Ambiguity is sometimes produced by putting the preposition in an

improper place. “A clergyman is, by the militia act, exempted from

both serving and contributing.” This, though intended to express a

different meaning, strictly implies, that he is not obliged both to

serve and to contribute, but does not exclude his liability to do the

one, or the other. If we say, “he is exempted both from serving and

contributing,” we express an exemption from both.

“Such of my readers, as have a taste of fine writing.”--_Addison’s

Spect._ “To have a taste of a thing,” is “to feel how it affects the

sensitive or perceptive faculty;” “to have a taste for a thing,” is

“to relish its agreeable qualities;” “to have a taste in a thing,”

which is the expression used by Addison in the same paper, is “to

have a discriminative judgment in examining the object.” The first

expression is incorrect, as not conveying his meaning.

Swift, speaking of Marlborough’s dismission from the queen’s

ministry, as a bad requital of his public services, says, “If a

stranger should hear these furious outcries of ingratitude against

our general, he would be apt to inquire,” &c. One would naturally

conclude from the author’s expression, that Marlborough, and not

the nation, was charged with ingratitude. He should have said,

“ingratitude towards our general.”

“I received the sword in a present from my brother.” This is a very

common colloquial Scotticism, and occurs occasionally in written

language. The sword was not received _in_, but _as_ a present.

In the use of prepositions, a distinction is properly made between

their literal and figurative meaning. “Wit,” says Shakspeare,

“depends _on_ dilatory time.” Here the verb is employed

figuratively, and the idea involved in the primitive meaning is

dismissed.

“From gilded roofs depending lamps display.”--_Dryden._

Here the verb is used in its literal acceptation, denoting “to hang,”

and is followed, therefore, by _from_.

To the same purpose it has been remarked by Campbell, that the

verb “to found,” used literally, is followed by _on_ preferably to

_in_, as, “the house was founded _on_ a rock;” but, when employed

metaphorically, is better followed by _in_, as, “dominion is founded

in grace.”

“There is no need _for_ your assistance.” It should be, “_of_ your

assistance.” We say, “occasion _for_,” and “need _of_.” _Need

for_ may likewise be pronounced a Scotticism, as, I believe, this

phraseology is seldom or never used by English writers.

“For, what chiefly deters the sons of science and philosophy

from reading the Bible, and profiting of that lecture, but the

stumbling-block of absolute inspiration?”--_Geddes._ “To profit of”

is a Gallicism; it should be, “profiting by.”

SECTION VII.

THE CONJUNCTION.

SOLECISM.

“A system of theology, involving such absurdities, can be maintained,

I think, by no rational man, much less by so learned a man as him.”

Conjunctions having no government, the word _as_ ought not to be

joined with an objective case. It should be, “so learned a man as

_he_,” the verb _is_ being understood.

“Tell the cardinal, that I understand poetry better than

him.”--_Smollett._ According to the grammatical construction of

the latter clause, it means, “I understand poetry better than I

understand him.” This, however, is not the sentiment which the writer

intended to convey. The clause should proceed thus, “I understand

poetry better than _he_;” that is, “than _he_ understands it.” Those

who contend for the use of _than_ as a preposition, and justify the

phraseology which is here censured, must at least admit, that to

construe _than_ as a preposition, creates ambiguity. Thus, when it

is said, “you think him handsomer than _me_,” it would be impossible

to determine whether the meaning is, “you think him handsomer than I

think him,” or “you think him handsomer than you think me.”

“There is nothing more pleases mankind, as to have others to admire

and praise their performances, though they are never so trivial.”

Here there are two errors. The comparative _more_ is followed by

_as_, instead of _than_; and the adverb _never_ is improperly used

for _ever_. “How trivial so ever.” It should be, “There is nothing

that pleases mankind more, than,” &c.

Conjunctions having no government, the scholar, desirous to avoid

error, should carefully observe, whether the predicate be applicable

to the two subjects, connected by the conjunction, or, to speak

more generally, whether the two nouns be dependent on the same verb

or preposition, expressed or understood. “The lover got a woman of

greater fortune than her he had missed.”--_Addison_, _Guardian_.

This sentence, if not acknowledged to be ungrammatical, is at least

inelegant. The pronoun should have been introduced. If _than_ be

considered as having the power of a preposition, the charge of

solecism is precluded; but if _than_ be a conjunction, he should have

said, “than she, whom he had missed.” For, as Lowth observes, there

is no ellipsis of the verb _got_, so that the pronoun _her_ cannot

be under its government. The meaning is not, “The lover got a woman

of greater fortune, than he got her, whom he missed,” for this would

be a contradiction, but, “of greater fortune, than she was.” In like

manner, in the following passage:

“Nor hope to be myself less miserable,

By what I seek, but _others_ to make

Such _as I_.”--_Milton._

Bentley says, that it should be _me_. We concur with Dr. Lowth in

rejecting this correction, and approving the expression of Milton.

There is no ellipsis of the verb _make_; _others_ and _I_ are not

under the government of the same word. The meaning is not, “to make

others such, as to make me,” but, “such as I _am_” the substantive

verb being understood.

In the following passage, on the contrary, the ellipsis seems

evident: “I found none so fit as _him_ to be set in opposition to the

father of the renowned city of Rome.” It has been contended, that the

author should have said, “as he,” and not “as him:” but it appears

to me, that the verb _found_ is understood in the secondary clause,

and that the expression is correct, the sense being, “I found none so

fit, as I found him.”

In the following passage the two subjects belong to the same verb:

“The sun, upon the calmest sea,

Appears not half so bright as thee.”--_Prior._

It ought to be, “as thou;” that is, “as thou appearest.”

“So as,” and “as, as,” though frequently, have not always the same

import. “These things,” said Thales to Solon, who was lamenting

the supposed death of his son, “which strike down _so firm a man

as you_, have deterred me from marriage.” The expression clearly

refers to Solon; but, if he had said “as firm a man as you,” it might

have referred to a different person from Solon, but a man of equal

fortitude.

“For ever in this humble cell,

Let thee and I, my fair one, dwell.”

The second line of the couplet is ungrammatical, the conjunction

connecting an objective with a nominative case, or, to speak more

correctly, the pronoun of the first person, which should be a regimen

to the verb understood, being here in the nominative case. Thus, “let

thee,” and, “let I, my fair one, dwell,” instead of “let _thee_, and

let _me_.”

“Let us make a covenant, I and thou.”--_Bible._ The error here,

though similar, does not come under precisely the same predicament

with the former. The pronoun _us_ is very properly in the objective

case, after the verb _let_; _I_ and _thou_ should therefore be in

the same case, according to Rule vii. of Syntax. The expression is

in fact elliptical, and when completed proceeds thus, “Let us make

a covenant: let me and thee make.”

“Though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things which

he suffered.” The first clause is intended to express a fact, not a

hypothesis; the verb, therefore, should be in the indicative mood.

Conjunctions have no government, either of cases or moods.

IMPROPRIETY.

“If in case he come, all will be well.” _If_ and _in case_ are

synonymous, the one meaning “suppose,” and the other, “on the

supposition.” One of them, therefore, is redundant.

“The reason of my desiring to see you was, because I wanted to talk

with you.” _Because_ means “by reason;” the expression, therefore, is

chargeable with redundancy. It should be, “that I wanted to talk with

you.”

“No sooner was the cry of the infant heard, but the old gentleman

rushed into the room.”--_Martinus Scrib._ The comparative is here

improperly followed by _but_, instead of _than_.

“Scarce had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, than it was

attacked.” _Than_ is employed after comparatives only, and the word

_other_. It ought to be “scarce,” or, for reasons formerly given,

“scarcely had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, _when_ it was

attacked,” or “no sooner--than.”

“The resolution was not the less fixed, that the secret was as yet

communicated to very few, either in the French or English court.”

This passage from Hume I have not been able to find. Priestley

observes, that it involves a Gallicism, the word _that_ being used

instead of _as_. If the meaning intended be, that some circumstances,

previously mentioned, had not shaken the resolution, because the

secret was as yet known to few, then Priestley’s observation was

correct, and the word _as_ should be substituted for _that_, to

express the cause of the firmness. But, if the author intended to

say, that the very partial discovery of the secret had not shaken

the resolution, the clause is then perfectly correct. According

to the former phraseology, the circumstance subjoined operated as

a cause, preventing the resolution from being shaken: according

to the latter, it had no effect, or produced no change of the

previous determination. In other words, “the less fixed that,”

implies that the subject of the following clause did not affect that

of the preceding; “the less fixed _as_” denotes, that the latter

circumstance contributed to the production of the former. As it is

obvious, that, in such examples, the definite article may refer

either to the antecedent or the subsequent clause, the distinction,

here specified, should, for the sake of perspicuity, be carefully

observed[148].

“His donation was the more acceptable, that it was given without

solicitation.” That the word _that_ is frequently used for _because_

cannot be questioned; thus, “I am glad _that_ you have returned

safe,” that is, “_because_ you have returned safe.”

“’T is not _that_ I love you less

Than when before your feet I lay.”--_Waller._

Here _that_ is equivalent to _because_. English writers, however,

after a comparative, employ _as_ or _because_, to denote that the

circumstance subjoined was the cause of the preceding one. The use

of _that_ in such examples is accounted a Scotticism; it should,

therefore, be, “his donation was the more acceptable, _as_” or

“_because_ it was given without solicitation.”

“His arguments on this occasion had, it may be presumed, the greater

weight, that he had never himself entered within the walls of a

playhouse.”--_Stewart’s Life of Robertson._

“A mortification, the more severe, that the joint authority

of the archduke and the infanta governed the Austrian

Netherlands.”--_Thomson’s Continuation of Watson’s History._

These sentences are chargeable with the same error; and, it is not a

little remarkable, though the impropriety has been pointed out again

and again, that there is scarcely a Scotch writer, not even among

those of the highest name, who is not chargeable with the frequent

commission of this error.

“On the east and west sides, it (America) is washed by the Atlantic

and Pacific oceans.”--_Robertson._ This mode of expression is

incorrect; and, though to the geographer intelligible, it strictly

conveys a conception not intended by the author. The copulative joins

the two sides, which ought to be separated; and combines the two

seas, instead of the two facts, implying, that both sides are washed

by the same two oceans. It should be rather, “On the east side it is

washed by the Atlantic, and on the west (is washed) by the Pacific

ocean.”

“Will it be believed, that the four Gospels are as old, or even older

than tradition?”--_Bolingbroke._ Here there is a faulty omission of

the particle corresponding to _as_; for the positive and comparative

cannot be followed by the same conjunction. It ought to be, “as old

_as_, or even older _than_ tradition;” or, perhaps, better, “as old

as tradition, or even older.”

“The books were to have been sold as this day.” This is a most

offensive vulgarism. The conjunction _as_ can have no regimen; nor

can it be properly used as equivalent to _on_. It ought to be, “sold

this day,” or “on this day.”

“It is supposed, that he must have arrived at Paris as yesterday.”

This sentence is chargeable with the same error. Construed strictly,

it is, “he must have arrived at Paris _as_, or _in like manner as_,

he arrived yesterday.”

“The duke had not behaved with that loyalty, as he ought to have

done.” Propriety of correspondence here requires _with that_ to be

followed by _with which_, instead of _as_. The sentence, even thus

corrected, would be still inelegant and clumsy. “The duke had not

behaved with becoming loyalty,” would be much better.

“In _the_ order _as_ they lie in his preface.” This involves a

similar impropriety. It should be, “in order as,” or “in the order,

in which they lie in his preface.”

