property of two or more persons, the last only takes the sign of
the genitive, as, “this is John, William, and Richard’s house;”
that is, “this is the house of John, William, and Richard.”
But when several subjects are implied, as severally belonging
to various individuals, the names of the individuals are all
expressed in the genitive case, as “these are John’s, William’s,
and Richard’s houses.” In such examples as these, the use of the
genitive involves an ambiguity, which it is sometimes difficult
to prevent. Thus, if we say, agreeably to the first observation
in this note, “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’s posterity were carried
captive to Babylon,” one unacquainted with the history of these
patriarchs, might be at a loss to determine whether “the patriarch
Abraham,” “the patriarch Isaac,” and “the posterity of Jacob,”
were carried captive; in other words, whether there be three
subjects of discourse, namely, _Abraham_, _Isaac_, and _the
posterity of Jacob_, or only one subject, _the posterity of the
patriarchs_. Nor will the insertion of the preposition in all
cases prevent the ambiguity. For, in the example before us, were
the word “descendants” substituted for “posterity,” and the phrase
to proceed thus, “the descendants of Abraham, of Isaac, and of
Jacob,” an ignorant reader might be led to suppose that not one
generation of descendants, but three distinct generations of these
three individuals were carried into captivity. If we say, “the
posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” the expression appears to
me liable to the same misconstruction with the one first mentioned.
If we say, “the common posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,
were carried captive to Babylon,” all ambiguity of expression is
prevented.
Instead also of saying, “John, William, and Richard’s house,”
I should prefer “a house belonging in common to John, William,
and Richard.” This expression, though laborious and heavy, is
preferable to the inelegance and harshness of three inflected
substantives, while it removes the ambiguity, which might in some
cases be occasioned by withholding the inflexion from the two first
substantives. Where neatness and perspicuity cannot possibly be
combined, it will not be questioned which we ought to prefer. I
observe, also, that though such phraseologies as this, “John’s,
William’s, and Richard’s houses,” be perfectly consonant with
syntactical propriety, and strictly analogous to the established
phraseology, “his, Richard’s, and my houses,” yet, as there appears
something uncouth in the former expression, it would be better to
say, “the houses belonging in common, or severally (as the meaning
may be) to John, William, and Richard.”
_Note_ 7.--When a name is complex, that is, consisting of more
terms than one, the last only admits the sign of the genitive, as,
“Julius Cæsar’s Commentaries,” “John the Baptist’s head,” “for
Herodias’ sake, his brother Philip’s wife.”
_Note_ 8.--When a short explanatory term is subjoined to a name,
it matters little to which the inflexion be annexed, as, “I left
the parcel at Mr. Johnson, the bookseller’s,” or “at Mr. Johnson’s,
the bookseller.” But if the explanatory term be complex, or if
there are more explanatory terms than one, the sign of the genitive
must be affixed to the name, or first substantive, thus, “I left
the book at Johnson’s, a respectable bookseller, a worthy man,
and an old friend.” In the same manner we should say, “this psalm
is David’s, the king, priest, and prophet of the people,” and
not “this psalm is David, the king, priest, and prophet of the
people’s.”
_Note_ 9.--In some cases we employ both the genitive and a
preposition, as “this is a friend of the king’s,” elliptically, for
“this is a friend of the king’s friends.” We say also, “this is a
friend of the king.” These forms of expression, however, though
in many cases equivalent, sometimes imply different ideas. Thus,
if I say, “this is a picture of my friend,” it means, “this is an
image, likeness, or representation of my friend.” If I say, “This
is a picture of my friend’s,” it means, “this picture belongs to my
friend.”
As the double genitive involves an ellipsis, and implies part of
a whole, or one of a plurality of subjects, I think the use of it
should be avoided, unless in cases where this plurality may be
implied. Thus we may say, “a kinsman of the traitor’s waited on
him yesterday,” it being implied that the traitor had several or
many kinsmen. The expression is equivalent to “a kinsman of the
traitor’s kinsmen.” But, if the subject possessed were singular, or
the only one of the kind, I should recommend the use of the simple
genitive; thus, if he had only one house, I should say, “this is
the house of the traitor,” or “this is the traitor’s house;” but
not “this is a house of the traitor’s.”
_Note_ 10.--The recurrence of the analytical expression, and
likewise of the simple genitive, should be carefully avoided.
Thus, there is something inelegant and offensive in the following
sentence, “the severity of the distress of the son of the king
touched the nation.” Much better, “the severe distress of the
king’s son touched the nation.”
_Note_ 11.--There is sometimes an abrupt vulgarity, or uncouthness,
in the use of the simple genitive. Thus, in “the army’s name,” “the
commons’ vote,” “the lords’ house,” expressions of Mr. Hume, there
is a manifest want of dignity and of elegance. Much better, “the
name of the army,” “the vote of the commons,” “the house of lords.”
RULE IX.--Pronouns agree with their antecedents, or the nouns which
they represent, in gender, number, and person, as, “They respected
Cato and his party,” where _Cato_ is singular and masculine, and
_his_ agrees with it in gender and number. “He addressed you and me,
and desired _us_ to follow him,” where _us_ sylleptically represents
the two persons. “Thou, who writest.” Here the antecedent _thou_
being a person, the relative _who_, not _which_, is employed. The
antecedent also being of the second person and singular number, the
relative is considered as of the same character, and is therefore
followed by the verb in the second person and singular number. “Vice,
which no man practises with impunity, proved his destruction.” Here
the antecedent _vice_ not being a person, the pronoun _which_, of
the neuter gender, is therefore employed. “The rivers, which flow
into the sea.” Here also the antecedent not being a person, the
relative is _which_. It is also considered as in the plural number;
and, as all substantives are joined to the third person, _which_, the
representative of _rivers_, is joined to the third person plural of
the verb.
_Note_ 1.--This rule is transgressed in the following examples:
“Beware of false prophets, _which_ come to you in sheep’s
clothing.” “The fruit tree bearing fruit after _his_ kind.” “There
was indeed in our destinies such a conformity, as seldom is found
in _that_ of two persons in the same age.” Here that, referring
to _destinies_, is put for _those_. “The crown had it in _their_
power to give such rewards as they thought proper.”--_Parliamentary
Debates._
_Note_ 2.--The relative should be placed as near as possible to the
antecedent, otherwise ambiguity is sometimes occasioned.
_Note_ 3.--In the earlier editions of Murray’s Grammar, we find the
following rule: “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives
of different persons, it may agree in person with either, as, ‘I
am the man who commands you,’ or ‘I am the man who command you.’”
The rule here given is erroneous. The construction is by no means
arbitrary. If we say, “I am the man who commands you,” the relative
clause, with the antecedent _man_, form the predicate; and the
sentence is equivalent to “I am your commander.” If we say, “I am
the man who command you,” _the man_ simply is the predicate, and
_I who command you_ the subject; thus, “I who command you,” or “I
your commander am the man.” This error, sufficiently obvious to
every discerning reader, I pointed out in the former edition of
this Treatise. Murray’s rule, as it stood, is clearly repugnant to
perspicuity, and syntactical correctness.
In the last edition of his Grammar, and, I believe, in every
edition posterior to the publication of the “Etymology and Syntax,”
the rule is altered; but whether from a disinclination to expunge
a rule, which he had once delivered--a disinclination perhaps
accompanied with a belief, that it might be corrected with little
prejudice to its original form, or from what other motive he has
left it in its present state, I will not presume to determine;
but in the alteration, which he has introduced, he appears to me
to have consulted neither usefulness nor perspicuity. He says,
“When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different
persons, it _may_ agree in person with either.” So far he has
transcribed the former rule; but he adds, “according to the
sense.” Now it cannot be questioned, and the learner needs not to
be informed, that the relative _may_ agree with either. If after
having taught the learner, that a Latin adjective _must_ agree
with its substantive, we were to add, as a distinct rule, that it
_may_ agree with either of the two substantives, according to the
sense, I apprehend, we should be chargeable with vain repetition,
or with extreme inattention to correctness and precision. For what
would our rule imply? Clearly nothing more, than that the adjective
is capable of agreeing with the substantive to which it belongs;
and of this capacity no scholar, who had learned to decline an
adjective, could possibly be ignorant; or it might convey some
idea, that the concord is optional. Now, is it not certain, that
the adjective must agree with its proper substantive, namely, that
whose meaning it is intended to modify, and no other? The relative,
in like manner, _must_ agree with that antecedent, and that only,
whose representative it is in the relative clause. There is nothing
arbitrary in either the one case, or the other.
Perhaps it may be answered that, though the former part of the
altered rule leaves the concord as it first stood, discretionary,
the latter confines the agreement of the relative to its proper
antecedent. But why this apparent contrariety? Why is that
represented as arbitrary, which is determined by the sense? This,
however, is not the only objection; for it may be affirmed,
without hesitation, that the rule, thus considered, is completely
superfluous. For the learner has been already told, that the
relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person.
And can the antecedent be any other, than that which the sense
indicates? And what does this rule teach? Precisely the same
thing. The rule, therefore, is either calculated to mislead by
representing as arbitrary what is fixed and determinate, or it is
purely a rule of supererogation. As it stood originally, it gave
some new information; but that information was erroneous: as it
stands now, it is either indefinite, or it is useless.
The scholar may require an admonition, when there are two
antecedents of different persons, to be careful in referring
the relative to its proper antecedent; but to tell him that it
may agree with the one, or the other, according to the sense,
is to tell him nothing, or tell him that, which he already
knows. In the examples just now adduced, the termination of the
verb, by indicating the person of the relative, clearly shows
the antecedent; but, where the substantives are of the same
person, and the verb cannot therefore by its termination indicate
the antecedent, ambiguity should be precluded by the mode of
arrangement. Thus, “He is the hero who did it,” and “He who did it
is the hero.” In the former, _he_ is the subject, and the _hero who
did it_ the predicate; and in the latter, _he who did it_ is the
subject, and the _hero_ the predicate.
_Note_ 4.--The relative, instead of referring to any particular
word as its antecedent, sometimes refers to a whole clause, thus,
“the bill was rejected by the lords, which excited no small degree
of jealousy and discontent,” that is, “which thing,” namely, the
rejection of the bill.
_Note_ 5.--The antecedent pronoun of the third person is often
suppressed, when no particular emphasis is implied; as, “Who
steals my purse, steals trash,” _i.e._ “he,” or “the man, who.”
“Whom he would he slew; and whom he would he kept alive,” _Bible_;
_i.e._ “Those whom he would.” “Whosoever committeth sin, is
the servant of sin.” In this example the antecedent _he_, and
nominative to the principal verb, is understood.
Priestley has remarked that the pronouns _whoever_ and _whosoever_
have sometimes a double construction. He gives the two following
examples. “Elizabeth publicly threatened that she would have
the head of whoever had advised it.”--_Hume._ “He offered a
great recompense to whomsoever would help him to a sight of
him.”--_Hume._ Though the learned author seems to admit both
these modes of construction, we apprehend that only one of them
is grammatical. It has been just now observed that the antecedent
is often understood to the relative _who_, and to the compounds
_whoever_ and _whosoever_. If the antecedent be supplied, it will
be found that the construction is not arbitrary, as Priestley
supposes, but definite and fixed. The first sentence is correct.
“She would have the head of him, or them, whoever had advised,”
the relative being the nominative to the verb. “He offered a
great recompense to him, or them, whosoever should help him.”
_Whomsoever_ is a solecism: though close to the preposition _to_,
it is not under its government. (_See the following rules._)
RULE X.--If no nominative intervene between the relative and the
verb, the relative shall be the nominative to the verb, as, “Solomon,
who was the son of David, built the temple of Jerusalem.” Here _who_
is the nominative to the verb _was_.
RULE XI.--But, if a nominative intervene between the relative
and the verb, the relative shall be under the government of the
preposition going before, or the noun or verb following, as, “God,
whom we worship, is the Lord, by whose gift we live, and by whom
all things were made.” In the first relative clause, where _we_ is
the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case,
and governed by the verb following: in the second clause, where the
intervening nominative is likewise _we_, the relative is in the
genitive case, and governed by the noun following, thus, “by whose
gift,” or “by the gift of whom;” and in the third clause, where
_things_ is the intervening nominative, the relative is in the
objective case, and governed by the preposition.
