The principal charge made against the scheme of Home Rule contained in
the Irish Government Bill, 1886, is that it is incompatible with the
maintenance of the unity of the Empire and the supremacy of the Imperial
Parliament. A further allegation states that the Bill is useless, as
agrarian exasperation lies at the root of Irish discontent and Irish
disloyalty, and that no place would be found for a Home Rule Bill even
in Irish aspirations if an effective Land Bill were first passed. An
endeavour will be made in the following pages to secure a verdict of
acquittal on both counts--as to the charge relating to Imperial unity
and the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, by proving that the
accusation is absolutely unfounded, and based partly on a misconception
of the nature of Imperial ties, and partly on a misapprehension of the
effect of the provisions of the Home Rule Bill as bearing on Imperial
questions; and as to the inutility of the Home Rule Bill in view of the
necessity of Land Reform, by showing that without a Home Rule Bill no
Land Bill worth consideration as a means of pacifying Ireland can be
passed.
The complete partisan spirit in which Home Rule has been treated is the
more to be deplored as the subject is one which does not lend itself
readily to the trivialities of party debates. It raises questions of
principle, not of detail. It ascends at once into the highest region of
politics. It is conversant with the great questions of constitutional
and international law, and leads to an inquiry into the very nature of
governments and the various modes in which communities of men are
associated together either as simple or composite nations. To describe
those modes in detail would be to give a history of the various
despotic, monarchical, oligarchical, and democratic systems of
government which have oppressed or made happy the children of men. Such
a description is calculated to perplex and mislead from its very extent;
not so an inquiry into the powers of government, and a classification of
those powers. They are limited in extent, and, if we confine ourselves
to English names and English necessities, we shall readily attain to an
apprehension of the mode in which empires, nations, and political
societies are bound together, at least in so far as such knowledge is
required for the understanding of the nature of Imperial supremacy, and
the mode in which Home Rule in Ireland is calculated to affect that
supremacy.
The powers of government are divisible into two great classes--1.
Imperial powers; 2. State powers, using "State" in the American sense of
a political community subordinated to some other power, and not in the
sense of an independent nation. The Imperial powers are in English law
described as the prerogatives of the Crown, and consist in the main of
the powers of making peace and war, of maintaining armies and fleets and
regulating commerce, and making treaties with foreign nations. State
powers are complete powers of local self-government, described in our
colonial Constitutions as powers to make laws "for the peace, order, and
good government of the Colony or State" in which such powers are to be
exercised.
Intermediate between the Imperial and State powers are a class of
powers required to prevent disputes and facilitate intercourse between
the various parts of an empire or other composite system of States--for
example, the coinage of money, and other regulations relating to the
currency; the laws relating to copyright, or other exclusive rights to
the use and profits of any works or inventions; and so forth. These
powers may be described as quasi-Imperial powers.
Having arrived at a competent knowledge of the materials out of which
governments are formed, it may be well to proceed to a consideration of
the manner in which those materials have been worked up in building the
two great Anglo-Saxon composite nations--namely, the American Union and
the British Empire--for, if we find that the arrangements proposed by
the Irish Home Rule Bill are strictly in accordance with the principles
on which the unity of the American Union was based and on which the
Imperial power of Great Britain has rested for centuries, the conclusion
must be that the Irish Home Rule Bill is not antagonistic to the unity
of the Empire or to the supremacy of the British Parliament.
In discussing these matters it will be convenient to begin with the
American Union, as it is less extensive in area and more homogeneous in
its construction than the British Empire. The thirteen revolted American
colonies, on the conclusion of their war with England, found themselves
in the position of thirteen independent States having no connection with
each other. The common tie of supremacy exercised by the mother country
was broken, and each State was an independent nation, possessed both of
Imperial and Local rights.
The impossibility of a cluster of thirteen small independent nations
maintaining their independence against foreign aggression became
immediately apparent, and, to remedy this evil, the thirteen States
appointed delegates to form a convention authorized to weld them into
one body as respected Imperial powers. This was attempted to be done by
the establishment of a central body called a Congress, consisting of
delegates from the component States, and invested with all the powers
designated above as Imperial and quasi-Imperial powers. The expenses
incurred by the confederacy were to be defrayed out of a common fund, to
be supplied by requisitions made on the several States. In effect, the
confederacy of the thirteen States amounted to little more than an
offensive and defensive alliance between thirteen independent nations,
as the central power had States for its subjects and not individuals,
and could only enforce the law against any disobedient State by calling
on the twelve other States to make war on the refractory member of the
union. A system dependent for its efficacy on the concurrence of so many
separate communities contained in itself the seeds of dissolution, and
it soon became apparent that one of two things must occur--either the
American States must cease as such to be a nation, or the component
members of that union must each be prepared to relinquish a further
portion of the sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers which it possessed.
