Ireland is a component member of the most complex political body the
world has yet known; any inquiry, then, into the fitness of any
particular form of government for that country involves an investigation
of the structures of various composite nations, or nations made up of
numerous political communities more or less differing from each other.
From the examination of the nature of the common tie, and the
circumstances which caused it to be adopted or imposed on the component
peoples, we cannot but derive instruction, and be furnished with
materials which will enable us to take a wide view of the question of
Home Rule, and assist us in judging between the various remedies
proposed for the cure of Irish disorders.
The nature of the ties which bind, or have bound, the principal
composite nations of the world together may be classified as--
1. Confederate unions.
2. Federal unions.
3. Imperial unions.
A confederate union may be defined to mean an alliance between the
governments of independent States, which agree to appoint a common
superior authority having power to make peace and war and to demand
contributions of men and money from the confederate States. Such
superior authority has no power of enforcing its decrees except through
the medium of the governments of the constituent States; or, in other
words, in case of disobedience, by armed force.
A federal union differs from a confederate union in the material fact
that the common superior authority, instead of acting on the individual
subjects of the constituent States through the medium of their
respective governments, has a power, in respect of all matters within
its jurisdiction, of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding
directly on the individual citizens.
The distinguishing characteristics of an imperial union are, that it
consists of an aggregate of communities, one of which is dominant, and
that the component communities have been brought into association, not
by arrangement between themselves, but by colonization, cession, and by
other means emanating from the resources or power of the dominant
community.
The above-mentioned distinction between a Government having communities
only for its subjects, and incapable of enforcing its orders by any
other means than war, and a Government acting directly on individuals,
must be constantly borne in mind, for in this lies the whole difference
between a confederate and federal union; that is to say, between a
confederacy which, in the case of the United States, lasted a few short
years, and a federal union which, with the same people as subjects, has
lasted nearly a century, and has stood the strain of the most terrible
war of modern times.
The material features of the Constitution of the United States have been
explained in a previous article.[61] All that is necessary to call to
mind here is, that the Government of the United States exercises a power
of taxation throughout the whole Union by means of its own officers, and
enforces its decrees through the medium of its own Courts. A Supreme
Court has also been established, which has power to adjudicate on the
constitutionality of all laws passed by the Legislature of the United
States, or of any State, and to decide on all international questions.
Switzerland was till 1848 an example of a confederate union or league of
semi-independent States, which, unlike other confederacies, had existed
with partial interruptions for centuries. This unusual vitality is
attributed by Mill[62] to the circumstance that the confederate
government felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted
to exercise any real authority. Its present government, finally settled
in 1874, but based on fundamental laws passed in 1848, is a federal
union formed on the pattern of the American Constitution. It consists of
a federal assembly comprising two Chambers--the Upper Chamber composed
of forty-four members chosen by the twenty-two cantons, two for each
canton; the Lower consisting of 145 members chosen by direct election at
the rate of one deputy for every 20,000 persons. The chief executive
authority is deputed to a federal council consisting of seven members
elected for three years by the federal assembly, and having at their
head a president and vice-president, who are the first magistrates of
the republic. There is also a federal tribunal, having similar functions
to those of the supreme court of the United States of America,
consisting of nine members elected for six years by the federal
assembly.
