CHAPTER IX.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY THE LAW OF

NATURE.

_Sect._ 1. What our opposites have alleged for the ceremonies, either from

the law of God, or the law of man, we have hitherto answered; but we heard

the law of nature also alleged(1131) for holidays, and for kneeling at the

communion. And when Hooker(1132) goeth about to commend and defend such

visible signs, “which, being used in performance of holy actions, are

undoubtedly most effectual to open such matter, as men, when they know and

remember carefully, must needs be a great deal the better informed to what

effect such duties serve,” he subjoineth: “We must not think but that

there is some ground of reason even in nature,” &c. This is a smoke to

blind the eyes of the unlearned. Our opposites have taken no pains nor

travail to make us see any deduction of those ceremonies from the law of

nature: we desire proofs, not words. In the meanwhile, for giving further

evidence to the truth, we will express our own mind touching things

warranted by the law of nature.

_Sect._ 2. And, first, we must understand aright what is meant by the law

of nature: to wit, that law which God writeth and imprinteth in the nature

of man,(1133) so that it is as it were co-natural and born together with

man. Now, if we consider what law was written in the nature of man in his

first creation, it was no other than the decalogue, or the moral

law.(1134) But the law which we are here to inquire of is that law which,

after the fall, God still writeth in the heart of every man; which (we all

know) cometh far short, and wanteth much of that which was written in the

heart of man before his fall. That we may understand what this law of

nature is which is written in all men’s hearts since the fall, we must

distinguish _jus naturale_ from _jus divinum naturale_. For that law which

is simply called _jus naturale_ is _innatum_, and layeth before the minds

of men that way wherein, by the guidance and conduct of nature,(1135) they

may be led to that good which is, in the end, proportionate to nature;

whereas _jus divinum_ is _inspiratum_, and layeth before us another way,

wherein, by a supernatural guidance,(1136) we may be led to a supernatural

good, which is an end exceeding the proportion of nature. As for that part

of the law of God which is called _jus divinum naturale_, it is so called

in opposition to _jus divinum positivum_.

_Sect._ 3. _Jus naturale,_ saith Justinian,(1137) _est quod naturo omnia

animalia docuit_. This the lawyers take to be the law of nature, which

nature, by its sole instinct, teacheth as well to other living creatures

as to men; for nature teacheth all living creatures to save and preserve

their own being, to decline things hurtful, to seek things necessary for

their life, to procreate their like, to care for that which is procreated

by them, &c. The Archbishop of Spalato(1138) liketh to speak with the

lawyers. _Jus naturale_, saith he, _simpliciter ponitur in omnibus

animalibus. Videntur autem_, saith Joachinus Mynsingerus,(1139) _juris

consulti, valde in hoc abuti vocabulo juris, cum exemplae praedicta sint

potius affectus et inclinationes naturales, quae cum quibusque animantibus

enascuntur; quas philosophi_ στοργὰς φυσικὰς _appellant. In brutis enim

cum nulla sit ratio, igitur nec ullum jus esse potest._

Aquinas also showeth(1140) that beasts are not properly governed by the

law of nature, because _lex_ is _aliquid rationis_. Wherefore they err who

would make the law of nature to differ in kind from _jus gentium_, which

natural reason hath taught to all nations. For this law of nations _per se

speciem non facit_, as saith Mynsingerus.(1141) And the law of nature is

also, by the heathen writers, often called _jus gentium_, as Rosinus

noteth.(1142) If any will needs have the law of nature distinguished from

the law of nations, let them either take Aquinas’ distinction,(1143) who

maketh the law of nature to contain certain principles, having the same

place in practical reason which the principles of scientific

demonstrations have in speculative reason; and the law of nations to

contain certain conclusions drawn from the said principles: or, otherwise,

embrace the difference which is put betwixt those laws by Mattheus

Wesenbecius:(1144) _Quæ bestiæ naturali concitatione; ea_, saith he,

_homines ex eodem sensu ac affectione, cum moderatione tamen ratione si

faciunt, jure naturæ faciunt. Quæ bruta non faciunt, sed sola ratione

hominis propria, non affectione communis naturæ, omnes homines faciunt,

fierique opportere intelligunt hoc fit jure gentium._

_Sect._ 4. For my part, I take the law of nature and the law of nations to

be one and the same. For what is the law of nations but that which

nature’s light and reason hath taught so to all nations? Now this is no

other than the law of nature. We think, therefore, they have well

said,(1145) who comprehend under the law of nature both the common

principles of good and evil, virtue and vice, right and wrong, things

beseeming and things not beseeming, and likewise the general conclusions

which, by necessary consequences, are drawn from the said principles. To

come to the particulars, there are three sort of things which the law of

nature requireth of man, as both schoolmen(1146) and modern doctors(1147)

have rightly taught. The first, it requireth as he is _ens_; the second,

as he is _animal_; and the third, as he is _homo ratione præditus_. First,

As he is _ens_, the law of nature requireth him to seek the conservation

of his own being, and to shun or repel such things as may destroy the

same. For so hath nature framed not only all living creatures, but other

things also which are without life, that they seek their own conservation,

and flee (if they can) from apparent destruction. Let us take one example

out of subtle Scalliger,(1148) which is this: If a small quantity of oil

be poured upon a sound board, let a burning coal be put in the midst of

it, and the oil will quickly flee back from its enemy, and seek the

conservation of itself. This is, therefore, the first precept of the law

of nature, that man seek his own conservation, and avoid his own

destruction. Whereupon this conclusion necessarily followeth, that he may

repel violence with violence. Secondly, As man is a living creature, the

law of nature teacheth him to propagate and conserve his kind. Whereupon

these conclusions do follow, viz., the commixion of male and female, the

procreation of children, the educating of them, and providing for them.

This nature hath taught to man, as a thing common to him with other living

creatures.

