep and

cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. But they

found it hard to move, as most of them had been always used to live in

the country.

From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians

than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign

of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent

townships, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in times

of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary seasons

they carried on their government and settled their affairs without his

interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, as in the case

of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In Theseus,

however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and one of

the chief features in his organization of the country was to abolish

the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge

them in the single council-chamber and town hall of the present

capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as

before, but they were henceforth compelled to have only one political

centre, viz., Athens; which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica

among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he left a great state

behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or Feast of Union;

which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in

honour of the goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present

citadel and the district beneath it looking rather towards the south.

This is shown by the fact that the temples of the other deities,

besides that of Athene, are in the citadel; and even those that are

outside it are mostly situated in this quarter of the city, as that of

the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in

the Marshes, the same in whose honour the older Dionysia are to this

day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion not only by the Athenians

but also by their Ionian descendants. There are also other ancient

temples in this quarter. The fountain too, which, since the alteration

made by the tyrants, has been called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but

which, when the spring was open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or

Fairwater, was in those days, from being so near, used for the most

important offices. Indeed, the old fashion of using the water before

marriage and for other sacred purposes is still kept up. Again, from

their old residence in that quarter, the citadel is still known among

Athenians as the city.

The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent

townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still

prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most

Athenians still lived in the country with their families and

households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now,

especially as they had only just restored their establishments after

the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at

abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient

constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid

farewell to what each regarded as his native city.

When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go

to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the

greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city

that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes,

except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian Demeter and such

other Places as were always kept closed. The occupation of the plot of

ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgian had been forbidden

by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle

which said:

Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, Woe worth the day that men inhabit

it!

Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in

my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to

what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from

the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the

war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would

be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be inhabited. Many

also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever else

they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small

to hold them; though afterwards they divided the Long Walls and a great

part of Piraeus into lots and settled there. All this while great

attention was being given to the war; the allies were being mustered,

and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was

the state of preparation at Athens.

Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town

they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the country.

Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall with engines

and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border,

was of course a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the

Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their

assault, and wasted some valuable time before the place. This delay

brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of

the war he had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half

measures he had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had

further injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the

Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march had been

conducted. But all this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During

this interval the Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was

the belief of the Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found

everything still out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was

the feeling of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it

is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their

land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still

uninjured; and this was why he waited.

But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it

had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp

and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt

upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and

Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon, was in command.

Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages,

and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or

the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right,

through Cropia, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the

Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp

there, and continued their ravages for a long while.

The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae

during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to

have been this. He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted

by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency of

their service to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation

of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met him at Eleusis or the

Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked to a sally by the

spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought the place itself a good

position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important

part of the state as the three thousand heavy infantry of the

Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and

would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand,

should the Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could

then fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his

advance up to the very walls of Athens. After the Acharnians had lost

their own property they would be less willing to risk themselves for

that of their neighbours; and so there would be division in the

Athenian counsels. These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining

at Acharnae.

In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian

plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It

was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon,

had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but

had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis and Thria, which

indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, as it was thought he

had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the army at Acharnae,

barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory

of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a

sight which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the

Median wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the

determination was universal, especially among the young men, to sally

forth and stop it. Knots were formed in the streets and engaged in hot

discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was

also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were

recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of

the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians,

as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was

their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a

most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his

previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading

out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole

of the public suffering.

He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant,

and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly

or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate

inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he addressed

himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible,

though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands

near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling

affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the

Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather

the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support of the

Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a

few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day without a

truce. The next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient

alliance brought the Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came

being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians,

and Pheraeans. The Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus,

two party leaders in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of

the other cities had also its own commander.

In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out

to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes

between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the

Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing

round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred

archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus,

Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament

weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after

remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through

Boeotia by a different road to that by which they had entered. As they

passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of Graea, which is held by the

Oropians from Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke up to their

respective cities.

After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the

points at which they intended to have regular stations during the war.

They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents

from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the

current expenses of the war were to be otherwise provided for. If any

one should move or put to the vote a proposition for using the money

for any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event

of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a

capital offence. With this sum of money they also set aside a special

fleet of one hundred galleys, the best ships of each year, with their

captains. None of these were to be used except with the money and

against the same peril, should such peril arise.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese,

reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others of

the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the

country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault

upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being

weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, was

in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing of the

attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of

the besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was

scattered over the country and had its attention turned to the wall,

threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his

entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his

exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during

the war. The Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their

cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the country for two

days and defeated a picked force of three hundred men that had come

from the vale of Elis and the immediate neighbourhood to the rescue.

But a stiff squall came down upon them, and, not liking to face it in a

place where there was no harbour, most of them got on board their

ships, and doubling Point Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the

meantime the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board,

marched over by land and took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round

and picked them up and then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the

main army of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued their

cruise, and ravaged other places on the coast.

About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round

Locris and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, being in

command. Making descents from the fleet he ravaged certain places on

the sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages from it. He also

defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled to resist him.

During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their

wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the

chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so

near Peloponnese that it seemed safer to send colonists of their own to

hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent out. The

banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was given to them

by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also

because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the time of

the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is

on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those

of the Aeginetans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest

of Hellas.

