THE PEOPLE AND ITS POWERS
We have already noticed the duality of procedure by which the powers of
the people were exercised, and seen that every popular act was dependent
on a _rogatio_.[1160] But different spheres of popular activity may
conveniently be distinguished. They may be divided into (i.) legislative
or quasi-legislative acts; (ii.) elective; (iii.) judicial.
(i.) With respect to legislation proper, the Roman, like every other
government which recognises the theory of parliamentary sovereignty and
has no provision for a constituent assembly, drew no distinction between
constitutional and other laws. But in our enumeration we may conveniently
distinguish between those ordinances which altered the structure of the
constitution and affected public rights, and those which dealt merely
with the private relations of the citizens to one another.
In constitutional legislation the power of the people was unlimited.
They could create new parliaments, as they did the _comitia tributa
populi_;[1161] they could delegate full powers of legislation
to parliaments already existing, as they did to the _concilium
plebis_.[1162] They could devolve powers almost amounting to sovereign
rights on an individual, as they devolved them ultimately on the
Princeps. They might suspend the constitution and set up a provisional
government, as they did when they gave constitutive powers to the
decemvirs or to Sulla.
They might also observe or create rules which limited their own power
of utterance. A result of observance of a rule is a _formula_ which
appears in Roman laws declaring their operation invalid in so far as they
conflict with any fundamental obligation—the _fas_ or _jus_ which lies
at the background of the state and which the people themselves dare not
infringe. The scruple was expressed in the saving clause—
SI QUID JUS NON ESSET ROGARIER, EJUS EA LEGE NIHILUM
ROGATUM.[1163]
Primarily this clause guarded a law against being a breach of a religious
obligation;[1164] but, as interpreted by Cicero, it was a profession of
respect even for certain ultimate secular rights—the rights for instance,
to the possession of citizenship.
The creation of limitations may be instanced by the provision of the
Twelve Tables, which forbade enactments to the detriment of individuals
(_privilegia_),[1165] and by a principle—perhaps rather a rule of
procedure analogous to the formalities of legislation—which forbade laws
on different subjects to be passed _en bloc_ (_per saturam_), a provision
re-enacted by a _lex Caecilia Didia_ of 98 B.C.[1166]
The creation of new magistracies was also within the power of the
people, and, originally, the extension of an office beyond its proper
term. In the year 327 B.C., at the commencement of the second Samnite
war, the consul Q. Publilius Philo had his _imperium_ prolonged by a
_plebiscitum_;[1167] although, as early as 308 B.C., in the prorogation
of the command of the consul Q. Fabius Maximus, the Senate alone is
mentioned as giving its sanction.[1168]
The establishment of special judicial commissions to decide without
appeal, in cases where the ordinary authorities were felt to be unable
to cope with crime or conspiracy, was, in the strict theory of the
constitution, entirely in the people’s hands. Commissions of this kind
are found in 187,[1169] 172,[1170] and 141[1171] B.C. In all these cases
there was co-operation between the Senate and people, and it is not until
the revolutionary period that the people ventures on its own authority to
establish a commission for criminal investigation.[1172]
The public rights of the individual were also under the control of
the _comitia_, and the conferment of citizenship was solely the
people’s gift. As originally the patrician _comitia_ could alone coopt
patricians,[1173] so in later times the assembly of the whole Populus
could alone admit new partners to its rights. Civic rights could be
conferred on individuals or communities, in whole or in part, and the
Plebs was for this purpose equally competent with the Populus.[1174] A
mediate grant of the citizenship could be made by the conferment of the
power by the people on a magistrate entrusted with the founding of a
settlement, as when the _lex Appuleia_ of 100 B.C. granted the right to
Marius to raise three persons to the citizenship in any colony which he
planted.[1175] Citizenship might also be conferred by an imperator for
good service in the field; but the power had to be given, or perhaps in
some cases the grant retrospectively sanctioned, by the people. Such a
power was given by law to Pompeius after the war with Sertorius;[1176]
but Pompeius may provisionally have conferred the citizenship during the
campaign. Marius granted the boon on the field of battle;[1177] he may
have already had the power given him by the people,[1178] or he may have
calculated on the subsequent ratification of his act.