_Note_ 1.--The case of the relative may always be ascertained
by repeating the antecedent, and arranging the clause in the
natural order, thus, “the city, which is called Rome, was founded
by Romulus,” _i.e._ “the city, which city is called Rome.” The
antecedent repeated is the nominative to the verb _is_, _which_
therefore agrees with it in case. “God, who sees all things, will
punish the wicked,” _i.e._ “God, which God sees all things;” the
relative, therefore, is the nominative to the verb _sees_, that
is, it is in the same case in which the antecedent would be put,
if again expressed. “Solomon, whom David loved, was the wisest of
princes.” Here, if we arrange the relative clause in the natural
order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, it will run
thus, “David loved whom,” an expression analogous to “David loved
him,” or “David loved which Solomon.” Many solecisms in the
construction of the relative would be easily avoided, by a little
attention to the natural arrangement. Thus, instead of committing
the error involved in the following examples, “The philosopher, who
he saw to be a man of profound knowledge,” “’Twas my brother, who
you met with,” “I was a stranger to the person, who I spoke to,”
we should be led by the natural order to the correct phraseology;
“he saw whom,” “you met with whom,” “I spoke to whom.” It is to be
observed, however, that, though the personal pronouns, when under
the government of a verb, may either precede or follow it, the
relative in the same state of government must invariably go before
it.
_Note_ 2.--The relatives _who_ and _which_ are often understood,
especially in colloquial language: “The friend I visited yesterday
is dead to-day,” _i.e._ “the friend whom I visited yesterday is
dead to-day.”
_Note_ 3.--After a comparative, both relative and antecedent are
often understood. “The damage was far greater than he knew.” Here
there is a comparison of two objects, the damage suffered, and
the damage known; but only one is expressed. The sentence, if
the ellipsis were supplied, would run thus, “The damage was far
greater, than what,” or “that, which he knew.”
_Note_ 4.--There are a few cases, which are considered by some
distinguished critics and grammarians, as requiring the use of
_that_ in preference to the pronouns _who_ and _which_.
1st. After superlatives the pronoun _that_ is generally used, as,
“The wisest man, that ever lived, is liable to error.”
2ndly. After the word _same_, _that_ is generally used, as, “he
is the same man, that you saw yesterday.” But, if a preposition
should precede the relative, one of the other two pronouns must be
employed, the pronoun _that_ not admitting a preposition prefixed
to it, as, “he is the same man, with whom you were acquainted.”
It is remarkable, however, that when the arrangement is somewhat
changed, the word _that_ admits the preposition, as, “he is the
same man, that you were acquainted with.”
3rdly. _That_ is used after _who_, taken interrogatively, as, “Who,
that has the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus
degraded?”
4thly. When persons and things are referred to, as, “the _men_
and _things_, _that_ he hath studied, have not contributed to the
improvement of his morals.”
RULE XII.--An active transitive verb governs the accusative or
objective case, as,
“He teaches me.”
“We honour him.”
_Note_ 1.--As examples of transgression against this
rule, we may adduce the following: “_Who_ do I love so
much?”--_Shakspeare._ “_Who_ should I meet the other day, but my
old friend?”--_Spectator._ “Those, _who_ he thought true to his
party.”--_Clarendon._
_Note_ 2. As substantives have no objective case, the subject
or object of the energy or affection is distinguished by its
place, which is after the verb, as “Achilles slew Hector,” where
_Achilles_, the agent, precedes, and _Hector_, the subject of the
action, follows the verb. Reverse this order, and the meaning is
reversed, as “Hector slew Achilles.” Where the proper arrangement
is not observed, ambiguity or misconstruction is frequently
produced. Thus, when Pope says, Odyss. xix.
“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”
it may be asked, did the son address the sire, or the sire address
the son? A little attention would have prevented the ambiguity. If
the sire addressed the son, the line should run thus,
“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”
If the son addressed the sire,
“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”
_Note_ 3.--An active intransitive verb sometimes governs the
objective case of a noun, of the same or a kindred signification,
as, “Let us run the race, which is set before us.” “If any man
see his brother sin a sin, which is not unto death.”--_Bible._
The latter verb, however, though thus used, must not be employed
in a transitive sense. It is an error, therefore, to say, “What
have I sinned?”--_Bible._ It should be, “How?” or “In what?” Some
intransitive verbs also, when used in a reflex sense, are joined
to an objective case, as, “Then having shown his wounds, he’d sit
him down.”--_Home’s Douglas._ This is a poetic licence, which, in a
prose writer, would not be tolerated, unless in colloquial and very
familiar language.
_Note_ 4.--The objective case should not, if possible, be separated
from its verb. This rule is violated in the following sentence:
“Becket could not better discover, than by attacking so powerful an
interest, his resolution to maintain,” &c.--_Hume._ The regimen is
here unnecessarily, and very inelegantly, separated from its verb.
RULE XIII.--Verbs signifying to ask, teach, offer, promise, pay,
tell, allow, deny, and some others of like signification, are
sometimes, especially in colloquial language, followed in the passive
voice by an objective case.
_Note_ 1.--This rule seems to have escaped the attention of all our
English grammarians, except Priestley, who observes, “that in some
familiar phrases, the subject and object of our affirmation seem
to be transposed.” This idiom, except in a very few instances, is
not to be found in Latin, though it occurs pretty often in Greek:
it therefore particularly merits the attention of the junior Latin
scholar, lest in his Anglo-Latin translations it should betray him
into an egregious solecism. “He allowed me great liberty,” turned
passively, in concurrence with the Latin idiom, “great liberty
was allowed me.” But we say also in English, “I was allowed great
liberty.” “He promised (to) me a ship in five days,” passively, “a
ship was promised me,” and “I was promised _her_ in five days.”
“She would not accept the jewels, though they were offered to her
by her mother,” or, “though she was offered _them_ by her mother.”
_Note_ 2.--After verbs of _giving_, _telling_, _sending_,
_promising_, _offering_, and others of like signification, the
thing is very generally placed before the person. In the time of
Swift and Addison this rule was not uniformly observed. We find
authors of that period saying indiscriminately, “Give it us,”
and “Give us it;” “Tell him it,” and “Tell it him;” “He promised
me it,” and “He promised it me.” In Scotland these two modes of
expression still obtain. In England they are now reduced under one
general rule. We say, “Give it me,” “Tell it him,” “He sent it us.”
RULE XIV.--The verb _to be_ has the same case after it as it has
before it, thus denoting that the subjects are identical, or that the
one term is the predicate of the other, as, “It is he,” “You believed
it to be him.” In the former example, _it_ is the nominative to the
verb, the nominative case _he_ therefore follows the verb. In the
latter, _it_ is the regimen of the verb _believed_, the verb _to be_
is therefore followed by the objective case.
_Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such examples as “it is _me_,”
“it was _him_,” “I believed it to be _he_,” “_whom_ do men say that
I am?” In the last example, the natural arrangement is, “men say
that I am whom,” where, contrary to the rule, the nominative _I_
precedes, and the objective case _whom_ follows the verb.
_Note_ 2.--Priestley has asked, “Who would not say, ‘If it be me,’
rather than ‘If it be I?’” Our ears are certainly more familiar
with the former than with the latter phraseology, and those who
consult the ear only, may prefer it: but, where no advantage is
gained by a departure from analogy, every deviation is at once idle
and reprehensible.
_Note_ 3.--The verb _to be_ is called by logicians the _copula_, as
connecting the subject with the predicate. Thus, when we say, “he
is wise,” “they are learned,” _he_ and _they_ are the subjects;
_wise_ and _learned_ the predicates. Now, it particularly deserves
the attention of the classical scholar, that in English almost
any verb may be used as a _copula_. This circumstance is the more
worthy of his notice, as a conformity to the Latin idiom may lead
him to reject expressions, which are unexceptionable, and to adopt
others not strictly correct[125]. Thus we say, “it tastes good,”
“he strikes hard,” “I remember right,” “he feels sick;” “we came
late,” “they rise early,” “he drinks deep.” I am aware that the
words _late_, _early_, are in such examples considered as adverbs.
It appears to me they are adjectives,--that the idiom is truly
English, and that all these expressions are perfectly analogous.
RULE XV.--When two verbs come together, the attribute signified by
the one verb being the subject or object of the action, energy, or
affection expressed by the other, the former is governed in the
infinitive mood, as, “he taught me to read,” “I knew him to be.”
_Note_ 1.--The infinitive thus frequently supplies the place of an
objective case after the verb, as it often stands for a nominative
before it, as, “he loves to study,” or “he loves study.”
_Note_ 2.--In such examples as, “I read to learn,” where the latter
phrase, though in the same form as _to study_, in the preceding
example, has, notwithstanding, a different meaning, and cannot be
resolved like it into “I read learning,” in such examples, as Tooke
justly observes, the preposition _for_ denoting the object, and
equivalent to _pour_ in French, is understood, as, “I read for to
learn.” Our southern neighbours indeed, in these examples, never
omit the casual term; and Trusler has not improperly observed,
that, when the verb does not express the certain and immediate
effect, but something remote and contingent, the words _in order
to_, which are nearly equivalent to _for_, may be pertinently
introduced as, “in order to acquire fame, men encounter the
greatest dangers.”
_Note_ 3.--The verbs to _bid_, _dare_, _need_, _make_, _see_,
_hear_, _feel_, _let_, are not followed by the sign of the
infinitive, as, “He bade me go,” “I saw him do it.” It is to be
observed, however, that in the language of Scripture the verb
“to make” is often followed by _to_, as, “He maketh his sun _to_
rise.” The verb “to dare,” for “to challenge,” or “to defy,” is
also construed with _to_, “I dare thee but _to_ breathe upon my
love.”--_Shakspeare._
_Note_ 4.--Nouns, adjectives, and participles, are often followed
by an infinitive, as, “your _desire to improve_ will ultimately
contribute to your happiness.” “Good men are _desirous to do_ good.”
_Note_ 5.--As the proper tense of the subsequent or secondary
verb has, in certain cases, been a subject of dispute, it may be
necessary to observe, that, when the simple attribute, or merely
the primary idea expressed by the subsequent verb, is intended
to be signified, it should then be put in the present tense: but
when the idea of perfection or completion is combined with the
primary idea, the subsequent verb should have that form, which
is termed the perfect of the infinitive. Or, perhaps, this rule
may, more intelligibly to the scholar, though less correctly, be
thus expressed, that when the action or state, denoted by the
subsequent verb, is contemporary with that of the primary verb,
then the secondary verb must be put in the present tense; but when
the action or state is prior to that expressed by the secondary
verb, the latter must be put in the preterite tense. Usage, indeed,
and the opinions of grammarians, are divided on this subject. But
when nothing but usage can be pleaded in favour of one phraseology,
and when reason concurs with usage to recommend another, it will
not be questioned that the latter deserves the preference. Thus,
we should say, “I expected to see you,” and not “I expected to
have seen you;” because either the expectation and the seeing must
be regarded as contemporary, or the former must be considered as
prior to the latter. But why, it may be asked, must the seeing
be considered as contemporary with the expectation? Might not
the former have been anterior to the latter? This is certainly
possible; I may see a friend before I expect him. But though the
sight, abstractedly considered, may precede the expectation, it
cannot possibly, as an object of expectation, be prior to it. The
idea involves absurdity, equal and analogous to the assertion, that
the paper, on which I write, existed as an object of my perception,
previously to my perceiving it. Agreeably to the second form of
the rule here given, we find that the Latins very generally used
the present of the infinitive, to express an action or state
contemporary with the attribute of the primary verb. Thus, _dixit
me scribere_, “he said that I wrote,” or “was writing,” that is, at
the time of his saying so: _dixit me scripsisse_, “he said that I
had written.”