“No; this is not always the case neither.”--_Beattie._

“Men come not to the knowledge of ideas which are thought innate,

till they come to the use of reason; nor then neither.”--_Locke._

In old English two negatives denied; hence, perhaps, this phraseology

originated. Johnson remarks, that the use of _neither_, after a

negative, and at the end of a sentence, though not grammatical,

renders the expression more emphatic. Analogy, however, is decidedly

in favour of the affirmative term; I, therefore, prefer the word

“either.” Were Johnson’s argument admitted, such expressions as

these, “I forbade you _not_ to go;” “I won’t suffer no such thing;”

“He would not have none of my assistance,” might, I apprehend, be

justified on the same principle. Those who employ them, doubtless,

believe them to be more emphatic, than if they included a single

negative.

“This I am the rather disposed to do, that it will serve to

illustrate the principles above laid down.”--_Campbell on

Rhetoric._ This sentence involves an error, on which I have already

animadverted. “_The rather_” should be followed by _as_, not _that_.

“This is another use, that in my opinion contributes rather to make

a man learned than wise: and is neither capable of pleasing the

understanding, or imagination.” Lowth justly observes, that _or_

is here improperly used for _nor_, the correlative words being

_neither_, _nor_. In addition to this observation, I remark, that

the word _neither_ is erroneously placed. To render this collocation

of the conjunction correct, there should be another attributive

opposed to the word “capable,” as, “neither capable of pleasing the

understanding, nor calculated to gratify the imagination.” But,

as the author intended to exclude two subjects, these should have

been contrasted by the exclusive conjunctions, thus, “is capable of

pleasing neither the understanding, nor the imagination.”

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Adversity both

taught you to think and reason.”--_Steele._ The conjunction, which

is, in truth, the adjective _both_, is improperly placed. It should

be, “taught you both,” _i.e._ the two things, “to think and reason.”

It has been already observed, that the conjunction _or_ is used

disjunctively, and subdisjunctively, sometimes denoting a diversity

of things, and sometimes merely a difference of names. Hence often

arises ambiguity, where the utmost precision of expression is

necessary[149]. When Ruddiman delivers it as a rule, that “verbal

adjectives, _or_ such as signify an affection of the mind, require

the genitive,” I have known the scholar at a loss to understand,

whether there be two distinct classes of adjectives, here intended,

or one class under two designations. The ambiguity might here be

avoided, by using _and_ or _with_ instead of _or_. It may also be

prevented in many cases, by more forcibly marking the distinction

by the use of _either_. Thus, if we say, “whosoever shall cause, or

occasion a disturbance,” it may be doubtful, whether the latter of

the two verbs be not designed as explanatory of the former, they,

though their meanings be distinct, being often used as synonymous

terms. If we say, “shall either cause or occasion,” all doubt

is removed. Sometimes ambiguity may be precluded either by the

insertion, or the omission, of the article. Thus, if we say, “a

peer, or lord of parliament,”[150] meaning to designate only one

individual, or one order, the expression is correct. But if it be

intended to signify two individuals, every peer not being a lord of

parliament, and every lord of parliament not being a peer, we should

say, “a peer, or a lord of parliament,” or “either a peer, or lord of

parliament.”

Having now endeavoured to explain and illustrate the etymology and

syntax of the English language, I cannot dismiss the subject without

earnestly recommending to the classical student to cultivate a

critical acquaintance with his native tongue. It is an egregious,

but common error, to imagine, that a perfect knowledge of Greek and

Latin precludes the necessity of studying the principles of English

grammar. The structure of the ancient, and that of modern languages,

are very dissimilar. Nay, the peculiar idioms of any language,

how like soever in its general principles to any other, must be

learned by study, and an attentive perusal of the best writers in

that language. Nor can any imputation be more reproachful to the

proficient in classical literature, than, with a critical knowledge

of Greek and Latin, which are now dead languages, to be superficially

acquainted with his native tongue, in which he must think, and speak,

and write.

The superiority of Greek and Latin over the English language in

respect of harmony, graceful dignity, conciseness, and fluency,

will be readily admitted. Our language is, comparatively, harsh

and abrupt. It possesses strength, indeed; but unaccompanied with

softness, with elegance, or with majesty. It must be granted also,

that the Greek is, perhaps, a more copious, and is certainly a more

ductile[151] and tractable language. But though, in these respects,

the English be inferior to the languages of Greece and Rome, yet

in preciseness of expression, diversity of sound, facility of

communication, and variety of phrase, it may claim the pre-eminence.

It would be easy to evince the truth of this assertion, did the

limits, which I have prescribed to myself permit. The fact is, that

analogous languages almost necessarily possess a superiority in these

respects over those, which are transpositive.

It is to be remembered, also, that our language is susceptible of

high improvement; and though its abrupt and rugged nature cannot

be entirely changed, much may be done to smooth its asperities and

soften its harshness.

As a further inducement to the study of the English language, I

would assure the young reader, that a due attention to accuracy of

diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it

is generally true, that he, whose conceptions are clear, and who

is master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and

perspicuity[152]; so it is equally certain, that, as language is not

only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention,

if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly and thinking

correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and

precision.

It must, at the same time, be remembered, that to give our chief

attention to mere phraseology, or to be more solicitous about the

accuracy of the diction than the value of the sentiment, is a sure

indication of a nerveless and vacant mind. As we estimate a man,

not by his garb, but by his intellectual and moral worth, so it is

the sentiment itself, not the dress in which it is exhibited, that

determines its character, and our opinion of its author.

“True expression, like th’ unchanging sun,

Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon;

It gilds all objects, _but it alters none_.”--_Pope._

In short, the precept of Quintilian should be studiously observed:

“curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse solicitudinem.”--_Inst. Orat._

lib. viii.

THE END.

G. Woodfall and Son, Printers, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Beattie seems to think that the antediluvians had an alphabet,

and that hieroglyphical was posterior to alphabetical writing. “The

wisdom and simple manners of the first men,” says he, “would incline

me to think, that they must have had an alphabet; for hieroglyphic

characters imply quaintness and witticism.” In this reasoning I

cannot concur. Alphabetic writing is indeed simple, when known; so

also are most inventions. But, simple and easy as it appears to us,

we have only to examine the art itself, to be fully convinced, that

science, genius, and industry, must have been combined in inventing

it. Nay, the learned author himself acknowledges, “that though of

easy acquisition to us, it is in itself neither easy nor obvious.” He

even admits, “that alphabetical writing must be so remote from the

conceptions of those who never heard of it, that without divine aid

it would seem to be unsearchable and impossible.” I observe also that

in passing from picture-writing to hieroglyphical expression, and

in transferring the signs of physical to intellectual and invisible

objects, fanciful conceits would naturally take place. It is true

also that the manners of the antediluvians were simple; but it is

not from prudence nor simplicity of manners, but from human genius,

gradually improved, that we are to expect inventions, which require

the greatest efforts of the human mind.

[2] Cicero regards the invention of alphabetic writing as an evidence

of the celestial character of the soul; and many have ascribed its

origin to the inspiration of the Deity. To resort to supernatural

causes, to account for the production of any rare or striking event,

is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy. And how wonderful

soever the art of alphabetical writing may appear, there can be no

necessity for referring its introduction to divine inspiration, if

the inventive powers of man be not demonstrably unequal to the task.

Picture-writing is generally believed to have been the earliest

mode of recording events, or communicating information by permanent

signs. This was probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters.

How these pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through

negligence or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form, and

lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented, may

be easily conceived. Hence that association, which existed between

the sign and the thing signified, being founded in resemblance,

would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This having taken

place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be converted

into a mere verbal denotation, representative of words and not of

things. Hence, as Goguet, in his work, “De l’Origine des Loix,” &c.,

reasonably conjectures, would arise by a partial and easy analysis,

a syllabic mode of denotation, which would naturally introduce a

literal alphabet. This conjecture must seem highly probable, when it

is considered, that both a verbal and syllabic mode of notation are

still practised by some Eastern nations.

[3] I am aware, that in considering the letters _y_ and _w_ to be

the same with _i_ and _u_ (_oo_), I maintain an opinion, the truth

of which has been disputed. The reasons, however, which have been

assigned for rejecting it do not appear to me satisfactory.

[4] The mouth is not the proper organ for producing sound; but merely

the organ for modulating and articulating the specific sounds.

[5] The sound of _th_ in _thin_, is usually marked with a stroke

through the _h_, to distinguish it from its other sound; thus,

_tħick_. This distinction is by some writers reversed.

[6] Hutton’s Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. ii.

p. 688.

[7] Plato and Aristotle, when they treat of prepositions, considered

the noun and the verb as the only essential parts of speech; these,

without the aid of any other word, being capable of forming a

sentence. Hence they were called τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, “the

most animated parts of speech.” The latter of these philosophers, in

his Poetics, admits four, adding to the noun and the verb the article

and the conjunction. The elder Stoics made five, dividing the noun

into proper and appellative.

[8]

Noun, Nomen de quo loquimur.

Verb, Verbum seu quod loquimur.--_Quint._ _lib._ i. 4.

Horace has been thought by some to countenance this doctrine when he

says,

“Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,

Nominaque invenere.”--_Lib._ i. _Sat._ 3.

[9] The plural number, and the genitive singular, seem to have been

originally formed by adding _er_ to the nominative singular, as

_you, you-er, your_; _they, they-er, their_; _we, we-er, our_. This

termination was afterwards changed into _en_, and then into _es_

or _s_. Thus we have still in provincial usage, though now almost

entirely obsolete, _childer_ for the plural of _child_, and the

double plural in _child-er-en, children_, with the double genitive in

_west-er-en, western_.

[10] _Brethren_, in Scripture, is used for _brothers_.

[11] The obsolete plural occurs in the Bible. “These men were bound

in their hosen and hats.”--_Dan._ iii. 21.

[12] Baker inclines also to this usage in preference to the other;

but does not affirm it to be a plural noun.

[13] _Much_ is sometimes joined with collective nouns; but these

denote number in the aggregate; thus, _much company_.

[14] The gender of _mors_, _virtus_, _sol_, θάνατος, ἀρετή, ἥλιος,

was unalterably fixed.

[15] It seems, however, to be more applicable to the English language

than to any other with which I am acquainted.

[16] These observations will sufficiently explain the reason why

we cannot concur with Dr. Johnson in thinking that there is “an

impropriety in the termination,” when we say of a woman, “She is

a philosoph_er_.” The female termination in such examples is not

wanted; it would be pleonastic and improper. The meaning is, “She is

a person given to the study of nature.” If we had been speaking of a

lady devoted to philosophy, and had occasion afterwards to mention

her by an appellative, we should feel the want of the appropriate

termination; and instead of saying “the philosopher,” we should

wish, for the sake of discrimination, to be able to say, “the

philosophress,” or to employ some equally distinctive term. In the

example adduced by the learned lexicographer, the female termination

is superfluous; and would intimate a distinction of philosophic

character, instead of a distinction of sex, the latter being denoted

by the female pronoun.

[17] We remark, in some instances, a similar phraseology in Greek

and Latin. Θεὸς and θεὰ, _deus_ and _dea_, are contradistinguished

as in English, _god_ and _goddess_; the former of each pair strictly

denoting the male, and the latter the female. But the former, we

find, has a generical meaning, expressing “a deity,” whether male

or female; and is frequently used when the female is designed, if

divinity in the abstract be the primary idea without regard to the

sex, thus,

... “τὸν δ’ ἐξήρπαξ’ Ἀφροδίτη,

Ῥεῖα μάλ’ ὥστε θεός.”--_Hom. Il._ iii. 380.

Here the term θεός is applied to Venus, the character of divinity,

and not the distinction of sex, being the chief object of the poet’s

attention. Θεός is, therefore, to be considered as either masculine

or feminine.

“Ἀλλά μ’ ἁ Διός γ’ ἀλκίμα θεός.”--_Soph. Aj._ 401.

“Μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεός.”--_Hom. Il._ Θ. 7.