Deprivation of the citizenship of a community, the legality of which by
any power was questioned in the later Republic,[1179] could be effected,
if at all, only by the people, and the people might in this particular
be represented by the Plebs. It was this body which pronounced on the
fate of Capua in 210 B.C., and their decision entailed a criminal
condemnation, the penalty of being sold into slavery. The people,
however, did not itself pronounce deprivation of citizenship, but left
the fate of the Capuan burghers to the Senate.[1180]
The people might also give the right of voting to those who already
possessed citizenship without it. This was so entirely a popular gift
that even the previous deliberation of the Senate was not considered
necessary for such a conferment. When a tribune proposed to grant the
right of suffrage to the _municipia_ of Formiae, Fundi, and Arpinum in
188 B.C., he was met by the veto of four of his colleagues, who insisted
that the Senate’s judgment should first be taken. But, yielding to
instruction on the true principle of such gifts, they eventually withdrew
their opposition.[1181]
The deprivation of voting power—_tribu movere_ in the extreme sense—seems
to have been retained by the censor,[1182] although a protest against
its use to disfranchise a whole class was raised in 169 B.C.[1183]. The
people alone could impose a new burden on itself, and taxation belonged
wholly to the _comitia_.[1184]
Passing to legislation on private matters, we find that any fundamental
change in the legal relations of citizens to one another must be effected
by the people. The law of the Twelve Tables is itself a _lex centuriata_,
and we need only think of laws, such as those on usury, or the _lex
Voconia_ on inheritance, as types of a multitude of others. In the matter
of civil procedure also a fundamental change, such as that permitting
the use of the _formula_ in place of the _legis actio_ in cases falling
under the _jus civile_, required legislation.[1185] Yet we feel that it
is only a question of degree whether such changes are effected by the
people or by the authority of individuals. In matters of substantive law
immense changes were brought about by the interpreting authority of the
praetor;[1186] while in procedure also much was left to the discretion
of pontiffs, magistrates, and jurists. The same principle of division of
authority applies to police regulations. Wide as were the coercive powers
of the magistrates, sweeping infringements on individual liberty, such as
those created by the sumptuary laws, were the work of the people.
We may pause here to examine the form of a _lex_, and especially that
portion of it which secured its validity—its sanction. A complete
law contained three parts: (1) its preamble (_praescriptio_), which
described the formal circumstances of its enactment;[1187] (2) the text,
in which a minute and exhaustive formalism was rigorously preserved;
(3) the sanction, which contained the pains and penalties pronounced
against those who violated the provisions of the enactment. A _poena_,
however, was not of itself sufficient to constitute a perfect law. A _lex
perfecta_ was one which declared an act invalid and imposed a penalty
for disobedience. The imposition of a penalty without the declaration of
invalidity constituted a _lex minus quam perfecta_.[1188] A law without
a sanction was _imperfecta_.[1189] The method of repeal most frequently
practised at Rome was rather that of supersession than of the declaration
of the nullity of the former enactment. Hence the sanction of laws often
gives impunity to those who by obedience incur the pains and penalties
pronounced by some previous measure.[1190] Repeal might be either
complete or partial, and a series of technical terms was evolved to
express this difference.[1191]
The attempt of certain laws to secure finality by prohibiting repeal
was necessarily futile, as opposed to the whole theory of parliamentary
sovereignty.[1192] It is possible, however, that the _leges sacratae_
of the early Republic, such as that which made the tribune sacrosanct,
were regarded as unalterable. The _execratio_, which was their sanction,
may have been regarded as a fundamental religious obligation, and have
been held, as such, to be one of those sacred rights which, as we have
seen,[1193] no law professed to infringe.
The sovereign privilege of exempting individuals from laws was naturally
possessed at first by the legislative body itself; but by a curious
revolution, which we shall trace elsewhere,[1194] this singular privilege
became a prerogative of the Senate.
The people’s control of external matters, although it is still, from
a juristic point of view, legislative, bears a closer resemblance to
the administrative functions of a Greek or modern government. Here the
magistrate was empowered to act in all matters of detail, and we shall
see how this magisterial sphere was usurped by the Senate. The people
had only the control of the fundamental relations of Rome with foreign
states. Their activity was confined to the declaration of war, the making
of treaties, and the giving of charters.
