Causes of the War—The Affair of Epidamnus—The Affair of Potidæa
The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic
Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people.
The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of
Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to
ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother
country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians, and others of
the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became
great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it is said,
from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much
enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act
before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The
exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in
the city by sea and land; and the Epidamnians, finding themselves hard
pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother country
not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them and
the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the barbarians. The
ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and
made the above requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused
to accept their supplication, and they were dismissed without having
effected anything.
When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra,
they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and
inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to the
Corinthians and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their
founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place
themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to
Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands of
the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and
revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them
to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do.
Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the
Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their
protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt of
the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours accorded
to the parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as
precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with contempt
by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with any
even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great
military strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the
high naval position of an island whose nautical renown dated from the
days of its old inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one reason of the
care that they lavished on their fleet, which became very efficient;
indeed they began the war with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys.
All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to
Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force
of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched
by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being
avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the Corcyraeans
heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the
surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting
to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly followed by
others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back the
banished nobles—(it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had
come to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had
appealed to their kindred to restore them)—and to dismiss the
Corinthian garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians
turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Corcyraeans commenced operations
against them with a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the
exiles, with a view to their restoration, and also secured the services
of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued a
proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that chose, and the
foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being
treated as enemies. On their refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to
besiege the city, which stands on an isthmus; and the Corinthians,
receiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus, got together an
armament and proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, perfect political
equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go. Any who were not
prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of fifty
Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving
Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this proclamation, some being
ready to start directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case
of their passage being disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were
asked to lend them a convoy. Megara prepared to accompany them with
eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with four; Epidaurus furnished five,
Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Thebans
and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for hulls as well;
while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy
infantry.
When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth
with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to
accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she
had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to
make, they were willing to submit the matter to the arbitration of such
of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement,
and that the colony should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators
might assign it. They were also willing to refer the matter to the
oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their protestations, war was
appealed to, they should be themselves compelled by this violence to
seek friends in quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and to
make even old ties give way to the necessity of assistance. The answer
they got from Corinth was that, if they would withdraw their fleet and
the barbarians from Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible; but,
while the town was still being besieged, going before arbitrators was
out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth would
withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they
were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being
concluded till judgment could be given.
Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned
and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them
to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and two
thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the
Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of Aristeus, son of
Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes;
the troops under that of Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas,
son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the territory of
Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where
the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a
light boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they
proceeded to man their ships, all of which had been equipped for
action, the old vessels being undergirded to make them seaworthy. On
the return of the herald without any peaceful answer from the
Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea to meet
the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail (forty were engaged in the siege
of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a decisive
victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day
had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the
conditions being that the foreigners should be sold, and the
Corinthians kept as prisoners of war, till their fate should be
otherwise decided.
After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a
headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the
Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the
Corinthians and their allies repaired home, and left the Corcyraeans
masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to Leucas, a
Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt Cyllene, the
harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to
Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the battle
they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were
harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the
sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the
summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in
Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the rest of the friendly
cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar station on
Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they remained
confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at
hand before either of them returned home.
Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole
of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building
ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers
being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement
of large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their
preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not
enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian
confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into
alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also,
hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the
Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of
ordering the war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An
assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared: the
Corcyraeans spoke as follows:
“Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important service
or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they might
claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to
solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy
certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first, that it is
expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next, that they will
retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly
establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet
with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with their petition for
assistance they can also give you a satisfactory answer on these
points, and they have therefore dispatched us hither. It has so
happened that our policy as regards you with respect to this request,
turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests, to be at
the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a power
which has never in the whole of her past history been willing to ally
herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking them to ally
themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war
with Corinth it has left us in a position of entire isolation, and what
once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in
alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in
risks of their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is
true that in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians
from our shores single-handed. But they have now got together a still
larger armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing
our utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the
magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it
necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope
to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political
isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister
intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment.
“Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you
will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you.
First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which,
herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly,
because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and
your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of
goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in
our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval
power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune
more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that
the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and
moral strength should present herself self-invited, should deliver
herself into your hands without danger and without expense, and should
lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the eyes of
the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great
accession of strength for yourselves? You may search all history
without finding many instances of a people gaining all these advantages
at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance
being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits
as much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged
that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To
this we answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he
is grievously mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon
regards you with jealousy and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful
there—the same, remember, that is your enemy, and is even now trying to
subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to
prevent our becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both
on her hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two
ways, either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own.
Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her—that is, for Corcyra to
make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we ought
to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she
forms against us.
“If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance
is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated
honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice.
For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to
be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be
their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to
refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to
prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair trial. And let
their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not
to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests;
concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more
strictly they are avoided the greater will be the chance of security.
