THE SUBMARINE IN ACTION
Once, and only once, has a submarine boat succeeded in inflicting any
damage on an enemy in actual warfare. This was during the American Civil
War when one of the Confederate _Davids_ succeeded in blowing up the
Federal frigate _Housatonic_, and in annihilating itself at the same
time.
Before this event under-water vessels had attempted to destroy hostile
craft, but with no success.
In 1776 Bushnell’s diving torpedo-boat made an attack on the English
frigate _Eagle_, and in 1777 on the English man-of-war _Cerberus_ and
other vessels. Although it failed to inflict any injury on a single
vessel, three of the crew of a prize schooner astern of the _Cerberus_,
hauling one of Bushnell’s drifting torpedoes on board, were killed by
the explosion.
In 1801 Fulton attempted to destroy one of the English Channel Fleet off
Boulogne by means of his drifting torpedoes, but owing to the ship
altering her position at the moment of setting the torpedo adrift, the
attack failed. In 1804–5, Fulton, who had now joined the British forces,
attacked some of the French ships, but the torpedoes exploded
harmlessly. From the death of Fulton to the commencement of the American
Civil War, numerous inventive minds built or projected submarine craft
of all shapes and sizes, but none of these ever participated in an
actual engagement.
The exploits of the diving torpedo-boats known by the generic name of
_David_, during the contest between the Federals and the Confederates,
have been fully described in Chapter XII., and there is therefore no
need to dwell further on this period in the history of under-water
warfare. Since then no submarine boat has ever been taken into battle,
although during the Spanish-American war Spain might have used the
_Peral_, and the United States the _Holland_. In mimic warfare
submarines have played their part, and although no very definite
conclusions respecting their possible value in time of war can be drawn
from their performances in peace manœuvres, still it may not be
unprofitable briefly to note the various occasions on which some of the
new submarine torpedo-boats have been used.
The first of these occasions was in September, 1900, during the
manœuvres of the U.S. North Atlantic Squadron off Newport, Rhode Island,
when the _Holland_ made an attack upon the fleet by herself, without
convoy, at a distance of seven miles out from the mouth of the harbour,
and, with her own crew alone in her, torpedoed the flagship of the
squadron, the _Kearsarge_, commanded by Capt. Wm. M. Folger. Lieut.
Caldwell, who commanded the _Holland_ on this occasion, wrote regarding
the incident:—
“The _Holland_ was not seen by any vessel of the blockading fleet or
torpedo-boat, although she was within torpedo range of three of the
former and several of the latter. I consider the attack was a success
because the _Holland_ could in all probability have torpedoed three
blockading vessels without being discovered.”
It must be added that Admiral O’Neil, who has but a poor opinion of the
value of submarines in war, has written as follows: “.... On September
25, 1900, during some manœuvres of the North Atlantic Fleet off Newport,
Rhode Island, the _Holland_, on a very fine evening and under
exceptionally favourable circumstances, steamed seven miles as a surface
boat only outside Newport harbour, and like the torpedo-boat _Porter_,
claims to have put the battleship _Kearsarge_ out of action, which was
not allowed by the umpire, as it was decided that the _Kearsarge_ had
already been put out of action by the torpedo-boat _Dahlgren_.”
Since this exploit of the _Holland_, no American submarine has taken
part in manœuvres with the fleet.
FRENCH SUBMARINES.
From 1898 onwards French under-water vessels have often engaged in mimic
warfare, and many of the French papers have published glowing accounts
of their wonderful performances, but one has to accept such statements
with caution. In the following story of their doings care has been taken
so far as possible to represent what really took place.
[Illustration:
THE SUBMARINE IN ACTION.
]
The torpedoing of the _Magenta_ in December, 1898, by the _Gustave Zédé_
is a famous chapter in the history of French submarines, and one of
which all Frenchmen are naturally proud.
M. Lockroy in his book “La Défense Navale” has recorded the incident.
The manœuvre commenced at 3.17 in the afternoon, and the torpedo was
fired at 3.28. The _Gustave Zédé_ plunged at 3.20 for the first time;
she emerged five times, and the longest appearance was 1 min. 30 secs.,
the shortest 30 secs.