A declaration of war was, according to Roman notions, strictly necessary
only when treaty relations, or even at times relations which approximated
to those of a treaty,[1195] had been broken. Such a declaration could
be made only by the people.[1196] But the international point of view
was not the only dominant one in this matter. The people must have been
consulted in many cases where there were no treaty relations, and the
reason would have been simply the advisability of its declaring its will
on a matter which might be of vital importance to the community. The
_comitia centuriata_ seems invariably to have represented the people in
this capacity.[1197] With respect to the conclusion of international
relations, we shall touch elsewhere on the controverted question[1198]
whether the magistracy had the right of binding the popular conscience
by a sworn treaty, or whether this required the consent of the people.
The survival of the controversy into as late a period as that of the
Jugurthine war seems to prove that the federative power was once a
magisterial privilege; and the fact is also attested by the inclusion in
agreements made by commanders of a clause specifying that the agreement
should only be valid if ratified by the people.[1199] In the middle
Republic there was no question that treaty relations were the prerogative
of the people,[1200] and, unlike the case of the declaration of war, the
Plebs is here included in the conception of the people.[1201] By the
nature of the case it could only be the outlines of an agreement that
were thus laid before the _comitia_, and details of settlement were left
to the commander, assisted by a commission.[1202] The organisation of
a province and the _lex provinciae_ that followed the subjection of a
district were not usually interpreted in the light of treaty relations;
they were the work of a commander and a senatorial commission. On the
other hand, cities with treaties (_civitates foederatae_) and cities
with charters (_civitates liberae_) have their rights given them by the
people. In the one case the rights are guaranteed by an irrevocable
agreement sworn to by the _fetiales_; in the other by a revocable charter
(_lex data_), which as late as 71 B.C. is still an utterance of the
people (_lex rogata_).[1203] We shall see, in dealing with the Senate,
that, even in this matter of granting treaties or charters to separate
states, senatorial authority encroached on that of the people.
(ii.) We have already seen how in theory the popular power of election
was a modification of a principle of nomination;[1204] after its
recognition the principles regulating it were practically those of
legislation, the magistrate questioning and the people commanding. The
representation of the dual community is here rather more marked than in
the case of legislation; for while a _plebiscitum_ is often spoken of as
a _lex_, no one credits the tribune with the position of a _magistratus
populi_, and however wide his powers may have become, he always remains
in theory the head of the plebeian community. The preliminaries to
election necessary to the candidate for office have already been
considered,[1205] and the further process of election will be dealt with
when we describe the procedure of the _comitia_ as a whole.
(iii.) The origin of the jurisdiction of the people is, as we have seen,
obscure; but it is probable that it did not spring wholly from the
_provocatio_,[1206] and even in cases where it did, the appeal tended
to become extinct, from the fact that a magistrate who recognised the
restrictions imposed on his _imperium_ by law would not pronounce a
sentence, but would bring the case immediately before the people. A
trial before the people (_judicium populi_) took place when a magistrate
recognised the limitations on his power; the _provocatio_—an extremely
rare occurrence in the later Republic—was required to start the same
procedure when the magistrate refused to recognise these limitations.
The judicial competence of the different magistrates and _comitia_ was
determined partly by law, partly by custom. Two fundamental principles
were recognised:—
(1) That capital cases should be reserved for the centuries. To this
there is the exception furnished by the special capital jurisdiction of
the Plebs.[1207]
(2) That a case initiated by a magistrate could be tried only in that
assembly which the magistrate was competent to approach. To this
principle there were two exceptions: first, the consular delegates—the
quaestors and the _duumviri perduellionis_—although possessing no _jus
agendi cum populo_, yet guided the assemblies in which an appeal from
their decision was made;[1208] and secondly, the tribune, when conducting
a capital prosecution before the _comitia centuriata_, approached, and
perhaps had the presidency of, this body.[1209]
But, as a rule, the official character of the magistrate who conducts the
prosecution, and the nature of the penalty which he proposes, are signs
of what assembly passes its final judgment on the case.
The capital jurisdiction of the consuls, expressed through the quaestors,
was exercised in the _comitia centuriata_; an appeal against the
_coercitio_ of consuls and praetors, when the fine which they imposed
passed the limit of the _multa suprema_[1210] came before the _comitia
tributa populi_. The jurisdiction of the aediles[1211] was always
exercised before the tribes; the curule aediles as _magistratus populi_
must have brought their case before the _comitia tributa populi_; the
plebeian aediles, who, as magistrates of the Plebs, had no right of
approaching the people, appeared before the _concilium plebis_. With
regard to the tribunes, where their jurisdiction was capital, it may in
certain cases have been exercised by the _concilium plebis_, but usually
necessitated an appearance before the _comitia centuriata_,[1212] where
it was pecuniary, the tribune would invariably have brought the case
before his own assembly of the Plebs.