The Empire of Germany is a federal union, differing from the United
States and Switzerland in having an hereditary emperor as its head. It
comprises twenty-six States, who have "formed an eternal union for the
protection of the realm, and the care of the welfare of the German
people."[63] The King of Prussia, under the title of German Emperor,
represents the empire in all its relations to foreign nations, and has
the power of making peace and war, but if the war be more than a
defensive war he must have the assent of the Upper House. The
legislative body of the empire consists of two Houses--the Upper, called
the Bundesrath, representing the several component States in different
proportions according to their relative importance; the lower, the
Reichstag, elected by the voters in 397 electoral districts, which are
distributed amongst the constituent States in unequal numbers, regard
being had to the population and circumstances of each State.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire is a federal union, differing alike in its
origin and construction from the federal unions above mentioned. In the
beginning Austria and Hungary were independent countries--Austria a
despotism, Hungary a constitutional monarchy, with ancient laws and
customs dating back to the foundation of the kingdom in 895. In the
sixteenth century the supreme power in both countries--that is to say,
the despotic monarchy in Austria and the constitutional monarchy in
Hungary--became vested in the same person; as might have been
anticipated, the union was not a happy one. If we dip into Heeren's
_Political System of Europe_ at intervals selected almost at random, the
following notices will be found in relation to Austria and
Hungary:--Between 1671 and 1700 "political unity in the Austrian
monarchy was to have been enforced especially in the principal country
(Hungary), for this was regarded as the sole method of establishing
power; the consequence was an almost perpetual revolutionary state of
affairs."[64] Again, in the next chapter, commenting on the period
between 1740 and 1786: "Hungary, in fact the chief, was treated like a
conquered province; subjected to the most oppressive commercial
restraints, it was regarded as a colony from which Austria exacted what
she could for her own advantage. The injurious consequences of this
internal discord are evident." Coming to modern times we find that
oppression followed oppression with sickening monotony, and that at last
the determination of Austria to stamp out the Constitution in Hungary
gave rise to the insurrection of 1849, which Austria suppressed with the
assistance of Russia, and as a penalty declared the Hungarian
Constitution to be forfeited, and thereupon Hungary was incorporated
with Austria, as Ireland was incorporated with Great Britain in 1800.
Both events were the consequences of unsuccessful rebellions; but the
junction which, in the case of Hungary, was enforced by the sword, was
in Ireland more smoothly carried into effect by corruption. Hungary,
sullen and discontented, waited for Austria's calamity as her
opportunity, and it came after the battle of Sadowa. Austria had just
emerged from a fearful conflict, and Count Beust[65] felt that unless
some resolute effort was made to meet the views of the constitutional
party in Hungary, the dismemberment of the empire must be the result.
Now, what was the course he took? Was it a tightening of the bonds
between Austria and Hungary? On the contrary, to maintain the unity of
the empire he dissolved its union and restored to Hungary its ancient
constitutional privileges. Austria and Hungary each had its own
Parliament for local purposes. To manage the imperial concerns of peace
and war, and the foreign relations, a controlling body, called the
Delegations, was established, consisting of 120 members, of whom half
represent and are chosen by the Legislature of Austria, and the other
half by that of Hungary; the Upper House of each country returning
twenty members, and the Lower House forty.[66] Ordinarily the delegates
sit and vote in two Chambers, but if they disagree the two branches
must meet together and give their final vote without debate, which is
binding on the whole empire.[67]
The question arises, What is the magnetic influence which induces
communities of men to combine together in federal unions? Undoubtedly it
is the feeling of nationality; and what is nationality? Mr. Mill
says,[68] "a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality
if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not
exist between them and any others; which make them co-operate with each
other more willingly than other people; desire to be under the same
government, and desire that it should be a government by themselves or a
portion of themselves exclusively." He then proceeds to state that the
feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes.
Sometimes it is the identity of race and descent; community of language
and community of religion greatly contribute to it; geographical limits
are one of its causes; but the strongest of all is identity of political
antecedents: the possession of a national history and consequent
community of recollections--collective pride and humiliation, pleasure
and regret--connected with the same incidents in the past.
The only point to be noted further in reference to the foregoing federal
unions, is that the same feeling of nationality which, in the United
States, Switzerland, and the German Empire, produced a closer legal bond
of union, in the case of Austria-Hungary operated to dissolve the
amalgamation formed in 1849 of the two States, and to produce a federal
union of States in place of a single State.
One conclusion seems to follow irresistibly from any review of the
construction of the various States above described: that the stability
of a nation bears no relation whatever to the legal compactness or
homogeneity of its component parts. Russia and France, the most compact
political societies in Europe, do not, to say the least, rest on a
firmer basis than Germany and Switzerland, the inhabitants of which are
subjected to the obligations of a double nationality. Above all, no
European nation, except Great Britain, can for a moment bear comparison
with the United States in respect of the devotion of its people to their
Constitution.