The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time

by the way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after

noon. After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars

had come out, it returned to its natural shape.

During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, whose

sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians

and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him their enemy;

but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished this prince

to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and King of the

Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish

the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest

of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians being independent. This

Teres is in no way related to Tereus who married Pandion’s daughter

Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they belong to the same part of

Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis, but

which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that

the women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when

they mention the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion

in contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the

advantages of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at

the above moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates

Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this

Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained to

any power. Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the

Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian towns

and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the alliance

with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, and

promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the

Athenians a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also reconciled

them with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon

which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and Phormio in an

expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son of Teres, King

of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King of the

Macedonians, became allies of Athens.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising

round Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to Corinth,

and presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira,

they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the

place for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island of

Cephallenia and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia lies

off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans,

Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the fleet

returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the Athenians

invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens included,

under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the

hundred ships round Peloponnese on their journey home had just reached

Aegina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in full force at

Megara, now sailed over and joined them. This was without doubt the

largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the state being still in the

flower of her strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full ten

thousand heavy infantry were in the field, all Athenian citizens,

besides the three thousand before Potidæa. Then the resident aliens who

joined in the incursion were at least three thousand strong; besides

which there was a multitude of light troops. They ravaged the greater

part of the territory, and then retired. Other incursions into the

Megarid were afterwards made by the Athenians annually during the war,

sometimes only with cavalry, sometimes with all their forces. This went

on until the capture of Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off

the Opuntian coast, was towards the end of this summer converted into a

fortified post by the Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing

from Opus and the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the

events of this summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from

Attica.

In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return to

Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and

fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him; himself also hiring

some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas, son of

Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of

Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an

attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous

of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore they touched

at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian territory, and losing

some men by the treachery of the Cranians, who fell suddenly upon them

after having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and

returned home.

In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to

those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their

ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the

ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has been

erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as

they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in

cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the

coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for

the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered.

Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and the

female relatives are there to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in

the public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in which

those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those

slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were

interred on the spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid

in the earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent

reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric; after which

all retire. Such is the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole

of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was

observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles,

son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the

proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated

platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and

spoke as follows:

“Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this

speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be

delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I

should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds

would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as

you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s cost. And I could

have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be

imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall

according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly

upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that

you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar

with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been set

forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on

the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to

suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men

can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally

persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions

recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it

incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with

their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to

satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.

“I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they

should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the

present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from

generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time

by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much

more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire

which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their

acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few

parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us

here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; while the

mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable

her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. That

part of our history which tells of the military achievements which gave

us our several possessions, or of the ready valour with which either we

or our fathers stemmed the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a

theme too familiar to my hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall

therefore pass it by. But what was the road by which we reached our

position, what the form of government under which our greatness grew,

what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions

which I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these

men; since I think this to be a subject upon which on the present

occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the whole

assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with advantage.

“Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are

rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration

favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a

democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in

their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public

life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being

allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if

a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity

of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends

also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous

surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry

with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those

injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they

inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations

does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief

safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws,

particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they

are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which,

although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace.

“Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself

from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round,

and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of

pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our

city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the

Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as

those of his own.

“If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our

antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien

acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing,

although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our

liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native

spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their

very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we

live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every

legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be noticed that the

Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all

their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the

territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually

vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force

was never yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to

attend to our marine and to dispatch our citizens by land upon a

hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage with some

such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is

magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse

suffered at the hands of our entire people. And yet if with habits not

of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are

still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of

escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them

in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from

them.

“Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of

admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge

without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and

place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in

declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides

politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary

citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair

judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him

who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we

Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and,

instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of

action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at

all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of

daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both

united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of

ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm of courage will

surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference

between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from

danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by

conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the

favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness

to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly

from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment,

not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of

consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of

expediency, but in the confidence of liberality.

“In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I

doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to

depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a

versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out

for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state

acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries

is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives

no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they

have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to

rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be

ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown

it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist,

or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for

the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have

forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and

everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable

monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the

assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and

well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.

“Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our

country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the

same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the

panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite

proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great measure complete;

for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these

and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most

Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And

if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene,

and this not only in cases in which it set the final seal upon their

merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their

having any. For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his

country’s battles should be as a cloak to cover a man’s other

imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his

merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual.

But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future

enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of

freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that

vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal

blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they

joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their

vengeance, and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope

the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they

thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die

resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from

dishonour, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment,

while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but

from their glory.

“So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must

determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you

may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas

derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the

defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to

a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you

must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon

her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when

all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by

courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that men

were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an

enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their

valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution

that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common

by them all they each of them individually received that renown which

never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their

bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their

glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on

which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have

the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where

the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every

breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of

the heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the

fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of

war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of

their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom

continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall,

if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely,

to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably

more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of

his strength and patriotism!

“Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the

parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to

which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed

are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has

caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as

to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still I know

that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of

whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others

blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much

for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to

which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to

beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their

stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost,

but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for

never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does

not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and

apprehensions of a father. While those of you who have passed your

prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part

of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will

be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of

honour that never grows old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would

have it, that rejoices the heart of age and helplessness.

“Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle

before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should

your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult

not merely to overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living

have envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path

are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. On the

other hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence

to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised

in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling

short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least

talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad.

“My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my

ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now

satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have

received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their

children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the

state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this

race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their

survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are

found the best citizens.

“And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your

relatives, you may depart.”

CHAPTER VII

Second Year of the War—The Plague of Athens—Position and Policy of

Pericles—Fall of Potidæa

Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the

first year of the war came to an end. In the first days of summer the

Lacedaemonians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as

before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of

Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste the

country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague first

began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it had

broken out in many places previously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and

elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere

remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any service,

ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but they died

themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor

did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the temples,

divinations, and so forth were found equally futile, till the

overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to them

altogether.

It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, and

thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King’s

country. Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the population

in Piraeus—which was the occasion of their saying that the

Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells

there—and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths became

much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if

causes can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave

to other writers, whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall

simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps

it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again.

This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its

operation in the case of others.

That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free

from sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in this.

As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in good

health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and

redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as the

throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid

breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after

which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When

it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every

kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress. In

most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing violent

spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much later.

Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its

appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules

and ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear

to have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description;

or indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. What they would have liked

best would have been to throw themselves into cold water; as indeed was

done by some of the neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in

their agonies of unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference

whether they drank little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling

of not being able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The

body meanwhile did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its

height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when they

succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the

internal inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if

they passed this stage, and the disease descended further into the

bowels, inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe

diarrhoea, this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. For

the disorder first settled in the head, ran its course from thence

through the whole of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal,

it still left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy

parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of

these, some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with

an entire loss of memory on their first recovery, and did not know

either themselves or their friends.

But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all

description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to

endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference

from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds and

beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained from touching them

(though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting them. In

proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind actually

disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at

all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could best be

studied in a domestic animal like the dog.

Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which were

many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper.

Meanwhile the town enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary disorders;

or if any case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in neglect, others

in the midst of every attention. No remedy was found that could be used

as a specific; for what did good in one case, did harm in another.

Strong and weak constitutions proved equally incapable of resistance,

all alike being swept away, although dieted with the utmost precaution.

By far the most terrible feature in the malady was the dejection which

ensued when any one felt himself sickening, for the despair into which

they instantly fell took away their power of resistance, and left them

a much easier prey to the disorder; besides which, there was the awful

spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection

in nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. On the one

hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from

neglect; indeed many houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a

nurse: on the other, if they ventured to do so, death was the

consequence. This was especially the case with such as made any

pretensions to goodness: honour made them unsparing of themselves in

their attendance in their friends’ houses, where even the members of

the family were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and

succumbed to the force of the disaster. Yet it was with those who had

recovered from the disease that the sick and the dying found most

compassion. These knew what it was from experience, and had now no fear

for themselves; for the same man was never attacked twice—never at

least fatally. And such persons not only received the congratulations

of others, but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half

entertained the vain hope that they were for the future safe from any

disease whatsoever.

An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country

into the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As

there were no houses to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot

season of the year in stifling cabins, where the mortality raged

without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and

half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the

fountains in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which

they had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had

died there, just as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds,

men, not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly careless of

everything, whether sacred or profane. All the burial rites before in

use were entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they could.

Many from want of the proper appliances, through so many of their

friends having died already, had recourse to the most shameless

sepultures: sometimes getting the start of those who had raised a pile,

they threw their own dead body upon the stranger’s pyre and ignited it;

sometimes they tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of

another that was burning, and so went off.

Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its

origin to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly

done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid

transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those

who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved

to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches

as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was

popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to

attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all

that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or

law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they

judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as

they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live

to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far

severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever

over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy

life a little.

Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the

Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. Among

other things which they remembered in their distress was, very

naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago been

uttered:

A Dorian war shall come and with it death.

So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the

word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course

decided in favour of the latter; for the people made their recollection

fit in with their sufferings. I fancy, however, that if another Dorian

war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth should happen to

accompany it, the verse will probably be read accordingly. The oracle

also which had been given to the Lacedaemonians was now remembered by

those who knew of it. When the god was asked whether they should go to

war, he answered that if they put their might into it, victory would be

theirs, and that he would himself be with them. With this oracle events

were supposed to tally. For the plague broke out as soon as the

Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not at

least to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at

Athens, and next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns.

Such was the history of the plague.

After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian

region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and

first laid waste the side looking towards Peloponnese, next that which

faces Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, held the

same opinion as in the former invasion, and would not let the Athenians

march out against them.

However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered

the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for

Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the ships

he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred

cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of

old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the

expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the

Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at Epidaurus

in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and even had hopes

of taking the town by an assault: in this however they were not

successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory

of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on the coast of

Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime town in Laconia,

ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked the place itself;

after which they returned home, but found the Peloponnesians gone and

no longer in Attica.