The procedure in a _judicium populi_ consisted of two stages. In the
first, the magistrate who intended to impose a sentence which was beyond
the limits of his personal jurisdiction held a preliminary examination
(_anquisitio_).[1213] This is conducted with the fullest publicity before
an informal assembly or _contio_ which he has summoned. This preliminary
investigation is repeated three times, on days not necessarily
consecutive. The magistrate is represented as a prosecutor, and his
expressions of opinion at these meetings are spoken of as _accusationes_.
His final judgment, consequent on the proceedings of the third _contio_,
is a bill (_rogatio_), which he gives notice of his intention to bring
before the _comitia_. The penalty proposed in this bill need not be that
originally suggested, for the investigation may have led the magistrate
to amend his original proposal.[1214]
The legal interval for promulgation—three weeks—then elapsed, and at its
close the proposal was brought by the magistrate before the _comitia_. It
was then either accepted or rejected (necessarily without amendment) by
the assembled people. This formal assembly (_comitia_) was, in judicial
as in legislative acts, preceded by a _contio_; and the magistrate’s
final statement of his proposal before this _contio_ is spoken of
as his “fourth accusation” (_quarta accusatio_).[1215] If, through
any chance, such as evil auspices, the bill was not carried through
the _comitia_, a fresh promulgation, with another interval of three
weeks, was necessary for a revival of the trial. This necessity made a
repetition of a prosecution by the same magistrate on the same charge
very infrequent.[1216]
Hitherto we have been treating the case of a _judicium populi_ consequent
on the magistrate’s recognising the limitations on his power. But there
is a possibility of his refusing this recognition, and in this case
the matter can be brought to the people only by means of an appeal
(_provocatio_) lodged by the accused. This contingency was, in the middle
and later Republic, unusual but not unknown, for the jurisdiction of the
_duumviri perduellionis_ was, as we know from the case of Rabirius,[1217]
regulated at times in such a manner that an appeal to the people was an
essential part of the procedure.
In such a case there were two magisterial investigations instead of
one. The first was the _quaestio_, as a result of which the magistrate
had pronounced the appellable sentence; the second was the _anquisitio_
before the people preceding the decision in the _comitia_. It must
occasionally have happened that different magistrates conducted these two
stages of procedure; for if an individual appealed against the decision
of a magistrate in a province or in the field, this magistrate might
himself be unable to conduct the case at Rome.
The people is represented from a very early time as rescinding its own
sentences.[1218] This rescission was simply the repeal of a law, and was
perhaps not regarded originally as the revision of its own sentence by
a court. No provision was made that the particular assembly which had
pronounced the sentence should repeal it. This was, indeed, sometimes
the case. Popilius, for instance, who had been held responsible for
the judicial murders following the fate of Ti. Gracchus, was both
banished and restored by _plebiscita_.[1219] But, on the other hand,
Metellus, “interdicted” by a consular bill, which must have been passed
at the _comitia centuriata_,[1220] was restored by the _rogatio_ of a
tribune,[1221] while Cicero himself, banished by a tribunician enactment,
was recalled from exile by a consular law passed at the _comitia
centuriata_.[1222]
A further step in the exercise of this power was taken when attempts
were made to rescind the decisions of the _judices_ of criminal
commissions by decrees of the people. This was first attempted in 88
B.C. by the tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus, who carried a _plebiscitum_
for the restoration of exiles who had been condemned by the Varian
commission.[1223] Other tentative steps in the same direction led up to
Caesar’s bill of 49, by which he effected the restoration of those who
had been condemned under the Pompeian laws of 52 B.C.[1224] The instances
of this period generally illustrate the rescission of the decrees of
special commissions, which were themselves political weapons evoked by
party conflict, but M. Antonius when tribune is said to have effected the
restoration of a man who had been condemned for an ordinary crime,[1225]
and, therefore, presumably by an ordinary _quaestio perpetua_, and
it seems clear that by Cicero’s time this power of restitution by
the _comitia_ had come to be regarded as practically one of pardon.
Each of the three legislative assemblies was competent to “restore”
(_restituere_). The proposals are usually tribunician, but Caesar also
employed praetorian rogations (probably before the _comitia tributa_) for
the purpose.[1226]
Two powers analogous to that of the rescission of a sentence are the
remission of outlawry and amnesty.