Under those circumstances, what was the course taken by the thirteen
States? They perceived that it was quite possible to maintain complete
unity and compactness as a nation if, in addition to investing the
Supreme Government with Imperial and quasi-Imperial powers, they added
full power to impose federal taxes on the component States and
established an Executive furnished with ample means to carry all federal
powers into effect through the medium of federal officers. The
government so formed consisted of a President and two elected Houses
called Congress, and, as a balance-wheel of the Constitution, a Supreme
Court was established, to which was confided the task of deciding in
case of dispute all questions arising under the Constitution of the
United States or relating to international law. The Executive of the
United States, with the President as its source and head, was furnished
with full authority and power to enforce the federal laws. The army and
navy were under its command, and it was provided with courts of justice,
and subordinate officers to enforce the decrees of those courts
throughout the length and breadth of the Union. Above all, a complete
system of federal taxation supplied the Central Government with the
necessary funds to perform effectually all the functions of a supreme
national government.
The nature of the Constitution of the United States will be best
understood by considering the position in which its subjects stand to
the Central Government and their own State Governments. In effect, every
inhabitant of the United States has a double nationality. He belongs to
one great nation called the United States, or, as it would be more aptly
called to show its absolute unity, the American Republic, having
jurisdiction over the whole surface of ground comprised in the area of
the United States. He is also a citizen of a smaller local and partially
self-governing body--more important than a county, but not approaching
the position of a nation--called a State.
It is no part of the object of this article to enter into the details of
the American government, its advantages or defects. This much, however,
is clear--the American Constitution has lasted nearly one hundred years,
and shows no signs of decay or disruption. It has stood the strain of
the greatest war of modern times, and has emerged from the conflict
stronger than before. Even during the war the antagonism of the rebels
was directed, not against the Union, but against the efforts of the
Northern States to suppress slavery, or, in other words, to destroy, as
the Southern States believed (not unjustly as the event showed), their
property in slaves, and consequently the only means they had of making
their estates profitable. One conclusion, then, we may draw, that a
nation in which the Imperial powers and the State powers are vested in
different authorities is no less compact and powerful, as respects all
national capacities, than a nation in which both classes of powers are
wielded by the same functionaries; and one lesson more may be learnt
from the American War of Secession--namely, that in a nation having such
a division of powers, any conflict between the two classes results in
the Supreme or Imperial powers prevailing over the Local governmental
powers, and not in the latter invading or driving a wedge into the
Supreme powers. In fact, the tendency in case of a struggle is towards
an undue centralization of the nation by reason of the encroachment by
the Supreme authority, rather than towards a weakening of the national
unity by separatist action on the part of the constituent members of the
nation.
In comparing the Constitution of the United States with the Constitution
of the British Empire, we find an apparent resemblance in form as
respects the Anglo-Saxon colonies, but underlying the surface a total
difference of principle. The United States is an aggregate of
homogeneous and contiguous States which, in order to weld themselves
into a nation, gave up a portion of their rights to a central authority,
reserving to themselves all powers of government which they did not
expressly relinquish.