I have observed, that, when the simple attribute denoted by the
subsequent verb is implied, we should use the present of the
infinitive. This phraseology should not only be used in all cases,
where contemporary actions or states are to be signified, but
may also be sometimes employed, where the secondary verb denotes
something posterior to what is implied by the first. For though in
no instance, where the simple action or state is to be expressed,
should we use the sign of past or future time, yet for obvious
reasons we may, and often do, employ the present infinitive,
or simple name, to denote what is future, when the primary verb
necessarily implies the futurity of its object. Thus, instead of
saying, “he promised that he would pay,” where the constructive
sign of futurity is used to denote the posteriority of the payment,
we often say, “he promised to pay,” employing the present tense,
synonymous with the simple name, as, “he promised payment.” The
Latins also, though they almost universally, unless in colloquial
language, preferred the former mode of expression, sometimes
adopted the latter, as, _denegavit se dare_.--_Plaut._ _Jusjurandum
pollicitus est dare._--_Id._ “He refused to give,” “he promised to
give,” or “he promised giving,” the secondary verb expressing the
act simply, and the time being necessarily implied.
_Note_ 6.--The infinitive mood is sometimes used in an absolute
or independent sense, as, “to speak the truth, we are all liable
to error.” “Not to trespass on your time, I will briefly explain
the whole affair,” that is, “that I may speak,” “that I may not
trespass.”
RULE XVI.--The imperative, agreeably to the general rule, agrees with
its nominative, as,
“Love thou;” “listen ye,” or “you.”
_Note_ 1.--The imperative is frequently used, without its subject,
that is, the nominative being suppressed, but the person or persons
being perfectly understood. “And Samuel said to the people, Fear
not,” _i.e._ “Fear ye not.”
_Note_ 2.--It is employed in the same way, in an absolute sense,
without its subject. “Our ideas are movements of the nerves of
sense, as of the optic nerve, in recollecting visible ideas,
_suppose_ of a triangular piece of ivory.”--_Darwin._ I agree with
Webster in thinking, that there is “a peculiar felicity” in such
absolute forms of expression, the verb being thus applicable to any
of the three persons, thus, “I may suppose,” “you may suppose,”
“one may suppose.”
RULE XVII.--Participles are construed as the verbs to which they
belong, as,
“_Teaching us_ to deny ungodliness.”
_Note_ 1.--The imperfect participle is frequently used like a
substantive, and is, in such examples, of the same import with the
infinitive of the verb; as, “they love reading,” _i.e._ “they love
to read.” In some examples it becomes a real noun, and has a plural
number, as, _the outgoings of the morning_.
_Note_ 2.--Lowth contends that, when the imperfect participle
of a transitive verb is not preceded by the definite article,
it properly governs the objective case, and is analogous to the
Latin gerund, as, “much advantage will be derived from observing
this rule;” in which example, _this rule_ is the regimen of the
participle _observing_; and that, when the definite article
precedes the participle, it becomes then a pure noun, and,
therefore, cannot have the regimen of a verb. He therefore condemns
this expression, “by the sending them the light of thy holy
Spirit.” Some of our grammarians consider Lowth, in this instance,
as fastidiously critical; but to me he appears chargeable with
error. Let us examine the reasons, which the author adduces in
support of his opinion.
In this inquiry, the first and most pertinent question is, does
usage justify the opinion of the author? He acknowledges the
contrary: he even admits that there is not a single writer who
does not violate this rule. Were it necessary, indeed, after
this concession, it would be easy to evince, that not only our
translators of the Bible, whose authority surely is of great
weight, but also other writers of the highest eminence, employ the
phraseology which he condemns.
Again. Does the distinction, which he wishes to establish, favour
perspicuity? The very reverse appears to me to be the case; for he
admits an identity of sense in two distinct phraseologies, which
are incontestably, in many instances, susceptible of different
meanings. And, though this ambiguity may not be involved in every
example, we have surely good reasons for repudiating a phraseology
which may, in any instance, be liable to misconstruction. We are to
prescribe, not what may be perspicuous in some instances, but what
must be intelligible in all.
Lowth says, that we may express the sentiment, either by inserting
the article before the participle and the preposition after it, or
by the omission of both; in other words, that these phraseologies
are equivalent. Thus, according to him, we may say either, “_by
sending_ his Son into the world,” or “by the sending _of_ his Son.”
Here, perhaps, the meaning is sufficiently clear, whichsoever of
these forms of expression be adopted. But let us take another
example, as, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in hearing the
philosopher.” Now, according to Lowth, we may also say, “he
expressed the pleasure he had, in the hearing of the philosopher.”
Is there no difference of sentiment here? Are these expressions
equivalent? The contrary must be obvious to the most inattentive
reader. According to the former phraseology, the philosopher was
heard--he is represented as passive; agreeably to the latter, he
was active--he heard.
Again. “When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them, because of the
provoking of his sons and daughters.” Our translators have
correctly exhibited the sentiment. The sons and daughters had given
offence; they had provoked the Deity. But, if Lowth’s opinion be
correct, the expression might be “because of provoking his sons and
daughters;” a phrase which evidently conveys a very different idea.
Again. When it is said, “at the hearing of the ear, they will
believe,” is this expression convertible, without violating the
sense, into, “at hearing the ear they will believe?” Many more
examples might be produced to prove that these phraseologies, which
Lowth considers of the same import, are by no means equivalent. It
appears, then, that perspicuity is not consulted by adopting this
rule.
Again. He considers the participle, with a preposition before it,
as correspondent to the Latin gerund, and therefore governing
an objective case; but the participle preceded by an article,
he considers as a substantive, and therefore incapable of any
regimen. Now, as the author reasons from one language to another,
we may pertinently ask, is not the Latin gerund a noun, a verbal
substantive, not only having the form, and the inflexions of a
noun, but governed like it, by nouns, adjectives, verbs, and
prepositions, itself likewise governing the case of its verb? This
position, were this the place for it, we could easily prove,
notwithstanding the objections which Scioppius, Vossius, with some
other grammarians, have alleged against it. Nay, whatever theory
be adopted respecting the nature of the gerund, there cannot exist
a doubt, that, in the early ages of Roman literature, the verbal
nouns in _io_ governed an accusative, like the verbs whence they
were derived. _Quid tibi curatio est hanc rem_, is one example from
Plautus out of many, which might be produced[126]. That the supines
also were, in truth, substantives admitting a regimen, is equally
clear: _Difficile dictu_ was originally _difficile in dictu_; and
_misit oratum opem_, _misit ad oratum opem_. Nor can the structure
of the future infinitive passive be so satisfactorily resolved,
notwithstanding a few repugnant examples, as on this supposition:
_Dixit libros lectum iri_ is resolved into _dixit (id) iri ad
lectum libros_, where _libros_ is the regimen of the verbal noun
_lectum_.
Thus it is evident, that the Latin gerunds, supines, and verbal
nouns in _io_, though in form and inflexion substantives, governed
an accusative case. It matters not, indeed, to the point in
question, what was the practice of the ancients in this respect;
nor should I, therefore, have dwelt so long on this subject, did I
not conceive, that the very authority to which Dr. Lowth seems to
appeal, militates against him; and that the very language, to which
in this, as in most other cases, he strives to assimilate ours, had
nouns governing cases, like the verbs from which they came.
From the preceding observations, I think it must appear, that the
rule given by Dr. Lowth, is neither sanctioned by general usage,
nor friendly to perspicuity; while the violation of it is perfectly
reconcilable with the practice of the Roman writers, if their
authority can, in this question, be deemed of any value.
Having attempted to prove the invalidity of Lowth’s argument,
and the impropriety of his rule, as establishing an identity of
meaning, where a difference must exist, I would submit to the
candid and judicious critic the following remarks.
The participle in _ing_ has either an active or passive
signification; its import must, therefore, be determined by the
judgment of the reader, or by explanatory adjections. Whatever,
then, is calculated to remove all misconstruction, and to render
its import clear and unequivocal, merits attention. Consistently,
then, with some of the examples already adduced, I am inclined to
suggest, that, when the noun, connected with the participle, is
active or doing something, the preposition should be inserted, as,
“in the hearing of the philosopher,” that is, _the philosopher
hearing_; and that, when the noun represents the subject of an
action, or what is suffering, the preposition should be omitted,
as, “in hearing the philosopher,” or _the philosopher being heard_.
An attention to this rule will, I conceive, in most cases prevent
ambiguity.
If it should be said that I have admitted Lowth’s phraseologies,
I answer, it is true; but with this difference, that he considers
them as equivalent, and I as diametrically opposite. I observe,
likewise, that, though I prefer the suppression of the article when
the participle is not followed by _of_, and its insertion when
it is followed by the preposition, it is not because I perceive
any impropriety in the other phraseology, but because, since the
publication of Lowth’s Grammar, it has been less employed; and
because also it less forcibly marks the distinction, which I
have recommended. That it has the sanction of good authority, is
unquestionable; and that it is not inconsistent with analogy, will
still further appear from the following note.
_Note_ 3.--The participle in _ing_ is construed like a noun,
governing the genitive case, and, at the same time, having the
regimen of its proper verb, as, “Much depends on Richard’s
observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his
neglecting it.” In this example, the words _Richard’s_ and _his_
are in the genitive case, governed by the participles _observing_
and _neglecting_, while these participles, having here every
character of a noun, admit the objective case. This form of
expression has been received as unexceptionable; the following
phraseology, however, has been censured, though, in truth,
precisely analogous to the one now exemplified: “Much depends on
the rule’s being observed, and error will be the consequence of
its being neglected.” “Here,” said a certain writer, “is a noun
with a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that
is, under the government of another noun, but without any other
noun to govern it; for _being observed_ and _being neglected_ are
not nouns, nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by
the preposition _of_, before the noun or pronoun.”
I concur with Dr. Campbell, who has examined this objection, in
thinking, that the expression is not only sanctioned by good usage,
but is also agreeable to analogy, and preventive of circumlocution.
The objector, indeed, does not seem to have been aware, that his
opinion is at variance with itself; and that the reason, which he
assigns for rejecting this phraseology, would, with equal force,
conclude against another mode of expression, which he himself
approves. For he would have no objection to say, “Much depends on
his observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his
neglecting it.” Now let us try whether this sentence be not liable
to the same objection as the other. In the former, he says, you
cannot possibly supply the place of the possessive case, by the
preposition _of_ before the noun or pronoun. This is true; for it
would not be English to say, “Much depends on the being observed of
the rule; and error will be the consequence of the being neglected
of it.” But will his own approved phraseology admit this? Let us
see; “Much depends on the observing of him of the rule, and error
will be the consequence of the neglecting of him of it.” Were
the example simpler, the argument would be equally strong; as,
“Much depends on your pupil’s composing, but more on his reading
frequently.” This sentence, the author alluded to, would have
approved. Let us try if it can be resolved by _of_: “Much depends
on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him
frequently.”
The author’s argument, then, if it prove anything, proves too much;
it cannot, therefore, have any weight.
In addition to these observations, I would remark, that the
writer’s argument involves another inconsistency. He admits that
the participle in _ing_ may be thus construed; for he approves
the phrases, “his observing the rule,” and “his neglecting it.”
Why then does he reject “his being” and “its being?” for the past
or perfect participles _observed_ and _neglected_ have no share
in the government, _rule’s_ and _it’s_ being under the regimen of
the participle in _ing_. In fact, then, the phrase seems no more
objectionable than “his being a great man did not make him a happy
man;” which our author would admit to be wholly unexceptionable.
Some late writers, reasoning doubtless on a principle similar to
that, the absurdity of which we have been attempting to expose,
have discarded a phraseology which appears unobjectionable, and
substituted one which seems less correct. Many writers, instead
of saying, “his being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the
cause of his murdering his son,” would say, “he being smitten with
the love of Orestilla was the cause.” This seems to me an idle
affectation of the Latin idiom, less precise than the common mode
of expression, and less consonant with the genius of our language.
For, ask what was the cause; and, according to this phraseology,
the answer must be _he_; whereas the meaning is, that not _he_, but
_his being smitten_, was the cause of his murder.