The outlawry referred to is not that following on _aquae et ignis
interdictio_, which was an act of the people and the confirmation of
a criminal sentence, but that consequent on a decree of the Senate,
which had pronounced individuals to be _hostes_. Although we might
have expected that the Senate, which passed, would be the body to
rescind such a decree, we find the belief that the restitution of the
outlawed required a _lex_ or _plebiscitum_. Marius pretended that such
a permit was necessary for his entrance into Rome in 87 B.C.,[1227] and
Octavian in 43 B.C. had a law passed which rescinded the outlawry of
Dolabella.[1228]
Amnesty is an act which implies that no trial and no condemnation,
whether pronounced by a court or other body, have taken place; it gives
immunity from the consequence of criminal acts that have not yet been
judged. This, however, is a prerogative, not of the people, but of
the Senate. It was a decree of this body that gave an immunity (not
subsequently respected) to Caesar’s murderers in 44 B.C.,[1229] and a
similar act in 33 B.C. granted an amnesty to senators who had during the
civil war raised troops at their own cost.[1230]
The occasional grounds of invalidity of these legislative or
quasi-legislative acts of the people have already been incidentally
considered. We have spoken of the conditions of the auspices and the
intercession,[1231] neglect of either of which made a law _ipso jure_
invalid, and the same consequence followed a breach of the formal rules
which the people had made for its own guidance, such as the rules of
promulgation which we shall soon discuss, or the provision against the
union of heterogeneous measures in the same bill.[1232] In the earlier
period of Republican history such invalid ordinances were, when they
took the form of election, subjected to a procedure resembling repeal,
and there are many instances of magistrates _vitio creati_ forced to
abdicate their office, a renewal of the elective procedure following
on their abdication;[1233] and even in the case of laws which offended
against fundamental principles of the constitution, it was at all times
considered safer to secure their formal repeal.[1234] But the more
logical idea of absolute nullity, which required no repeal, subsequently
prevailed, and we shall find that it is the Senate which, as the guide of
the executive power, pronounces enactments to be invalid in consequence
of formal flaws.
When we turn from the “people” in general to its manifestations in
the separate _comitia_ and in the _concilium_ of the Plebs, we find
that, although historically we are dealing with different parliaments,
practically we are treating the Roman community engaged with different
orders of the day under different formal rules. The people require to be
organised in one way for one function, in another way for another,[1235]
but under the changing forms there is a unity of personnel which forbids
us regarding the different assemblies as different sovereigns.[1236] The
only disturbance to this unity is found in the fact that the Patricians
were always excluded from the _concilium_ of the Plebs.[1237]
The _comitia curiata_, the oldest sovereign in Rome, was a mere shadow of
its former self. Its main constitutional function was that of passing
the _lex curiata_, which was necessary for the ratification originally
of the _imperium_[1238] and, with the creation of fresh patrician
magistracies, of the _potestas_ which these involved.[1239] Yet although
in theory no magistracy was properly constituted (_justus_) until its
holder had received the ratification of the _curiae_, we know that in
the case of those with _imperium_, and we may conclude that in that of
others, most of the ordinary functions could be exercised without this
sanction. It was only the full exercise of the _imperium_, whether in
jurisdiction, in military command, or in the transmission of office,
that was in suspense until the _lex_ had been elicited. Without it the
praetor could not give justice from his tribunal,[1240] the consul could
not hold an assembly for the creation of his successor,[1241] and whether
as magistrate or pro-magistrate could not exercise the full _imperium_
in the field,[1242] until the ambiguous wording of the _lex Cornelia de
provinciis ordinandis_ made the requirement in this last particular a
doubtful point.[1243]
For the purpose of this conferment the _comitia curiata_ was in Cicero’s
day often represented by but thirty lictors,[1244] and the same scanty
attendance may have sufficed for the other formal acts which it retained
from antiquity. These are the acts of the _comitia calata_.[1245] The
public will and testament made at this assembly was extinct at the close
of the Republic; but the _comitia_ still met, under the presidency of the
_pontifex maximus_, for the inauguration of the _rex sacrorum_ and the
_flamines_, and under the same guidance for the _detestatio sacrorum_
made by one who passed from his _gens_ either by an act of adrogation or
by transition from the patrician to the plebeian order.[1246]
The _comitia centuriata_, once known as the “greatest of the comitia”
(_comitiatus maximus_),[1247] not only from its importance as expressing
the sovereign will, but from the possibility of enforcing the attendance
of the assembled army, always retained something of its military
character and its association with the _imperium_. Its summons and
presidency belong by right only to the magistrates with _imperium_. The
consuls are its normal presidents for elections and for laws; the praetor
approaches it for purposes of jurisdiction, and the interrex for the
election of a consul. The election of magistrates with _imperium_ and of
the censors was confined to this body, and we have already seen how its
supreme judicial authority was asserted and infringed.[1248] The army
alone could declare war,[1249] but its legislative power, though never
lost, was infrequently asserted after the recognition of sovereignty in
the two assemblies of the tribes which were more easily summoned and
organised.