The British Empire is an aggregate of many communities under one common
head, and is thus described by Mr. Burke in 1774, in language which may
seem to have been somewhat too enthusiastic at the time when it was
spoken, but at the present day does not more than do justice to an
Empire which comprises one-sixth of the habitable globe in extent and
population:--
"I look, I say, on the Imperial rights of Great Britain, and the
privileges which the colonies ought to enjoy under those rights, to be
just the most reconcilable things in the world. The Parliament of Great
Britain sits at the head of her extensive Empire in two capacities: one
as the local legislature of this island, providing for all things at
home immediately and by no other instrument than the executive power;
the other, and I think her nobler capacity, is what I call her Imperial
character, in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all
the several Legislatures, and guides and controls them all without
annihilating any. As all these provincial Legislatures are only
co-ordinate with each other, they ought all to be subordinate to her,
else they can neither preserve mutual peace, nor hope for mutual
justice, nor effectually afford mutual assistance."[9]
The means by which the possessions of Great Britain were acquired have
been as various as the possessions themselves. The European, Asiatic,
and African possessions became ours by conquest and cession; the
American by conquest, treaty, and settlement; the Australasian by
settlement, and by that dubious system of settlement known by the name
of annexation. Now, what is the link which fastens each of these
possessions to the mother country? Surely it is the inherent and
indestructible right of the British Crown to exercise Imperial
powers--in other words, the supremacy of the Queen and the British
Parliament? What, again, is the common bond of union between these vast
colonial possessions, differing in laws, in religion, and in the
character of the population? The same answer must be given: the joint
and several tie, so to speak, is the same--namely, the sovereignty of
Great Britain. It is true that the mode in which the materials composing
the British Empire have been cemented together is exactly the reverse of
the manner of the construction of the American Union. In the case of the
Union, independent States voluntarily relinquished a portion of their
sovereignty to secure national unity, and entrusted the guardianship of
that unity to a representative body chosen by themselves. Such a union
was based on contract, and could only be constructed by communities
which claimed to be independent. Far different have been the
circumstances under which England has developed itself into the British
Empire. England began as a sovereign power, having its sovereignty
vested at first solely in the Sovereign, but gradually in the Sovereign
and Parliament. This sovereignty neither the Crown nor the Parliament
can, jointly or severally, get rid of, for it is of the very essence of
a sovereign power that it cannot, by Act of Parliament or otherwise,
bind its successors.[10] This principle of supremacy has never been lost
sight of by the British Parliament. Their right to alter or suspend a
colonial Constitution has never been disputed. Contract never enters
into the question. The dominant authority delegates to its subordinate
communities as much or as little power as it deems advantageous for each
body, and, if it sees fit, resumes a portion or the whole of the
delegated authority. The last point of difference to be noted between
the American Constitution and the Constitution of the British Empire is
the fact that as Minerva sprang from the brain of Jupiter fully
equipped, so the American Constitution came forth from the hands of its
framers complete and, what is of more importance, practically in
material matters unchangeable except by the agony of an internecine war
or some overwhelming passions. The British Empire, on the other hand,
is, as respects its component members, ever in progress and flux. An
Anglo-Saxon colony, no less than a human being, has its infancy under
the maternal care of a governor, its boyhood subject to the government
of a representative council and an Executive appointed by the Crown, its
manhood under Home Rule and responsible government, in which the
Executive are bound to vacate their offices whenever they are out-voted
in the Legislature. Changes are ever taking place in the growth, so to
speak, of the several British possessions, but what is the result?
Nobody ever dreams of these changes injuring the Imperial tie or the
supremacy of the British Parliament, that alone towers above all,
unchangeable and unimpaired; and, what is most notable, loyalty and
devotion to the Crown--that is to say, the Imperial tie--so far from
being weakened by the transition of a colony from a state of dependence
in local affairs to the higher degree of a self-governing colony, are,
on the contrary, strengthened almost in direct proportion as the central
interference with local affairs is diminished. On this point an
unimpeachable witness--Mr. Merivale--says: "What, then, are the lessons
to be learnt from a consideration of the American Constitution and of
our colonial system? Surely these: that Imperial unity and Imperial
supremacy are in no degree dependent on the control exercised by the
central power on its dependent members." Facts, however, are more
conclusive than any arguments; and we have only to look back to the
state some forty years ago of Canada, New Zealand, and the various
colonies of Australia, and compare that state with their condition
to-day, to come to the conclusion that the fullest power of local
government is perfectly consistent with the unity of the Empire and the
supremacy of the British Parliament. Under the old colonial
Constitutions the Executive of those colonies was under the control of
the Crown; and Mr. Merivale says "that the political existence consisted
of a series of quarrels and reconciliations between the two opposing
authorities--the colonial legislative body and the Executive nominated
by the Crown." England resolved to give up the control of the Executive,
and to grant complete responsible government--that is to say, the
Governor of each colony was instructed that his Executive Council (or
Ministry, as we should call it) must resign whenever they were out-voted
by the legislative body. The effect of this change, this relaxing, as
would be supposed, of the Imperial tie, was magical, and is thus
described by Mr. Merivale:[11]
"The magnitude of that change--the extraordinary rapidity of its
beneficial effects--it is scarcely possible to exaggerate. None but
those who have traced it can realize the sudden spring made by a young
community under its first release from the old tie of subjection,
moderate as that tie really was. The cessation, as if by magic, of the
old irritant sores between colony and mother country is the first
result. Not only are they at concord, but they seem to leave hardly any
traces in the public mind behind them. Confidence and affection towards
the home, still fondly so termed by the colonist as well as the
emigrant, seem to supersede at once distrust and hostility. Loyalty,
which was before the badge of a class suspected by the rest of the
community, became the common watchword of all, and, with some
extravagance in the sentiment, there arises no small share of its
nobleness and devotion. Communities, which but a few years ago would
have wrangled over the smallest item of public expenditure to which they
were invited by the Executive to contribute, have vied with each other
in their subscriptions to purposes of British interests in response to
calls of humanity, or munificence for objects but indistinctly heard of
at the distance of half the world."