“Descendo, ac ducente deo, flammam inter et hostes

Expedior.”--_Virg. Æn._ ii. 632.

Here, also, _deo_ is applied to Venus, as likewise in the following

passage, “_deum_ esse indignam credidi.”--_Plaut. Pœn._ 2, l. 10.

[18] Πτῶσις γενική: general case. It has been supposed by some that

the Latins, mistaking the import of the Greek term, called this the

genitive case. See _Ency. Brit., Art. Grammar_.

[19] _Amor Dei_ denotes either _amor quo Deus amat_, or _quo Deus

amatur_. _Reformatio Lutheri_, either _qua reformavit_, or _qua

reformatus est_. _Injuria patris, desiderium amici_, with many other

examples which might be produced, have either an active or passive

sense. ἡ ἀγαπὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, אהבת יהוה, l’amore de Dio, l’amour de Dieu,

severally involve the same ambiguity with “the love of God.”

[20] Of the six declensions, to one or other of which the learned

Dr. Hickes conceives the inflexion of almost all the Saxon nouns may

be reduced, three form their genitive in _es_, as, _word, wordes_;

_smith, smithes_. In the Mœsogothic, a kindred language, the genitive

ends in _s_, some nouns having _is_, some _ns_, and others _as_, as,

_fan, fanins_; _faukagagja, faukagagjis_.

[21] It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong

not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of

intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.

[22] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere

curandum.--_Inst._ _lib._ viii. _cap._ 4.

I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in

this respect over the Greek itself. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος

παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ may signify either “man in the species, or an

individual, was sent from God.” The author of the article Grammar,

in the Encyc. Brit., observes, “that the word ἄνθρωπος is here

restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb and the

participle.” If he mean by this that the term must be significant

of only one individual, (and I can annex no other interpretation

to his words,) because a singular verb and participle singular are

joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be

produced to evince the contrary. Job. v. 7. ἄνθρωπος γεννᾶται κόπῳ

“man (mankind) is born unto trouble;” where the subject is joined to

a verb singular. Psal. xlix. 12. ἄνθρωπος ἐν τιμῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκε, “man

being in honour abideth not.” Here also _man_ for _mankind_ is joined

with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently

asked, would not the term _one_ for _a_ in the first example somewhat

alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by

the evangelist?

[23] They are the Saxon words _this_ or _thes_, “hic, hæc, hoc,”

_that_ or _thæt_, “ille, illa, illud,” which were frequently used

by the Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, _send us

on thas swyn_, “send us into the swine.” Mark v. 21, _tha eodon tha

unclænan gastas on tha swyn_, “then the unclean spirits entered into

the swine.”

The Saxon definites are _se_, _seo_, _thæt_, for the three genders

severally; and _tha_ in the plural, expressing _the_ or _those_, as,

_thæt goed sæd_, the good seed. _Thæt_ is also joined to masculine

and feminine nouns, as, _thæt wif_, the woman; _thæt folc_, the

people. _Thæ_ (pronounced _they_) still obtains in Scotland, as, “thæ

men” for “these men.”

[24] ארץ‏‎ ‎‏הארץ.

[25] אשרי האיש.

[26] Horne Tooke appears to me to have erred in deriving _odd_

from _ow’d_. His words are these: “_Odd_ is the participle _ow’d_.

Thus, when we are counting by couples or pairs, we say, ‘one pair,’

‘two pairs,’ &c., and ‘one ow’d,’ ‘two ow’d,’ to make up another

pair. It has the same meaning when we say, ‘an odd man,’ ‘an odd

action,’ it still relates to pairing; and we mean ‘without a

fellow,’ ‘unmatched.’” Now, I must own, this appears to me a very

odd explanation; for, in my apprehension, it leads to a conclusion

the very reverse of that which the author intends. The term _odd_ is

applied to the one which stands by itself, and not to that which is

absent, or ow’d, to complete the pair. If I say, “there are three

pairs, and an odd one,” the word _odd_ refers to the single one,

over and above the three pairs, and not to the one which is wanting;

yet Mr. Tooke refers it to the latter. His explanation seems at

once unnatural and absurd. Had he substituted, according to his own

etymology, _add_ for _and_, saying, “three pairs, add an ow’d one,”

he must, I think, have perceived its inaccuracy. It is the _odd_ and

_present one_, of which the singularity is predicated, and not the

_absent_ or _ow’d one_.

[27] “_Quivis_ seu _quilibet_ affirmat; _quisquam_, _quispiam_,

_ullus_, aut negat aut interrogat,” are the words of an ancient

grammarian. It is observable also, that in Latin, _ullus_, any, is a

diminutive from _unus_, one; as _any_ in English is from _ane_, the

name of unity, as formerly used.

[28] In Anglo-Saxon _ic_, in German _ich_, in Greek ἐγὼ, in Latin

_ego_. Mr. Webb delivered it as his opinion, that the pronoun of the

first person was derived from the Hebrew ech or ach, _one_, used by

_apocope_ for _achad_ or _ahad_, he added, “oned,” or “united.” It is

doubtless true, that _ech_ occurs in one or two passages for _one_:

see Ezek. xviii. 10, and Ps. xlix. 8; in which latter passage it is

rendered in our translation, _brother_, and by R. Jonah, _one_; but

we apprehend that this fact will by no means justify his conclusion.

And as he considered that the pronoun of the first person radically

denoted _one_, he imagined that the pronoun of the second person came

from the numeral _duo_, _du_, _tu_, _thu_. Now, it must be granted

that there is an obvious resemblance between _ic_ and _ech_, and also

between _duo_, _tu_, and _thu_; but were we to draw any conclusion

from this similarity, it would be the reverse of that which the

author has deduced. It seems quite preposterous to suppose, that

the necessity for expressing a number would present itself, before

that of discriminating between the person speaking and the person

addressed. The rude savage could not converse with his fellow without

some sign of this distinction; and if visible signs (as is probable)

would be first adopted, we may reasonably presume, on several

grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions.

The pronoun _ic_ is in Saxon declined thus:

_Sing. Nom._ Ic _Gen._ Min _Dat._ Me _Acc._ Me

_Plur. Nom._ We _Gen._ Ure _Dat._ Us _Acc._ Us.

[29] The pronoun of the second person is thus declined:

_Sing. Nom._ Thu _Gen._ Thin _Dat._ The _Acc._ The

_Plur. Nom._ Ge (hard) _Gen._ Eower _Dat._ and _Acc._ Eow.

[30] The Anglo-Saxon he is declined thus:

_Sing. Nom._ He _Gen._ His _Dat._ and _Acc._ Him.

[31]

_Sing. Nom._ Heo _Gen._ Hire _Dat._ Hire. _Acc._ Hi.

[32] This pronoun is from the Anglo-Saxon _hyt_ or _hit_, “i” _or_

“that.”

[33] In Anglo-Saxon _hi_, in Teutonic _die_.

[34] In Anglo-Saxon, hwa, hua; _Gen._ hwæs; _Dat._ hwam; _Acc._

hwæne, hwone. Also _hwilc_, whence, says Hickes, proceeded _which_,

the letter _l_ being elided.

[35] Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly termed

adjective noun, and “that it is altogether as much the name of a

thing, as the noun substantive.” Names and designations necessarily

influence our conceptions of the things which they represent. It

is therefore desirable, that in every art or science, not only

should no term be employed which may convey to the reader or hearer

an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every

term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object which

it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr. Tooke in thinking, that the

adjective is by no means a necessary part of speech. I agree with

him also in opinion, that, in a certain sense, all words are nouns

or names. But, as this latter doctrine seems directly repugnant to

the concurrent theories of critics and grammarians, it is necessary

to explain in what sense the opinion of Mr. Tooke requires to be

understood; and in presenting the reader with this explanation,

I shall briefly state the objections which will naturally offer

themselves against the justness of this theory. “_Gold_, and

_brass_, and _silk_, is each of them,” says Mr. Tooke, “the name of

a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I say, _a gold-ring_,

a brass-tube, a silk-string; here are the substantives _adjectivè

posita_, yet names of things, and denoting substances.” It may be

contended, however, that these are not substantives, but adjectives,

and are the same as _golden_, _brazen_, _silken_. He proceeds: “If

again I say, _a golden ring_, _a brazen tube_, _a silken string_; do

_gold_, and _brass_, and _silk_, cease to be the names of things, and

cease to denote substances, because instead of coupling them with

_ring_, _tube_, and _string_, by a hyphen thus (-), I couple them to

the same words, by adding the termination _en_?” It may be answered,

they do not cease to imply the substances, but they are no longer

names of those substances. _Hard_ implies hardness, but it is not

the name of that quality. _Atheniensis_ implies _Athenæ_, but it is

not the name of the city, any more than _belonging to Athens_ can be

called its name. He observes: “If it were true, that adjectives were

not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives;

for you cannot attribute nothing.” This conclusion may be disputed.

An adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it

is not the name of it. _Cereus_, “waxen,” implies _cera_, “wax;” but

it is the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance.

_Pertaining to wax, made of wax_, are not surely names of the thing

itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must imply

an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that attribute.

_Juvenescit_, “he waxes young,” expresses an attribute; but we should

not call _juvenescit_ the name of the attribute.

It may be asked, what is the difference between _caput hominis_,

“a man’s head,” and _caput humanum_, “a human head?” If _hominis_,

“man’s,” be deemed a noun, why should not _humanum_, “human,” be

deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that _hominis_ does, in

fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the

individual, but conjunction also; and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the

English genitive the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke

himself maintain, “that case, gender, and number, are no parts of

the noun”? and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not

_hominis_, but _homo_,--not _man’s_, but _man_? for such certainly

is their form when divested of those circumstances which, according

to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of

the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender,

case, and number, as any part of it, neither _hominis_ nor _humanum_,

_man’s_ nor _human_, can with consistency be called nouns.

But let Mr. Tooke’s argument be applied to the verb, the τὸ ῥῆμα,

which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. “If verbs

were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by verbs,

for we cannot attribute nothing.” Are we then to call _sapit_,

_vivit_, _legit_, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to

this conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion; for he says,

that all words are names.

Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this sagacious

critic, with the objections which naturally present themselves, I

proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to me to be, in a

great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed on both sides,

that the adjective expresses a substance, quality, or property; but,

while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied by others, that

it is the name of the thing signified. The metaphysician considers

words merely as signs of thought, while the grammarian regards

chiefly their changes by inflexion: and hence arises that perplexity

in which the classification of words has been, and still continues

to be, involved. Now, it is evident that every word must be the

sign of some sensation, idea, or perception. It must express some

substance or some attribute: and in this sense all words may be

regarded as names. Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply,

as _person_. Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with

the simple sign, as “possession,” “conjunction,” “action,” and so

forth, as _personal_, _personally_, _personify_. This accessary

circumstance, we have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a

distinct word, significant of the idea intended; and that this word

was, in the progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with

the primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix.

Thus _frigus_, _frigidus_, _friget_, all denote the same primary

idea, involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation,

which we term _cold_. _Frigus_ is the name of the thing simply;

_frigidus_ expresses the quality _in concreto_, or conjunction.

Considering, therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a

complex name, expressing two distinct ideas,--that of the quality,

and that of conjunction. _Friget_ (the subject being understood)

may be regarded as a name still more complex; involving, first, the

name of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the

sign of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name,

or constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, _est cum

frigore_. According, then, to this metaphysical view of the subject,

we have first _nomen simplex_, the simple name; secondly, _nomen

adjectivum_ or _nomen duplex_, the name of the thing, with that of

conjunction; thirdly, _nomen affirmativum_, the name of the thing

affirmed to be conjoined.