_Sect._ 5. Thirdly, As a man is a creature endowed with reason, the law of

nature teacheth him, 1. Something concerning God; 2. Something concerning

his neighbour; 3. Something concerning himself. I mean some general

notions concerning good and evil, in respect of each of these; whereof the

Apostle meaneth whilst he saith that the Gentiles “show the work of the

law written in their hearts,” Rom. ii. 15. First, then, the law of nature

teacheth man to know that there is a God, and that this God is to be

worshipped; whereupon it followeth that man should seek to know God and

the manner of his worship. Now that which may be known of God is showed

even unto the Gentiles. The Apostle saith _signanter_, το λυωστὸν τοῦ

Θεοῦ, Rom. i. 19, meaning those few and small sparkles of the knowledge of

God which nature’s inbred light discovered unto the Gentiles, for making

them inexcusable, namely, that there is an eternal power and Godhead,

which men ought to reverence and to worship. 2. The law of nature teacheth

man to hold fast friendship and amity with his neighbours, forasmuch as he

is _animal sociale. Violare alterum_, saith Cicero, _naturae legae

prohibemur_.(1149) For the law of nature biddeth us do to others as we

would have others to do unto us, Luke vi. 31. And from these precepts it

followeth, that we should not offend other men; that we should keep

promises; stand to bargains; give to every man his own, &c. 3. As touching

a man’s self, the law of nature teacheth him that he should not live as a

reasonless creature, but that all his actions should be such as may be

congruous and beseeming for a creature endued with reason: Whereupon it

followeth, that he should live honestly and virtuously, that he should

observe order and decency in all his actions, &c. Hence the Apostle saith,

that nature itself teacheth that it is a shame for a man to have long

hair, 1 Cor. xi. 14, because it is repugnant to that decency and

comeliness which the law of nature requireth. For, among other

differences(1150) which nature hath put betwixt men and women, this is

one, that it hath given to women thicker and longer hair than to men, that

it might be as a veil, to adorn and cover them. The reason whereof nature

hath hid in the complexion of a woman, which is more humid than the

complexion of a man; so that, if a man should take him to this womanish

ornament, he should but against nature transform himself (in so far) into

a woman.

_Sect._ 6. These things being permitted, I will add four reasons to prove

that neither sacred significant ceremonies in general, nor kneeling,

holidays, &c., in particular, can be warranted unto us by the law of

nature. 1. The law of nature cannot direct us unto a supernatural end, as

is acknowledged not only by our divines,(1151) but by Aquinas also.(1152)

It only teacheth us to seek and to do _bonum, velut finem naturæ_,(1153)

such a good as is an end proportioned to nature. All these precepts of the

law of nature which we have spoken of could never lead men to a

supernatural good. It is only the divine law,(1154) revealed from God,

which informeth the minds of men with such notions as are _supra naturam_,

and which may guide them _ad finem supernaturalem_. But all sacred

significant ceremonies which, by their holy and spiritual significations,

express to us some mysteries of grace, and of the kingdom of God, must be

thought to direct us unto a supernatural good; therefore they are not of

that sort of things which the law of nature requireth; for this law goeth

no higher than to teach men that there is a God, and that this God is to

be worshipped, the knowledge of which things is not a good exceeding the

proportion of nature: for it was found in the Gentiles themselves, who

knew no other spiritual and supernatural good than that which was

proportioned to nature. Let me now conclude this reason with Scalliger’s

words, _Neque enim quae supra naturae leges sunt, ex naturae legibus

judicanda censeo_.(1155)

_Sect._ 7. 2. As the ceremonies, by their sacred, spiritual, and mystical

significations, direct us unto a supernatural good, so they are thought to

guide us unto the same by a way which nature’s light could never discover

unto men. But, in the law of nature, as we are directed unto no other good

than such as is proportioned to nature, so are we guided unto the same

_natura duce_,(1156) that is to say, by such common notions as God hath

imprinted in the nature of all men. Now, I suppose our opposites will not

unwillingly reckon their sacred significant ceremonies among those things

of the Spirit of God which a natural man cannot receive, because they are

spiritually decerned, 1 Cor. ii. 14. What then have they to do with the

law of nature? If it be said, that they necessarily follow upon those

first principles and conclusions which a natural man receiveth, I answer,

This shall never be proved. They will say, perhaps, that nature teacheth

us to use certain rites in the worship of God, to observe set times for

his worship, also to kneel down in reverence of God whom we worship.

_Ans._ Be it so: but how make they up a necessary connection betwixt

certain rites and significant ceremonies of human institution; betwixt set

times, and some more days than one of seven; betwixt kneeling in the

worship of God _in genere_, and kneeling at the sacrament _in specie_,

unless they say that nature requireth us to kneel in every act of worship,

and never to worship God without kneeling on our knees?

_Sect._ 8. 3. _Jus naturae_ is _ubique idem_, as Rosinus:(1157) it is

approved _communi omnium gentium judicio atque assensu_, as the Professors

of Leyden:(1158) it is one and the same among all nations, in respect of

the principles of it, as Aquinas(1159) and Zanchius:(1160) the law of

nature _fixa est cordibus nostris_, as Stella:(1161) yea, it is “so

written in our hearts that iniquity itself cannot blot it out,” as

Augustine saith;(1162) and we learn from the Apostle, that the law of

nature is manifest in the Gentiles, for God hath showed it unto them, Rom.

i. 19; therefore there is none ignorant, saith Pareus.(1163) Whatsoever,

then, the law of nature requireth, it doth clearly and necessarily follow

upon those principles which are written in every man’s conscience, unless

we set up new divinity, and either say that the principles of the law of

nature are not written in every man’s conscience, or else that they may be

at some time abolished and rased out of the consciences of men; which were

to leave men without a witness. Nay, saith Augustine,(1164) the heaven and

the earth, and all that is in them, on every side, cease not to bid all

men love God, that they be made inexcusable. Now if all the principles of

the law of nature be firmly and clearly written in every man’s conscience,

and cannot but be known to every man who has the use of natural judgment

and reason, it followeth, that they who will prove or warrant anything by

the law of nature, must only take their premises from every man’s

conscience, and say, as the Apostle saith, “Judge in yourselves,” &c.,

“doth not even nature itself teach you,” &c., 1 Cor. xi. 13, 14; as if the

Apostle said, This principle of nature is fixed in all your hearts, that

men should affect honesty and comeliness. Go to reason in yourselves, from

the judgment of nature, whether it follow not, upon this principle, that a

man should not wear long hair, forasmuch as his wearing of long hair is

repugnant to the principle of nature. _Committit ipsis judicium_, saith

Pareus; _ipsos testes, imo judices appellat_,(1165) so that, if the

ceremonies be warranted unto us by the law of nature, the judgment must be

committed to every man’s conscience, and so should every man be convinced

in himself, by such a principle of nature, from which the ceremonies have

a necessary and manifest deduction. Yet we attest the Searcher of all

hearts, that we have never been convinced in ourselves, by such a

principle of nature, no, not after diligent search and inquiry.