The Dominion of Canada has been so much talked about that it may be well
to give a summary of its Constitution, though, in so far as regards its
relations to the mother country, it differs in no material respect from
any other self-governing colony. The Dominion consists of seven
provinces, each of which has a Legislature of its own, but is at the
same time subject to the Legislature of the Dominion, in the same manner
as each State in the American Union has a Legislature of its own, and is
at the same time subject to the control of Congress. The distinguishing
feature between the system of the American States and the associated
colonies of the Dominion of Canada is this--that all Imperial powers,
everything that constitutes a people a nation as respects foreigners,
are reserved to the mother country. The division, then, of the Dominion
and its provinces consists only in a division of Local powers. It is
impossible to mark accurately the line between Dominion and Provincial
powers, but, speaking generally, Dominion powers relate to such
matters--for example, the regulation of trade and commerce, postal
service, currency, and so forth--as require to be dealt with on a
uniform principle throughout the whole area of a country; while the
Provincial powers relate to provincial and municipal institutions,
provincial licensing, and other subjects restricted to the limits of the
province. As a general rule, the Legislature of the Dominion and the
Legislature of each province have respectively exclusive jurisdiction
within the limits of the subjects entrusted to them; but, as respects
agriculture and immigration, the Dominion Parliament have power to
overrule any Act of the provincial Legislatures, and, as respects
property and civil rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick,
the Dominion Parliament may legislate with a view to uniformity, but
their legislation is not valid unless it is accepted by the Legislature
of each province to which it applies.
The executive authority in the Dominion Government, as in all the
self-governing colonies, is carried on by the Governor in the name of
the Queen, but with the advice of a Council: that is to say, as to all
Imperial matters, he is under the control of the mother country; as to
all local matters, he acts on the advice of his local Council. The
result of the whole is that the citizenship of an inhabitant of the
Dominion of Canada is a triple tie. Suppose him to reside in the
province of Quebec. First, he is a citizen of that province, and bound
to obey all the laws which it is within the competence of the provincial
Legislature to pass. Next, he is a citizen of the Dominion of Canada,
and acknowledges its jurisdiction in all matters outside the legitimate
sphere of the province. Lastly, and above all, he is a subject of her
Majesty. He is to all intents and purposes, as respects the vast company
of nations, an Englishman, entitled to all the privileges as he is to
all the glory of the mother country so far as such privileges can be
enjoyed and glory participated in without actual residence in England.
One startling point of likeness in events and unlikeness in consequences
is to be found in the history of Ireland and Canada. In 1798 Ireland
rebelled. Protestant and Catholic were arrayed in arms against each
other. The rebellion was quenched in blood, and measures of repression
have been in force, with slight intervals of suspension, ever since,
with this result--that the Ireland of 1886 is scarcely less disloyal and
discontented than the Ireland of 1798. In 1837 and 1838 Canada rebelled.
Protestants and Catholics, differing in nationality as well as in
religion, were arrayed in arms against each other. The rebellion was
quelled with the least possible violence, a free Constitution was given,
and the Canada of 1886 is the largest, most loyal, and most contented
colony in her Majesty's dominions.
Assuming, then, thus much to be proved by the Constitution of the United
States that national unity of the closest description is consistent with
complete Home Rule in the component members of the nation, and by the
history of Canada and the British colonial empire that an Imperial tie
is sufficient to bind together for centuries dependencies differing in
situation, in nationality, in religion, in laws, in everything that
distinguishes peoples one from another, and further and more
particularly that emancipation of the Anglo-Saxon colonies from control
in their internal affairs strengthens instead of weakening Imperial
unity, let us turn to Ireland and inquire whether there is anything in
the circumstances under which Home Rule was proposed to be granted to
Ireland, or in the measures intended to establish that Home Rule, fairly
leading to the inference that disruption of the Empire or an impairment
of Imperial powers would probably be a consequence of passing the Irish
Government Bill and the Irish Land Bill. And, first, as to the
circumstances which would seem to recommend the Irish Home Rule Bill.