But not only did the tribe assemblies infringe the power of those of the
centuries, they became the later model of the latter, and the tendency
to detract from the influence of wealth was shown in the reorganisation
of the _comitia centuriata_ on a tribal basis.[1250] The date of this
change is unknown; but, as the redistribution of the centuries in its
final form assumes the existence of thirty-five tribes, the alteration
may not be earlier than the year 241 B.C. The leading principle of the
new arrangement was that the five classes were distributed over all the
tribes in such a manner that there were two centuries of each class—one
century of _seniores_ and one of _juniores_—in a single tribe. Each
class thus had two votes in a tribe and seventy votes in all. The
eighteen centuries of knights still stood outside the tribe; so did the
four centuries of _fabri_, _accensi_, _tibicines_ and _cornicines_,
and the fifth century of _proletarii_ which probably existed at this
time.[1251] The total number of centuries would thus be 373 (350 + 18
+ 5). The majority of this number is 187, but the first class and the
_equites_ together now have but 88 votes, thus losing their preponderance
in voting power. In spite of this arrangement by tribes there is no
tribal vote. The unit of voting is still the century, and it is the
number of centuries that decides the question. The organisation is still
by classes, the seventy centuries of each class voting as distinct
bodies.[1252] The _equites_ seem still to have had the right of voting
first,[1253] and the first class took precedence of the others; for the
lot which designated the _centuria praerogativa_[1254] seems to have
been cast only amongst the seventy groups of _seniores_ and _juniores_
belonging to this class.[1255]
The restoration by Sulla of the older method of voting (88 B.C.)[1256]
was not a permanent reform. It disappeared during the Cinnan reaction,
and it is questionable whether it was renewed by the dictator. If it was,
it soon vanished with other items of his aristocratic reorganisation.
The _comitia tributa_ was the most handy of all the assemblies of the
full Populus, and was, consequently, the most frequently employed for
the passing of _leges_. Its presidents were the patrician magistrates,
usually the consuls and praetors and, for purposes of jurisdiction, the
curule aediles. It elected these aediles and other lower magistrates
of the people, as well as the twenty-four tribunes of the first four
legions. Its jurisdiction was limited to pecuniary penalties.
The _concilium plebis_, practically the sovereign body of the state,
differed from this last assembly in two respects. It could be summoned
only by plebeian magistrates and it never included the Patricians.[1257]
Besides issuing universally valid decrees (_plebiscita_), it elected
the magistrates of the Plebs, and in its judicial capacity was the
body which considered the penalties which they had formulated. By the
strict letter of the Twelve Tables this jurisdiction should have been
limited to the imposition of fines,[1258] but, besides instances of its
capital jurisdiction at an early period of its history, it continued
to possess the unquestioned right of pronouncing outlawry (_aquae et
ignis interdictio_) against any one already in exile,[1259] and after
the time of Caius Gracchus there are traces of an independent capital
jurisdiction which it exercised against magistrates who had violated the
_provocatio_.[1260]
The freedom of this plebeian assembly was for a time limited by Sulla’s
ordinance (88 B.C.) directing that no measure should be brought before
it which had not received the previous sanction of the Senate;[1261] but
the old powers of unimpeded legislation were restored in 70 B.C. If Sulla
also took the right of prosecution from the tribune,[1262] the higher
jurisdiction of the Plebs was restored by the enactment which gave it
back its legislative power, for tribunician prosecutions continue to the
end of the Republic.