“If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the
treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a
neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is
that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to
join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be
allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also
from the rest of Hellas, no small number being furnished by your own
subjects; while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left open
to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other
quarters, and you are to be accused of political immorality if you
comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater
cause to complain of you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who are
in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet with a repulse at your
hands, while Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only
meets with no hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material
for war from your dependencies. This ought not to be, but you should
either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions, or you should lend
us too what help you may think advisable.
“But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support.
The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our
speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there
be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact
that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us,
and that that power is fully able to punish defection? And there is a
wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of a
maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent, if
possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing
this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if
any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon
this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must
remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will
be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the
confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will
have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your
decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not
making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are
anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the
breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to
attach to your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike
pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for
the coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able
to bar the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese,
and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most
desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both
general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of
sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval
powers in Hellas—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and that if you allow two
of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you
will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and
Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to
reinforce you in the struggle.”
Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the
Corinthians spoke as follows:
“These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine
themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They
also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims
of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both
these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that
you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have
good cause to reject their petition. According to them, their old
policy of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of moderation.
It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their conduct
is such as to make them by no means desirous of having allies present
to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence.
Besides, their geographical situation makes them independent of others,
and consequently the decision in cases where they injure any lies not
with judges appointed by mutual agreement, but with themselves,
because, while they seldom make voyages to their neighbours, they are
constantly being visited by foreign vessels which are compelled to put
in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose to themselves, in
their specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in
the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves—the
licence of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can
elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they
were the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had
upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have put
their honesty by giving and taking what was just.
“But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards
us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of
estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: ‘We were not
sent out to be ill-treated.’ We rejoin that we did not found the colony
to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with a
proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we are
much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if the majority are
satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction
in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in making
war against them, nor are we making war against them without having
received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would
be honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us
to trample on their moderation; but in the pride and licence of wealth
they have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than
when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in
its distress upon our coming to relieve it, was by them seized, and is
now held by force of arms.
“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first
submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from
the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit
due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as
words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it
was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length
understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of
the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own
misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them
not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their
being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they
should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been
wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you will be
admitting to a share in your protection those who never admitted you to
a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal amount of blame
from us with those in whose offences you had no hand. No, they should
have shared their power with you before they asked you to share your
fortunes with them.
“So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the
violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that
you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may
be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be
competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join
whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those
whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those
whose need of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and
whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to
receive them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, if
you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and
remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the
punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the
best possible right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the
contrary join us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you;
with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not lay down the
principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection
of the Samians record our vote against you, when the rest of the
Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether they
should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has
a right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to
receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of
your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you
establish will press less heavily on us than on yourselves.
“This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But
we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since
there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and
since our friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we
say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture. When you were in
want of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the
Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good
turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when we were the
cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to
conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when,
if ever, men are wont in their efforts against their enemies to forget
everything for the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then
as a friend, even if thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes
them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a friend; indeed they
allow their real interests to suffer from their absorbing preoccupation
in the struggle.
“Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they
are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have
done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say,
but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the
straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of the
war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do
wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be carried away
by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It were,
rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which
your conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has
a greater power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case
may warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval
alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate powers is a
greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained by the
sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an apparent temporary
advantage. It is now our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid
down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish her own
allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against
your rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by
yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this
is that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he
who opposes is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans—neither receive
them into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So
do, and you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the
same time best consult your own interests.”
Such were the words of the Corinthians.
When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the
first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations
of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance
with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a
defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of
the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join
Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties
had a right to the other’s assistance against invasion, whether of his
own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the
coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one
was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra
sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other
by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle
which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other
naval powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on
the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens
received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the Corinthians
not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were
commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of
Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were
to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain
circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her
coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to
prevent it. These instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a
breach of the treaty.
Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for
Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten,
Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and
Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral,
the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles,
with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the part
of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the harbour of
Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which, at some
distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean district.
By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets
its name from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis and
falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the
boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between these rivers
rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent the
Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the
Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships,
commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed
themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being
present. On Point Leukimme they posted their land forces, and a
thousand heavy infantry who had come from Zacynthus to their
assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the mainland without their
allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their assistance,
the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of
theirs.
When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days’
provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action.
Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and
coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed
in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian
ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed
in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three
admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as
follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the
centre the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of
the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and
the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised
on either side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of
heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of archers and
darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing. The sea-fight was
an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science; indeed it was
more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other, the
multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get
loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy
infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships
remaining stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried;
in short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science.
Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion;
meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever
they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders
could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right
wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and
chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up
to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and
plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their
allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where
the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided
success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by
the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the
Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them
more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging
any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians
were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all
distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the
Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other.