Ireland, from the very commencement of her connection with England, has
chafed under the restraints which that connection imposed. The closer
the apparent union between the two countries the greater the real
disunion. The Act of 1800, _in words and in law_, effected not a union
merely, but a consolidation of the two countries. The effect of those
words and that law was to give rise to a restless discontent, which has
constantly found expression in efforts to procure the repeal of the Act
of Union and the reestablishment of a National Parliament in Dublin. How
futile have been the efforts of the British Parliament to diminish by
concession or repress by coercion Irish aspirations or Irish discontent
it is unnecessary to discuss here. All men admit the facts, however
different the conclusions which they draw from those facts. What Burke
said of America on moving in 1775 his resolution on conciliation with
the colonies was true in 1885 with respect to Ireland:--
"The fact is undoubted, that under former Parliaments the state of
America [read for America, Ireland] has been kept in continual
agitation. Everything administered as remedy to the public complaint, if
it did not produce, was at least followed by an heightening of the
distemper, until, by a variety of experiments, that important country
has been brought into her present situation--a situation which I will
not miscall, which I dare not name, which I scarcely know how to
comprehend in the terms of any description."[12]
At length, after the election of 1885, Mr. Gladstone and the majority of
his followers came to the conclusion that an opportunity had presented
itself for providing Ireland with a Constitution conferring on the
people of that country the largest measure of self-government consistent
with the absolute supremacy of the Crown and the Imperial Parliament and
the entire unity of the Empire. A scheme was proposed which was accepted
in principle by the representatives of the National party in Ireland as
a fair and sufficient adjustment of the Imperial claims of Great Britain
and the Local claims of Ireland. The scheme was shortly this. A
Legislative Assembly was proposed to be established in Ireland with
power to make all laws necessary for the good government of Ireland--in
other words, invested with the same powers of local self-government as a
colonial Assembly. The Irish Assembly was in one respect unlike a
colonial Legislature. It consisted of one House only, but this House was
divided into two orders, each of which, in case of differences on any
important legislative matter, voted separately. This form was adopted in
order to minimize the chances of collision between the two orders, by
making it imperative on each order to hear the arguments of the other
before proceeding to a division, thus throwing on the dissentient order
the full responsibility of its dissent, with a complete knowledge of the
consequences likely to ensue therefrom. The clause conferring on the
Irish Legislature full powers of local self-government was immediately
followed by a provision excepting, by enumeration, from any interference
on the part of the Irish Legislature, all Imperial powers, and declaring
any enactment void which infringed on that provision. This exception (as
is well known) is not found in colonial Constitutional Acts. In them the
restriction of the words of the grant to Local powers only has been
held sufficient to safeguard the supremacy of the British Parliament and
the unity of the Empire. The reason for making a difference in the case
of the Home Rule Bill was political, not legal. Separation was declared
by the enemies of the Bill to be the real intention of its supporters,
and destruction of the unity of the Empire to be its certain
consequence. It seemed well that Ireland, by her representatives, should
accept as a satisfactory charter of Irish liberty a document which
contained an express submission to Imperial power and a direct
acknowledgment of Imperial unity. Similarly with respect to the
supremacy of the British Parliament. In the colonial Constitutions all
reference to this supremacy is omitted as being too clear to require
notice. In the case of the Irish Home Rule Bill instructions were given
to preserve in express words the supremacy of the British Parliament in
order to pledge Ireland to an express admission of that supremacy by the
same vote which accepted Local powers. It is true that the wording by
the draftsman of the sentence reserving the supremacy of Parliament was
justly found fault with as inaccurate and doubtful, but that defect
would have been cured by an amendment in Committee; and, even if there
had not been any such clause in the Bill, it is clear, from what has
been said above, that the Imperial Legislature could not, if it would,
renounce its supremacy or abdicate its sovereign powers. The executive
government in Ireland was continued in the Queen, to be carried on by
the Lord Lieutenant on behalf of her Majesty, with the aid of such
officers and Council as to her Majesty might from time to time seem fit.