An imperial union, though resembling somewhat in outward form a federal
union, differs altogether from it both in principle and origin. Its
essential characteristic is that one community is absolutely dominant
while all the others are subordinate. In the case of a federal union
independent States have agreed to resign a portion of their powers to a
central Government for the sake of securing the common safety. In an
imperial union the dominant or imperial State delegates to each
constituent member of the union such a portion of local government as
the dominant State considers the subordinate member entitled to,
consistently with the integrity of the empire. The British Empire
furnishes the best example of an imperial union now existing in the
world. Her Majesty, as common head, is the one link which binds the
empire together and connects with each other every constituent member.
The Indian Empire and certain military dependencies require no further
notice in these pages; but a summary of our various forms of colonial
government is required to complete our knowledge of the forms of Home
Rule possibly applicable to Ireland.
The colonies, in relation to their forms of government, may be
classified as follows:--
I. Crown colonies, in which laws may be made by the Governor alone, or
with the concurrence of a Council nominated by the Crown.
2. Colonies possessing representative institutions, but not responsible
government, in which the Crown has only a veto on legislation, but the
Home Government retains the control of the executive.
3. Colonies possessing representative institutions and responsible
government, in which the Crown has only a veto on legislation, and the
Home Government has no control over any public officer except the
Governor.
The British Colonial Governments thus present an absolute gradation of
rule; beginning with absolute despotism and ending with almost absolute
legal independence, except in so far as a veto on legislation and the
presence of a Governor named by the Crown mark the dependence of the
colony on the mother country.
It is to be remembered, moreover, that the colonies which have received
this complete local freedom are the great colonies of the earth--nations
themselves possessing territories as large or larger than any European
State--namely, Canada, the Cape, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland,
South Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania. And this change from dependence
to freedom has been effected with the good-will both of the mother
country and the colony, and without it being imputed to the colonists,
when desiring a larger measure of self-government, that they were
separatists, anarchists, or revolutionists.
Such are the general principles of colonial government, but one colony
requires special mention, from the circumstance of its Constitution
having been put forward as a model for Ireland; this is the Dominion of
Canada. The Government of Canada is, in effect, a subordinate federal
union; that is to say, it possesses a central Legislature, having the
largest possible powers of local self-government consistent with the
supremacy of the empire, with seven inferior provincial Governments,
exercising powers greater than those of an English county, but not so
great as those of an American State. The advantage of such a form of
government is that, without weakening the supremacy of the empire or of
the central local power, it admits of considerable diversities being
made in the details of provincial government, where local peculiarities
and antecedents render it undesirable to make a more complete
assimilation of the Governments of the various provinces.
Materials have now been collected which will enable the reader to judge
of the expediency or inexpediency of the course taken by Mr. Gladstone's
Government in dealing with Ireland. Three alternatives were open to
them--
1. To let matters alone.
2. To pass a Coercion Bill.
3. To change the government of Ireland, and at
the same time to pass a Land Bill.
The two last measures are combined under the head of one alternative, as
it will be shown in the sequel that no effective Land Bill can be passed
without granting Home Rule in Ireland.
Now, the short answer to the first alternative is, that no party in the
State--Conservative, Whig, Radical, Unionist, Home Ruler,
Parnellite--thought it possible to leave things alone. That something
must be done was universally admitted.
The second alternative has found favour with the present Government, and
certainly is a better example of the triumph of hope over experience,
than even the proverbial second marriage.