_Sect._ 9. 4. Let our opposites say to us, once for all, upon what precept

of the law of nature do they ground the ceremonies; for I have before

opened up all sorts of things which the law of nature requireth of man as

he is _ens_; and as he is _animal_ belongeth not to our purpose. As for

that which it requireth of him as he is a creature endued with reason,

there is one part of it that concerneth ourselves, viz., that we should

live honestly, and _secundum modum rationis_, that we should observe order

and decency in all our actions. This order and decency do not respect our

holy duties to God, nor comprehend any sacred ceremony in his worship; but

they look to usward, and are referred only to such beseeming qualities as

are congruous and convenient to a reasonable nature in all its actions.

Yea, even generally, we may say with Scalliger,(1166) _Ordinem dico sine

quo natura constare non potest. Nihil enim absque ordine vel med tata est

vel effecit illa._ Another part of that which nature requireth of man, as

he is a creature endued with reason, concerneth (as we showed) our

neighbours, whom it teacheth us not to harm nor offend, &c. And if our

opposites would reckon with us here, their ceremonies will appear

repugnant to nature, because of the detriment and offence which they offer

unto us, whereof we have spoken in our argument of scandal. But there was

a third part, concerning God and his worship; and here must our opposites

seek a warrant for the ceremonies. Now, albeit nature (as was said)

teaches all men that there is an eternal and mighty God, who should be

worshipped and honoured by them, yet it descendeth not unto such

particular precepts as can have any show of making aught for significant

ceremonies. _Omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse

deos_; but yet _quales sint_, saith Cicero, _varium est_.(1167) And as

nature hath not taught men to know the nature and attributes of the

Godhead, together with the sacred Trinity of persons in the same; so

neither hath it taught what sort or manner of worship should be given unto

God. _Lex naturalis rerum communium est_,(1168) and doth only inform us

with those common notions called κοιναὶ εννοιαὶ. Concerning the worship of

God, it speaks only _de genere_, not _de specie_: wherefore there can be

no inference from that worship which the law of nature requireth, either

of any distinct kind of worship or of any ceremony in that kind, no more

than it followeth, _Si est animal, est Asinus; for à genere ad speciem non

valet consequentia affirmando_.

THE FOURTH PART.

AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

CHAPTER I.

OF OUR OPPOSITES’ PLEADING FOR THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

If it seem to any that it is a strange method to speak now of

indifferency, in the end of this dispute, which ought rather to have been

handled in the beginning of it, they may consider, that the method is not

ours, but our opposites’; for they have been fleeing upon Icarus’ wings,

and soaring so high that their wings could not but melt from them: so have

they, from necessity fallen down to expediency; from it to lawfulness; and

from thence to indifferency.

I knew certain of them, who, after reasoning about the ceremonies with

some of our side, required, in the end, no more but that they would only

acknowledge the indifferency of the things in themselves. And so being

wooed and solicitously importuned by our former arguments against the

ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelope’s web, thereby to

suspend us, and to gain time against us: this indifferency, I mean, which

they shall never make out, and which themselves, otherwhiles, unweave

again. Always, so long as they think to get any place for higher notions

about the ceremonies, they speak not so meanly of them as of things

indifferent; but when all their forces of arguments and answers are spent

in vain, then are our ears filled with uncouth outcries and declamations,

which tend to make themselves appear blameless for receiving, and us

blameworthy for refusing matters of rite and indifferency.

Upon this string they harp over and over again, in books, in sermons, in

private discourses. Mr G. Powell (in his book _De Adiaphoris_), and Tilen

(in the 12th and 17th chapters of his _Paraenesis_), condemn those who

make aught ado about the controverted English ceremonies, for so much as

they are things indifferent. Paybody, in his Apology for kneeling at the

communion, standeth much upon the indifferency of this gesture, both in

every worship of God, and in that sacrament namely. The Archbishop of St.

Andrews, in his sermon at Perth Assembly, because he could not prove this

indifferency, he chose to suppose it. “Of the indifferency of these

articles (saith he) I think there is little or no question amongst us.”

Whether he spake this of ignorance or of policy, I leave it to be guessed

at. Howsoever, if we should thus compose our controversy about the

ceremonies, embrace them, and practise them, so being that they be only

called things indifferent, this were to cure our church, as L. Sylla cured

his country, _durioribus remediis quam pericula erant_, saith

Seneca.(1169) Wherefore we will debate this question of indifferency also.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.

_Sect._ 1. To say nothing here of the homonymy of the word _indifferent_,

but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose,

it signifieth such a mean betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is

alike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptive of either of

them. _Indifferens_, saith Calepin, is that _quod sua natura neque bonum

est neque malum_. Aquinas(1170) calleth that an indifferent action which

is neither good nor evil. _Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque

mala in se est_, saith a later writer.(1171)

But Dr Forbesse(1172) liketh to speak in another language. He will have

that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary; and a

thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily

to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity

of the commandment of God; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with

eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is

punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now,

because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which

is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness

of an individual action.(1173) The one he calleth _bonitas generalis,

concomitans, et sine qua non_; by which goodness is meant the doing of an

action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth

himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and

hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth _bonitas

specialis, causans, et propter quam_. This goodness he calleth legal, and

saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent

actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded,

and which are remunerable with eternal life.

_Sect._ 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered

to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some

things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall

neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by

God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear

before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which

we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to

receive either a reward or a punishment. What! Could the Doctor say that

these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith

that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor

remunerable? Nay, but he saith(1174) that the general goodness which

accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the

action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had

as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the

doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself

is not remunerable.

_Ans._ 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking

only of individual actions, and that _actus individuatur a circumstantus

et adjecto modo_, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that

one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant

goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no

more in effect, but that _actus quo ad speciem_ is not remunerable, which

none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth

necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual

good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I

go to hear God’s word upon the Lord’s day, let this action of mine be

considered _quo ad individuum_, is it any otherwise remunerable than in

respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the

hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not

remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because

commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the

remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of

those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman’s

action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,(1175) if a woman

marry in the Lord, this action is good _respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in

se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum_, implying that if, on the

other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action

of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, _etiam quo ad

individuum_.