Her Majesty was also a constituent part of the Legislature, with power
to delegate to the Lord Lieutenant the prerogative of assenting to or
dissenting from Bills, and of summoning, proroguing, and dissolving
Parliament. Under these provisions the Lord Lieutenant resembled the
Governor of a colony with responsible government. He was invested with a
double authority--first, Imperial; secondly, Local. As an Imperial
officer, he was bound to veto any Bill injuriously affecting Imperial
interests or inconsistent with general Imperial policy; as a Local
officer, it was his duty to act in all local matters according to the
advice of his Council, whose tenure of office depended on their being in
harmony with, and supported by, a majority of the Legislative Assembly.
Questions relating to the constitutionality of any particular law were
not left altogether to the decision of the Governor. If a Bill
containing a provision infringing Imperial rights passed the
Legislature, its validity might be decided in the first instance by the
ordinary courts of law, but the ultimate appeal lay to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, and, with a view to secure absolute
impartiality in the Committee, it was provided that Ireland should be
represented on that body by persons who either were or had been Irish
judges. Not the least important provision of the Bill, as respects the
maintenance of Imperial interests, was the continuance of Imperial
taxation. The Customs and Excise duties were directed to be levied, as
heretofore, in pursuance of the enactments of the Imperial Parliament,
and were excepted from the control of the Irish Legislature, which had
full power, with that exception, to impose such taxes in Ireland as they
might think expedient. The Bill further provided that neither the
Imperial taxes of Excise nor any Local taxes that might be imposed by
the Irish Legislature should be paid into the Irish Exchequer. An
Imperial officer, called the Receiver-General, was appointed, into whose
hands the produce of every tax, both Imperial and Local, was required to
be paid, and it was the duty of the Receiver-General to take care that
all claims of the English Exchequer, including especially the
contribution payable by Ireland for Imperial purposes, were satisfied
before a farthing found its way into the Irish Exchequer for Irish
purposes. The Receiver-General was provided with an Imperial Court to
enforce his rights of Imperial taxation, and adequate means for
enforcing all Imperial powers by Imperial civil officers. The Bill did
not provide for the representation of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament
on all Imperial questions, including questions relating to Imperial
taxation, but it is fully understood that in any Bill which might
hereafter be brought forward relating to Home Rule those defects would
be remedied.
An examination, then, of the Home Rule Bill, that "child of revolution
and parent of separation," appears to lead irresistibly to two
conclusions. First, that Imperial rights and Imperial powers,
representation for Imperial purposes, Imperial taxation--in short, every
link that binds a subordinate member of an Empire to its supreme
head--have been maintained unimpaired and unchanged. Secondly, that, in
granting Home Rule to discontented Ireland, that form of responsible
government has been adopted which, as Mr. Merivale declares--and his
declaration subsequent events have more than verified--when conferred on
the discontented colonies, changed restless aspirations for separation
into quiet loyalty.
That such a Bill as the Home Rule Bill should be treated as an invasion
of Imperial rights is a proof of one, or perhaps of both, the following
axioms--that Bills are never read by their accusers, and that party
spirit will distort the plainest facts. The union of Great Britain and
Ireland was not, so far as Imperial powers were concerned, disturbed by
the Bill, and an Irishman remains a citizen of the British Empire under
the Home Rule Bill, with the same obligations and the same privileges,
on the same terms as before. All the Bill did was to make his Irish
citizenship distinct from his Imperial citizenship, in the same manner
as the citizenship of a native of the State of New York is distinct
from his citizenship as a member of the United States. Now it has been
found that the Central power in the United States has been more than a
match for the State powers, and can it be conceived for a moment that
the Imperial power of Great Britain should not be a match for the Local
power of Ireland--a State which has not one-seventh of the population or
one-twentieth part of the income of the dominant community?