The three cruisers, _Magenta_, _Neptune_, and _Marceau_, knew the exact
moment when the attack would take place, and also the exact position of
the _Gustave Zédé_, yet though they trained their quick-firing guns upon
the submarine, the judges decided that she would not have been hit.
M. Lockroy says that if the boat had carried her optical arrangements
she would not have needed to come to the surface.
“The eyes of all on board were fixed on the sea; officers and men
stood watching the crest of the waves, and every minute there were
exclamations, or some one fancied he had seen the submarine. We
imagined we saw it everywhere, and it was nowhere.
“In point of fact it was proceeding quietly and invisibly towards
its mark.
“Suddenly a precise and exact observation was made. The cupola of
the _Gustave Zédé_ had just appeared 400 yards away, still abreast
of us, notwithstanding the distance which we had covered.
“Immediately orders were issued. The guns were brought to bear upon
her, and the quick-firers depressed in her direction. The submarine
was no longer there. She was hidden from our fire and from our view.
A minute elapsed. Though orders were given to the engineers to put
on steam, and the _Magenta_ had gone some considerable distance in
the sixty seconds, the Admiral and I, leaning over the railing of
the bridge, saw approaching us with lightning speed an elongated
body shining like gold.
“It was the torpedo of the _Gustave Zédé_! It struck the ship about
four yards below the water-line, and was smashed on the iron armour,
but if it had been charged the _Magenta_ would have been sunk.”
The _Majenta_ was twice successfully torpedoed, once while at anchor and
once whilst steaming at ten knots, and the _Gustave Zédé_ showed that it
was quite possible for a submarine to discharge torpedoes below the
water without having its equilibrium disturbed.
To accomplish the second of these feats the vessel came five times to
the surface to take bearings, but on no occasion was her conning tower
in view for more than 1½ minutes. The last time just before discharging
her torpedo the conning tower was only seen for 30 seconds. The torpedo
struck the battleship on the port side just forward of the bow barbette.
After her trial the submarine proceeded unaided from Toulon to
Marseilles, a distance of 41 miles in a rough sea at 6 knots, thus
showing her sea-going qualities.
When Englishmen took up their morning papers on July 5, 1901, there met
the gaze such headings as “Submarine’s great feat;” “How the _Gustave
Zédé_ torpedoed a big battleship;” “New Naval Warfare;” “French Navy the
most powerful in the world.”
The Paris correspondent of the _Daily Express_ sent the following
telegram to his journal:—
“The feat performed in Ajaccio Harbour by the submarine _Gustave
Zédé_ in hitting the great battleship _Jauréguiberry_ with a dummy
torpedo without her approach being even suspected, has produced a
deep impression in naval circles. That the act was a brilliant piece
of seamanship and gunnery tactics now admits of no question, though
full details are not yet forthcoming. The facts, according to the
concurring testimony of the Paris journals, are shortly these: The
Mediterranean division of Admiral Gervais’ great fleet, which is
under Admiral de Maigret, and has its headquarters at Algiers, had
put into Ajaccio to provision, and yesterday morning steamed from
the harbour in three lines, the torpedo-boat flotilla leading, then
the cruisers, and the two battleships _Charles Martel_ and the
_Jauréguiberry_ in rear. All the other ships had got well under way,
and the _Jauréguiberry_ had just moved from her moorings, when she
was struck by a dummy torpedo by an invisible enemy. Instantly the
quick-firing machine guns were set to sweep the sea, and signals
sent the torpedo flotilla scouring in all directions to search for
the mysterious foe. The chase being quite fruitless, the division
finally steamed away, and then, the coast being clear, there popped
up to the surface, like a dark spectre from the nether world, the
submarine _Gustave Zédé_. Vice-Admiral Menard, who commands the
Northern Squadron, with headquarters at Toulon, hearing that his
adversary was provisioning at Ajaccio, had despatched the submarine
from Toulon on Tuesday night on the mission which was to put the
efficacy of submarines in practical warfare to a supreme test. The
sequel shows that she had accomplished her voyage, taken her
observations, gone under water, and after allowing the whole
division to pass, had struck with unerring aim, and with complete
success, at the most formidable vessel in it. This perfect mastery
of the position shown by the submarine constitutes the most striking
part of the achievement, which can only be minimised by assuming on
the part of the Mediterranean squadron a degree of carelessness
difficult to understand, considering that the order had been given
to act in all things as in real war. After every deduction has been
made, however, there is no disputing the fact that the submarine has
proved its tremendous possibilities in warfare. In consequence of
this success of the _Gustave Zédé_ the French are suffering from a
bad attack of naval fever. Some would call it ‘tête montée.’ ‘Where
is Britain’s naval supremacy now?’ is a question which was often
asked to-day. ‘C’est magnifique!’ say the papers, describing
France’s submarine fleet. ‘By reason of her submarine division the
navy of France is the most dread and powerful in the world.’”