An anomalous use of the popular suffrage was made in the case of
elections to the priestly colleges. Formerly they had been kept distinct
from the secular life of the state, and even when the reforming spirit
dictated that they should be submitted to the voice of the people,
a religious scruple forbade the intervention of the _comitia_. The
electoral body was composed of seventeen tribes selected by lot from
the thirty-five, and this body, which was _not_ the Populus,[1263] was
presided over by a pontiff.[1264] This organisation was probably first
applied about the middle of the third century B.C. to the creation of
the _pontifex maximus_: it received a great extension at the close of
the second century. A Domitian law, a _plebiscitum_ of 104 B.C., applied
election in a modified form to the religious _collegia_—probably to the
four great guilds of pontiffs, augurs, quindecemvirs, and epulones. The
college in question presented, the people elected and gave to the college
again a _congé d’élire_, whereupon the chosen candidate was solemnly
coopted by the members of his guild.[1265] Sulla abolished this mode
of appointment, and perhaps with it the popular election of the chief
pontiff, restoring the aristocratic mode of cooptation; but appointment
by the seventeen tribes was restored again in 63 B.C., through a
plebiscite of the tribune Labienus.[1266]
Our final task in connexion with the people and its powers will be to
describe the preliminaries to the meetings of the _comitia_ and the
_concilium_, and the mode in which business was transacted at these
gatherings.
The legal days of meeting (_comitiales dies_) were those which were
neither holy (_nefasti_) nor dedicated to the work of justice (_fasti_).
The 194 days thus left clear were further broken into by the _nundinae_,
the first days of the eight-day week, on which not even a _contio_ could
be held,[1267] and by the movable festivals (_feriae conceptivae_) which
were fixed by the magistrates. These rules of time were binding on all
meetings of Populus and Plebs; those of place differed for the various
assemblies. The assembly of the _curiae_ met within the _pomerium_,
usually in the Comitium on the north-west of the Forum.[1268] The
centuries, on the other hand, must meet without the walls, and their
place of assembly was usually the Campus Martius, but meetings are
sometimes found in other places such as “the Peteline grove outside the
river-gate,” and an unknown site called the Aesculetum.[1269] The two
assemblies of the tribes were originally bound to no locality, except for
the fact that the plebeian, as purely city, magistrates could not easily
find their way outside the walls. But the eliciting of a _rogatio_ from
the tribes by the consul in his camp at Sutrium in 357 B.C. led, through
the fear of military influence, to the rule that no resolution should
be elicited from the people in the military domain,[1270] and since
that date the two assemblies of the tribes were held within the first
milestone. The open space of the Capitol (_area Capitolii_) was at one
time their usual resort both for elections and for laws, but in the later
period of the Republic it was found convenient to conduct the elections
both of the lower and plebeian magistrates in the Campus Martius, while
the Rostra in the Forum, the usual centre of demagogic strife and the
ordinary gathering place for _contiones_, was chosen as the site for the
legislation of the tribes.[1271]
The first step in the intercourse of a magistrate with the people, which
was to produce a binding act, was the setting forth by the former of a
decree specifying the day of meeting,[1272] and describing the nature
of the act which he meant to introduce. This promulgation[1273] assumed
various forms in accordance with the purpose of the projected meeting.
In prosecutions it contained the name of the accused, the nature of
the charge, and the penalty proposed; in elections at least the places
to be filled, but probably in later times a list of the candidates as
well;[1274] in legislation the text of the law which was to be the
subject of the _rogatio_. No provision seems to have been made that
the text should remain unaltered until a Licinio-Junian law of 62 B.C.
provided that a copy of the promulgated enactment should be deposited in
the _aerarium_ as a guarantee that no amendment was inserted before the
people was asked to accept it.[1275]
The minimum interval between the promulgation and the meeting was the
space of three _nundina_, i.e. 24 days, and this condition was as
necessary for jurisdiction and elections as for laws.[1276] On the
appointed day the first act of the magistrate, who meant to guide a
meeting of the Populus, was the _auspicatio_ in the sacred enclosure
(_templum_) which formed the centre of the gathering. Celestial signs
alone[1277] seem to have been the object of this morning watch; but
no such observation was necessary for plebeian gatherings; they were
disturbed only by _auspicia oblativa_.[1278] The auspices had been taken
before sunrise, and if they were favourable the herald was then sent
round the walls inviting the people to meet the magistrate at dawn.[1279]
This was sufficient for the _comitia_ of the tribes.[1280] For the
centuries more elaborate preparations were necessary. Proclamation of
the meeting was made from the Rostra, and the red flag flew from the
Janiculum to show that it was guarded while the army was busy in the
Campus.[1281] The military horn was blown on the _arx_ and round the
walls, and, if the summons was for a court of justice, before the house
of the accused.[1282]
When the people were assembled the president opened with a prayer,[1283]
and the _rogatio_ was read with the request whether the quirites “will
and order it” (_velitis_, _jubeatis_). The magistrate is now addressing
a _contio_, and the _rogatio_ is subjected to a limited discussion. The
president explains and advises it, and the officials or senators whom he
has assembled express their support or dissent.[1284] This discussion
always preceded acts of legislation.[1285] When the _comitia_ met for
jurisdiction there may have been some debate even in the _quarta
accusatio_;[1286] it was probably only at elections that it was wholly
absent.