Eighty-six years have elapsed since the Union. During the first
thirty-two years only eleven years, and during the last fifty-four years
only two years have been free from special repressive legislation; yet
the agitation for repeal of the Union, and general discontent, are more
violent in 1887 than in any one of the eighty-six previous years. In
the name of common-sense, is there any reason for supposing that the
Coercion Bill of 1887 will have a better or more enduring effect than
its numerous predecessors? The _primâ facie_ case is at all events in
favour of the contention that, when so many trials of a certain remedy
have failed, it would be better not to try the same remedy again, but to
have recourse to some other medicine. What, then, was the position of
Mr. Gladstone's Government at the close of the election of 1885? What
were the considerations presented to them as supreme supervisors and
guardians of the British Empire? They found that vast colonial empire
tranquil and loyal beyond previous expectation--the greater colonies
satisfied with their existing position; the lesser expecting that as
they grew up to manhood they would be treated as men, and emancipated
from childish restraints. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man were
contented with their sturdy dependent independence, loyal to the
backbone. One member only stood aloof, sulky and dissatisfied, and
though in law integrally united with the dominant community, practically
was dissociated from it by forming within Parliament (the controlling
body of the whole) a separate section, of which the whole aim was to
fetter the action of the entire supreme body in order to bring to an
external severance the practical disunion which existed between that
member and Great Britain. This member--Ireland--as compared with other
parts of the empire, was small and insignificant; measured against Great
Britain, its population was five millions to thirty-one millions, and
its estimated capital was only one twenty-fourth part of the capital of
the United Kingdom. Measured against Australia, its trade with Great
Britain was almost insignificant. Its importance arose from the force of
public opinion in Great Britain, which deemed England pledged to protect
the party in Ireland which desired the Union to be maintained, and from
the power of obstructing English legislation through the medium of the
Irish contingent, willing and ready on every occasion to intervene in
English debates. The first step to be taken obviously was to find out
what the great majority of Irish members wanted. The answer was, that
they would be contented to quit the British Parliament on having a
Parliament established on College Green, with full powers of local
government, and that they would accept on behalf of their country a
certain fixed annual sum to be paid to the Imperial Exchequer, on
condition that such sum should not be increased without the consent of
the Irish representatives. Here there were two great points gained
without any sacrifice of principle. Ireland could not be said to be
taxed without representation when her representatives agreed to a
certain fixed sum to be paid till altered with their consent; while at
the same time all risk of obstruction to English legislation by Irish
means was removed by the proposal that the Irish representatives should
exercise local powers in Dublin instead of imperial powers at
Westminster.
On the basis of the above arrangement the Bill of Mr. Gladstone was
founded. Absolute local autonomy was conferred on Ireland; the assent of
the Irish members to quit the Imperial Parliament was accepted; and the
Bill provided that after a certain day the representative Irish peers
should cease to sit in the House of Lords, and the Irish members vacate
their places in the House of Commons. Provisions were then made for the
absorption in the Irish Legislative Body of both the Irish
representative peers and Irish members.
The legislative supremacy of the British Parliament was maintained by an
express provision excepting from any interference on the part of Irish
Legislature all imperial powers, and declaring any enactment void which
infringed that provision; further, an enactment was inserted for the
purpose of securing to the English Legislature in the last resource the
absolute power to make any law for the government of Ireland, and
therefore to repeal, or suspend, the Irish Constitution.
Technically these reservations of supremacy to the English Legislature
were unnecessary, as it is an axiom of constitutional law that a
sovereign Legislature, such as the Queen and two Houses of Parliament in
England, cannot bind their successors, and consequently can repeal or
alter any law, however fundamental, and annul any restrictions on
alteration, however strongly expressed. Practically they were never
likely to be called into operation, as it is the custom of Parliament to
adhere, under all but the most extraordinary and unforeseen
circumstances, to any compact made by Act of Parliament between itself
and any subordinate legislative body. The Irish Legislature was
subjected to the same controlling power which has for centuries been
applied to prevent any excess of jurisdiction in our Colonial
Legislatures, by a direction that an appeal as to the constitutionality
of any laws which they might pass should lie to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. This supremacy of the imperial judicial power over
the action of the Colonial Legislatures was a system which the founders
of the American Constitution copied in the establishment of their
supreme Court, and thereby secured for that legislative system a
stability which has defied the assaults of faction and the strain of
civil war.