The enthusiasm of the French was somewhat lessened by the subsequent
accounts of the exploits of the submarine. It appeared that it was the
battleship _Charles Martel_ which received the _Gustave Zédé’s_ torpedo,
and that the latter, after her feat, crossed the bows of the
_Jauréguiberry_ so closely that the last named had to turn in her whole
length to avoid colliding with the submarine, which in war would have
been destroyed. It was also stated that the success of the _Gustave
Zédé_ was considerably minimised by the fact that Ajaccio was an
“inviolate” port and that the enemy had no necessity to keep a sharp
look-out when they knew themselves to be in absolute security, that the
_Gustave Zédé_ belonged to the same side as her “victim,” and that the
manœuvres did not commence officially until Wednesday night, whereas the
incident in question took place on Wednesday morning.
Certain cynical folk declared that the whole business was a
stage-managed affair designed to gratify the popular affection the
French had for the submarine, and to justify the naval department which
had exploited the engine of war. The majority of the French papers,
however, made the most of the _Gustave Zédé’s_ “splendid
accomplishment,” and seemed to imagine that the British Admiralty were
terror-stricken at the notion of what French submarines would be able to
accomplish in war.
The _Patrie_ published an interview a correspondent had at Toulon with
Lieutenant Jobart, who was in command of the _Gustave Zédé_. The officer
stated that the enemy were perfectly well aware of the departure of the
_Gustave Zédé_ from Toulon in tow of the tug _Utile_. As Ajaccio was
neared, Lieutenant Jobart dismissed the _Utile_, and lay on the surface
of the ocean waiting for the appearance of the enemy. He soon saw two
cruisers leave their anchorage, and he sank his vessel until they had
passed out of sight. On coming again to the surface, he saw that the
battleships were still at anchor, so he crept nearer, only sinking when
he saw the big vessels moving, and after he had taken his bearings for
an attack on the _Charles Martel_, and when the battleship passed over
the _Gustave Zédé_, the torpedo was fired which struck the vessel, and
thus warned the Fleet that a submarine was in the harbour. The
lieutenant asserts that none of the look-out men on the warship observed
him, but when the torpedo had been fired he rose to the surface,
whereupon two shots were fired from the Fleet, and he sank at once,
remaining below the surface until the last vessel of the Fleet was out
of the harbour, and the submarine was beyond range. The _Journal_ stated
that Admiral Gervais had indirectly warned the squadron of the
participation of the _Gustave Zédé_ by recommending it to act as if
threatened by an attack of submarines.
The Paris correspondent of the _Times_ wrote as follows:—
“What will be the result of these exercises it is impossible at
present to foresee, but meanwhile an event of singular, and one
might even add, of grave suggestiveness has occurred—of a character,
indeed, which may render these manœuvres historic. I refer to an
exploit of the _Gustave Zédé_, which suddenly turned up in the port
of Ajaccio, unheralded but safe and sound, and so completely in
fighting trim, in spite of the long voyage from Toulon, that she
dared even to torpedo the battleship _Jauréguiberry_ as the latter
was leaving her moorings. The unexpected arrival of the submarine
created consternation. She had passed nearly the whole day at sea
out of sight of land. She left Toulon in company with a tug, and may
for a time have utilised the assistance thus furnished in order to
economise her store of electricity. But she arrived, at all events,
quite alone at Ajaccio with enough electricity at her disposal to
torpedo one of the enemy’s vessels, escaped from the torpedo-boats
which she surprised in her daring exploit, and again disappearing
below the surface, returned without being detected to port. She
entered the bay of Ajaccio completely submerged, sighted by none of
the signal-stations, and was thus able to traverse the entire line
of war vessels in the bay. This feat is regarded as conclusive as to
the practical utility of the French submarine. It sets one
speculating on the revolution which the invention of these submarine
craft may, after all, make in naval warfare, in spite of incredulous
over-Channel critics.”