“This jealousy accounts for Hall charging the Duke of Gloucester
with the murder of Prince Edward.” “This,” says Mr. Baker, very
justly, “is, in my opinion, a very uncouth way of speaking, though
much used by ignorant people, and often affected by those who are
not ignorant.” The writer should have said, “for Hall’s charging.”
“His words being applicable to the common mistake of our age
induce me to transcribe them.” Here I agree with the same writer
in thinking, that it would be better to consider _words_ as in
the genitive case plural, governed by the participle, as _Hall’s_
in the preceding example, and join _his words’ being applicable_,
equivalent to _the applicability of his words_, with the verb
singular; thus, “his words’ being applicable to the common mistake
of our age, induces me to transcribe them.” A ridiculous partiality
in favour of the Latin idiom, which in this case is not so correct
as our own, not exhibiting the sentiment with equal precision, has
given birth to this phraseology, which in many cases conveys not
the intended idea. For, as Priestley remarks, if it is said, “What
think you of my horse’s running to-day?” it is implied, that the
horse did actually run. If it is said, “What think you of my horse
running to-day?” it is intended to ask, whether it be proper for my
horse to run to-day. This distinction, though frequently neglected,
deserves attention; for it is obvious, that ambiguity may arise
from using the latter only of these phraseologies, to express both
meanings.
_Note_ 4.--This participle is sometimes used absolutely, in the
same manner as the infinitive mood, as, “this conduct, _viewing
it in the most favourable light_, reflects discredit on his
character.” Here the participle is made absolute, and is equivalent
to the infinitive in that state, as, “to view it in the most
favourable light.” Both these modes of expression are resolvable,
either by the hypothetical, or the perfective conjunctions; thus,
“if we view it in the most favourable light.” “To confess the
truth, I have no merit in the case;” _i.e._ “that I may confess.”
RULE XVIII.--A noun or pronoun joined to a participle, its case being
dependent on no word in the sentence, is put in the nominative.
_Note_ 1.--This rule will be perfectly understood by the classical
scholar, when we say, that the absolute case in English is the
nominative. Thus, “We being exceedingly tossed the next day, they
lightened the ship.” The pronoun of the first person, joined to the
participle, _being_, is neither the nominative to any verb, nor is
it connected with any word, of which it can be the regimen. It is
therefore put in the nominative case.
_Note_ 2.--This rule is violated in such examples as the following,
“Solomon made as wise proverbs as anybody has done, _him_ only
excepted, who was a much wiser man than Solomon.”--_Tillotson._
“For only in destroying I find ease
To my relentless thoughts; and, _him_ destroy’d,
Or won to what may work his utter loss,
For whom all this was made, all this will soon
Follow,”--_Milton._
This seems to be the only example in which the poet has
transgressed this rule; and in several instances, in which he has
observed it, Bentley would erroneously substitute the objective
case.
RULE XIX.--Prepositions are joined with the objective case, or govern
nouns and pronouns in the accusative, as, “he ran to me,” “he was
loved by us.”
_Note_ 1.--This rule is violated in such expressions as these, “Who
servest thou under?” “Who do you speak to?” for the syntactical
arrangement is, “thou servest under who?” “thou speakest to who?”
instead of “under whom?” “to whom?”
_Note_ 2.--The preposition is frequently separated from its
regimen, as, “Horace is an author, whom I am much delighted with,”
_i.e._ “with whom I am much delighted.”
_Note_ 3.--The prepositions _to_ and _for_ are often understood,
as, “he gave me a book,” “he told me the news:” _i.e._ “he gave to
me,” “he told to me.”
Lowth has, indeed, observed, that in such examples, the pronouns,
_me_, _thee_, &c., may be considered to be in the dative case,
as, in truth, they are in Saxon the datives of their respective
pronouns, and in their form include _to_, as, “woe is to me.” This
phrase, he observes, is pure Saxon, the same as, “wae is me,” in
which _me_ is a dative case.
The preposition _by_ is also, in a few colloquial expressions,
omitted, as, “he went across the bridge,” “he crossed the bridge,”
for “he crossed (the river) by the bridge.”
_Note_ 4.--A preposition, following a verb, constituting with
it what has been termed a compound active verb, is sometimes
suppressed. We say, “he hoped for a reward,” “you wondered at
his courage.” Addison, Steele, and Johnson, with several other
reputable writers, say, “It is to be hoped,” instead of “to
be hoped for;” and Johnson very generally says, “It is not to
be wondered,” for “not to be wondered at.” The latter form of
expression seems to have been adopted, in order to avoid the abrupt
and inelegant conclusion of the clause, especially when followed by
the word _that_.
_Note_ 5.--The prepositions _in_, _on_, _for_, and _from_, are
often understood before nouns of time and place; thus, “this day,”
“next month,” “last year,” are often used elliptically for “on
this day,” “in next month,” “in last year.” We say, also, “He was
banished England,” _i.e._ “_from_ England.”
Care, however, should be taken that the omission create no
ambiguity. If we say, “He was deaf some years before he died,”
referring to a temporary deafness, and a point of time at which it
occurred, the expression is not improper, though the meaning might
be more clearly expressed; but if we intend to signify a continued
deafness, we ought to say, “for” or “during some years.”
_Note_ 6.--The preposition is improperly omitted in the following
line of Pope’s:
“And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”
It should be, according to the rules of syntax, “smiled at what
they blushed at before,” both verbs requiring _at_ after them,
thus, “they smiled at that, at which they blushed before.”
_Note_ 7.--Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to
each of the words, whose relation they express. The following
sentence from Hume is, in this respect, faulty: “The ignorance
of the age in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow
of this new invention.” It should be, “the progress of this new
invention.” The following sentence from Johnson, is, for the same
reason, chargeable with faulty arrangement: “The country first
dawned, that illuminated the world, and beyond which the arts
cannot be traced of civil society or domestic life.”--_Rasselas._
It should be, “the arts of civil society or domestic life cannot be
traced.” Priestley has censured the following clause from Harris,
“being in no sense capable of either intention or remission.” If
it be considered, however, that the word _either_ properly means
“the one or the other,” and in truth denotes the subject, being,
therefore, in strict propriety, the regimen of the preposition, the
arrangement of Harris, though now not so common as the other, will
not appear exceptionable. Nay, whatever may be the future decision
of usage, that great arbitress of all language, (for at present she
is divided,) Harris’s arrangement seems more conformable to the
strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley’s own rule,
than that, which the latter recommends; thus, “capable of either
(_i.e._ of the one or of the other), intension, or remission.”
RULE XX.--Adverbs have no government.
_Note_ 1.--They are sometimes improperly used for adjectives, as,
“After those wars of which they hoped for a soon and prosperous
issue.”--_Sidney._ “A soon issue” is not English; an adverb
cannot agree with a substantive; it should be “a speedy and
prosperous issue.” Such expressions likewise as the following,
though not destitute of authority, are exceedingly inelegant, and
irreconcilable with analogy: “the then ministry,” for “the ministry
of that time;” “the above discourse,” for “the preceding discourse.”
_Note_ 2.--They are sometimes used like substantives, as, “a little
while,” for “in a little time,” or “for a little time.” “Worth
while,” “some how,” “any how,” “any where,” are examples of the
same kind.
_Note_ 3.--The adverbs _whence_, _thence_, _hence_, are equivalent
to, “from which place,” “from that place,” “from this place;” _from
whence_, _from thence_, _from hence_, are therefore chargeable with
redundancy.
_Note_ 4.--_Never_ is sometimes erroneously used for _ever_, as,
“they might be extirpated, were they never so many.” It should be,
“ever so many,” _i.e._ “how many soever.” “Who will not hearken to
the voice of the charmer, charm he _never_ so sweetly.” It should
be, “_ever_ so sweetly;” _i.e._ “however sweetly,” or “how sweetly
soever.”
_Note_ 5.--_Ever_ is likewise sometimes improperly used for
_never_, as, “I seldom or ever see him now.” It should be, “seldom
or _never_,” the speaker intending to say, “that rarely, or rather
at no time, does he see him now;” not “rarely,” or “at any time.”
_Note_ 6.--Priestley remarks, that the French always place their
adverbs immediately after their verbs, which order, he observes,
by no means suits the English idiom. “His government gave courage
to the English barons to carry farther their opposition.”--_Hume._
It would be better, “to carry their opposition farther.” “Edward
obtained a dispensation from his oath, which the barons had
compelled Gaveston to take, that he would abjure for ever the
realm;” better “the realm for ever.”
_Note_ 7.--The adverb is generally placed between the auxiliary
verb and the participle, as, “this is perfectly understood.” When
there are more auxiliaries than one, the same author observes, that
the adverb should be placed after the first. This rule, however,
is by no means universally followed; for many of our best writers
employ a different arrangement, and, I think, with great propriety;
as, “this will be perfectly understood,” where the adverb follows
both auxiliaries. The place of the adverb may, in general, be
ascertained, by considering what word it is intended to qualify:
and, in the last example, it should be closely connected with
_understood_. But more on this subject in the following note.
_Note_ 8.--The adverb, as its name imports, is generally placed
close to the word, which it modifies or affects: its force,
therefore, very much depends upon its position. Inattention to
the proper collocation of adverbs is frequently the cause of much
obscurity and misconception. To this inattention we may ascribe
the ambiguity in the following sentence: “He was not honoured
with this reward, but with the approbation of the people.” This
sentence may imply, either that he was honoured with this reward,
not without the approbation of the people; or that he was not
honoured with this reward, but was honoured with the approbation
of the people. The latter is the meaning intended. It should
therefore be, “he was honoured, not with this reward, but with the
approbation of the people.” By this arrangement the sentiment is
correctly exhibited--the two subjects, reward and approbation, are
perspicuously contrasted, and while the former is negatived, the
latter is affirmed[127].
_Note_ 9.--Lowth observes that “the adverb should be for the
most part placed before adjectives, and after verbs;” thus, “he
was excessively modest,” “he fought bravely.” This is, indeed,
the general arrangement; but it admits many exceptions. In no
case are writers so apt to err as in the position of the word
_only_. Its place, in my opinion, is after the substantive to
which it refers, or which it exclusively implies, and before the
attributive. In the following sentence of Steele’s, the collocation
is faulty: “The bridegroom sits with an aspect which intimates
his thoughts were not only entertained with the joys with which
he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude, and divine
pleasure.” This collocation of the two adverbs implies that his
thoughts were something more than entertained: whereas it is the
author’s intention to say, that his thoughts were entertained with
something more than joys. The sentence, therefore, should proceed
thus: “The bridegroom sits with an aspect, which intimates, that
his thoughts were entertained not with the joys only, with which
he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude and divine
pleasure.”[128]
When Addison says (_Spec._ No. 412), “By greatness I do not only
mean the bulk of any single object, but the largeness of a whole
view,” the question naturally occurs, what does he more than mean?
It is evident that, agreeably to this arrangement, the adverb
refers to _mean_, exclusively of all other attributes or actions,
and being prefaced by a negative, implies “that he does something
more than mean.” In this criticism I concur with Blair, who has
expressed his disapprobation of this arrangement.
Had he, as the same author observes, placed the adverb after
_bulk_, it would have still been wrong. For if he had said, “I
do not mean the bulk only,” then the adverb, following a noun
substantive, must refer to it exclusively of every other, and the
clause being negative, the question would be, what does he mean
more than the bulk? Is it the colour, the beauty, or what else?
Now, as Mr. Addison intended to say that he did not mean one
thing, the word _only_ should have followed the name of that
thing, whether its designation was simple or complex. He should,
therefore, have said, “the bulk of any single object only, but the
largeness of a whole view.” According to this arrangement, the word
_only_ refers, as it ought, to “the bulk of any single object” as
one idea; and the question occurs, what does he mean more than
the bulk of any single object? to which the answer follows, “the
largeness of a whole view.” It may, however, at the same time be
observed that, consistently with the practice of some of our best
writers, who place the adverb before its subject, there seems no
impropriety here in saying, “I do not mean only,” _i.e._ “one
thing,” “the bulk of a single object, but the largeness of a whole
view.”