The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb

excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign them

such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances by which

they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be the only mode

which the grammarian, as the teacher of an art, can successfully

adopt. Considering the subject in this light, I am inclined to say

with Mr. Harris, that the adjective, as implying some substance or

attribute, not _per se_, but _in conjunction_, or _as pertaining_,

is more nearly allied to the verb than to the noun; and that though

the verb and the adjective may, in common with the noun, denote the

thing, they cannot strictly be called its name. To say that _foolish_

and _folly_ are each names of the same quality, would, I apprehend,

lead to nothing but perplexity and error.

It is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name

of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all

right to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply,

but the subject _in conjunction_--the inflexion being equivalent

to “belonging to.” This indeed is an inconsistency which can in

no way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who

assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers _man’s_, _king’s_,

&c., to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke’s definition

of our adjective, and say, “It is the _name of a thing_ which is

directed to be joined to another _name of a thing_,” it will follow,

that _king’s_, _man’s_, are adjectives. In short, if the question

be confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove

all inconsistency, either deny the appellation of _noun_ to the

adjective, and, with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or

we must first call _man’s_, _king’s_, &c., adjectives; secondly, we

must term _happy_, _extravagant_, _mercenary_, &c., nouns, though

they are not names; and thirdly, we must assign the appellation of

noun to the verb itself.

From this view of the subject the reader will perceive that the

whole controversy depends on the meaning which we annex to the term

_noun_. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself, without

any accessary circumstance, then nothing can be called a noun but

the name in its simple form. If to the term noun we assign a more

extensive signification, as implying not only the thing itself simply

and absolutely, but also any accessary idea, as conjunction, action,

passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all words may be termed

names.

[36] The Saxons formed their comparative by _er_ or _ere_, _ar_

or _ære_, _er_, _or_, _ur_, _yr_, and their superlative by _ast_,

_aste_, _est_, _ist_, _ost_, _ust_, _yst_. Now _ar_ means _before_;

hence the English words _ere_ and _erst_. Thus, in Saxon, _riht

wisere_ means “righteous _before_,” “just _before_,” or “_more

than_.” The suffix is equivalent to the Latin _præ_, and the Hebrew

preposition _min_, signifying also _before_; the only difference

being this, that what is a suffix to the Saxon adjective is in Hebrew

a prefix to the consequent subject of comparison, and that in Latin

the preposition following the positive stands alone.

Mr. Bosworth, in his “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” a work

displaying sound philological principles, has remarked, that the

Gothic superlative in _itsa_ bears an obvious resemblance to some of

the Greek superlatives, as, ἄριστος, κάλλιστος, βράδιστος.

[37] _Up_ and _in_ are now used as adverbs and prepositions.

[38] This phraseology is Hebraistic--“more than all his children”

is the literal translation of the original, מְּכל־בניו præ omnibus

filiis, seu, magis omnibus filiis suis.

[39] See a valuable little volume on English Grammar, by Mr. Grant.

The “Institutes of Latin Grammar,” by the same author, we would

recommend to the attention of every classical student.

[40] _I, hi, hie_, “to go,” he considers to be from Ἰ-έναι, the Greek

verb; and hence to be derived the Latin verb _I-re_, “to go,” “to

hie.”

[41] Intransitive verbs sometimes are used transitively, as, when we

say, “to walk the horse,” “to dance the child.” They also admit a

noun of their own signification, as, “to run a race.”

[42] Conformably to general opinion I here consider the English

language as having a passive voice. How far this opinion is well

founded shall be the subject of future inquiry.

[43] Mr. Bosworth seems to think, that the word _tense_ is derived

from the Latin _tensus_, “used to denote that extension or inflexion

of the word, by which difference in time is implied, or difference in

action is signified.” I am rather inclined to consider it as derived

from the French _tems_ or _temps_, and that from _tempus_.

[44] “Some,” says Dr. Beattie, “will not allow anything to be a

tense, but what, in one inflected word, expresses an affirmation

with time; for, that those parts of the verb are not properly called

tenses, which assume that appearance, by means of auxiliary words. At

this rate, in English, we should have two tenses only, the present

and the past in the active verb, and in the passive no tenses at

all. But this is a needless nicety; and, if adopted, would introduce

confusion into the grammatical art. If _amaveram_ be a tense, why

should not _amatus fueram_? If _I heard_ be a tense, _I did hear_,

_I have heard_, and _I shall hear_, must be equally entitled to that

appellation.”

How simplicity can introduce confusion I am unable to comprehend,

unless we are to affirm that the introduction of Greek and Latin

names, to express nonentities in our language, is necessary to

illustrate the grammar, and simplify the study of the language to

the English scholar. But the author’s theory seems at variance

with itself. He admits, that “we have no cases in English, except

the addition of _s_ in the genitive;” whence we may infer, that

he considers inflexion as essential to a case. Now, if those

only be cases, which are formed by inflexion, those only should,

grammatically, be deemed tenses, which are formed in the same manner.

When he asks, therefore, if _amaveram_ be a tense, why should not

_amatus fueram_ be a tense also? the answer on his own principles is

sufficiently obvious, namely, because the one is formed by inflexion,

the other by combination. And, I would ask, if _king’s_ be a genitive

case, why, according to this theory, is not of _a king_ entitled

to the same appellation? I apprehend the answer he must give,

consistently with his opinion respecting cases, will sufficiently

explain why _amaveram_, and _I heard_, are tenses, while _amatus

fueram_, and _I had heard_, are not.

Nay, further, if it be needless nicety to admit those only as

tenses, which are formed by inflexion, is it not equally a needless

nicety to admit those cases only, which are formed by varying the

termination? And if confusion be introduced by denying _I had heard_

to be a tense, why does not the learned author simplify the doctrine

of English nouns, by giving them six cases, _a king_, _of a king_,

_to_ or _for a king_, _a king_, _O king_, _with, from, in_, or _by a

king_? This surely would be to perplex, not to simplify. In short,

the inconsistency of those grammarians, who deny that to be a case,

which is not formed by inflexion, yet would load us with moods and

tenses, not formed by change of termination, is so palpable, as to

require neither illustration nor argument to expose it. If these

authors would admit, that we have as many cases in English, as there

exists relations expressed by prepositions, then, indeed, though they

might overwhelm us with the number, we should at least acknowledge

the consistency of their theory. But to adopt the principle of

inflexion in one case, and reject it in another, precisely parallel,

involves an inconsistency which must excite amazement. _Nil fuit

sic unquam impar sibi._ Why do not these gentlemen favour us with a

dual number, with a middle voice, and with an optative mood? Nay,

as they are so fond of tenses, as to lament that we rob them of all

but two, why do they not enrich us with a first and second aorist,

and a paulo post future? and, if this should not suffice, they will

find in Hebrew a rich supply of verbal forms. We should then have

kal and niphal, pihhel and pyhhal, hiphhil and hophhal, hithpahhel

and hothpahhel, and numerous other species and designations. What a

wonderful acquisition this would be to our stock of moods, tenses,

and voices!

One of these grammarians, indeed, reverencing the old maxim _est

modus in rebus_, observes, that “it is necessary to set bounds to

this business, so as not to occasion obscurity and perplexity,

when we mean to be simple and perspicuous.” This is so far good;

because, though it vindicates the impropriety, it modestly would

confine it within decent bounds. But surely it cannot be necessary

to remind this writer, that when the boundary between right and

wrong, propriety and impropriety, is once passed, it is extremely

difficult to prescribe limits to the transgression; and that

arbitrary distinctions, resting on no other foundation than prejudice

or fashion, must ever be vague, questionable, and capricious. These

are truths of which, I am persuaded, the author to whom I allude

needs not to be reminded. But it may be necessary to impress on his

attention another truth equally incontestable, that no authority,

how respectable soever, can sanction inconsistency; and that great

names, though they may be honoured by ignorance and credulity with

the most obsequious homage, will never pass with the intelligent

reader, either for demonstration or for argument. This author, in

defence of his theory of cases and tenses, observes, “that the proper

form of a tense, in the Greek and Latin languages, is certainly that

which it has in the grammars of these languages.” On what evidence

is this assumption founded? Here is exhibited a _petitio principii_,

too palpable to escape the detection of the most inattentive reader.

He proceeds: “But in the Greek and Latin grammars we uniformly find

that some of the tenses are formed by variations of the principal

verb, and others by the addition of helping verbs.” It is answered

that the admission of these forms in Greek and Latin grammars is a

question of mere expediency, and nowise affects the doctrine for

which we contend, any more than the admission of six cases in all the

Latin declensions affects the doctrine of cases; though in no one

declension have all the cases dissimilar terminations. This position

it would be easy to demonstrate: it would be easy likewise to show

why, notwithstanding this occasional identity of termination, six

cases are admitted in all the declensions; but the subject is foreign

to our present purpose. It is important, however, to observe, what

has escaped the notice of the author, that the principle, on which

the admission just mentioned may be expedient in a Latin grammar, has

no existence whatever in the English language.

“It is, therefore,” he continues, “indisputable, that the principal,

or the participle, and an auxiliary, constitute a regular tense

in the Greek and Latin languages.” This, as I have remarked, is a

palpable _petitio principii_. It is to say, that because _amatus

fueram_ is a tense, therefore “I had been loved” is a tense also.

The author forgets that the premises must be true, to render the

conclusion legitimate. He forgets, that a circular argument is a

mere sophism, because it assumes as true what it is intended to

prove. Whether _amatus fueram_ be or be not a tense, is the very

point in question; and so far am I from admitting the affirmative

as unquestionable, that I contend, it has no more claim to the

designation of tense, than ἔσομαι τετυφώς--no more claim than

_amandum est mihi_, _amari oportet_, or _amandus sum_, have to be

called moods. Here I must request the reader to bear in mind the

necessary distinction between the grammar of a language and its

capacity of expression.

In answer to the objection of inconsistency, in admitting tenses

where there is no inflexion, yet rejecting cases where there is

no change of termination, the author says, “that such a mode of

declension cannot apply to our language.” But why can it not apply?

Why not give as English cases, _to a king_, _of a king_, _from a

king_, _with a king_, _by a king_, _at a king_, _about a king_,

&c. &c.? The mode is certainly applicable, whatever may be the

consequences of that application. A case surely is as easily formed

by a noun and preposition, as a tense by a participle and auxiliary.

But the author observes, “the English language would then have a much

greater number of cases than the Greek and Latin languages.” And why

not? Is the number of cases in English, or any other language, to

be limited by the number in Greek or Latin? or does the author mean

to say, that there is any peculiar propriety in the number five or

six? The author, to be consistent with himself, ought to acknowledge

as many cases as there are prepositions to be found in the English

language. This, it may be said, would encumber our grammar, and

embarrass the learner. This is, indeed, an argument against the

expediency of the application, but not against the practicability

of the principle in question. Besides, it may be asked, why does

the author confine his love of simplification to cases? Why not

extend it to tenses also? Why maintain, that inflexion only makes a

case, and that a tense is formed without inflexion? Why dismiss one

encumbrance, and admit another?

The author observes, that “from grammarians, who form their ideas

and _make_ their decisions respecting this part of grammar, on the

principles and construction of languages, which in these points do

not suit the peculiar nature of our own, but differ considerably from

it, we may naturally expect grammatical schemes that are neither

perspicuous nor consistent, and which will tend more to perplex

than inform the learner.” Had I been reprehending the author’s own

practice, I should have employed nearly the same language. How these

observations, certainly judicious and correct, can be reconciled

with the doctrine of the writer himself, I am utterly at a loss

to conceive. His ideas of consistency and simplicity are to me

incomprehensible. He rejects _prepositional_ cases for the sake of

simplicity, and he admits various moods and tenses, equally foreign

to the genius of our language, in order to avoid perplexity. Surely

this is not a “consistent scheme.” Nay, he tells us, “that on the

principle of imitating other languages in names and forms (I beseech

the reader to mark the words), without a correspondence in nature and

idiom, we might adopt a number of declensions, as well as a variety

of cases, for English substantives: but,” he adds, “this variety does

not at all correspond with the idiom of our language.” After this

observation, argument surely becomes unnecessary.