The _Temps_ somewhat detracts from the glory of the performance by
pointing out that the _Gustave Zédé_ was towed most of the way from
Toulon, but added that there could be no two opinions as to the value of
the subsequent success. The fleet had no suspicion of what had happened
until the _Jauréguiberry_ was struck by the torpedo. Even then it was a
mystery, as the destroyers dashed hither and thither, seeking in vain
for the hidden foe. When they had returned, baffled and perplexed, the
submarine rose to the surface and steamed slowly alongside the great
battleship, whose crew lined the sides and cheered with wild enthusiasm
at the brilliant achievement which had vindicated the glory of the
unconquerable submarine.
With regard to the tug which accompanied the _Gustave Zédé_, it was
stated that she was sent with the submarine as an additional precaution,
in order that she might be assured of help in case of accident, but the
_Gustave Zédé_ could have reached Ajaccio by her own motor-power. She
accomplished the voyage, moreover, in a sea with waves nine to twelve
feet high, but notwithstanding the rough passage, her rolling was
comparatively slight.
Those who had been most insistent in arguing the value of submarine
warships declared that the torpedoing of the _Charles Martel_ proved
that instead of simply serving to defend the coast, a submarine could
put to sea and assail the coasts of an enemy.
After her “brilliant exploit” the _Gustave Zédé_ left Ajaccio at 6
o’clock one evening, and arrived at Toulon at 11 o’clock the following
morning, her speed averaging 8 knots.
A _Petit Journal_ correspondent at Marseilles said:—
“I mentioned this morning that the _Gustave Zédé_ had arrived at 11
o’clock in the old port while still under warfare. I should like to
call attention to the feat accomplished by this little boat. The
_Gustave Zédé_ had not been perceived by any of the coast signal
stations, although the sea was calm, and the pilot steamer the
_Sentinelle_ went out to meet the tug _Utile_ without suspecting
that the submarine was immersed near at hand, navigating under
water. Its presence was shown above water only by the tiny tricolour
flag, the size of a sheet of paper, just above the surface. The
_Gustave Zédé_ entered the port and was moored at the quay among the
other vessels without its presence being detected, save by reason of
the little flag. This shows what service this submarine can render
in time of war, and how natural and patriotic is the interest taken
in it.”
On July 27, 1901, during a sham fight at Toulon, the _Gustave Zédé_ was
reported to have approached the _Bouvet_, on which were MM.
Waldeck-Rousseau and De Lanessan, unseen, and to have fired a torpedo at
the battleship whilst the Ministers and the Admiral were peacefully
eating their dinners.
Commenting on this “feat,” a correspondent of the _Matin_ said:—
“About 5 o’clock in the evening the fleet arrived at the entrance to
the Salins d’Hyères. The _Gustave Zédé_, which was lying under the
shelter of one of the islands which close the Roads, at once got
under way, and from the bridge of the _Bouvet_, M. Waldeck-Rousseau
could see it plunge, and then make its way beneath the surface
straight for the _Bouvet_, without deviating once.
“When about three hundred yards off, the _Gustave Zédé_ launched a
torpedo, which came towards the flagship in an absolutely straight
line, showing that its course had been as admirably directed as it
had been aimed. The _Bouvet_ was struck on the starboard beam, three
yards below the water-line. All those who were on the bridge saw the
torpedo strike the hull, and they even heard the sound caused by the
shock, and felt the slight trepidation usual in such cases, for it
needs very little to cause vibration on board ships constructed
entirely of steel.
“What is curious is that the torpedo, probably on account of its
velocity, immediately after striking the _Bouvet_, glanced forward
and was lost to sight. Thrown out of order by the sudden shock, it
must have sunk to the bottom, for it has never been found.”