But, I reply, what means he by these words, _in se_? Means he the

individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other

than this, _quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum_. And, besides, the

Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than

the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden _individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione

specici_?(1176) Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the

thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the

definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by _in se_,

understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of

things indifferent, _in se_, _per se_, or _sua natura_, they mean only

things indifferent _quo ad speciem_. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said

nonsense, for so we should take his words, _quamvis quoad speciem sit

media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum_.

_Sect._ 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what

he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be

imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when

one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely,

because it is both good in itself, or _quo ad speciem_, and likewise

_respectu adjecti modi_, whereas a woman’s action of marrying (when she

marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect,

namely, _respectu modi_, for, _in se_, or, _quo ad speciem_, it hath no

remunerable goodness in it.

_Ans._ What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions _quo ad

speciem_? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt

the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being

considered _quo ad individuum_.

That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth

to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing

to agree to it _quo ad individuum_, as if to speak of Peter _quatenus est

homo_, and to speak of him _quatenus est individuum signatum_, or _res

singularis sub specie hominis_, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my

individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary because of the

commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of

it _quo ad individuum_, but as the specifical nature of that action of

hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we

speak of this individual action, _quo ad individuum_, we cannot consider

it otherwise than _respectu adjecti modi_, because, in moral actions,

_modus adjectus_ is _principium individuationis_, and nothing else doth

individualise a moral action.

_Sect._ 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those

individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their

species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth

indifferent, because their _species_ is not commanded, both being

considered _quo ad individuum_, the former hath no other remunerable good

in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either

of them standeth only _in objecto modo_; which being so, it is all one

when we speak of any individual moral action _quo ad individuum_, whether

we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are

one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,(1177) _Necessarium est omnem actum

hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere_.

And again: _Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui

malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus_; wherefore that distinction of a twofold

goodness, _causans_ and _concomitans_, which the Doctor hath given us,

hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and

remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now

moral goodness, saith Scalliger,(1178) _est perfectio actus cum recta

ratione_. Human moral actions are called good or evil, _in ordine ad

rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum_, saith

Aquinas,(1179) thereupon inferring that _illis mores dicuntur boni, qui

rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui à ratione discordant_. Dr Forbesse doth

therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,(1180) _in hac cum

fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium_. Nay, those actions

we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be

necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable

which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to

right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the

Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are,

therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and

so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being

considered _quo ad individuum_, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable

than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner

_quo ad individuum_, as hath been showed.

_Sect._ 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the

Doctor’s speculation about the nature of things indifferent.

For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that

which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now

albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that

which is hot to that which is cold, yet _bonum bona non contrariatur in

moralibus_.(1181) The reason of the difference is, because _bonitas

physica_, or _relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem_, saith

Scalliger;(1182) and because two natures may be contrary one to another,

therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the

good which is congruous to the other; but _bonum virtutis_, saith

Aquinas(1183) _non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum,

scilicet rationem_; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be

opponed to another.

2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be _medium inter bonum et

malum morale_; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is

such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other,

but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far

departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the

word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable

goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as

giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?

3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth(1184) out of the

Helvetic Confessor Jerome’s definition of a thing indifferent, and

approveth it. _Indifferens_, saith he, _illud est quod nec bonum nec malum

est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habeas nec

injustitiam._ Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a

thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath

the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent,

making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things

which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he

acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), have

righteousness in them, as all men know.

CHAPTER III.

WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING INDIFFERENT IN ACTU EXERCITO.

_Sect._ 1. For our better light in this question I will premit these

considerations, 1. When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human

action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all

the circumstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus,(1185) upon those

words of Seneca, _Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi,_ &c., saith, that

without those circumstances of things, persons, times, places, _facti

ratio non constat_. Circumstances sometimes _constituunt rerum earum quae

aguntur speciem_, say our divines,(1186) meaning that circumstances do

make an action good or bad. _Humani actus_, say the schoolmen,(1187) _non

solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur_.

It is not every man’s part, saith one of our opposites,(1188) to judge _de

circumstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam_. “Some

circumstances, saith another of them,(1189) are intrinsical and essential

to actions, and specially making up their nature.” The principal

circumstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:—

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur quomodo,

quando.

The first circumstance which maketh an action good or bad is _quis_, which

designeth the person: If a magistrate put to death a malefactor, the

action is good; but if a private person put him to death, it is evil.

The second is _quid_, which noteth the quality or condition of the object:

If a man take _sua_, the action is good; if _aliena_, it is evil.

The third is _ubi_: If men banquet in their own houses, the action is

good; if in the church, it is evil.

The fourth is _quibus auxiliis_: If men seek health by lawful means, the

action is good; if by the devil, or his instruments, it is evil.

The fifth is _cur_: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love

to him, and desire to reclaim him, the action is good; if out of hatred

and spleen, the action is evil.

The sixth is _quomodo_: For he who doth the work of the Lord carefully

doth well; but he who doth it negligently doth evil.

The seventh is _quando_: To do servile work upon the six days of labour,

is good; but to do it upon the Lord’s Sabbath, is evil.

2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the former; and it

is this: The goodness or badness of a human action may be considered two

ways, viz., either _in actu signato_, and _quo ad speciem_; or _in actu

exercito_, and _quo ad individuum_; for an action is said to be

specificated by its object, and individuated by its circumstances; so

that, when an action is good or evil in respect of the object of it, then

it is called good or evil _quo ad speciem_: when it is good or evil in

respect of the circumstances of it, then it is said to be good or evil

_quo ad individuum_.

3. Human actions, whether considered _quo ad speciem_, or _quo ad

individuum_, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason,

or from bare imagination only. To this latter kind we refer such actions

as are done through incogitancy, while the mind is taken up with other

thoughts; for example, to scratch the head, to handle the beard, to move

the foot, &c.; which sort of things proceed only from a certain stirring

or fleeting of the imagination.

4. Let it be remembered, that those things we call morally good, which

agree to right reason; those morally evil which disagree from right

reason; and those indifferent which include nothing belonging to the order

of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor dissonant from the same.