The Executive Government of Ireland was continued in her Majesty, and
was to be carried on by the Lord Lieutenant on her behalf, by the aid of
such officers and such Council as her Majesty might from time to time
see fit. The initiative power of recommending taxation was also vested
in the Queen, and delegated to the Lord Lieutenant. These clauses are
co-ordinate and correlative with the clause conferring complete local
powers on the Irish Legislature, while it preserves all imperial powers
to the Imperial Legislature. The Governor is an imperial officer, and
will be bound to watch over imperial interests with a jealous scrutiny,
and to veto any Bill which may be injurious to those interests. On the
other hand, as respects all local matters, he will act on and be guided
by the advice of the Irish Executive Council. The system is self-acting.
The Governor, for local purposes, must have a Council which is in
harmony with the Legislative Body. If the Governor and a Council,
supported by the Legislative Body, do not agree, the Governor must give
way, unless he can, by dismissing his Council, and dissolving the
Legislative Body, obtain both a Council and a Legislative Body which
will support his views. As respects imperial questions, the case is
different; here the last word rests with the mother country, and in the
last resort a determination of the Executive Council, backed by the
Legislative Body, to resist imperial rights, must be deemed an act of
rebellion on the part of the Irish people, and be dealt with
accordingly.
In acceding to the claims of the National Party for Home Rule in Ireland
another question had to be considered: the demands of the English
garrison, as it is called--or, in plain words, of the class of Irish
landlords--for protection. They urged that to grant Home Rule in Ireland
would be to hand them over to their enemies, their tenants, and to lead
to an immediate, or to all events a proximate, confiscation of their
properties. Without admitting the truth of these apprehensions to the
full extent, or indeed to any great extent, it was undoubtedly felt by
the framers of the Home Rule Bill that a moral obligation rested on the
Imperial Government to remove, if possible, "the fearful exasperations
attending the agrarian relations in Ireland," rather than leave a
question so fraught with danger, so involved in difficulty, to be
determined by the Irish Government on its first entry on official
existence. Hence the Land Bill, the scheme of which was to frame a
system under which the tenants, by being made owners of the soil, should
become interested as a class in the maintenance of social order, while
the landlords should be enabled to rid themselves on fair terms of their
estates, in cases where, from apprehension of impending changes, or for
pecuniary reasons, they were desirous of relieving themselves from the
responsibilities of ownership. Of the land scheme brought into
Parliament in 1886, it need only here be said that it proposed to lend
the Irish Government 3 per cent. stock at 3-1/8 per cent. interest, the
Irish Government undertaking to purchase, from any Irish landlord
desirous of selling, his estate at (as a general rule) twenty years'
purchase on the net rental. The money thus disbursed by the Irish
Government was repaid to them by an annuity, payable by the tenant for
forty-nine years, of 4 per cent. on a capital sum equal to twenty times
the gross rental; the result being that, were the Bill passed into law,
the tenant would become immediate owner of the land, subject to the
payment of an annuity considerably less than the previous rent--that the
Irish Government would make a considerable profit on the transaction,
inasmuch as it would receive from the tenant interest calculated on the
basis of the _gross_ rental, whilst it would pay to the English
Government interest calculated on the basis of the _net_ rental--and
that the English Government would sustain no loss if the interest were
duly received by them.
The effect of such a plan appears almost magical: Ireland is transformed
at one stroke from a nation of landlords into a nation of peasant
proprietors--apparently without loss to any one, and with gain to
everybody concerned, except the British Government, who neither gain nor
lose in the matter. The practicability, however, of such a scheme
depends altogether on the security against loss afforded to the British
tax-payer, for he is industrious and heavily burdened, and cannot be
expected to assent to any plan which will land him in any appreciable
loss. Here it is that the plan of Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill differs from
all other previous plans. Act after Act has been passed enabling the
tenant to borrow money from the British Government on the security of
the holding, for the purpose of enabling him to purchase the fee-simple.