When the discussion was over the _contio_ was dissolved. Those who had
no votes were dismissed from the enclosure;[1287] to those with votes
the magistrate said, “Si vobis videtur, discedite, quirites,”[1288]
thus asking them to divide up into their separate compartments, whether
tribes or curiae or centuries. The enclosure was deemed large enough to
hold all the privileged citizens, although where such a space could have
been found on the Capitol or in the Forum is one of the mysteries of
Roman topography. This enclosure was divided longitudinally into as many
compartments (_consaepta_) as there were voting divisions. Each division
was connected with the magistrate’s tribunal through a gallery (_pons_)
running the whole length of the enclosure, this high gallery being
connected with the various voting compartments by separate descending
_pontes_.
The votes in each compartment were taken singly, and were given at the
exits of the various _pontes_. During the greater part of Republican
history votes were given verbally, the tellers (_rogatores_) marking
them off on tablets by means of points (_puncta_).[1289] In legislation
the affirmative answer was _uti rogas_, the negative _antiquo_; in
jurisdiction acquittal and condemnation were pronounced by _libero_
and _damno_; in elections _dico_ and _facio_ seem to have been
employed.[1290] But in the latter half of the second century of the
Republic the ballot was introduced. The change was gradual. Secrecy
was first secured for elections by the _lex Gabinia_ of 139, and for
jurisdiction, with the exception of cases of treason (_perduellio_),
by the _lex Cassia_ of 137. The _lex Papiria_ of 131 extended the
principle to legislation, and finally the _lex Caelia_ of 107 admitted
it for cases of treason.[1291] In legislation and jurisdiction the old
formulae were retained, the tablets which were distributed being marked
V and A, or L and C. For the purpose of elections blank tablets were
distributed on which the voters wrote the names.[1292] The _tabellae_
were now thrown into an urn (_cista_) at the exit of each _pons_. The
reckoning of the votes (_diribitio_) was in the hands of tellers who were
sometimes called by the old name _rogatores_, but were also spoken of
as _diribitores_.[1293] The _cistae_ were watched by public _custodes_,
and in the case of elections the candidates were allowed to place one
guardian at each urn.[1294]
The issue was decided by the vote of the groups. In the assemblies
of the curiae and the tribes the voting of the groups took place
simultaneously, in that of the centuries in the order which we have
already described.[1295] In the two former assemblies the order in
which the votes of the groups were proclaimed had thus to be decided by
lot.[1296] The reading (_pronuntatio_, _recitatio_) was continued only
to the point at which an absolute majority for or against the measure
had been obtained. When sixteen curiae or eighteen tribes were found to
have given the same vote, it ceased, and the formal announcement of the
result (_renuntiatio_) was then made by the magistrate. In the _comitia
centuriata_ the announcement of the result might be reached without
all the centuries being called on to vote, since the result of each
vote was proclaimed immediately after the group had given it, and the
needful majority might be reached before all the groups had voted. The
absolute majority was required in elections as well as in legislative
acts, and hence the candidate who gained a mere relative majority was not
returned.[1297]
Records of the voting were kept for some time in case the decision
should be challenged.[1298] The promulgated _lex_ was, as we saw,
deposited in the _aerarium_, as laws which had passed must have been
long before this provision was made, but they were kept without order or
method, and skilled assistants were required to ferret out the desired
enactment.[1299] Little regular provision seems to have been made for
the publication even of recent measures; but those which were considered
important were originally painted on wood and later engraved on bronze,
and fixed in temples or other public places.[1300]