5. When we speak of the indifferency of an individual action, it may be

conceived two ways: either _absolute et sine respectu ad aliud_; or

_comparate et cum respectu ad aliud_. In the free-will offerings, if so be

a man offered according as God had blessed and prospered his estate, it

was indifferent to offer either a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat; but if

he chose to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be

indifferent, but either good or evil. When we speak of the indifferency of

an action _comparate_, the sense is only this, that it is neither better

nor worse than another action, and that there is no reason to make us

choose to do it more than another thing; but when we speak of the

indifferency of an action considered absolutely and by itself, the simple

meaning is, whether it be either good or evil, and whether the doing of

the same must needs be either sin or evil doing.

6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by

indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought

evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed or forsaken, according

to these three rules delivered to us in God’s word: 1. The rule of piety;

2. The rule of charity; 3. The rule of purity.

The first of these rules we find, 1 Cor. x. 31, “Whether, therefore, ye

eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God;” and Rom.

xiv. 7, 8, “For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself.

For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die

unto the Lord:” where the Apostle, as Calvin noteth,(1190) reasoneth from

the whole to the part. Our whole life, and, by consequence, all the

particular actions of it, ought to be referred to God’s glory, and ordered

according to his will. Again, Col. iii. 17, “And whatsoever ye do, in word

or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus.” In the expounding of which

words Dr Davenant saith well, that _Etiam ille actiones quæ sunt sua

natura adiaphoræ, debent tamen à Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc

est, juxta voluntatem Christi, et ad gloriam Christi_.

The second rule is the rule of charity; which teacheth us not to use

anything indifferent when scandal riseth out of it: Rom. xiv. 21, “It is

good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy

brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;” yea, though it do not

weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so

lawful or indifferent in its own nature, the law of charity bindeth us to

abstain from it: Rom. xiv. 19, “Let us therefore follow after the things

which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify another;”

Rom. xv. 2, “Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to

edification;” 1 Cor. x. 23, “All things are lawful for me, but all things

are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify

not:” where the Apostle teacheth, that _in cibo_, &c.,(1191) “In meat,

drink, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to look

whether they be lawful, but that, farther, we are to look whether to do or

omit the same be expedient, and may edify.” The Bishop of Winchester,

preaching upon John xvi. 7, “I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you

that I go away,” &c., marketh, that Christ would not go away without

acquainting his disciples with the reason of it; and that reason was,

because it was for their good: whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should

avoid Hophni’s _non vult enim_, and make our _vult_ our _enim_, 1 Sam. ii.

15; that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason

for our will; 2. That we should not, with the Corinthians, stand upon

_licet_,—it is lawful, but frame our rule by _expedit_,—it is expedient, 1

Cor. vi. 13; x. 23; 3. That our rule should not be Caiaphas’ _expedit

nobis_, but Christ’s _expedit vobis_,—for you it is good, you, the

disciples, John xi. 50; and make that the rule of our going out and our

coming in. The heathens themselves could say that we are born, partly for

God, partly for our country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more

ought Christians to understand that we are not born for ourselves, but for

Christ and his church. And as in the whole course of our life, so

especially in the policy of the church, we may do nothing (be it never so

indifferent in itself) which is not profitable for edification: 1 Cor.

xiii. 26, “Let all things be done to edifying.” From which precept Pareus

inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the church which doth not

manifestly make for the utility of all and every one; and that therefore

not only unknown tongues, but cold ceremonies and idle gestures should be

exploded out of the church.

The third rule is the rule of purity, which respecteth our peace and

plerophory of conscience, without which anything is unclean to us, though

it be clean and lawful in its own nature: Rom xiv. 14, “To him that

esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean,” therefore _si

quis aliquam in cibo immunditiem imagineter, eo libere uti non

potest_.(1192) Whatsoever indifferent thing a man in his conscience

judgeth to be unlawful, he may not lawfully do it: Rom xiv. 5, “Let every

man be fully persuaded in his own mind;” and verse 23, “He that doubteth

is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not

of faith is sin.” _Nefas est omnino_, saith Calvin,(1193) _quippiam

aggredi quod putes illi (domino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis

illi placere_. Now if a thing indifferent be used according to these three

rules, the use of it is not only lawful but expedient also; but if it be

not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogether unlawful.

_Sect._ 3. And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it can never be

lawfully used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that

the use of a thing indifferent is never lawful to us when we have no other

warrant for using the same beside our own will and arbitrement.

Dr Forbesse speaks unadvisedly whilst he saith,(1194) _Evenit nonnunquam_,

&c.: “It falleth out sometimes that that which was expedient for thee to

do yesterday, and to omit this day, thou mayest, notwithstanding,

afterward either do it, or not do it, according to thy arbitrement:” As

if, forsooth, our using of things indifferent should not evermore be

determined by the rule of expediency which God’s word giveth us, but

sometimes by our own will. Dr Davenant(1195) could not dream that any,

except the ignorant common people, could be of this opinion which Dr

Forbesse holdeth _Fallitur vulgus_, saith he, _dum judicat licere __ sibi,

uti victu, vestitu, sermone, aut quacunque re adiaphora pro arbitrio suo;

nam haec omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt_.

Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing at our own pleasure; so

neither may the church, at her will and pleasure, command the use of it:

but as our practice, so the church’s injunction must be determined and

squared according to the former rules. And if any man think that, in the

using of things indifferent, he may be led and ruled by the church’s

determination, without examining any further, let him understand that the

church’s determination is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by

higher rules.

Dr Forbesse, perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his

cause, desireth to subject them to the church’s determination, and to make

it our highest rule. _Jam autem_, saith he,(1196) _in talium rerum usu, id

edificat, quod pacificum; illud est pacificum quod est ordinatum; is autem

decens ordo est in ecclesia ab ipso Christo constitutus, ut in talibus non

suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiatur ecclesia, et exhibeatur

praepositis obedientia._

He hath been speaking of the rules which God’s word giveth us concerning

the use of things indifferent; and all of them he comprehendeth under this

rule, that we should hear the church, and obey them who are set over us,

as if God’s rules were subordinate to men’s rules, and not theirs to his.