I have here, the reader will perceive, assailed the author’s doctrine

merely on the ground of inconsistency. It is liable, however, to

objections of a more serious nature; and were I not apprehensive

that I have already exhausted the patience of the reader, I should

now proceed to state these objections. There is one observation,

however, which I feel it necessary to make. The author remarks, that

to take the tenses as they are commonly received, and endeavour to

ascertain their nature and their differences, “is a much more useful

exercise, as well as a more proper, for a work of this kind, than to

raise, as might be easily raised, new theories on the subject.” If

the author by this intends to insinuate that our doctrine is new,

he errs egregiously. For Wallis, one of the oldest, and certainly

one of the best of our English grammarians, duly attentive to

the simplicity of that language whose grammar he was exhibiting,

assigned only two tenses to the English verb. He says, _Nos duo

tantum habemus tempora Præsens et Præteritum_; and on this simple

principle his explanation of the verb proceeds. In the preface to

his grammar, he censures his few predecessors for violating the

simplicity of the English language, by the introduction of names and

rules foreign to the English idiom. _Cur hujusmodi casuum, generum,

modorum, temporumque fictam et ineptam plane congeriem introducamus

citra omnem necessitatem, aut in ipsa lingua fundamentum, nulla

ratio suadet._ And so little was he aware that the introduction of

technical names for things which have no existence, facilitates the

acquisition of any art or science, that he affirms it in regard

to the subject before us to be the cause of great confusion and

perplexity. _Quæ (inutilia præcepta) a lingua nostra sunt prorsus

aliena, adeoque confusionem potius et obscuritatem pariunt, quam

explicationi inserviunt._

[45] Mr. Gilchrist, in his “Philosophic Etymology,” represents

the terminations _ath_, _eth_, _ad_, _ed_, _et_, _en_, _an_, as

conjunctives, equivalent to the sign +, denoting _add_, or _join_

(see p. 162). In another part of the same work, he considers _did_

to be _do_ doubled, as _dedi_ from the Latin _do_, which he believes

to be the very same word with our _do_. Repetition, he observes, is

a mode of expressing complete action. Hence we have _do_, _do-ed_,

_dede_, _did_, in English. This explanation is ingenious, and

furnishes a probable account of the origin of the word _did_, which

he remarks was formerly spelled _dede_.

[46]

I be Thou beest He, she, or it be

We be Ye or you be They be,

from the Saxon

Ic beo Thu beest He beeth,

are obsolete, unless followed by a concessive term. Thus, instead

of saying, “Many there _be_ that go in thereat,” we should now

say, “Many there _are_.” For “to whom all hearts _be_ open,” we

should now write, “to whom all hearts _are_ open.” We find them,

however, used with the conjunctions _if_ and _though_; thus, “If

this be my notion of a great part of that high science, divinity,

you will be so civil as to imagine, I lay no mighty stress upon the

rest.”--_Pope._ That this was his notion the author had previously

declared; the introductory clause, therefore, is clearly affirmative,

and is the same as if he had said, “As this is my notion.” “Although

she _be_ abundantly grateful to all her protectors, yet I observe

your name most often in her mouth.”--_Swift._ “The paper, although

it _be_ written with spirit, yet would have scarce cleared a

shilling.”--_Swift._ In the two last sentences the meaning is

affirmative; nothing conditional or contingent being implied.

In the following examples, it expresses doubt or contingency. “If

thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down:” _i.e._ “shouldst be.” “If

I be in difficulty, I will ask your aid;” _i.e._ “If I should be.”

[47] Though the authority of Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift, can

be pleaded in favour of _wert_, as the second person singular of

this tense, I am inclined to agree with Lowth, that in conformity

to analogy, as well as the practice of the best ancient writers, it

would be better to confine _wert_ to the imperfect conditional.

[48] If the expression of time with an attribute “be sufficient to

make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it signifies

time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in predication, which

is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all other parts of speech,

and these infinitives never predicating, they cannot be verbs.

Again, the essence of a noun consisting in its so subsisting in the

understanding, as that it may be the subject of predication, and

these infinitives being all capable of so subsisting, they must of

necessity be nouns.”--_R. Johnson’s Gram. Comment._

[49] The variety of form which this verb assumes, clearly shows that

it has proceeded from different sources.

_Am_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _eom_, and _is_ from the Anglo-Saxon

_ys_ or _is_; and these have been supposed to have come from the

Greek εἰμὶ, εἶς.

The derivation of _are_ is doubtful. It may, perhaps, have proceeded

directly from _er_ or _erum_ of the Icelandic verb, denoting “to

be.” By Mr. Gilchrist it is considered as “the same with the

infinitive termination _are, ere, ire_.” Mr. Webb conjectured, that

it might have some relation to the Greek ἔαρ, _spring_. Both these

explanations appear to us somewhat fanciful.

_Art_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _eart_. “Thou eart,” _thou art_.

_Was_ is evidently the Anglo-Saxon _wæs_; and _wast_, _wert_,

probably from the Franco-Theatisc, _warst_; and _were_ from the

Anglo-Saxon _wære_, _wæron_.

_Be_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _Ic beo_, _I am_, which, with the Gaelic

verb _bi_, _to be_, Mr. Webb considered to be derived from βίος,

_life_, as the Latin _fui_, from φύω, _to grow_. This conjecture

he supports by several pertinent quotations. See Mr. Bosworth’s

“Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” p. 164.

[50] The words _did_, _hast_, _hath_, _has_, _had_, _shall_, _wilt_,

are evidently, as Wallis observes, contracted for _doed_, _haveth_,

_haves_, _haved_, _shall’st_, _will’st_.

[51] This verb is derived from the Saxon magan, _posse_, the present

of which is _Ic mæg_, and the preterite _Ic miht_. Hence also _Ic

mot_.

“For as the fisshe, if it be drie,

Mote in defaute of water die.”--_Gower._

[52] This verb is derived from cunnan, _scire_, _posse_, _sapere_.

Hence is derived the verb “to ken,” or “to know;” or more probably,

indeed, they were one and the same word: hence also the word

_cunning_. “To ken” is still used in Scotland; and in the expression

of Shakspeare, “I ken them from afar,” is erroneously considered by

some critics to mean, “I see them.”

[53] This verb is, unquestionably, a derivative from the Saxon ꞅceal,

_I owe_ or _I ought_, and was originally of the same import. _I

shall_ denoted “it is my duty,” and was precisely synonymous with

_debeo_ in Latin. Chaucer says, “The faith I shall to God;” that is,

“the faith I owe to God.” “Thou shalt not kill,” or “thou oughtest

not to kill.” In this sense _shall_ is a present tense, and denoted

present duty or obligation. But, as all duties and all commands,

though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must

be future in regard to their execution; so by a natural transition,

observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty,

came to be a note of future time. I have considered it, however, as

a present tense; 1st, because it originally denoted present time;

2dly, because it still retains the form of a present, preserving

thus the same analogy to _should_ that _can_ does to _could_, _may_

to _might_, _will_ to _would_; and 3dly, because it is no singular

thing to have a verb in the present tense, expressive of future time,

commencing from the present moment; for such precisely is the Greek

verb μέλλω, _futurus sum_. Nay, the verb _will_ denotes present

inclination, yet in some of its persons, like _shall_, expresses

futurition. I have considered, therefore, the verb _shall_ as a

present tense, of which _should_ is the preterperfect.

Johnson’s explanation of the meaning of this verb is so perspicuous,

that, as foreigners are apt to mistake its use, I shall here

transcribe his words. _I shall love_: “it will be so that I must

love,” “I am resolved to love.” _Shall I love?_ “will it be permitted

me to love?” “will it be that I must love?” _Thou shalt love_: “I

command thee to love;” “it is permitted thee to love;” “it will be,

that thou must love.” _Shalt thou love?_ “will it be, that thou must

love?” “will it be permitted thee to love?” _He shall love_: “it will

be, that he must love;” “it is commanded that he love.” _Shall he

love?_ “is it permitted him to love?” The plural persons follow the

signification of the singular.

I transcribe also the same author’s explanation of the verb _I will_.

_I will come_: “I am willing to come,” “I am determined to come.”

_Thou wilt come_: “it must be, that thou must come,” importing

necessity; or “it shall be, that thou shalt come,” importing choice.

_Wilt thou come?_ “hast thou determined to come?” importing choice.

_He will come_: “he is resolved to come;” or “it must be, that he

must come,” importing choice or necessity.

Brightland’s short rule may be of some service in assisting

foreigners to distinguish the use of these two verbs. It is this:

“In the first person simply _shall_ foretels:

In _will_ a threat, or else a promise, dwells;

_Shall_ in the second and the third does threat;

_Will_ simply then foretels the future feat.”

In addition to these directions for the use of _shall_ and _will_,

it is to be observed, that, when the second and third persons are

represented as the subjects of their own expressions, or their own

thoughts, _shall_ foretels, as in the first person, thus, “he says

he shall be a loser by this bargain:” “do you suppose you shall go?”

“He hoped he should recover,” and “he hoped he would recover,” are

expressions of different import. In the former, the two pronouns

necessarily refer to the same person; in the latter, they do not.

[54] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb willan, _velle_, the

preterite of which is Ic wold.

[55] The preterite _would_ is frequently employed, like the Latin

preterimperfect tense, to denote what is usual or customary. Thus,

Quintilio si quid recitares, corrige, sodes,

Hoc, aiebat, et hoc; melius te posse negares,

Bis terque expertum frustra; delere jubebat,

Et malè tornatos incudi reddere versus:

Si defendere delictum quàm vertere, malles,

Nullum ultra verbum, aut operam insumebat inanem.

_Horace._

where the verbs aiebat, jubebat, insumebat, may be translated, “he

would say,” “he would desire,” “he would spend.” Thus also in English,

Pleas’d with my admiration, and the fire

His speech struck from me, the old man _would_ shake

His years away, and act his young encounters:

Then having show’d his wounds, _he’d_ sit him down.

[56] In Latin the imperfect potential is frequently employed in the

same manner to denote present time; thus, _irem si vellem_, expresses

present liberty and inclination. And the same analogy obtains in

Latin; for we say, either, _tu, si hic sis, aliter sentias_, or _tu,

si hic esses, aliter sentires_. In such examples, it is intended

to signify either the coexistence of two circumstances, or the one

as the immediate consequence of the other. An identity of tense,

therefore, best expresses contemporary events.

[57] If it should be said, that the participle may properly be

considered as a verb, since it implies an attribute with time,

I would ask, whether _affirmation_, the most important of all

circumstances, and without which no communication could take place,

should be overlooked in our classification of words agreeably to

their import, or the offices which they perform. If the verb and

participle be referred to one class, the principal part of speech

which has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb,

or _the word_, is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a

species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of

thought. Surely, if any circumstance can entitle any sort of words to

a distinct reference, it is that of _affirmation_.

If it should be objected that the participle, like the verb, governs

a case, I would ask, because _lectio_, _tactio_, and many other

substantives, are found sometimes joined with an accusative case,

were they ever on this account considered as verbs? Besides, if the

government of a case be urged as an argument, what becomes of those

participles which govern no case? Nay, if the government of a case be

deemed the criterion of a verb, what name shall we assign to those

verbs which have no regimen at all? If any species of words is to be

distinguished from another, the characteristic difference must surely

belong, not to part only, but to the whole.

[58] The termination _ing_ is from the Anglo-Saxon _ande_, _ænde_,

_ende_, _ind_, _onde_, _unde_, _ynde_, and corresponds to the

termination of the Latin gerunds in _andum_ and _endum_, expressing

continuation, _Amandum_, _Lufiande_, _Loving_.