“The perfidious voice of flattery reminded him,” says Gibbon, “that
by exploits of the same nature, by the defeat of the Nemean lion,
and the slaughter of the wild boar of Erymanthus, the Grecian
Hercules had acquired a place among the gods, and an immortal
memory among men.” “_They only_ forgot to observe that, in the
first ages of society, a successful war against savage animals is
one of the most beneficial labours of heroism.” In the beginning
of the latter sentence the adverb _only_ is misplaced. As it
stands, the meaning is that they were the only persons who forgot:
it should be “_only_ they forgot to observe;” _i.e._ “one thing
they forgot,” namely, “to observe.” To this erroneous collocation
in Gibbon, I shall oppose a similar example from Pope, in which
the adverb is correctly placed. In a letter to Hughes, speaking
of the compliments which this gentleman had paid to him on his
translation of Homer, he acquaints him, that he should be ashamed
to attempt returning these compliments; one thing, however, he
would observe, namely, that he esteemed Mr. Hughes too much not to
be pleased with the compliments which he had received from him. His
words, therefore, are, “I should be ashamed to offer at saying
any of those civil things, in return to your obliging compliments,
in regard to my translation of Homer: _only_ I have too great a
value for you not to be pleased with them;” where the word _only_
introduces the clause, and is equivalent to “one thing is true,”
or “thus much (_tantum_), I say, I have too great a value,” &c.
Here it is obvious that the adverb, as it precedes the pronoun,
does not refer to it; and that Mr. Pope’s collocation of it is
perfectly correct, to express the sentiment, which he intended. Had
he said, “I only,” the adverb would have referred to the pronoun,
and implied that he was the only person who valued. Had he intended
to say, that he merely entertained an esteem for him, but could not
manifest it, then the presence of the auxiliary would have been
necessary, and he would have expressed himself thus, “I do only
entertain too great an esteem for you;” that is, “I do only (one
thing) entertain too great an esteem.” Had he said, “I have only
too great a value for you,” it would be properly opposed to, “and
not too little.” Had he said, “I have too great a value only,” then
_value_ would be contrasted with some other sentiment, as when one
says, he “has wealth only, but not virtue,” for example, or any
other acquirement. As a violation of this rule, I adduce also the
following expression of a reviewer. “We only discharge our duty
to the public;” a declaration which, strictly interpreted, means
“we are the only persons who discharge.” It should be, “we do only
(one thing) discharge our duty;” for the writer intended to say,
that he did nothing but discharge his duty to the public[129].
In justification of such inaccuracies, it is impertinent to
plead, that a little attention will prevent misconception. It is
the business of every author to guard his reader, as far as the
language in which he writes will permit, from the possibility of
misconstruction, and to render that attention to the language
unnecessary. Quintilian’s maxim cannot be too often repeated to
those who, by such apologies, attempt to defend any avoidable
ambiguity[130].
The following sentence is justly censured by Blair, and also by
Baker, in his “Remarks.” “Theism,” says Shaftesbury, “can only be
opposed to polytheism or atheism.” He ought to have said, observes
Baker, “Theism can be opposed only to polytheism or atheism.”
Dr. Blair concurs in opinion with the remarker. I am inclined,
however, to differ from both; and think, that the sentence should
run thus: “Theism can be opposed to polytheism only, or atheism;”
where the adverb _only_ refers to the noun immediately preceding,
and is understood to the other, implying, that these two systems
of belief are the only creeds to which theism can be opposed. If
this be not the proper arrangement, it is obvious, that no definite
rule can be given on the subject. For, if the adverb may be placed
either before or after the substantive, to which it refers, then
precision becomes impossible, and we may say, “_he only_” or “_only
he_” to express the same sentiment; which collocations, I have
already shown, denote ideas materially different. But, if there
be a definite and precise rule for the position of this word, and
if the sense be different, according to the collocation of the
adverb, then I think it will appear, that it ought to be subjoined
to the substantive or pronoun to which it refers; and this opinion
is supported by the authority of Blair himself, in the examples
which I have just now adduced. For why, unless on this principle,
does he contend that the word _only_ should be placed after _the
bulk of a single object_? If the adverb then be, in this example,
rightly placed after the substantive or complex name, to which it
refers, it ought to have the same position assigned to it in every
similar instance. That the adverb, in the last example, refers to
“polytheism,” there can be no question; it should therefore follow,
and not precede, it.
I am well aware, that many examples may be produced, wherein, with
an arrangement different from that here recommended, the sense
would, notwithstanding, be perfectly clear; and, perhaps, Blair’s
collocation, in the last example, may be adduced as an instance.
But when a rule, conducive to perspicuity, is once established,
every unnecessary deviation from it should be studiously avoided,
or, at least, not wantonly adopted.
The sentence, as it stands in Shaftesbury, implies that theism is
capable of nothing, but of being opposed to polytheism, or atheism;
“Theism can only (one thing, namely) be opposed to polytheism or
atheism;” where it is evident that _only_ refers to _be opposed_,
agreeably to the rule now given. In the same manner, if I say, “he
was only great,” it is implied, that he was nothing but great, the
adverb being placed before the attributive, to which it refers.
Hence the question naturally is, what was he not besides? The
answer may be, “not good,” “not wise,” “not learned.” Were the
adverb placed after the pronoun, it would imply, that “he was the
only person who was great.”[131]
I am perfectly aware, that the rule here given will not, in all
cases, preclude ambiguity; but whenever it becomes doubtful,
whether the adverb is intended to affect the preceding substantive,
or the following attributive, a different form of expression may be
adopted, and the use of the auxiliary, along with the principal
verb, will, in many instances, ensure perspicuity. This expedient,
however, cannot always be employed. If we say, “The manufacturer
only was prosperous,” it may be uncertain, whether the adverb is to
restrict the predicate “prosperous” to the manufacturer, implying
that he was the only prosperous man, or to the verb expressing past
time, signifying that he was then, but is not now prosperous. If
the former be the meaning intended, we may say, “he was the only
prosperous man;” if the latter, we may say, “the manufacturer was
once,” or “was then, the only prosperous man.”
It would have contributed much to perspicuity, if authors had
adopted one uniform practice, placing the adverb constantly,
either before or after its subject, whether a substantive or an
attributive[132]. But, where usage is so divided, and where
the adoption of a new and general rule would be now liable to
insuperable objections, all that can be successfully attempted is,
in accommodation to existing circumstances, to reduce the evil
within narrow limits, if we cannot, by any precise rule, entirely
remove it. With this view we would recommend, that when the adverb
refers not to a word, but to a sentence or clause, it be placed
at the beginning of that sentence or clause; where it refers to
a predicate, it precede the predicating term; and when it has a
reference to a subject, it follow its name or description. An
observation, however, already made, may be here repeated, namely,
that in the last case, a different collocation may often be adopted
without the risk of ambiguity, and even with advantage to the
structure of the sentence.
_Note_ 10.--Adverbs, as Lowth observes, are generally placed
before the adjective to which they refer. This rule, however,
admits a few exceptions. The adverb _enough_ is always placed
after its adjective, as, “the reward was small enough.” The
proper position of this adverb, indeed, seems to be immediately
after the adjective; it is frequently, however, placed at some
distance from it, as, “a large house enough.” Usage is, indeed,
somewhat divided on this point, Mr. Baker, and a few others,
pleading for the following arrangement, “a large enough house.” The
former collocation, however, seems far the more general; and is
recommended by that rule, by which the substantive and adjective
should be placed in juxta-position, or as near as possible to each
other. The latter is defended by the principle, that the qualifying
adverb should be placed close to the adjective, whose signification
it modifies. This collocation is generally, however, pronounced a
Scotticism; but it is not peculiar to Scotch writers.
RULE XXI.--Conjunctions have no government.
_Note_ 1.--In giving this rule, I differ from all other
grammarians, who have erroneously, as I conceive, assigned them a
regimen. Some conjunctions, says Lowth, govern the indicative, and
some the subjunctive mood. This I affirm without hesitation to be
a great mistake; for not a single example, I venture to assert,
can be produced, in which the verb is divested of its indicative
form, in consequence of its being subjoined to any conjunction.
The Latins had a form of the verb, which they properly enough
denominated the subjunctive mood; because, where the meaning
was unconditionally assertive, they employed this form, if the
clause was preceded by some particular conjunctive or adverbial
term. Thus, when they said, _adeo benevolus erat, ut omnes eum
amarent_, “he was so benevolent, that all men loved him,” though
the assertion in the latter clause, be evidently unconditional, as
the English shows, they changed the indicative into another form,
because the verb is preceded by the conjunction _ut_. No similar
example can be produced in English.
Lowth informs us, that, when hypothesis, conditionality, or
contingency is implied, the mood should be subjunctive; if
certainty, or something determinate and absolute be signified,
the verb should be indicative. Now surely, if the sense require a
form different from the indicative, the verb cannot be said to be
under the government of the conjunction; for the verb assumes that
form, not because preceded by the conjunctive term, or because it
is under its government, but because the sentiment to be expressed
requires that phraseology. Whether the conditional, or what Lowth
terms the subjunctive, be a distinct form of the verb, or only an
elliptical mode of expression, we have already inquired. See p. 126.
_Note_ 2.--Mr. Harris says, that the chief difference between
prepositions and conjunctions is, that the former couple words, and
the latter sentences. This opinion is erroneous; for conjunctions
frequently couple words, as in the following example: “A man of
wisdom and virtue is a perfect character.” Here it is not implied,
that “a man of wisdom is a perfect character;” but “a man of
wisdom combined with virtue, or a man of wisdom and virtue.” That
conjunctions, indeed, do not couple at all, in that sense, at
least, in which grammarians have understood the term, Mr. Tooke
seems to have incontestably proved. That they sometimes couple
sentences, or that instances may be produced, in which Harris’s
definition will appear correct, the following example will serve
as an evidence: “You, and I, and John rode to town;” _i.e._ “you
rode,” “and I rode,” “and John rode.” But to assert, that this is
their distinctive property, is to affirm what may be disproved by
numberless examples. If we say, “two and two are four.” Are two
four, and two four? “A B, B C, and C A, form a triangle.” Is A B a
triangle? or B C? or C A? “John and Mary are a handsome couple.” Is
John a couple? and Mary a couple? The common theory, therefore, is
false; nor is it to be doubted, that conjunctions are, in respect
to signification, and were originally in regard to their regimen,
verbs, or words compounded of nouns and attributives. In explaining
them, however, I divided them, as the reader may remember, into
the several classes of adversative, concessive, conditional, &c.
This I did, not only in conformity to general usage, and that he
might not be a stranger to the names assigned to them; but likewise
for this reason, that, though they originally formed no distinct
species of words, but were either verbs, or compounds of nouns and
verbs, they have now assumed another character, and are construed
in a different manner. It is necessary, however, that he should be
acquainted not only with their present use, but also with their
primitive import, and classification.
How these words were degraded from their original rank, and deemed
insignificant, while some, perhaps, lost their syntactical power,
is a matter, I conceive, of no difficult inquiry. For, when the
verbs, to which any of these words belonged, became obsolete,
the words themselves, thus separated from their parent stock,
and stripped of that consequence and authority which they thence
derived, their extraction becoming daily more dubious, and their
original value more obscure, sunk by degrees into inferior note,
and at last dwindled into comparative insignificance. Besides, many
of them, doubtless, were transplanted into our language without the
_radices_; their etymology, therefore, being little known, their
primitive character, and real import, would soon be involved in
increasing darkness.