In such transactions the British Government becomes the mortgagee, and
can only recover its money, if default is made in payment, by ejecting
the tenant and becoming the landlord. In proportion, then, as any
existing purchase Act succeeds, in the same proportion the risk of the
British taxpayer increases. He is ever placed in the most invidious of
all lights; instead of posing as the generous benefactor who holds forth
his hand to rescue the landlord and tenant from an intolerable position,
he stands forward either as the grasping mortgagee or as the still more
hated landlord, who, having deprived the tenant of his holding, is
seeking to introduce another man into property which really belongs to
the ejected tenant. Such a position may be endurable when the number of
purchasing tenants is small, but at once breaks down if agrarian reform
in Ireland is to be extended so far as to make any appreciable
difference in the relations of landlord and tenant; still more, if it
become general. Now, what is the remedy of such a state of things?
Surely to interpose the Irish Government between the Irish debtor and
his English creditor, and to provide that the Irish revenues in bulk,
not the individual holdings of each tenant, shall be the security for
the English creditor. This was the scheme embodied in the Land Act of
1886. The punctual payment of all money due from the Government of
Ireland to the Government of Great Britain was to have been secured by
the continuance in the hands of the British Government of the Excise and
Customs duties, and by the appointment of an Imperial Receiver-General,
assisted by subordinate officers, and protected by an Imperial Court.
This officer would have received not only all the imperial taxes, but
also the local taxes; and it would have been his duty to satisfy the
claims of the British Government before he allowed any sum to pass into
the Irish Exchequer. In effect, the British Government, in relation to
the levying of imperial taxes, would have stood in the same relation to
Ireland as Congress does to the United States in respect to the levying
of federal taxes. The fiscal unity of Great Britain and Ireland would
have been in this way secured, and the British Government protected
against any loss of interest for the large sums to be expended in
carrying into effect in Ireland any agrarian reform worthy of the name.
The Irish Bills of 1886, as above represented, had at least three
recommendations:
1. They created a state of things in Ireland under which it was possible
to make a complete agrarian reform without exposing the English
Exchequer to any appreciable risk.
2. They enabled the Irish to govern themselves as respects local
matters, while preserving intact the supremacy of the British Parliament
and the integrity of the Empire.
3. They enabled the British Parliament to govern the British Empire
without any obstructive Irish interference.
To the first of these propositions no attempt at an answer has been
made. The Land Bill was never considered on its merits; indeed, was
never practically discussed, but was at once swept into oblivion by the
wave which overwhelmed the Home Rule Bill.
The contention against the second proposition was concerned in proving
that the supremacy of the British Parliament was not maintained: the
practical answer to this objection has been given above. Pushed to its
utmost, it could only amount to proof that an amendment ought to have
been introduced in Committee, declaring, in words better selected than
those introduced for that purpose in the Bill, that nothing in the Act
should affect the supremacy of the British Parliament. In short, the
whole discussion here necessarily resolved itself into a mere verbal
squabble as to the construction of a clause in a Bill not yet in
Committee, and had no bottom or substance.
It was also urged that the concession of self-government to Ireland was
but another mode of handing over the Loyalist party--or, as it is
sometimes called, the English garrison--to the tender mercies of the
Parnellites. The reply to this would seem to be, that as respects
property the Land Bill effectually prevented any interference of the
Irish Parliament with the land; nay, more, enabled any Irishman desirous
of turning his land into money to do so on the most advantageous terms
that ever had been--and with a falling market it may be confidently
prophesied ever can be--offered to the Irish landlord; while as respect
life and liberty, were it possible that they should be endangered, it
was the duty of the imperial officer, the Lord Lieutenant, to take means
for the preservation of peace and good order; and behind him, to enforce
his behests, stand the strong battalions who, to our sorrow be it
spoken, have so often been called upon to put down disturbance and
anarchy in Ireland.