[59] Here I would be understood to reason on their own principles;

for the truth is, that each of these tenses admits a definitive.

[60] See the _Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy_, vol. iii.

[61] Dr. Beattie observes, “that the fundamental error of those

philosophers who deny the existence of present time is, that they

suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point,

neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our

senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we see or touch must of

necessity have magnitude,) so neither is the present, or any other

instant, wholly unextended.” His argument amounts to this, that as

a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real

existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted.

They are each ideal. But does this prove the author’s position, that

philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it

evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse.

The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary

to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived

to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to sense,

we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present

time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as

present an extended space. The doctor observes, that sense perceives

nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered

that not time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by

the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this

matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it

be the present hour, is it not obvious that part of it is past, and

part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear,

that the whole of it cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the

present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious that part of

it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it

possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly

speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be

extended; and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future

must necessarily be included in it. If it should be answered, that

this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the

most tedious process will still leave something capable of division,

I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case must be figure,

and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of

extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process,

therefore, must be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and

an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.

[62] When we say, _God is good_, I would ask Dr. Browne whether the

verb be definite or indefinite, whether it denote perfection or

imperfection, or have no reference to either. It appears to me that

neither of the terms is in his sense applicable; for that the verb

denotes simple affirmation with time; or, if applicable, that the

tense is, contrary to his opinion, indefinite, the idea of completion

or imperfection being entirely excluded.

[63] These phraseologies, as the author last quoted justly observes,

are harsh to the ear, and appear exceedingly awkward; but a little

attention will suffice to show that they correctly exhibit the ideas

implied by the tense which we have at present under consideration.

[64] See Encyc. Brit., Art. Grammar.

[65] I consider that no language, grammatically examined, has more

cases, tenses, or moods, than are formed by inflexion. But if any

person be inclined to call these forms of expression by the name of

imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be consistent,

and call “Dost thou love?” an interrogative mood, adopting also

the precative, the requisitive, the optative, the hortative, &c.,

together with the various cases in nouns, and tenses in verbs,

which are formed by prepositions and auxiliary verbs: I should only

apprehend, that language would fail him to assign them names.

If it should be asked, “Agreeably to your doctrine of the verb,

as implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the

verbs in the following sentences, _Depart instantly_, _improve

your time_, _forgive us our sins_? Will it be said that the verbs

in these phrases are assertions?” I should answer that all moods,

metaphysically considered, are, in my apprehension, equally

indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing but express

the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his sensation,

his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form, therefore, the

expression may assume, it must be resolvable into assertion; and

must be considered as expressing, in the person of the speaker,

what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth. No one surely

will deny, that “thou oughtest not to kill,” “thou shalt not kill,”

“thou art forbidden to kill,” are affirmations. And are not these

expressions so nearly equivalent to “do not kill,” that in Greek

and Latin they are rendered indifferently either by οὐ φονεύσεις,

or, μὴ φόνευε; _non occides_, or _ne occidito_? If then we say,

“kill thou,” will it be contended that, though the prohibition

implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command does not? The

expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to “thou shalt kill,”

“thou art ordered to kill.” Hence _ave_ and _jubeo te avere_, are

deemed expressions of the same import. If the question be examined

grammatically, or as a subject of pure grammar, I am inclined to

think that where there is no variety of termination, there cannot be

established a diversity of mood.

[66] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb Ic most, _ego debeo_.

[67] It belongs not to my province to inquire, how _amarem_ came to

signify _I might_ or _could love_, or whether it be strictly in the

potential or the subjunctive mood. I here take it for granted that

_amarem_ does, without an ellipsis, signify, _I might, could, would_,

or _should love_, implying _licet_, _possum_, _volo_, _debeo_.--See

_Johnson’s Comment_.

[68] Why this verb forms an exception, it would be easy to explain.

[69] See Webster’s Dissertations, p. 263.

[70] A similar phraseology in the use of the pluperfect indicative

for the same tense subjunctive, obtains in Latin, as

“Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras.”--_Virgil._

[71] The Latins used _si_ in both cases: and though their poets

did not attend to this distinction, their prose writers generally

observed it, by joining _si_ for _quoniam_ with the indicative mood.

[72] Where R is added, the verb follows also the general rule.

[73] Some have excluded _bore_ as the preterite of this verb. We have

sufficient authority, however, for admitting it; thus,

“By marrying her who bore me.”--_Dryden._

[74] _Beholden_ is obsolescent in this sense.

[75] “So kept the diamond, and the rogue was bit.”--_Pope._

“There was lately a young gentleman bit to the bone.”--_Tatler._

[76] _Brake_ seems now obsolescent.

[77] Though Johnson has not admitted the regular form of the

participle in this verb, I think there is sufficient authority for

concurring with Lowth in receiving _builded_ as the participle as

well as _built_, though it be not in such general use.

[78] _Chode_, which occurs twice in the Bible, is now obsolete.

[79] Lowth has given _clomb_ as the preterite of climb. I can find,

however, no authority later than Spenser, and am inclined to think it

is now obsolete.

[80] The irregular preterite _clad_ is obsolescent.

[81] I know no example in which the preterite, which analogically

would be _forwent_, is to be found. It may be here remarked that this

verb, in violation of analogy, is generally spelled _forego_, as if

it meant “to go before.” This is equally improper as it would be to

write _forebid, foresake, foreswear_, for _forbid, forsake, forswear_.

[82] _Fraught_ is more properly an adjective than participle.

[83] This verb, Lowth says, when employed as an active verb, “may

perhaps, most properly be used in the regular form.” Here the learned

author appears to me, if he be not chargeable with error, to have

expressed his meaning incorrectly; for it cannot be disputed that the

irregular form of this verb is frequently, and with unquestionable

propriety, used in an active sense. Thus we say, “the servant hung

the scales in the cellar;” and passively, “the scales were hung by

the servant.” I should, therefore, rather say that, when this verb

denotes suspension, for the purpose of destroying life, the regular

form is far preferable. Thus, “the man was hanged,” not “hung.”

[84] The irregular preterite and participle of this verb are employed

in sea language; but the latter rarely.

[85] Lowth has given _holpen_ as the participle; it is now

obsolescent, if not obsolete. It belonged to the verb _to holp_,

which has been long out of use.

[86] Several grammarians have rejected _hid_ as a participle.

It rests, however, on unquestionable authority; but _hidden_ is

preferable.

[87] _Holden_, which was some years ago obsolescent, is now returning

into more general use.

[88] _Laden_, like _fraught_, may be deemed an adjective.

[89] Priestley, I apprehend, has erred in giving _lain_ as the

participle of this verb.

[90] _Lien_, though not so generally used as _lain_, is not destitute

of unexceptionable authority. I have, therefore, with Johnson and

Lowth, given it as the participle. Murray has omitted it.

[91] Some grammarians have rejected _lit_. It can plead, however,

colloquial usage in its favour, and even other authority. “I lit my

pipe with the paper.”--_Addison._

[92] With Priestley and Lowth, I have given this verb a regular

participle; for which, I believe, there is sufficient authority,

without adducing the example of Shakspeare. Most other grammarians

have rejected it.

[93] _Quitted_ is far more generally used as the preterite than

_quit_.

[94] Priestley has rejected _rid_, and Murray _ridden_, as the

participle, while Johnson makes _rid_ the preterite of _ride_.

As _rid_ is the present and preterite of another verb, it would,

perhaps, be better to dismiss it entirely from the verb _to ride_,

and conjugate, with Priestley, _ride, rode, ridden_.

[95] Our translators of the Bible have used _roast_ as the perfect

participle. In this sense it is almost obsolete. _Roast beef_ retains

its ground.

[96] Story, in his Grammar, has most unwarrantably asserted, that the

participle of this verb should be _shaked_. This word is certainly

obsolete, and, I apprehend, was never in general use. I have been

able to find only one example of _shaked_ as the participle, “A sly

and constant knave, not to be _shaked_.”--_Shakspeare._ And two as

the preterite, “They shaked their heads.”--_Psal._ cxi. 55. “I shaked

my head.”--_Steele_, _Spectator_, No. iv.

[97] Of these preterites, the latter is now more generally used. Our

translators of the Bible used the former.

[98] A. Murray has rejected _sung_ as the preterite, and L. Murray

has rejected _sang_. Each preterite, however, rests on good authority.

The same observation may be made respecting _sank_ and _sunk_.

[99] _Sitten_, though formerly in use, is now obsolescent. Laudable

attempts, however, have been made to restore it. “To have _sitten_ on

the heads of the apostles.”--_Middleton._

“Soon after the termination of this business, the parliament, which

had now _sitten_ three years,” &c.--_Belsham’s Hist._

“And he would gladly, for the sake of dispatch, have called together

the same parliament, which had _sitten_ under his father.”--_Hume_,

vol. vi. p. 199.

Respecting the preterites which have _a_ or _u_, as _slang_, or

_slung_, _sank_, or _sunk_, it would be better were the former

only to be used, as the preterite and participle would thus be

discriminated.

[100] Pope has used the regular form of the preterite:

“In the fat age of pleasure, wealth, and ease,

Sprung the rank weed, and thrived with large increase.”

_Essay on Crit._

Horsley, with one or two other writers, have employed the regular

participle.

[101] _Washen_ seems obsolescent, if not obsolete. The compound

_unwashen_ occurs in our translation of the Bible.

[102] Pope, and our translators of the Bible, have used _winded_ as

the preterite. The other form, however, is in far more general use.

[103] _Wrote_, as the participle, is generally disused, and likewise

_writ_. The latter was used as a preterite by Pope, Swift, and other

writers of the same period.

[104] _Wit_ is now confined to the phrase _to wit_, or _namely_. It

is an abbreviation from the Anglo-Saxon verb þiꞇan, to know.

[105] This verb, as an auxiliary, is inflexible; thus we say, “he

will go,” and “_he wills to go_.”

[106] This verb, which signifies “to think,” or “to imagine,” is now

obsolete.

[107] This verb is now used as significant of present duty. It was

originally the preterite, and the perfect participle of the verb _to

owe_; and is corruptedly used in Scotland still to express a past

debt. “Apprehending the occasion, I will add a continuance to that

happy motion, and besides give you some tribute of the love and duty

I long have ought you.”--_Spelman._

“This blood, which men by treason sought,

That followed, sir, which to myself I ought.”--_Dryden._

It is now used in the present tense only; and, when past duty or

obligation is to be signified, we note, as I formerly mentioned, the

past time by the preterite sense of the subsequent verb; thus, “I

ought to read,” “I ought to have read.” The classical scholar knows

that the reverse takes place in Latin. _Debeo legere, debui legere_.

Cicero, however, though very rarely indeed, uses the preterite of the

infinitive after the preterite tense of this verb.

Murray has told us, that _must_ and _ought_ have both a present and

past signification, and, in proof of this, he adduces the following

examples:--“I must own, that I am to blame.” “He must have been

mistaken.” “Speaking things which they ought not.” “These ought ye

to have done.” This is truly a strange, and, I verily believe, a

singular opinion. Its inaccuracy is so manifest, that every reader of

discernment must intuitively perceive it. The opinion itself, indeed,

is not more surprising, than the ground on which it is maintained by

the author. It surely requires but a moderate portion of sagacity

to perceive, that the past time, in the second and fourth examples,

is not denoted by _must_ and _ought_, but by the expressions “have

been” and “have done.” In Latin, as I have just observed, _necessity_

and _duty_ are expressed as either present, past, or future, the

verbs denoting these having the three correspondent tenses; and the

object of the necessity or duty is expressed as contemporary, or

relatively present. In English, on the contrary, the two verbs _must_

and _ought_ having only the present tense, we are obliged to note

the past time by employing the preterite tense of the subsequent

verb. Thus, _Me ire oportet_, “I ought to go,” “I must go.” _Me

ire oportuit_, “I ought to have gone,” “I must have gone.” As well

may it be affirmed, that the past time is denoted by _ire_ and not

_oportuit_, as that it is signified by _must_ and not by “have gone.”