We say not that every man may use things indifferent _sua arbitratu_, but

we say withal, that neither may the church command the use of things

indifferent _suo arbitratu_. Both she in commanding and we in obeying must

be guided by the rules of Scripture.

They who are set over us in the church have no power given them of Christ

which is not for edifying, Eph. iv. 12. The counsel of the apostles and

elders at Jerusalem (which is a lively pattern of a lawful synod to the

world’s end) professed they would lay no other burden upon the disciples

except such things as the law of charity made necessary for shunning of

scandal, Acts xv. 28; and so that which they decreed had force and

strength to bind _a charitate propter scandalum_, saith Sanctius;(1197)

but _suo arbitratu_ they enjoined nothing. Cartwright saith, “It appeareth

by this place that there may be no abridgement of liberty simply decreed,

but in regard of circumstance, according to the rule of

edification.”(1198) And if the church’s decrees and canons be not

according to the rules of the word; yet, forasmuch as every one of us

shall give account of himself and his own deeds, we must look that

whatsoever the church decree, yet our practice, in the use or omission of

a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.

We may not, for the commandment of men, transgress the rule of piety, by

doing anything which is not for God’s glory, and ordered according to his

will; neither ought any of us to obey men, except “for the Lord’s sake,” 1

Pet. ii. 13, and “as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God,” Eph.

vi. 6; which teacheth us the manner how we ought to obey men, namely,

_propter Christum et sicut Christus praecipit_;(1199) for if we should

know no more but the will of man for that which we do, then we should be

the “servants of men,” not the servants of Christ. Neither yet may we for

any human ordinance break the rule of charity; “But whatsoever either

would weaken, or not edify our brother, be it never so lawful, never so

profitable to ourselves, never so powerfully by earthly authority

enjoined, Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ,

unto his church, and unto the fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with

it.”(1200)

Nor, lastly, may we obey men, so as to break the law of purity, and

“perform any action with a doubtful conscience; that is, whereof either

the world hath not,(1201) nor we out of it have no warrant, in which case

tender consciences must be tendered rather than be racked by authority,

for be the things in themselves never so lawful, &c., they are utterly

unlawful to me without such information.” Whereas, therefore, some say,

that in the use of matters indifferent, the laws of those who are set over

us ought to rule us; we still answer that our practice may not be ruled by

any law of man, except it be according to the rules of the word, whereof

one is this, _Tantum oportere esse obedientiae studium in

Christianis,_(_1202_)_ ut nihil agant, quod non existiment vel potius

certi sint placere Deo_.

_Sect._ 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the

question in hand, we say, 1. As touching those actions which proceed from

bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate _quo ad speciem_,

forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not

in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason,

but is like Gehazi, running away without his master’s leave, let the

learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such

actions may be and are of a civil _quo ad individuum_,(1203) or in respect

of the circumstances, which show forth in them reprovable temerity,

incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our

purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of

reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, _quo ad speciem_, yet none of

them are, nor can be indifferent, _quo ad individuum_. The reason of this

difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or

kind,(1204) from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or

kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is

reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include

something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action,

according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But

if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall

be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another

man’s goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth

not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a

straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are

indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise

of them when we speak of them _quo ad individuum_, because as they are

individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they

have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been

showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent,

_quo ad individuum_; because _oportet_ (saith Thomas(1205)) _quod quilibet

individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad

bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis_. Friar Ambrosius

Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of

Trent,(1206) that to do good was a work, the concurrences of all

circumstances is necessary, but the want of one only is sufficient for an

evil, so that howsoever among the works considered in general, some are

indifferent, yet in the singular there is no medium between having all the

circumstances and wanting some; therefore every particular action is good

or evil; and because among the circumstances the end is one, all works

referred to a bad end are infected. He further alleged St. Augustine, that

it is sin not only to refer the action to a bad end, but also not to refer

it to a good end. Thus spake the learned friar very appositely; and the

same is the judgment of our own divines. _De bis rebus indifferentibus_

(saith Martyr(1207)) _statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque

natura sua indifferentiam habeant, sed quando ad electionem descenditur

nihil est indifferens_; and so saith Pareus likewise.(1208)

_Sect._ 5. These things are so plain and undeniable, that Dr

Forbesse(1209) himself acknowledged no less than that every individual

human action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodness

which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the

last end, and the doing of it in faith; which goodness, if it be wanting,

the action is evil. Notwithstanding, he will have some actions, even _quo

ad individuum_, called indifferent, for this respect, because they are

neither commanded of God, and so necessary to be done, nor yet forbidden,

and so necessary to be omitted.

Of an individual action of this kind, he saith: _Manet homini respectu

istius actus plena arbitrii libertas moralis; tum ea quae exercitii seu

contradictionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quae specificationis seu

contrarietatis libertas appellatur._ He holdeth, that though such an

action be done in faith, and for the right end (which general goodness, he

saith, is necessary to the action, and commendeth a man to God), yet the

action itself is indifferent, because it is not necessary; for a man hath

liberty to omit the same, or to do another thing; which he illustrateth by

this example:—

If the widow Sempronia marry at all, it is faith, because, as the Apostle

teacheth, whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Now whilst everything is

condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as

Calvin observeth:(1210) 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor

approven by the word of God. 2. Such actions, as though they be approven

by the word of God, yet the mind, wanting this persuasion, doth not

cheerfully address itself to the doing of them. But, I pray, doth the word

underprop or approve the use of anything indifferent, if it be not used

according to the foresaid rules, and, by consequence, conveniently and

profitably?

_Sect._ 9. The Doctor thinks it enough that, in the use of a thing

indifferent, I believe it is lawful for me to do this thing, albeit I

believe and certainly know that it is lawful to me to omit it, or do the

contrary; so that the doing of a thing in faith inferreth not the

necessity of doing it: but for answer hereunto we say,

1. We have sufficiently proven that it is never lawful for us to do

anything which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be persuaded

not only of the lawfulness of the thing, but of the expediency of doing

it.

2. Of his comparing of things indifferent together, and not considering

them positively and by themselves, we have also said enough before.

3. The doing of a thing in faith inferreth the expediency and profit of

doing it, and that is enough to take away the indifferency of doing it;

for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else

unlawful to be done (as hath been showed), it followeth that either it

ought to be done, or else it ought to be left undone; therefore it is

never indifferent nor free to us to do it, or leave it undone, at our

pleasure.