Competing plans have been put forward, with more or less detail, for
governing Ireland. The suggestion that Ireland should be governed as a
_Crown_ colony need only be mentioned to be rejected. It means in
effect, that Ireland should sink from the rank of an equal or
independent member of the British Empire to the grade of the most
dependent of her colonies, and should be governed despotically by
English officials, without representation in the English Parliament or
any machinery of local self-government. Another proposal has been to
give four provincial Governments to Ireland, limiting their powers to
local rating, education, and legislation in respect of matters which
form the subjects of private Bill legislation at present; in fact, to
place them somewhat on the footing of the provinces of Canada, while
reserving to the English Parliament the powers vested in the Dominion of
Canada. Such a scheme would seem adapted to whet the appetite of the
Irish for nationality, without supplying them with any portion of the
real article. It would supply no basis on which a system of agrarian
reform could be founded, as it would be impossible to leave the
determination of a local question, which is a unit in its dangers and
its difficulties, to four different Legislatures; above all, the hinge
on which the question turns--the sufficiency of the security for the
British taxpayer--could not be afforded by provincial resources. Indeed,
no alternative for the Land Bill of 1886 has been suggested which does
not err in one of the following points: either it pledges English credit
on insufficient security, or it requires the landowners to accept Irish
debentures or some form of Irish paper money at par; in other words, it
makes English taxes a fund for relieving Irish landlords, or else it
compels the Irish landowner, if he sells at all, to sell at an
inadequate price. Before parting with Canada, it may be worth while
noticing that another, and more feasible, alternative is to imitate more
closely the Canadian Constitution, and to vest the central or Dominion
powers in a central Legislature in Dublin, parcelling out the provincial
powers, as they have been called, amongst several provincial
Legislatures. This scheme might be made available as a means of
protecting Ulster from the supposed danger of undue interference from
the Central Government, and for making, possibly, other diversities in
the local administration of various parts of Ireland in order to meet
special local exigencies.
A leading writer among the dissentient Liberals has intimated that one
of two forms of representative colonial government might be imposed on
Ireland--either the form in which the executive is conducted by
colonial officials, or the form of the great irresponsible colonies. The
first of these forms is open to the objection, that it perpetuates those
struggles between English executive measures and Irish opinion which has
made Ireland for centuries ungovernable, and led to the establishment of
the union and destruction of Irish independence in 1800; the second
proposal would destroy the fiscal unity of the empire--leave the
agrarian feud unextinguished, and aggravate the objections which have
been urged against the Home Rule Bill of 1886. A question still remains,
in relation to the _form_ of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which would not
have deserved attention but for the prominence given to it in some of
the discussions upon the subject. The Bill of 1886 provides "that the
Legislature may make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
Ireland," but subjects their power to numerous exceptions and
restrictions. The Act establishing the Dominion of Canada enumerates
various matters in respect of which the Legislature of Canada is to have
exclusive power, but prefaces the enumeration with a clause "that the
Dominion Legislature may make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of Canada in relation to all matters not within the
jurisdiction of the provincial Legislatures, although such matters may
not be specially mentioned." In effect, therefore, the difference
between the Irish Bill and the Canadian Act is one of expression and not
of substance, and, although the Bill is more accurate in its form, it
would scarcely be worth while to insist on legislating by exception
instead of by enumeration if, by the substitution of the latter form for
the former, any material opposition would be conciliated.
What, then, are the conclusions intended to be drawn from the foregoing
premises?
1. That coercion is played out, and can no longer be regarded as a
remedy for the evils of Irish misrule.
2. That some alternative must be found, and that the only alternative
within the range of practical politics is some form of Home Rule.
3. That there is no reason for thinking that the grant of Home Rule to
Ireland--a member only, and not one of the most important members, of
the British Empire--will in any way dismember, or even in the slightest
degree risk the dismemberment of the Empire.
4. That Home Rule presupposes and admits the supremacy of the British
Parliament.
5. That theory is in favour of Home Rule, as the nationality of Ireland
is distinct, and justifies a desire for local independence; while the
establishment of Home Rule is a necessary condition to the effectual
removal of agrarian disturbances in Ireland.
6. That precedent is in favour of granting Home Rule to Ireland--_e.g._
the success of the new Constitution in Austria-Hungary, and the happy
effects resulting from the establishment of the Dominion of Canada.
7. That the particular form of Home Rule granted is comparatively
immaterial.
8. That the Home Rule Bill of 1886 may readily be amended in such a
manner as to satisfy all real and unpartisan objectors.
9. That the Land Bill of 1886 is the best that has ever been devised,
having regard to the advantages offered to the new Irish Government, the
landlord, and the tenant.