After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in
lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they
had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as
they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of
their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of
the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides,
and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult,
after they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and
the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any
at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the
Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the
wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of
and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by
their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour
of Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against
the Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their
ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by
the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in
their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean had
been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back
water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had
been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians,
who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and
the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships
were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They suspected that they were
from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there
were more behind; they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans
meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing from a point
which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the
Corinthians were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and
cried out that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also
retired; for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of the
Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they parted from each
other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were in their
camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the
command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of Leogoras,
bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp,
not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans
feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and
the ships came to anchor.
The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by
all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour
at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The
Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea,
but beyond this made no further movement, having no intention of
assuming the offensive. For they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from
Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the
necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on board and the want
of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were
thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be effected; they
feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was dissolved
by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure.
Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send
them without a herald’s wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having
done so, they spoke as follows: “You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war
and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you
placing yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your
intentions are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that
we may wish, and if you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that
are here and treat us as enemies.” Such was what they said, and all the
Corcyraean armament that were within hearing immediately called out to
take them and kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows:
“Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the
treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help
them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in
your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her
possessions, we shall do our best to stop you.”
Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced
preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on
the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that
had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose
in the night and scattered them in all directions, and set up their
trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had
for claiming the victory were these. The Corinthians had been
victorious in the sea-fight until night; and having thus been enabled
to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer
than a thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close upon seventy
vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after
the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their
side; they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before them, backing
water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the
Athenians refuse to sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both sides
claimed the victory.
The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the
mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being
common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing
Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the
Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred and fifty they
retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope
that they might bring over their country to Corinth on their return;
most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in
Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the
war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was
the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians,
viz., that they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans in time of
treaty.
Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the
Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war.
Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her
hostility. The Potidæans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a
Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze
the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the
Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent
from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be
persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw
the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them.
These precautions against the Potidæans were taken by the Athenians
immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length
openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the
Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He had
been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his
brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm
he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war
with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in
order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He also made overtures to
the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to
persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these
places on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to
carry on the war with their co-operation. Alive to all this, and
wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as
follows. They were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand
heavy infantry for his country under the command of Archestratus, son
of Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the captains to
take hostages of the Potidæans, to raze the wall, and to be on their
guard against the revolt of the neighbouring cities.
Meanwhile the Potidæans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of
persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also went
to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need.
Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory
from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say, to prevent
the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against
them; and receiving from the Lacedaemonian government a promise to
invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidæa, the Potidæans,
thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the
Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the
Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard and,
settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place:
meanwhile to those who followed his advice he gave a part of his
territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the
war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished
their towns, removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of
the Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidæa and
the rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite
impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and
with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original
destination, and, having established themselves there, carried on war
in co-operation with Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had
invaded the country from the interior.
Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidæa in revolt and the Athenian
ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place
and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and
mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen
hundred heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light troops. Aristeus,
son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend to the Potidæans, took
command of the expedition, and it was principally for love of him that
most of the men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty
days after the revolt of Potidæa.
The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the
cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were on
their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens
and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of
Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in
Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been
first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna.
Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for
a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced
alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidæa and by the
arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from Macedonia, going
to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the
latter place, they pursued by land their march to Potidæa with three
thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of
their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of
Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy ships along the coast.
Advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus,
where they encamped.
Meanwhile the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were
encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in
expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside
the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry;
while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at
once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the
Potidæans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus
was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the
Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus,
and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the
Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against him; and thus
to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian
general and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of
the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made from that
quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched
against Potidæa. After they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the
enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon
afterwards engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and
other picked troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and
followed for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the
army of the Potidæans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the
Athenians, and took refuge within the fortifications. Returning from
the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army.
Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to
Olynthus or to Potidæa, he at last determined to draw his men into as
small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidæa.
Not without difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by
the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe,
though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from
Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of Potidæa, when
the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to
render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to
prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the
signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and the
Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry
present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy,
and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. The Potidæans
and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a
hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general.
The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised
against it, and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene
had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong
enough at once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to
Pallene and raise works there; they were afraid that the Potidæans and
their allies might take advantage of their division to attack them.
Meanwhile the Athenians at home learning that there were no works at
Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred heavy infantry
of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son of Asopius.
Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphytis, and led his
army against Potidæa by short marches, ravaging the country as he
advanced. No one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works
against the wall on the side of Pallene. So at length Potidæa was
strongly invested on either side, and from the sea by the ships
co-operating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing its investment complete,
and having no hope of its salvation, except in the event of some
movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable contingency,
advised all except five hundred to watch for a wind and sail out of the
place, in order that their provisions might last the longer. He was
willing to be himself one of those who remained. Unable to persuade
them, and desirous of acting on the next alternative, and of having
things outside in the best posture possible, he eluded the guardships
of the Athenians and sailed out. Remaining among the Chalcidians, he
continued to carry on the war; in particular he laid an ambuscade near
the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; he also
communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to contrive some method by
which help might be brought. Meanwhile, after the completion of the
investment of Potidæa, Phormio next employed his sixteen hundred men in
ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by
him.