4. Because the Doctor (I perceive) sticketh upon the term of necessity,

and will have everything which is not necessary to be indifferent;

therefore, to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostom and the author

of the interlineary gloss upon Matt. xviii. 7, take the meaning of those

words, “It must needs be that offences come,” to be this, _it is

profitable that offences come_. Which gloss, though it be not to be

received, yet as Camero noteth,(1211) it is ordinary to call that

necessary which is very profitable and expedient. Besides this, I say, we

further maintain, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we

deliberate upon to do is never lawful to be done except it be also

necessary, though not _necessitate absoluta seu consequentis_, yet

_necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione_. Paul’s circumcising of

Timothy was lawful only because it was necessary, for he behoved by this

means to win the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned

him,(1212) otherwise he could not safely have preached the gospel among

them. Therefore he had done wrong if he had not circumcised Timothy, since

the circumcising of him was according to the rules of the word, and it was

expedient to circumcise him, and unexpedient to do otherwise. And (because

_de partibus idem est judicium_) whensoever the use of any indifferent

thing is according to the rules of the word, that is, when it is

profitable for God’s glory, and man’s edification, and the doer is

persuaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (forsomuch as not

only it may, but ought to be done) the use of it is not only lawful but

necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but ought not to be

admitted) the omission of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful.

Again, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against

or not according to the said rules, then (forsomuch as not only it may,

but ought to be admitted) the omission of it is not only lawful but

necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but may not, neither

ought to be done) the doing of it is not only unnecessary but also

unlawful. For which it maketh, that the apostles in their decree, allege

no other ground for abstinence from blood and things strangled (which were

in their nature indifferent), but the necessity of abstaining caused and

induced by the foresaid rules, Acts xv. 28.

The Apostle showeth that that measure of liberality whereunto he exhorted

the Corinthians was not by any divine commandment necessary, yet he

adviseth it as a thing expedient, 2 Cor. viii. 8, 10. And were not the

Corinthians thereunto bound, because of this expediency of the matter,

though it was not necessary? _Juxta verbum_, &c.: “According to God’s word

(saith the Bishop of Salisbury(1213)) we are obliged to glorify God by our

good works, not only when necessity requireth, but also when ability

furnisheth, and opportunity occurreth,” Gal. vi. 10; Tit. ii. 14.

_Sect._ 10. As touching the scope of all this dispute, which is the

indifferency of the controverted ceremonies, we shall hear sundry reasons

against it afterward. For the present, I say no more but this: As in every

case, so most especially when we meddle with the worship of God, or any

appurtenance thereof, the rules of the word tie us so straitly, that that

which is in its own nature indifferent ought either to be done, or to be

left undone, according as it is either agreeable or not agreeable to these

rules; and so is never left free to us to be done or omitted at our

pleasure: for if at all we be (as certainly we are) abridged of our

liberty, chiefly it is in things pertaining to divine worship.

But I marvel why Dr Forbesse discourseth so much for the indifferency of

the ceremonies; for, lib. 1, cap. 7, he holdeth, that there were just

reasons in the things themselves why the pretended Assembly of Perth

should enjoin the five articles; some of which he calleth very convenient

and profitable, and others of them necessary in themselves. Sure, if he

stand to that which he hath there written, he cannot choose but say that

it is unlawful, both for us and for all Christians anywhere, to omit the

controverted ceremonies; and that all such as have at any time omitted

them, have thereby sinned, in leaving that undone which they ought to have

done—for the conveniency and necessity of them which he pretendeth is

perpetual and universal.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RULE BY WHICH WE ARE TO MEASURE AND TRY WHAT THINGS ARE

INDIFFERENT.

_Sect._ 1. That the word of God is the only rule whereby we must judge of

the indifferency of things, none of our opposites, we hope, will deny. “Of

things indifferent (saith Paybody(1214)) I lay down this ground, that they

be such, and they only, which God’s word hath left free unto us.”

Now these things which God’s word leaveth free and indifferent (in respect

of their nature and kind) are such things as it neither showeth to be good

nor evil. Where we are further to consider, that the word of God showeth

unto us the lawfulness or unlawfulness, goodness or badness of things, not

only by precepts and prohibitions, but sometimes also, and more plainly,

by examples. So that, not only from the precepts and prohibitions of the

word, but likewise from the examples recorded in the same, we may find out

that goodness or badness of human actions which taketh away the

indifferency of them.

And as for those who will have such things called indifferent as are

neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God, I ask of them whether

they speak of plain and particular precepts and prohibitions, or of

general only? If they speak of particular precepts and prohibitions, then,

by their rule, the baptising of young children, the taking of water for

the element of baptism; a lecturer’s public reading of Scripture in the

church upon the Sabbath day; the assembling of synods for putting order to

the confusions of the church; the writing and publication of the decrees

of the same; and sundry other things which the word hath commended unto us

by examples,—should all be things indifferent, because there are not in

the word of God either particular precepts for them, or particular

prohibitions against them. But if they speak of general precepts and

prohibitions, then are those things commanded in the word of God for which

we have the allowed and commended examples of such as we ought to follow

(for, in the general, we are commanded to be followers of such examples,

Phil. iv. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xi. 1; Eph. v. 1), though there be no particular

precept for the things themselves thus exemplified.

_Sect._ 2. To come, therefore, to the ground which shall give us here some

footing, and whereupon we mind to rear up certain superstructions, we

hold, that not only we ought to obey the particular precepts of the word

of God, but that also “we are bound to imitate Christ, and the commendable

example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident they had

special reasons moving them thereto, which do not concern us:” which

ground, as it hath been of a long time holden and confirmed by them of our

side, so never could, nor ever shall, our opposites subvert it. It is long

since the _Abridgement_ confirmed and strengthened it, out of those places

of Scripture: Eph. v. 1, “Be ye therefore followers of God, as dear

children;” 1 Cor. xi. 1, “Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of

Christ;” 1 Thess. i. 6, “And ye became followers of us and of the Lord;”

Phil. iii. 17, “Brethren, be followers together of me.”