It is to be considered, also, that those who have dispensed
the laws of grammar in our language, or assumed the office of
critics, have been generally such as, though perhaps sufficiently
conversant in Greek and Latin, were entirely unacquainted with
the Northern languages. Accustomed, therefore, to render the
conjunctions and prepositions in Greek or Latin, by synonymous
English words, and unacquainted with the true character of these
vernacular terms, their _etymons_ being obsolete, or having never
been used in our language, it is easy to conceive how they would
naturally assign to the English words the same character and the
same name which were affixed to the synonymous Latin terms. Nay,
this has been so much the case, that we have ascribed an ambiguous
character to several English words, referring them now to one
class, then to another, merely because they agree in signification
with certain Greek and Latin terms, which have been severally
referred by classical grammarians to different orders. That the
word _whether_ has uniformly, in our language, the same import and
the same character, denoting “which of the two,” there can be no
doubt; yet, because this word answers sometimes to _an_, _anne_,
_num_, and sometimes to _uter_, grammarians and lexicographers have
accounted it both a conjunction and a pronoun. _Utrum_ in Latin has
shared the same fate. So far, indeed, has this spirit been carried,
that we will not admit _except_, _according_, _concerning_,
_respecting_, with many similar terms, to be verbs or participles,
because _præter_, _secundum_, _de_, are prepositions. It is from
this propensity to assimilate ours with the Latin language, that
all these errors have arisen.
That the words now termed prepositions and conjunctions were
originally verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, Tooke has, in
my judgment, incontrovertibly proved. This being admitted, it
appears to me highly probable, that they were primitively construed
as such, joined either with the nominative or the objective case,
as the verbs had either a transitive or intransitive meaning;
and that they were followed by either single words or clauses.
This, however, is merely conjecture, founded indeed in the nature
of the words, but not supported by any evidence. In process of
time, in consequence of that assimilation which naturally takes
place between a living language and a dead one, much read, much
written, and much admired, these words, when their origin became
obscure, would, as I have remarked, be divested of their primitive
character, and be considered as belonging to those classes, to
which the synonymous Latin words were referred. Hence their
regimen would likewise undergo a change. It would appear awkward
and vicious to say now, “I saw nobody but he;” is not improbable,
however, that the mode of expression was originally, “I saw
nobody, be out he,” _i.e._ “he be out.” But I am now indulging
in conjecture, the very error which chiefly has misled us in our
grammatical researches. One thing, however, is certain, that
several words, which were originally employed as prepositions
or conjunctions indifferently, have now acquired a more fixed
character, and are used but seldom in a double capacity. Of this
the word _without_ is an example. Thus, it was not unusual to
say, “without you go, I will not,” where the term of exclusion,
though in truth a preposition prefixed to a clause, was considered
as a conjunction synonymous with _nisi_. This usage, unless in
conversation, is now almost entirely relinquished; and the term
_without_ is now generally employed as a preposition, being
prefixed to single words. It is likewise certain that in respect
to signification there is no difference between conjunctions and
prepositions: _vidi neminem nisi eum_, is equivalent to _vidi
neminem præter eum_. In like manner, “I saw nobody but him,” is
synonymous with “I saw nobody besides him;” in which examples
the conjunctions _nisi_ and _but_ are perfectly synonymous with
_præter_ and _besides_, which are termed prepositions.
It may be asked, if then prepositions and conjunctions be alike
verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, and if many prepositions
and conjunctions be in point of meaning identical, what forms the
ground of distinction between them? It is simply this, that the
former are prefixed to single words only, as nouns and pronouns,
or to clauses involving an infinitive mood[133], the infinitive
being strictly the name of the verb; and that they have a regimen;
while the latter are prefixed to clauses, and have no regimen.
This is the only distinction between prepositions and conjunctions
as discriminated in modern use. Their original character is
sufficiently established by Mr. Tooke.
I have said that some of these words have, in our language, an
ambiguous character, being employed both as prepositions and
conjunctions. Of this the word _than_ is an example. Priestley
seems to consider it as a preposition, and pleads in favour of the
following expression, “you are taller than him,” not “taller than
he.” “Since it is allowed,” says the Doctor, “that the oblique case
should follow prepositions, and since the comparative degree of an
adjective, and the particle _than_, have certainly between them
the force of a preposition, expressing the relation of one word
to another, they ought to require the oblique case of the pronoun
following, so that, _greater than me_ will be more grammatical than
_greater than I_.” Here I cannot concur with the learned author.
The same argument would prove that _major quam me_, would be more
grammatical than _major quam ego_; a conclusion which is opposed
by universal authority. The truth is, _than_ must be either a
conjunction or a preposition, or both. If a conjunction, it can
have no government, any more than the Latin _quam_; unless we
confound the distinction which has been just now explained, and is
universally admitted, namely, that conjunctions are distinguished
from prepositions, by their having no government. If it be a
preposition, no argument is necessary to prove that it may be
joined with an objective case; for such is the distinguishing
character of prepositions. If it be either a preposition or a
conjunction, it follows, that it may be construed either with or
without a regimen. Lowth, with greater propriety, considers it as a
conjunction; and Campbell, in his “Rhetoric,” recommends this usage
as the only means of preventing that ambiguity, which necessarily
arises from the employment of this word as a preposition only. For,
if we use it as a preposition, we should say, “I love you better
than him,” whether it be meant “I love you better than I love him,”
or “I love you better than he does.” By using it as a conjunction,
the ambiguity is prevented. For, if the former sentiment be
implied, we say, “I love you better than him,” _i.e._ “than I love
him;” if the latter, we say, “I love you better than he,” _i.e._
“than he loves you.” Whatever may have been the original character
or syntax of this word, since usage is now divided, some writers
employing it as a conjunction, and others as a preposition, the
grammarian may, consistently with his duty, plead for that usage
only, which prevents ambiguity.
The rule here recommended is generally violated, when _than_
is joined with the relative pronoun, as, “Alfred, than whom
a greater king never reigned.” “Beelzebub, than whom, Satan
excepted, none higher sat.” Salmon has attempted to account for
this almost universal phraseology, by saying, that the expression
is elliptical, being the same as, “than compared with whom.” This
explanation is forced and unnatural. It is likewise unnecessary.
The simple fact is, that the word _than_ was formerly used as a
preposition, and, I believe, more frequently than it is now. Hence,
doubtless, arose this phraseology.
RULE XXII.--Derivatives are generally construed like their
primitives; as, “it was a happy thing _for_ this country, that the
Pretender was defeated;” or “happily _for_ this country the Pretender
was defeated.” Thus also, “to compare _with_,” and “in comparison
_with_ riches;”--“to depend _on_,” and his “dependence on the court.”
RULE XXIII.--One negative destroys another; or two negatives are
equivalent to an affirmative; as, “nor have I no money, which I can
spare;” that is, “I have money, which I can spare.”--“Nor was the
king unacquainted with his designs;” that is, “he was acquainted.”
_Note_ 1.--Here our language accords with the Latin. In Greek and
French, two negatives render the negation stronger.
_Note_ 2.--This rule is violated in such examples as this, “Nor
is danger ever apprehended in such a government, no more than we
commonly apprehend danger from thunder or earthquakes.” It should
be _any more_.
RULE XXIV.--Interjections are joined with the objective case of the
pronoun of the first person, and with the nominative of the pronoun
of the second, as, “ah me,” “oh me,” “ah thou wretch,” “O thou who
dwellest.”
_Syntax_ being that part of grammar, which teaches rules not only
for the concord and government, but also for the order of words
in clauses and sentences, I shall subjoin the few following brief
directions for the guidance of the scholar, respecting arrangement.
1st. The collocation should never invert the natural order of
events, or violate the principles of reason and metaphysical
propriety. It is obvious, for example, that no person can write,
who cannot read. The ability to do the former necessarily implies
a capacity to do the latter. It is preposterous, therefore, to
say with Addison, “There will be few in the next generation, who
will not at least be able to write and read.” He should have
said, “to read and write.” “He was the son of a mother, who had
nursed him with maternal tenderness, and had borne him in an hour
of the deepest affliction.” The natural order of events should
have dictated the reverse arrangement. There would be a manifest
impropriety in saying “Our father is well, and alive;” the former
state necessarily implying the latter. In the following passage,
however, it is perhaps excusable, the answers particularly
corresponding to the questions: Joseph says to his brothers, “Is
your father well? The old man, of whom ye spake, is he yet alive?”
They answer, “Thy servant, our father, is in good health; he is yet
alive.” This error was termed by the ancient grammarians _hysteron
proteron_; and, though not so palpably as in the preceding
examples, it occurs much more frequently than an inattentive reader
is apt to imagine.
2nd. The English language admits but few inflexions, and therefore
little or no room for variety of arrangement. The connection of
one word with another is not to be perceived, as in Greek and
Latin, by correspondence of termination, but by relative position.
This renders it indispensably necessary, that those words which
are intimately related by sense one to another, should be closely
connected by collocation. “The cunning of Hannibal was too powerful
for the Pergamenians, who by the same kind of stratagem had
frequently obtained great victories at land.” The relative here, by
its position, must be understood as referring to the Pergamenians;
whereas it is intended to refer to Hannibal. The relative clause,
therefore, should have followed the name of the Carthaginian. “His
picture, in distemper, of calumny, borrowed from the description
of one painted by Apelles, was supposed to be a satire on that
cardinal.”--_Walpole._ The error here is obvious. He should have
said, “His picture of calumny.” “It is folly to pretend to arm
ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures,
which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of
our heavenly Father.”--_Sherlock._ Here the grammatical antecedent
is _treasures_; but it is intended to be _accidents_. The relative
is removed from its proper subject.
3rd. As the converse of the preceding rule, it may be observed,
that those words should be separated, which in juxta-position
may, at first sight, or first hearing, possibly convey a meaning
which the speaker or writer does not intend. “I, like a well-bred
man, who is never disposed to mortify or to offend, praised both
sorts of food.” As the two introductory words are capable of two
meanings, would it not be better to say, “Like a well-bred man
... I praised both sorts of food.” I am aware, that the other
collocation is preferable, where a particular stress is to be laid
on the principal subject; but ambiguity is an error, which should
be studiously avoided, and the meaning should not be left to the
determination of a comma.
4th. From the preceding rules, it follows as a corollary, that
no clause should be so placed in a sentence, as to be referable
either to what precedes, or what follows. “The knight, seeing his
habitation reduced to so small a compass, and himself in a manner
shut out of his own house, _on the death of his mother_, ordered
all the apartments to be flung open.” The clause in italics is
ambiguously placed.
5th. When each of two arrangements is equally favourable to
perspicuity, and equally consistent with metaphysical propriety,
that should be preferred which is the more agreeable to the ear.
6th. Harsh and abrupt cadences should be avoided; and in elevated
style, the clauses should swell towards the close of the sentence.
This latter rule, however, which requires some limitations, belongs
to the province of the rhetorician, rather than to that of the
grammarian.
PART III.
CHAPTER I.
CANONS OF CRITICISM.
Having explained and illustrated the etymology and syntax of the
English language, as fully as the limits, which I have prescribed to
myself, will permit, I would now request the reader’s attention to
some additional observations.
The grammar of every language is merely a compilation of those
general principles, or rules, agreeably to which that language is
spoken. When I say, a compilation of rules, I would not be understood
to mean, that the rules are first established, and the language
afterwards modelled in conformity to these. The very reverse is
the fact: language is antecedent to grammar. Words are framed and
combined to express sentiment, before the grammarian can enter on
his province. His sole business is, not to dictate forms of speech,
or to prescribe law to our modes of expression; but, by observing
the modes previously established, by remarking their similarities
and dissimilarities, his province is to deduce and explain the
general principles, and the particular forms, agreeably to which the
speakers of that language express themselves. The philosopher does
not determine by what laws the physical and moral world should be
governed; but, by the careful observation and accurate comparison
of the various phenomena presented to his view, he deduces and
ascertains the general principles, by which the system is regulated.
The province of the grammarian seems precisely similar. He is a mere
digester and compiler, explaining what _are_ the modes of speech, not
dictating what they _should be_. He can neither assign to any word a
meaning different from that which custom has annexed to it; nor can
he alter a phraseology, to which universal suffrage has given its
sanction. Usage is, in this case, law; usage _quem penes arbitrium
est, et jus et norma loquendi_. If it were now the practice to say,
“I loves,” instead of “I love,” the former phraseology would rest on
the same firm ground, on which the latter now stands; and “I love,”
would be as much a violation of the rules of grammar, or, which is
the same thing, of established usage, as “I loves” is at present.