In the time of Wallis, the term _must_, as a preterite tense, was

almost obsolete. “_Aliquando_,” he remarks, “_sed rarius in præterito

dicitur_.” And when it was employed as a preterite, it was followed

by the present tense. This verb in German has, I understand, a

preterite tense.

[108] _Firstly_, is used by some writers.

[109] Denominativa terminantur in _lic_ vel _lice_, ut þeꞃlic

virilis, ælic legitimus, ꞃælic marinus, þiꝼlic muliebris, &c. Hanc

terminationem hodie mutavimus in _like_ vel _ly_, ut in _godlike_ vel

_godly_. Hickesii Thes.

The correctness of this explanation has been controverted by Mr.

Gilchrist, who contends that, though it may answer in some cases,

it will fail “in nine times out of ten.” In the expressions “weekly

wages,” “daily labour,” “yearly income,” he observes, that the

meaning cannot be, “wages like a week,” “labour like a day,” “income

like a year.” He rejects, therefore, this explanation, and considers

the termination _lic_ to be the same with _lig_ in the Latin verb

_ligo_, “to tie,” or “join,” and to have the same effect as other

conjunctive particles, as “a friendly part,” “a friend’s part,”

“yearly produce,” “year’s produce.” Though a copious induction of

examples justifies us in refusing our assent to Mr. Gilchrist’s

exaggerated statement, that the derivation proposed by Hickes will

fail in nine cases out of ten; we candidly acknowledge, that in many

instances it is inadmissible; and that Mr. Gilchrist’s suggestion

is ingenious, though it will be found, we apprehend, opposed by the

same objection as he urges against Hickes’s explanation. Nor does it

appear to us, that Mr. Gilchrist’s argument subverts the doctrine

generally received. The termination may have been originally what

Hickes supposed, and the principle of analogy may, in time, have

introduced similar compositions, when this meaning of the termination

ceased to be regarded. Thus the term _candidly_, which we have just

now used, was probably introduced, in conformity to _analogy_, with

no reference whatever to the meaning of the termination. It may be

here also observed, that the import of this term seems inexplicable

on the hypothesis that _ly_ is a mere term of conjunction.

[110] These three adverbs, denoting motion or rest in a place, are

frequently employed by us, in imitation of the French, to denote

motion to a place in the same sense with the three following adverbs.

It would be better, however, were the distinction observed. The

French use _ici_ for _here_ and _hither_, _là_ for _there_ and

_thither_, _où_ for _where_ and _whither_.

[111]

“For blithesome Sir John Barleycorn

Had sae allur’d them i’ the morn,

That, what wi’ drams, and mony a horn,

And reaming bicker,

The ferly is, _withouten_ scorn,

They wauk’d sae sicker.”

_Mayne’s Siller Gun._

This animated little poem will be read with no common pleasure by

every admirer of the Scottish muse. In felicity of description the

author is not inferior to Burns, while in delicacy of humour he may

claim the superiority.

This preposition is supposed by Mr. Gilchrist to be derived from

_forth_, or rather to be a different form of that word. See his

“Philosophic Etymology,” a work exhibiting considerable ingenuity

and philological knowledge, combined with many fanciful and

unphilosophical opinions.

[112] It is possible that the Greek ἀπό, and the Latin _ab_ derived

from it, had their origin in אב _pater principium_, “author,” or

“principle of existence.”

[113] The verb, “to twin,” is still used in Scotland for “to part,”

or “separate.”

[114] That the Saxon word _ægther_ signified _each_, is sufficiently

evident from a variety of examples; and the adjective _either_ has

continued to be used in that sense by reputable writers. Lowth, who,

I apprehend, did not advert to its primitive signification, condemns

the use of it as equivalent to _each_; and notwithstanding its

original import, I agree with him in thinking, that it is much better

to confine its meaning to “one of two.” The reason will be assigned

hereafter.

[115] _Bot_ ser that Virgil standis _but_ compare.--_Gawin Douglass._

[116] _An_ occurs frequently for _if_ in the earliest English

writers. Bacon frequently uses it in this sense. “Fortune is to be

honoured and respected, _an_ it be but for her daughters, Confidence

and Reputation.” “And certainly it is the nature of extreme

self-lovers, as they will set their house on fire, _an_ it were, but

to roast their eggs.”--_Bacon’s Essays, Civ. and Mor._ In the folio

edition, printed in 1740, it is improperly spelled _and_. _An_ for

_if_ is still retained in our address to royalty, _An ’t please your

majesty_: and in Scotland is in general use.

[117] The correctness of most of these, and several other of

Tooke’s etymologies, has been disputed, in a learned and ingenious

article in the Quarterly Review (No. 108). In many of the critic’s

animadversions it is impossible not to concur; but we do not agree

with him, when he rejects the derivation of _if_ from the Anglo-Saxon

verb _gifan_, “to give;” nor do we consider that Jamieson’s argument,

to which he refers, is such as to justify the critic’s conclusion.

The distinction between _bot_ and _but_ he confidently pronounces

to be “a mere chimera,” and maintains that _but_ is in every

instance _be utan_, “be out,” without corresponding to the Latin

words _sed_, _vero_, _autem_, _sine_. It must be acknowledged that

Tooke’s derivation is erroneous, there being no such Anglo-Saxon

verb as “botan,” of which _bot_ could be the imperative. But we

agree with Dr. Jamieson in thinking, whatever may be the etymology,

that _but_ and _bot_ are originally distinct words. Indeed, it

appears to us, that the reasoning of the critic is neither correct,

nor quite consistent with itself. We do not consider _but_ for

_bot_ to be discriminative; nor can we allow, that, if _but_ be

equivalent to _sed_, _se_, _sine_, implying separation, it can also

be equivalent to _autem_, “moreover,” to which _bot_ corresponds,

implying adjection, or subjunction. Nor can we admit, that the

synonymous words _mais_ (French), _maar_ (Dutch), _ma_ (Italian),

imply preference, as the critic affirms, but something to be added,

corresponding with what has been previously said.

[118] The critic to whom we have alluded in the preceding note

contends, that _except_ cannot be an imperative, “because it has

no subject; and that a verb could not be employed, in any language

that distinguishes the different persons, without a gross violation

of idiom.” He considers the word to be an abbreviated participle.

The correctness of this opinion I am disposed to question. In our

Anglo-Saxon translation, the term _except_ is rendered by _buton_,

which is no participle; moreover, to place the participle perfect

before the noun, the clause being absolute, is irreconcilable with

the idiom of our language. “‘All were involved in this affair,

except one;’ that is,” says Webster, who seems divided between the

imperative and the participle, “‘one excepted.’” Now “one excepted,”

and “excepting one,” are perfectly consonant with analogy; but

“excepted one” is sanctioned by no authority. I am inclined to think

that our translators, without regarding the Latin or the Icelandic

idiom, to which the reviewer refers, used the word _except_ as an

imperative, without a subject. He denies, however, that it can be so

employed. He surely will not deny, that usage warrants us in saying,

“His arguments, take them as here exhibited, amount to nothing.” The

use of the imperative, infinitive, and participles, in an absolute

sense, or without a subject, is a common idiom in our language, and

recommends itself, as shall be afterwards shown, by some peculiar

advantages.

[119] This phraseology has been censured by Buchanan and the author

of the British Grammar; but, as I apprehend, without the shadow of

authority. To ask a question with a principal verb, as _burns he_,

the latter affirms to be a barbarism. To disprove the assertion, I

shall only, in addition to the one quoted from Macbeth, produce these

examples. “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?”--_Bible._ “Died he

not in bed?”--_Shakspeare._ “Or flies the javelin swifter to its

mark?”--_Ib._ “And live there men who slight immortal fame?”--_Pope._

[120] Our translators, as the judicious critic last quoted observes,

have totally enervated the strength of the original, which runs thus,

ἔπεσε, ἔπεσε, Βαβυλὼν ἡ πόλις ἡ μεγάλη, and which they have rendered,

“Babylon is fallen, is fallen, that great city.”

[121] The ellipsis of the copulative, in such examples, was

termed by the ancients _asyndeton_; and this deviation from the

established rules of syntax they referred to a grammatical figure

termed _syllepsis indirecta_, or “indirect comprehension of several

singulars under one plural,” opposed to the _syllepsis directa_, or

that expressed by a copulative.

[122] It is sometimes used for _every_, and applied to more than two.

[123] In the vulgar translation of the Bible, this mode of expression

frequently occurs, thus, “I am thy exceeding great reward.” “I will

make thee exceeding fruitful.”

Wallis’s admission of this phraseology proves it to have been good

English when he wrote, or that, in his opinion at least, it was

unobjectionable. His translation of _vir summe sapiens_, is “a man

exceeding wise.” This, and similar modes of expression, appear to

have been in his time very common, thus,

“Although he was exceeding wealthy.”--_Peers._

“He was moreover extraordinary courteous.”--_Ibid._

“The Athenians were extreme apprehensive of his growing

power.”--_Tully._

And in our version of the Bible we find a few such expressions as the

following: “The house I am to build, shall be _wonderful_ great.”

Addison likewise often uses the phrase “exceeding great;” and Swift,

less pardonably, writes “extreme unwilling,” “extreme good.”

[124] We say, indeed, “Messrs. Thomson;” but we seldom or never say,

“the two Messrs. Thomson,” but “the two Mr. Thomsons.”

[125] Horne Tooke observes, that Lowth has rejected much good

English: and it is to be apprehended, that the classical scholar is

too prone to condemn in his own language whatever accords not with

the Latin idiom.

[126] See Johnson’s Comm. p. 351, and Seyer on the Latin Verb, p.

174. To the arguments there offered, many others might be added.

[127] The propriety of this collocation of the _negative_ will be

more evident, if we attend to the two very different meanings of the

word _but_. According to the former construction of the sentence,

_but_ is the imperative of _beutan_, “to be out,” and is synonymous

with _unless_ or _except_; thus, “but with the approbation,” or

_except_ with the approbation. According to the latter construction,

it is properly _bot_, the imperative of _botan_, “to add.” Thus, “he

was honoured not with (_i.e._ exclude or except) this reward, but

(add) with the approbation of the people.”

[128] It is to be observed that a different collocation is sometimes

admissible without any risk of ambiguity, especially when the clause

is negative. Thus we may say, “His thoughts were entertained with not

only,” _i.e._ “with not one thing,” viz. “the joys” with which he was

surrounded; or, “not only with the joys; but (_bot_ or _add_) a noble

gratitude and divine pleasure.”

Usage in common conversation, and in familiar language, inclines to

this arrangement, and many of our best writers frequently adopt it.

[129] The omission of the auxiliary in such examples tends much to

produce ambiguity: for, as the adverb, when placed between the noun

and the attributive, may qualify either the former or the latter,

perspicuity requires the insertion of the auxiliary.

[130] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non

intelligere, curandum.

[131] In this and similar examples, the word _only_ has been

generally considered as an adjective, equivalent to _solus_. Thus, if

we say, _ille solum erat dives_, it means, “he was only rich,” or “he

was nothing but rich.” If we say, _ille solus erat dives_, it means,

“he only,” or “he alone was rich.” In the latter example, the word

_only_ has been termed an adjective. It is from the equivalence of

the words _only_ and _alone_, in such examples as the latter, that

several writers have employed them, as if, in all cases, synonymous.