One argument remains to be noticed which the opponents of Home Rule urge
as absolutely condemnatory of the measure, whereas, if properly weighed,
it is conclusive in its favour. Home Rule, they say, is a mere question
of sentiment. "National aspirations" are the twaddle of English
enthusiasts who know nothing of Ireland. What is really wanted is the
reform of the Land Law. Settle the agrarian problem, and Home Rule may
be relegated to the place supposed to be paved with good intentions. The
Irish will straightway change their character, and become a law-abiding,
contented, loyal people. Be it so. But suppose it to be proved that the
establishment of an Irish Government, or, in other words, Home Rule, is
an essential condition of agrarian reform--that the latter cannot be had
without the former--surely Home Rule should stand none the worse in the
estimation of its opponents if it not only secures a safe basis for
putting an end to agrarian exasperation, but also gratifies the feeling
of the Irish people as expressed by the majority of its representatives
in Parliament? Now, what is the nature of the Irish Land Question? This
we must understand before considering the remedy. In Ireland (meaning by
Ireland that part of the country which is in the hands of tenants, and
falls within the compass of a Land Bill) the tenure of land is wholly
unlike that which is found in the greater part of England. Instead of
large farms in which the landlord makes all the improvements and the
tenant pays rent for the privilege of cultivating the land and receives
the produce, small holdings are found in which the tenant does the
improvements (if any) and pays a fixed rent-charge to the owner. In
England the tenant does not perform the obligations or in any way aspire
to the character of owner. If he thinks he can get a cheaper farm, he
quits his former one, regarding his interest in the land as a mere
matter of pounds, shillings, and pence. Not so the Irish tenant. He has
made what he calls improvements, he claims a quasi-ownership in the
land, and has the characteristic Celtic attachment for the patch of
ground forming his holding, however squalid it may be, however
inadequate for his support. In short, in Ireland there is a dual
ownership--that of the proprietor, who has no interest in the soil so
long as the tenant pays his rent and fulfils the conditions of his
tenancy; and that of the tenant, who, subject to the payment of his rent
and performance of the fixed conditions, acts, thinks, and carries
himself as the owner of his holding. A system, then, of agrarian reform
in Ireland resolves itself into an inquiry as to the best mode of
putting an end to this dual ownership--that is to say, of making the
tenant the sole proprietor of his holding, and compensating the landlord
for his interest in the ownership. The problem is further narrowed by
the circumstance that the tenant cannot be expected to advance any
capital or pay an increased rent, so that the means of compensating the
landlord must be found out of the existing rent.
The plan adopted in Mr. Gladstone's Land Bill was to commute the
rent-charges, offering the landlord, as a general rule, twenty years'
purchase on the net rental of the estate (that is to say, the rent
received by him after deducting all outgoings), and paying him the
purchase-money in £3 per cent. stock taken at par. The stock was to be
advanced by the English Government to an Irish State department at 3-1/8
per cent. interest, and the Bill provided that the tenant, instead of
rent, was to pay an annuity of £4 per cent. on a capital sum equal in
amount to twenty times the gross rental.
The notable feature which distinguished this plan from all other schemes
was the security given for the repayment of the purchase-money: hitherto
the English Government has lent the money directly to the landlord or
tenant, and has become the mortgagee of the land--in other words, has
become in effect the landlord of the land sold to the tenant until the
repayment of the loan has been completed. To carry into effect under
such a system any extensive scheme of agrarian reform (and if not
extensive such a reform would be of no value in pacifying Ireland)
presupposes a readiness on the part of the English Government to become
virtually the landlord of a large portion of Ireland, with the attendant
odium of absenteeism and alien domination. Under a land scheme such as
that of 1886, all these difficulties would be overcome. The Irish, not
the English, Government would be the virtual landlord. It would be the
interest of Ireland that the annuities due from the tenants should be
regularly paid, as, subject to the prior charge of the English
Exchequer, they would form part of the Irish revenues. The cardinal
difference, then, between Mr. Gladstone's scheme and any other land
scheme that has seen the light is this--that in Mr. Gladstone's scheme
the English loans would have been lent to the Irish Government on the
security of the whole Irish revenues, whereas in every other scheme they
have been lent by the English Government to the Irish creditors on the
security of individual patches of land.
The whole question, then, of the relation between Home Rule and agrarian
reform may be summed up as follows:--Agrarian reform is necessary for
the pacification of Ireland; agrarian reform cannot be efficiently
carried into effect without an Irish Government; an Irish Government can
only be established by a Home Rule Bill: therefore a Home Rule Bill is
necessary for the pacification of Ireland. It is idle to say, as has
been said on numerous platforms, that plans no doubt can be devised for
agrarian reform without Home Rule. The Irish revenues are the only
collateral security that can be obtained for loans of English money, and
Irish revenues are only available for the purpose on the establishment
of an Irish Government. Baronial guarantees, union guarantees, county
guarantees, debenture schemes, have all been tried and found wanting,
and vague assertions as to possibilities are idle unless they are based
on intelligible working plans.
The foregoing arguments will be equally valid if, instead of making the
tenants peasant-proprietors, it were thought desirable that the Irish
State should be the proprietor and the tenants be the holders of the
land at perpetual rents and subject to fixed conditions. Again, it might
be possible to pay the landlords by annual sums instead of capital sums.