_Regula est, quæ rem, quæ est, breviter enarrat; non ut ex regula jus
sumatur, sed ex jure, quod est, regula fiat._--_Paul. Leg. 1, de Reg.
Jur._
Having said thus much to prevent misconception, and to define the
proper province of the grammarian, I proceed to observe, that this
usage, which gives law to language, in order to establish its
authority, or to entitle its suffrage to our assent, must be, in the
first place, _reputable_.
The vulgar in this, as in every other country, are, from their want
of education, necessarily illiterate. Their native language is known
to them no farther, than is requisite for the most common purposes
of life. Their ideas are few, and consequently their stock of words
poor and scanty. Nay, their poverty, in this respect, is not their
only evil. Their narrow competence they abuse and pervert. Some
words they misapply, others they corrupt; while many are employed
by them, which have no sanction, but provincial or local authority.
Hence the language of the vulgar, in one province, is sometimes
hardly intelligible in another. Add to this, that debarred by their
occupations from study, or generally averse to literary pursuits,
they are necessarily strangers to the scientific improvements of a
cultivated mind; and are therefore entirely unacquainted with that
diction, which concerns the higher attainments of life. Ignorant of
any general principles respecting language, to which they may appeal;
unable to discriminate between right and wrong; prone therefore to
adopt whatever usage casual circumstances may present; it is no
wonder, if the language of the vulgar be a mixture of incongruity and
error, neither perfectly consistent with itself, nor to themselves
universally intelligible. Their usage, therefore, is not the
standard, to which we must appeal for decisive authority; a usage so
discordant and various, that we may justly apply to it the words of
a celebrated critic,
Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?
The question then is, what is reputable usage? On this subject
philologists have been divided. Dr. Campbell appears to me to
decide judiciously, when he says, that the usage, to which we must
appeal, is not that of the court, or of great men, nor even of
authors of profound science, but of those, whose works are esteemed
by the public, and who may, therefore, be denominated _reputable_
authors. By referring to their practice, he appeals to a standard
less equivocal, than if he had resorted to the authority of good
writers; for, as he justly observes, there may be various opinions
respecting the merits of authors, when there may be no disagreement
concerning the rank which they hold in the estimation of the public;
and, because it is the esteem of the public, and not their intrinsic
merit, (though these go generally hand in hand,) that raises them to
distinction, and stamps a value on their language. Besides, it is to
be observed, that consummate knowledge is not always accompanied with
a talent for communicating it: hence the sentiment may be confessedly
valuable, while the language is regarded as of no authority.
This usage must be, in the second place, _national_. It must not be
confined to this or that province; it must not be the usage of this
or that district, the peculiarities of which are always ridiculous,
and frequently unintelligible beyond its own limits; but it must
be the general language of the country, intelligible everywhere,
and in no place ridiculous. And, though the variety of dialects may
collectively form a greater number of authorities than national
usage can boast, taken singly they are much fewer. Those, to use
Campbell’s apposite similitude, who deviate from the beaten road, may
be incomparably more numerous than those who travel in it; yet, into
whatever number of by-paths the former may be divided, there may not
be found in any one of these tracks so many as travel in the king’s
highway.
In the third place, this usage must be _present_. Here it may be
asked, what is meant by present usage? Is it the usage of the
present year, the present age, or the present century? How is it
defined, or by what boundary is it limited? In short, how far may we
revert in search of decisive authority? may we go back, for example,
as far as Chaucer, or must we stop at the age of Addison?
In determining this matter, the same learned and judicious critic
observes, that regard must be had to the species of composition and
the nature of the subject. Poetry is properly allowed a greater
latitude than prose; and therefore, a word, which in prose we should
reject as a barbarism, may, with strict propriety, be admitted in
verse. Here, also, there are limits which must not be passed; and,
perhaps, any word, which cannot plead the authority of Milton, or of
any contemporary or later poet, may be justly regarded as obsolete.
In prose, no word, unless the subject be art or science, should be
employed, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of
man. This is the judgment of the same critic. Against this answer,
indeed, it is possible to raise a thousand cavils; and, perhaps, we
shall be reminded of the poet’s strictures on the term _ancient_ in
his days[134]. One thing, however, is certain, that, though it be
difficult to fix a precise limit, where the authority of precedent
terminates, and legislative usage commences, or to define with
precision the age of man, it must be acknowledged, that there are
limits, in respect to usage, which we must not overleap, as there is
a certain term, which the life of man cannot surpass.
As there is a period, beyond which precedent in language ceases to
have authority; so, on the contrary, the usage of the present day
is not implicitly to be adopted. Mankind are fond of novelty; and
there is a fashion in language, as there is in dress. Whim, vanity,
and affectation, delight in creating new words. Of these, the far
greater part soon sink into contempt. They figure for a little, like
ephemeral productions, in tales, novels, and fugitive papers; and
are shortly consigned to degradation and oblivion. Now, to adopt
every new-fangled upstart at its birth, would argue not taste,
nor judgment, but childish fondness for singularity and novelty.
On the contrary, if any of these should maintain its ground, and
receive the sanction of a reputable usage, to reject it, in this
case, would be to resist that authority, to which every critic and
grammarian must bow with submission. The term _mob_, for example,
was, at its introduction, zealously opposed by Dean Swift. His
resistance, however, was ineffectual; and to reject it now would
betray prudish affectation, and fruitless perversity. The word
_inimical_, previously to the American war, could, I believe, plead,
in its favour, only one authority. In some dictionaries, accordingly
it was omitted; and in others stigmatized as a barbarism. It has now
obtained a permanent establishment, and is justly admitted by every
lexicographer.
“In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;
Alike fantastic, if too new or old:
Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”
_Pope’s Essay on Criticism._
In short, in this, as in every other question on this subject,
perspicuity should be our guide. If the subject be art or science,
or if the composition be intended for literary men, then a greater
latitude may be allowed, as the reader is supposed to be master
of the language, in all its varieties. But if the subject be
accommodated to common capacity, and the composition designed for
ordinary readers, the rule now given, not to employ a word, which
has been disused for a period greater than the age of man, will be
deemed, I conceive, rational and necessary.
The usage, then, which gives law to language, and which is generally
denominated “good usage,” must be _reputable_, _national_, and
_present_. It happens, however, that “good usage” is not always
uniform in her decisions, and that unquestionable authorities are
found for different modes of expression. In such cases, the following
canons, proposed by the same author, will be of considerable service,
in enabling the reader to decide, to which phraseology the preference
is due. These canons I shall give, nearly in the words of the author;
and illustrate them, as I proceed, by a few apposite examples, partly
his, and partly my own.
CANON I.--When the usage is divided, as to any particular words
or phrases, and when one of the expressions is susceptible of a
different meaning, while the other admits only one signification, the
expression, which is strictly univocal, should be preferred.
For this reason, _aught_[135], for “anything,” is better than
_ought_; _scarcely_, as an adverb, better than _scarce_; _by
consequence_ is preferable to _of consequence_, which signifies also
“of importance;” and _exceedingly_, as an adverb, is preferable to
_exceeding_.
For the same reason, _to purpose_, for “to intend,” is better than
_to propose_, which signifies also “to lay before,” or “submit to
consideration;” and _proposal_, for “a thing offered or proposed,”
is better than “proposition,” which denotes also “a position,”
or the “affirmation of any principle or maxim.” Thus we say, “he
demonstrated Euclid’s _proposition_,” and “he rejected the _proposal_
of his friend.”
Agreeably also to this canon, _disposal_, in common language, when a
grant, or giving away is denoted, or when the management of anything
is to be expressed, is preferable to _disposition_, which signifies
also _arrangement_, and likewise _temper of mind_; and _exposure_,
as the verbal noun from _expose_, is better than _exposition_, the
verbal noun of _expound_. We should say, “the exposure of a fault,”
and “the exposition of a text.” The analogous words _composure_,
from _compose_, and _composition_, from _compound_, or _compose_,
have been suffered to retain their distinct significations.
“To speak _contemptuously_ of a person,” is better than “to
speak _contemptibly_;” the latter term meaning generally, “in a
contemptible manner,” or, “in a manner worthy of contempt;” whereas
the former is univocal, and denotes _disrespectfully_, or “in a
manner significant of contempt.”
For the same reason, _obvious_, for “evident,” is better than
_apparent_, which means also “seeming,” as opposed to “real.”
The term _primitive_, as equivalent to _original_, is preferable
to _primary_. The latter is synonymous with _principal_, and is
opposed to _secondary_; the former is equivalent to _original_,
and is opposed to _derivative_ or _acquired_. I shall illustrate
this distinction by a few examples. The words _falsehood_ and _lie_
agree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, “contrariety to
fact;” but they differ in their secondary ideas, the former implying
simply, “inconsistency with physical truth,” the latter being a term
of reproach, expressing “a wilful breach of veracity, or of moral
truth.” _To kill_, and _to murder_, agree also in their primary
ideas, both denoting “the deprivation of life;” but they differ
in their secondary, the former implying no moral turpitude, the
latter denoting an immoral act. From these examples it will appear,
that _primary_ denotes “what is principal or chief,” as opposed to
“secondary,” or “subordinate.”
_Primitive_ is equivalent to _original_; thus we say, the _primitive_
meaning of the word _villain_, was “a nearer tenant to the lord of
the manor;” custom has altered its signification, and it now denotes
“a wicked fellow.” Thus the _primary_ and the _primitive_ meaning of
words may be very different; these terms, therefore, ought to be duly
discriminated.
_Intension_, for “the act of stretching or straining,” is for
the same reason, preferable to _intention_, which signifies also
“purpose,” or “design.” “I am mistaken,” is frequently used to denote
“I misunderstand,” or “I am in error;” but as this expression may
also signify, “I am misunderstood,” it is better to say, “I mistake.”
This canon I would earnestly recommend to the observance of every
writer, who is solicitous to exclude all unnecessary ambiguity, but
more emphatically to my junior readers, who are peculiarly prone to
the violation of this rule, misled by false notions of elegance and
dignity. There prevails at present a foolish and ridiculous, not to
say absurd, disposition in some writers, to prefer in every instance,
with no discrimination, long to short words. They seem to entertain
an inveterate antipathy to monosyllabic terms; and disdaining
whatever savours of Saxon origin, are incessantly searching after the
_sesquipedalia verba_ of Greek or Latin extraction, with no regard
whatever to precision and perspicuity. Thus many words, which cannot
be dismissed without detriment to the language, are falling into
disuse, and their places supplied by equivocal and less appropriate
terms.
CANON II.--In doubtful cases analogy should be regarded.
For this reason, _contemporary_ is better than _cotemporary_,
_con_ being used before a consonant, and _co_ before a vowel; as,
_concomitant_, _coeval_.
For the same reason, “_he needs_,” “_he dares_,” “_whether he will
or not_,” are better than “_he need_,” “_he dare_,” “_whether he
will or no_.” The last of the three phraseologies, here recommended,
Priestley thinks exceptionable. To me, as to Campbell, the ellipsis
appears evident; thus, “whether he will, or will not:” hence “will
not” seems the only analogical expression.
CANON III.--When expressions are in other respects equal, that should
be preferred, which is most agreeable to the ear. This requires no
illustration.
CANON IV.--When none of the preceding rules take place, regard should
be had to simplicity. On this ground, “accept,” “approve,” “admit,”
are preferable to “accept of,” “approve of,” “admit of.”
I have already observed, that no expression, or mode of speech,
can be justified, which is not sanctioned by usage. The converse,
however, does not follow, that every phraseology, sanctioned by
usage, should be retained; and, in such cases, custom may properly
be checked by criticism, whose province it is, not only to
remonstrate against the introduction of any word or phraseology,
which may be either unnecessary or contrary to analogy, but also
to extrude whatever is reprehensible, though in general use. It is
by this exercise of her prerogative, that languages are gradually
refined and improved; and were this denied, language would soon
become stationary, or more probably would hasten to decline. In
exercising this authority, she cannot pretend to degrade instantly
any phraseology, which she may deem objectionable; but she may,
by repeated remonstrances, gradually effect its dismission. Her
decisions in such cases may be properly regulated by the following
canons, as delivered by the same author.