They are by no means, however, of the same import. Thus, if we say,

“virtue alone is true nobility,” it means “virtue singly, or by

itself, is true nobility;” if we say, “virtue only is true nobility,”

it implies that nothing but virtue is true nobility. The expressions,

therefore, are not equivalent. Both sentiments are conveyed in the

following passage:

... “Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.”--_Juvenal_, Sat. viii.

The same observations are applicable to the collocation of the

numeral term _first_, as equivalent either to _primus_ or _primum_;

and also to the position of many other words, which are used

adjectively and adverbially. The classical scholar needs not to

be informed, that _Annibal primus_, and _Annibal primum--Alpes

transiit_, are not expressions mutually convertible.

[132] Addison, Pope, Swift, Steele, and Johnson, very generally place

the adverb before the attributive, to which it refers, and very often

also, before the substantive. “What he said, was only to commend my

prudence.”--_Addison._ “He did not pretend to extirpate French music,

but only to cultivate and civilise it.”--_Addison._ “I was only

scribbling.”--_Johnson._ “Not only the thought, but the language is

majestic.”--_Addison._ “Known only to those, who enjoy.”--_Johnson._

“Lay the blame only on themselves.”--_Johnson._ “Witty only by the

help of speech.”--_Steele._

Our translators of the Bible have almost uniformly observed the

same collocation in respect to the predicate; but have, with few

or no deviations, preferred a different arrangement in regard to

the subject, placing the adverb after, and not before it. It is in

conformity to their practice, that we have recommended the rule here

given. From the following examples, to which many more might be

added, it will appear that when the adverb referred to a sentence,

they made it the introductory word; when it affected an attributive,

they placed the adverb before it; and when it referred to a

substantive, or the name of a subject, they put the adverb after it.

“Only take heed to thyself.” “Only he shall not go in unto the vail.”

“Only thou shalt not number the tribe of Levi.” ... “The thoughts of

his heart are only evil.” “Thou shalt be only oppressed.” “They might

only touch the hem of his garment.” ... “None followed David, but

Judah only.” “He only of Jeroboam shall come to the grave.” “Against

thee only have I sinned.” “Take nothing for your journey, but a staff

only.” “David did that only which was right.” “They only shall be

delivered.” “This only have I found.” “If in this life only we have

hope.”

[133] In colloquial language, but chiefly among the vulgar,

prepositions are prefixed to verbs indicative.

[134]

“Est vetus, atque probus, centum qui perficit annos.

Quid? qui deperiit minor uno mense, vel anno;

Inter quos referendus erit? veteresne poetas,

An quos et præsens et postera respuet ætas?

Iste quidem veteres inter ponetur honestè,

Qui vel mense brevi, vel toto est junior anno.

Utor permisso, caudæque pilos ut equinæ

Paulatim vello; et demo unum, demo etiam unum;

Dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi,

Qui redit ad fastos.”

_Horace_, Ep. I. Lib. 2.

[135] The Saxon word is _awiht_, contracted _auht_, _aliquid_.

[136] We have remarked the same violation of common sense, as

occurring in Cicero, oftener than once. “Alium alio nequiorem.”--_Ep.

Fam._ “Aliam alia jucundiorem.”--_Att._

[137] Deprehendat, quæ barbara, quæ impropria, quæ contra legem

loquendi composita.--_Quintil._ lib. i. cap. 5.

[138] In conformity to the example of most of our grammarians, I

have employed the term _etymology_ in the title of this work, and

wherever else it occurs, as denoting that part of grammar, which

teaches the inflection of words. In its primitive acceptation, it

means an exposition of their derivation, and is still employed in

that sense, as well as in the signification in which it is here

used. Some writers have preferred the term _analogy_ to express the

doctrine of inflection. If the principle of analogy or similitude

were confined to inflection, the designation might be proper; but,

as this principle extends to the concord, the government, and the

collocation, generally termed the _syntax_ of words, it cannot be

considered an appropriate name for that part of grammar, which

teaches merely inflection or verbal termination. Analogy is the

leading principle, on which every grammatical rule is founded; and

those, who have employed the term for etymology, it would be easy to

show, have not been observant of strict consistency.

[139] The reader is requested to observe, that under “solecism,” I

have included several phraseologies, which, though not consistent

with syntactical propriety, may be justly called by the softer name

of “inaccuracies.”

[140] See Canon I., p. 229.

[141] We perceive intuitively the error of Milton, when he calls

Adam “the comeliest of men since born,” Eve also “the fairest of

her daughters,” and we laugh, perhaps, when the Cork almanack-maker

gravely tells us, “that the principal republics in Europe, are

Venice, Holland, and America;” yet the error here reprehended is

precisely of the same species, though it passes frequently unnoticed.

See p. 74.

[142] It has been already offered as the opinion of the writer, (see

p. 47,) that the English word _other_ is the Saxon oðeꞃ, and that

this word with the Arabic _ahd_, the Hebrew _had_ or _ahad_, the

Saxon oððe, the Teutonic _odo_, the Swedish _udda_, and probably

the Latin _aut_, have all sprung from the same source, or that one

of these is the parent of the rest, denoting _unus_ or _singulus_,

“one,” or “one by itself.” Of the origin of the Saxon _other_, Lye

has hazarded no opinion. It appears to me to be a comparative from

oððe. To those who have carefully examined, and have approved the

theory of Mr. Tooke, it will furnish no valid objection against this

opinion, that the word oððe is uniformly found in Saxon, signifying

_aut_. Such can have little or no difficulty in perceiving, not only

from the similarity of the elements, but from the affinity in point

of sense, that _had_, _ahd_, _aut_, oððe, oðeꞃ, _other_, _or_, are

all members of one and the same family.

[143] In French the article and the adjectives admitting a plural

termination, the expression “les uns et les autres” joined to a

plural verb is in perfect consistence with analogy. So also, in

Latin, are _utrique_ and _alteri_, referring to a plurality. But

_unus_ was never in this sense used as a plural.

[144] “Utrumque fecisse, dicimus, si et hic et ille fecerit

divisim; ambos fecisse dicimus, si duo conjunctim aliquid

fecerint.”--_Stephan._ This distinction, however, as the learned

critic acknowledges, is not uniformly observed.

[145] “The truth is, that _as_ is also an article; and however

and whenever used in English, means the same as _it_, or _that_,

or _which_. In the German, where it still evidently retains its

original signification and use, (as _so_ also does,) it is written

_es_.”--_Tooke’s Diversions._

[146] The error here involved suggests a few observations, which

it may be useful to offer, concerning the distinctive character of

active and neuter verbs. A neuter verb has been defined to be that,

which denotes neither doing nor suffering. An active verb, as its

name imports, denotes, that the subject is doing something. Johnson,

however, in his Dictionary, gives every active verb the designation

of _neuter_, unless followed by an objective case, that is, unless

the object or subject of the action be expressed. In the following

instances, for example, he considers the verbs as neuter. “’T is

sure, that Henry _reads_;” “so I _drank_; and she made the camels

_drink_ also;” “if you _plant_ where savages are;” “the priests

_teach_ for hire;” “nor feel him where he _struck_;” “they that _sow_

in tears, shall _reap_ in joy.” These are a few out of numberless

examples, which might be produced. Indeed, Johnson’s idea seems to

be, as has been just now observed, that the verb must be regarded as

neuter, unless followed by an objective case. This is certainly a

great inaccuracy, and tends to introduce perplexity and confusion.

The verb surely does not the less denote action, because it expresses

it absolutely, or because the subject acted upon is not particularly

specified. In the examples now quoted, can it be questioned, when we

say _he struck_, that _he_ was active; or when we say, _they that sow

shall reap_, will it be affirmed that _they_ are not active? This

would be to confound distinctions not merely acknowledged in theory,

and adopted in definition, but also founded in the very nature of

things. This matter, I conceive, may be shortly explained, and very

easily understood. It is admitted by every grammarian, that an active

verb denotes, that the subject is acting, and that a neuter verb

signifies that the subject is neither doing nor suffering. Now, of

active verbs there are two kinds, transitive and intransitive. The

latter is that which denotes immanent action, or that which does

not pass from the agent to anything else, as, _I walk_, _I run_.

Transitive verbs are such as denote that the action passes from

the agent to something acted upon, as, “Hector wounded him,” “Cain

slew his brother.” But the subject to which the energy passes, may

not always be expressed; the verb, however, is not the less active.

Whether we say, “the drummer beats his drum,” or “the drummer beats

every day,” it surely will not be contended, that there is less of

action implied in the one case than in the other. The reader, then,

is requested to observe, that it is not necessary to the active

transitive verb, that the subject acted upon should be expressed.

The active verb may predicate of its subject merely the action

generally and absolutely, as, “he reads in the morning, and writes

in the evening;” or with the action may be expressed the subject or

object, as, “he reads Homer in the morning, and writes letters in the

evening;” or the object or subject may be implied, and not expressed,

as, “the drummer beats at night,” namely, his drum. But in all these

cases the verb is equally active.

[147] In justice to this respectable sect, it is incumbent on me to

observe, that the Quakers are not Deists, nor does their religious

creed approach to Deism.

[148] A similar ambiguity sometimes occurs in Latin by the

indiscriminate use of _quod_. This may be prevented by employing

_quoniam_ when the succeeding member of the sentence expresses the

cause of the preceding subject. Thus, “Nec consilium eo minus erat

firmum, quoniam secretum cum perpaucis adhuc erat communicatum,”

where the _eo_ refers to a preceding circumstance. “Nec consilium

eo minus erat firmum, quod” where the _eo_ refers to the subsequent

clause. The former phraseology affirms, the latter denies, the

influence of the circumstance subjoined.

[149] In our penal statutes, which should be precisely worded,

because they are literally interpreted, much ambiguity frequently

arises from the loose and incorrect manner in which this conjunction

is used.

[150] The issue of a question, respecting a contested election at

Rochester in 1820, depended on the construction of this designation,

“a peer, or lord of parliament.”

[151] The superior ductility of the Greek, above every other

language, must appear from its singular aptitude to form new words

by composition or derivation, so as immediately to communicate

any new idea. Hence the names of most of our modern discoveries

and inventions are of Greek extraction. Thus we have the terms

“microscope,” “telegraph,” “panorama,” “odometer,” and many others.

[152]

“Cui lecta potenter erit res,

Nec facundia deseret hunc, nec lucidus ordo.

Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.”

_Hor. de Art. Poet._

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been

corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within

the text and consultation of external sources.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,

and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Pg 44: ‘primary preception’ replaced by ‘primary perception’.

Pg 46: ‘hartez, illa’ replaced by ‘ha’aretz, illa’.

Pg 46 Footnote [24]: ‘ארצ’ replaced by ‘ארץ’.

Pg 46 Footnote [24]: ‘הארצ’ replaced by ‘הארץ’.

Pg 87 Footnote [45]: ‘eo-ed, dede’ replaced by ‘do-ed, dede’.

Pg 102: missing subheading ‘OF THE PARTICIPLE.’ added.

Pg 115: ‘I written’ replaced by ‘I have written’.

Pg 150: ‘siginifies against’ replaced by ‘signifies against’.

Pg 155: ‘I did confess”...’ replaced by ‘I did confess...”’.

Pg 173 Footnote [123]: ‘Athough he was’ replaced by ‘Although he was’.

Pg 191: ‘the arrrangement is’ replaced by ‘the arrangement is’.

Pg 209: ‘The bridegrooms its’ replaced by ‘The bridegroom sits’.

Pg 246: ‘I know.” Addison.’ replaced by ‘I know.”--Addison.’.

Pg 249: ‘being accasioned’ replaced by ‘being occasioned’.

Pg 262: ‘οἱ duo’ replaced by ‘οἱ δύο’.

Pg 297: ‘before you feet’ replaced by ‘before your feet’.