Such matters are really questions of detail. The substance is to
interpose the Irish Government between the tenant and the English
mortgagee, and to make the loans general charges on the whole of the
Irish Government revenues as paid into the hands of an Imperial Receiver
instead of placing them as special charges, each fixed on its own small
estate or holding. The fact that Mr. Gladstone's land scheme was
denounced as confiscation of £100,000,000 of the English taxpayers'
property, while Lord Ashbourne's Act is pronounced by the same party
wise and prudent, shows the political blindness of party spirit in its
most absurd form. Lord Ashbourne's Act requires precisely the same
expenditure to do the same work as Mr. Gladstone's Bill requires, but in
Mr. Gladstone's scheme the whole Irish revenue was pledged as collateral
security, and the Irish Government was interposed between the ultimate
creditor and the Irish tenant, while under Lord Ashbourne's Act the
English Government figures without disguise as the landlord of each
tenant, exacting a debt which the tenant is unwilling to pay as being
due to what he calls an alien Government.
An endeavour has been made in the preceding pages to prove that Home
Rule in no respect infringes on Imperial rights or Imperial unity, for
the simple reason that the Imperial power remains exactly in the same
position as it was before, the Home Rule Bill dealing only with Local
matters. At all events, Burke thought that the Imperial supremacy alone
constituted a real union between England and Ireland. He says--
"My poor opinion is, that the closest connection between Great Britain
and Ireland is essential to the well-being--I had almost said to the
very being--of the three kingdoms; for that purpose I humbly conceive
that the whole of the superior, and what I should call Imperial
politics, ought to have its residence here, and that Ireland, locally,
civilly, and commercially independent, ought politically to look up to
Great Britain in all matters of peace and war. In all these points to be
joined with her, and, in a word, with her to live and to die."[13]
How strange to Burke would have seemed the doctrine that the restoration
of a limited power of self-government to Ireland, excluding commerce,
and excluding all matters not only Imperial, but those in which
uniformity is required, should be denounced as a disruption of the
Empire!
It remains to notice one other charge made against the Gladstonian Home
Rule Bill, namely, that of impairing the supremacy of the British
Parliament. That allegation has been shown also to be founded on a
mistake. Next, it is said that the Gladstonian scheme does not provide
securities against executive and legislative oppression. The answer is
complete. The executive authority being vested in the Queen, it will be
the duty of the Governor not to allow executive oppression; still more
will it be his duty to veto any act of legislative oppression. Further,
it is stated that difficulties will arise with respect to the power of
the Privy Council to nullify unconstitutional Acts. But it is hard to
see why a power which is exercised with success in the United States,
where all the States are equal, and without dispute in our colonies,
which are all dependent, should not be carried into effect with equal
ease in Ireland, which is more closely bound to us and more completely
under our power than the colonies are, or than the several States are
under the power of the Central Government.
To conclude: the cause of Irish discontent is the conjoint operation of
the passion for nationality and the vicious system of land tenure, and
the scheme of the Irish Home Rule Bill and the Land Bill removes the
whole fabric on which Irish discontent is raised. The Irish, by the
great majority of their representatives, have accepted the Home Rule
Bill as a satisfactory settlement of the nationality question. The
British Parliament can, through the medium of the Home Rule Bill and the
establishment of an Irish Legislature, carry through a final settlement
of agrarian disputes with less injustice to individuals than could a
Parliament sitting in Dublin, and, be it added, with scarcely any
appreciable risk to the British taxpayer. Of course it may be said that
an Irish Parliament will go farther--that Home Rule is a step to
separation, and a reform of the Land Laws a spoliation of the landlords.
To those who urge such arguments I would recommend the perusal of the
speech of Burke on Conciliation with America, and especially the
following sentences, substituting "Ireland" for "the colonies:"--
"But [the Colonies] Ireland will go further. Alas! alas! when will this
speculating against fact and reason end? What will quiet these panic
fears which we entertain of the hostile effect of a conciliatory
conduct? Is it true that no case can exist in which it is proper for the
Sovereign to accede to the desires of his discontented subjects? Is
there anything peculiar in this case to make it a rule for itself? Is
all authority of course lost when it is not pushed to the extreme? Is it
a certain maxim that the fewer causes of discontentment are left by
Government the more the subject will be inclined to resist and rebel?"