CANON I.--All words and phrases, particularly harsh, and not
absolutely necessary, should be dismissed; as, “shamefacedness,”
“unsuccessfulness,” “wrongheadedness.”
CANON II.--When the etymology plainly points to a different
signification from what the word bears, propriety and simplicity
require its dismission. For example, the word “beholden,” taken for
“obliged,” or the verb “to unloose,” for “to loose,” or “untie,”
should be rejected.
CANON III.--When words become obsolete, or are never used, but in
particular phrases, they should be repudiated; as they give the style
an air of vulgarity and cant, when their general disuse renders them
obscure. Of these “lief,” “dint,” “whit,” “moot,” “pro and con,”
furnish examples; as, “I had as lief go,” “by dint of argument,” “not
a whit better,” “a moot point,” “it was argued pro and con.” These
phraseologies are vulgar, and savour too much of cant to be admitted
in good writing.
CANON IV.--All words and phrases, which, analyzed grammatically,
include a solecism, should be dismissed; as, “I had rather go.”
The expression should be, “I would,” or “I’d rather go:” and from
the latter, the solecism “I had go,” seems by mistake to have
arisen, _I’d_ being erroneously conceived to be contracted for _I
had_, instead of a contraction for _I would_. This is the opinion
of Campbell, and to this opinion I expressed my assent, in the
former edition of this Treatise. I acknowledge, however, that it
now appears to me not strictly correct; and that Webster has not
questioned its accuracy on insufficient grounds. In the phrases
adduced by Campbell, such as “I’d go,” “I’d rather stay,” we can
readily perceive the probability that _I’d_ is a contraction for “I
would.” But in such expressions as “I had like to have been caught,”
which occur not only in colloquial language, but also in authors of
considerable name, it is impossible to admit Campbell’s explanation.
I must observe also, that the phraseology, which he censures, occurs
in some of our earliest writers, and is so frequently found in
Pope and Swift, that one is tempted to infer, notwithstanding its
solecistic appearance, that it is genuine English. It is difficult,
however, nay, perhaps impossible, to reconcile it to analogy. Were I
to offer conjecture on the subject, I should be inclined to say, that
in such phrases as “I had go,” _I had_ is, by a grammatical figure
very common in English, put for _I would have_, or _I would possess_,
and that the simple name of the act or state, by an ellipsis perhaps
of the verbal sign, is subjoined, as the object wished, no regard
being had to the completion of the action; in the same manner as we
say, I would have _gone_, when we wish the action perfected. But
by whatever authority this phraseology may be recommended, and in
whatever way it may be reconciled to the rules of syntax, it has
so much the appearance of solecism, that I decidedly prefer with
Campbell the unexceptional form of expression, _I would_. The phrase
_I had like_ appears to me utterly irreconcilable with any principle
of analogy.
CANON V.--All expressions, which, according to the established rules
of the language, either have no meaning, or involve a contradiction,
or, according to the fair construction of the words, convey a meaning
different from the intention of the speaker, should be dismissed.
Thus, when a person says, “he sings a good song,” the words strictly
imply that “the song is good,” whereas the speaker means to say, “he
sings well.” In like manner, when it is said, “this is the best part
he acts,” the sentence, according to the strict interpretation of the
words, expresses an opinion, not of his manner of acting, but of the
part or character which he acts. It should be, “he acts this part
best,” or “this is the part which he acts best.” “He plays a good
fiddle,” for “he plays well on the fiddle,” is, for the same reason,
objectionable.
Of expressions involving a contradiction, the following will serve as
an example. “There were four ladies in company, every one prettier
than another.” This is impossible. If A was prettier than B, B
must have been less pretty than A; but by the expression every one
was prettier than another, therefore B was also prettier than A.
Such absurdities as this ought surely to be banished from every
language[136].
Of those, which have little or no meaning, Campbell has given us
examples, “currying favour,” “having a month’s mind,” “shooting
at rovers.” Such modes of expression, he justly calls trash, the
disgrace of any language.
These canons I have extracted from “Campbell on Rhetoric,” a book
which I would recommend to the reader’s attentive perusal.
I proceed to observe, that to write any language with grammatical
purity, implies these three things:
1st. That the words be all of that language.
2ndly. That they be construed and arranged, according to the rules of
syntax in that language.
3rdly. That they be employed in that sense, which usage has annexed
to them.
Grammatical purity, therefore, may be violated in three ways:
1st. The words may not be English. This error is called barbarism.
2ndly. Their construction may be contrary to the English idiom. This
error is termed solecism.
3rdly. They may be used in a sense different from their established
acceptation. This error is named impropriety[137].
The barbarism is an offence against lexicography, by admitting new
words, as, “volupty,” “connexity,” “majestatic;” or by using obsolete
words, as, “uneath,” “erst;” or an offence against etymology, by
improper inflection, as, “teached” for “taught,” “oxes” for “oxen.”
The solecism is an offence against the rules of syntax, as, “I
reads,” “you was.”
The impropriety is an offence against lexicography, by mistaking the
meaning of words or phrases.
A solecism is regarded by grammarians as a much greater offence than
either of the others; because it betrays a greater ignorance of the
principles of the language. Rhetorically considered, it is deemed
a less trespass; for the rhetorician and grammarian estimate the
magnitude of errors by different standards; the former inquiring
only how far any error militates against the great purpose of his
art--persuasion; the latter, how far it betrays an ignorance of
the principles of grammar. Hence with the former, obscurity is the
greatest trespass; with the latter, solecism, and that species of
barbarism which violates the rules of etymology[138].
CHAPTER II.
CRITICAL REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.
Having, in the preceding chapter, explained the nature of that usage
which gives law to language; and having proposed a few rules for the
student’s direction in cases where usage is divided, and also where
her authority may be justly questioned and checked by criticism; I
intend, in the following pages, to present the young reader with a
copious exemplification of the three general species of error against
grammatical purity, arranging the examples in the order of the parts
of speech.
SECTION I.
THE NOUN.
BARBARISM.
“I rode in a one-horse chay.” It ought to be “a one-horse chaise.”
There is no such word as _chay_.
“That this has been the true and proper acception of this word, I
shall testify by one evidence.”--_Hammond._ _Acception_ is obsolete;
it ought to be _acceptation_.
“Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same
kind, not to accept of a certain wage.”--_Wealth of Nations._ _Wage_
is obsolete; the plural only is used.
“Their alliance was sealed by the nuptial of Henry, with the daughter
of the Italian prince.”--_Gibbon._ _Nuptial_ has not, I believe, been
used as a substantive since the days of Shakspeare, and may be deemed
obsolete. The plural _nuptials_ is the proper word.
“He showed that he had a full comprehension of the whole of
the plan, and of the judicious adaption of the parts to the
whole.”--_Sheridan’s Life of Swift._ _Adaption_ is obsolescent,
if not obsolete: _adaptation_ is the proper term. _Adaption_ is
frequently employed by Swift, from whom Sheridan seems to have copied
it.
... “Which even his brother modernists themselves, like ungrates,
whisper so loud that it reaches up to the very garret I am now
writing in.”--_Swift._ “Ungrate” is a barbarism. “Ingrate” is to be
found in some of our English poets as an adjective, and synonymous
with “ungrateful;” but “ungrate,” as a substantive, is truly
barbarous. Almost equally objectionable is Steele’s use of _stupid_
as a substantive plural. “Thou art no longer to drudge in raising the
mirth of stupids.”--_Spectator_, No. 468. And also of _ignorant_,
“the ignorants of the lowest order.”--_Ibid._
Pope also says, in one of his letters, “We are curious impertinents
in the case of futurity.” This employment of the adjective as a noun
substantive, though never sanctioned by general use, is now properly
avoided by our most reputable writers. It tends to confusion, where
distinction is necessary.
“The Deity dwelleth between the cherubims.” The Hebrews form the
plural of masculines by adding _im_; “cherubims,” therefore, is a
double plural. “Seraphims,” for the same reason, is faulty. The
singular of these words being “cherub” and “seraph,” the plural is
either “cherubs” and “seraphs,” or “cherubim” and “seraphim.” Milton
has uniformly avoided this mistake, which circumstance Addison, in
his criticisms on that author, has overlooked; nay, he has, even
with Milton’s correct usage before him, committed the error. “The
zeal of the _seraphim_,” says he, “breaks forth in a becoming warmth
of sentiments and expressions, as the character which is given of
_him_,” &c. Here “seraphim,” a plural noun, is used as singular. It
should be, “the zeal of the seraph.”
“Nothing can be more pleasant than to see virtuosoes about a cabinet
of medals descanting upon the value, the rarity, and authenticalness
of the several pieces.” _Authenticalness_, though used by Addison,
is obsolescent, and may, perhaps, be deemed a barbarism. It may be
properly dismissed, as a harsh and unnecessary term.
“He broke off with Lady Gifford, one of his oldest acquaintances
in life.”--_Sheridan’s Life of Swift._ _Acquaintances_ is now
deemed a Scotticism, being almost peculiar to the northern
parts of the island. Johnson, however, did not disclaim it. “A
young student from the inns of court, who has often attacked
the curate of his father’s parish, with such arguments as his
acquaintances could furnish.”--_Rambler._ We find it also in Steele;
thus, “she pays everybody their own, and yet makes daily new
acquaintances.”--_Tatler_, No. 109.
“I am sure that the farmeress at Bevis would feel emotions of
vanity ... if she knew you gave her the character of a reasonable
woman.”--_Lord Peterborough to Pope._ This, I believe, is the only
passage in which _farmeress_ is to be found; but, though it may
therefore be pronounced a barbarism, the author could not have
expressed himself so clearly and so concisely, in any other way. We
every now and then, as Johnson observes, feel the want of a feminine
termination.
“The bellowses were broken.” The noun, as here inflected, is
barbarous. “Bellows” is a plural word denoting a single instrument,
though consisting of two parts. There is, therefore, no such word as
“bellowses.”
SOLECISM[139].
“I have read Horace Art of Poetry.” This expression may be deemed
solecistical, being a violation of that rule, by which one
substantive governs another in the genitive. It should be, “Horace’s
Art of Poetry.” “These are ladies ruffles,” “this is the kings
picture,” are errors of the same kind, for “ladies’ ruffles,” “the
king’s picture.”
“These three great genius’s flourished at the same time.” Here
“genius’s,” the genitive singular, is improperly used for “geniuses,”
the nominative plural.
“They have of late, ’tis true, reformed, in some measure, the gouty
joints and darning work of _whereunto’s_, _whereby’s_, _thereof’s_,
_therewith’s_, and the rest of this kind.”--_Shaftesbury._ Here
also the genitive singular is improperly used for the objective
case plural. It should be, _whereuntos_, _wherebys_, _thereofs_,
_therewiths_.
“Both those people, acute and inquisitive to excess, corrupted the
sciences.”--_Adams’s History of England._
“Two rival peoples, the Jews and the Samaritans, have preserved
separate exemplars of it.”--_Geddes’ Preface to his Translation of
the Bible._ The former of these passages involves a palpable error,
the word “people,” here equivalent to _nation_, and in the singular
number, being joined with _both_ or “the two,” a term of plurality.
In the latter, this error is avoided, the noun being employed in
the plural number. This usage, however, though sanctioned by the
authority of our translators of the Bible in two passages, seems
now to be obsolete. _States_, _tribes_, _nations_, appear to be
preferable.
“I bought a scissars,” “I want a tongs,” “it is a tattered colours,”
involve a palpable solecism, the term significant of unity being
joined with a plural word. It should be “a pair of scissars,” “a pair
of tongs,” “a pair of colours.”
“They tell us, that the fashion of jumbling fifty things together
in a dish was at first introduced, in compliance to a depraved and
debauched appetite.”--_Swift._