M. Waldeck-Rousseau subsequently went on board the _Gustave Zédé_, and
after spending three-quarters of an hour on her he went away “in an
enthusiastic frame of mind.”
M. Camille Pelletan, reporter of the Budget of the Ministry of Marine,
said:—
“That a submarine should plunge beneath the surface of the water,
and that it should then be able to discharge a torpedo, does not
prove very much. There is no vessel of this description, however
indifferent it may be, which does not accomplish as much. The whole
question is to know its navigable sea-going and manœuvring
qualities. If the _Gustave Zédé_, therefore, in or near a harbour,
torpedoed an ironclad, that, I repeat, proves nothing. The
unfortunate thing is that it does not appear to have accomplished
even that on the occasion referred to, for all efforts to find the
torpedo have failed, and it is thus permissible to suppose that it
missed its mark. I do not think that M. Waldeck-Rousseau could have
seen the submarine effect its submersion and make for the _Bouvet_.
The foremost quality of a submarine—its special guarantee of
security—is that of being invisible. The _Gustave Zédé_ will
speedily have to be laid up if she betrays her presence so clumsily,
but I have not much difficulty in reassuring myself. At the most,
the _Gustave Zédé_ could only have been seen when, instead of the
vessel being nine feet below the surface, her optic tube, and
probably even her cupola, were emerging above the water, an
operation which is necessary for the discharge of the torpedo in the
desired direction.”
In July, 1901, the _Morse_ made an attempt to torpedo the coast-defence
ship _Jocyte_. According to one report the _Morse_ was ordered to sail
from Cherbourg to Havre, and go for the gunboat _Coeyte_, which would be
found moored in the Roads. Reaching Havre at night-time, the _Morse_,
while still an hour’s run out, plunged, and continuing her voyage at
eight knots an hour, approached the _Coeyte_ unperceived, and launched
three torpedoes against, her with success. The _Morse_ then came to the
surface, and was recognised by Admiral Fournier, who was on board the
_Coeyte_. A feature of this particular experiment was the long
preliminary voyage made by the submarine. Reuter, however, sent the
following message relating to the same experiment: “The attempt made by
the submarine _Morse_ last night to torpedo the coast-defence ship
_Jocyte_ (_sic_) did not succeed, owing to the state of the sea, but the
manœuvre gave certain results as showing the ability of the submarine to
approach without detection. The swell prevented any torpedo from being
fired.” A Dalziel message is still more emphatic as to the failure. It
states that the gunboat knew long enough ahead of the approach of the
submarine to repel the attack. No torpedo could be discharged because of
the swell.
In December, 1901, the _Narval_ and _Morse_ defended Cherbourg from an
attack by the coast-defence ships _Bouvines_ and _Valmy_, and torpedoed
these vessels, those on board not being aware of the presence of the
submarines until they rose to the surface.
During some manœuvres at Cherbourg in January, 1902, the two guardships
_Bouvines_ and _Tréhouart_, and the torpedo-boat destroyer _Cassini_
were attacked by the five submarines, _Morse_, _Narval_, _Triton_,
_Espadon_ and _Français_.
The _Bouvines_ was hit at 100 yards by a torpedo fired from the _Morse_,
which steered by periscope without showing above the surface; the
_Tréhouart_ was attacked by the _Triton_ and the _Espadon_; the former
came to the surface as a fishing boat got in her way, and she was put
out of action; the latter fired a torpedo, which hit the _Tréhouart_.
The _Cassini_ evaded the _Morse_, but passed within range of the
_Français_, and was torpedoed by her.
Thus of the five submarines one was put out of action, whilst all three
warships were destroyed.
In March, 1902, combined manœuvres of the coast-defence ships _Valmy_
and _Jemmapes_, and the submarines _Algerien_ and _Français_, took
place; the _Algerien_ was able unperceived to torpedo the _Valmy_, while
the _Français_ succeeded in directing a torpedo at the _Jemmapes_. In
May, 1902, the _Gustave Zédé_ in an experimental attack on the
battleship _Jauréguiberry_ off Hyères grounded, but was subsequently
refloated.