This ground is also at length pressed by Cyprian, who showeth(1215) that,

in the holy supper of the Lord, Christ alone is to be followed by us; that

we are to do what he did; and that we ought not to take heed what any man

hath done before us, but what Christ did, who is before all.

_Sect._ 3. But Bishop Lindsey(1216) asketh of us, if we hold this rule,

what is the cause why, at the celebration of the sacrament, we bless not

the bread severally by itself, and the cup severally by itself, seeing

Christ did so, yet having no cause to move him which concerns not us.

_Ans._ 1. Beside the common blessing of the elements, in the beginning of

the action, we give thanks also in the several actions of distribution,

saying after this or the like manner: “The Lord Jesus, the same night he

was betrayed, took bread, and when he had given thanks (as we also give

thanks to God who gave his Son to die for us) he brake it,” &c. “In like

manner also, after supper, he took the cup, and, when he had given thanks

(as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to shed his blood for us),

he gave it,” &c. Which form (we conceive) may be construed to be an

imitation of the example of Christ.

2. Though we did not observe such a form; yet there were two reasons to

move Christ to give thanks severally, both at the giving of the bread, and

at the giving of the cup, neither of which concerneth us: 1. The

eucharistical supper was one continued action with the other supper which

went before it; for it is said, “That whilst they did eat, he took bread,”

&c. Wherefore, for more distinction of it from that supper which

immediately proceeded, it was fit that he should give thanks severally at

the giving of each element. 2. He had to do with the twelve apostles,

whose hearts being so greatly troubled with sorrow, John xvi. 6, and whose

minds not well comprehending that which they heard concerning the death of

Christ, John xvi. 12, much less those mystical symbols of it, especially

at the first hearing, seeing, and using of the same, it was needful for

their cause distinctly and severally to bless those elements, thereby to

help the weakness of their understanding, and to make them the more

capable of so heavenly mysteries.

_Sect._ 4. Now, having heard that which the Bishop had to say against our

rule, let us examine his own. He holdeth,(1217) That in the actions of

Christ’s apostles, or the customs of the church, there is nothing

exemplary and left to be imitated of us, but that which either being

moral, is generally commanded in the decalogue, or being ceremonial and

circumstantial, is particularly commanded by some constant precept in the

gospel.

_Ans._ 1. This rule is most false; for it followeth from it that the

example of the apostles’ making choice of the element of water in baptism,

and requiring a confession of faith from the person who was to be

baptised; the example also both of Christ and his apostles using the

elements of bread and wine in the holy supper, a table at which they did

communicate, and the breaking of the bread, are not left to be imitated of

us; because these things are ceremonial, but not particularly commanded in

the gospel. So that according to the rule which the Bishop holdeth, we sin

in imitating Christ and his apostles in those things, forasmuch as they

are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

2. His weapons fight against his own fellows, who allege (as we have

showed elsewhere) the custom of the church(1218) is a sufficient warrant

for certain ceremonies questioned betwixt them and us, which are not

particularly commanded by any precept in the gospel. These the Bishop doth

unwittingly strike at it whilst he holdeth that such customs of the church

are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

_Sect._ 5. Wherefore we hold still our own rule for sure and certain.

Christ’s actions are either _amanda_, as the works of redemption; or

_admiranda_, as his miracles; or _notanda_, as many things done by him for

some particular reason proper to that time and case, and not belonging to

us, which things, notwithstanding, are well worthy of our observation; or

_imitanda_, and such are all his actions which had no such special reason

moving him thereto as do not concern us.

Calvin, upon 1 Cor. xi. 1, saith well, that the Apostle there calls back

both himself and others to Christ, _Tanquam unicum recte agendi exemplar_;

and Polycarpus Lycerus, upon Matt. xvi. 24, under that command of

following Christ, comprehendeth the imitations of Christ’s actions.

Most certainly it is inexcusable presumption to leave the example of

Christ, and to do that which seemeth right in our own eyes, as if we were

wiser than he. And now, having laid down this ground, we are to build

certain positions upon it, us follows.

CHAPTER V.

THE FIRST POSITION WHICH WE BUILD UPON THE GROUND CONFIRMED IN THE FORMER

CHAPTER.

_Sect._ 1. From that which hath been said of following Christ, and the

commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not

evident that they had some such special reason moving them to do that

which they did, as doth not concern us, our first inference is this: That

it is not indifferent for a minister to give the sacramental elements of

bread and wine out of his own hand to every communicant; forasmuch as our

Lord commanded his apostles to divide the cup among them, that is, to

reach it one to another, Luke xxii. 17. Some of the interpreters are of

opinion, that the cup spoken of by the Evangelist in that place is not the

same whereof he speaketh after, ver. 20; but they are greatly mistaken;

for if it were as they think, then Christ did again drink before his death

of that fruit of the vine whereof we read ver. 18, which is manifestly

repugnant to his own words. Wherefore, as Maldonat observeth(1219) out of

Augustine and Euthimius, there was but one cup; whereof Luke speaketh,

first, by anticipation, and, afterward, in its own proper place.

_Sect._ 2. But Bishop Lindsey(1220) falleth here upon a very strange

speculation; and tells us, that if all the disciples did drink, howbeit

they did not deliver the cup one to another, but received it severally

from Christ’s own hand, they divided the same among them; because every

one takes his part of that which is parted, they divide the whole among

them. Alas! that I should blot paper with the confutation of such

fooleries. I believe, when his Majesty hath distributed and divided so

many lands and revenues among the prelates of Scotland, every one of them

takes his part, but dare not say, though, that they have divided these

lands and revenues among themselves. Can twenty or forty beggars, when an

alms is distributed among them, because every one of them getteth his

part, say, therefore, that they themselves have parted it among them?

What, then, shall be said of the distributor who giveth to every one his

part severally, and by himself? That man who required that his brother

should divide the inheritance with him, did not, I trow, desire Christ to

cause his brother to take his own part of the inheritance (there was no

fear that he would not take his part); but he desired that his brother

might give to him his part. So that, to divide anything among men, is not

to take it, but to give it. And who did ever confound parting and

partaking, dividing a cup and drinking a cup, which differ as much as

giving and receiving. Thus we conclude, that when Christ commanded the

apostles to divide the cup among them, the meaning of the words can be no

other than this, that they should give the cup one to another; which is so

plain that a Jesuit(1221) also maketh it to follow upon this command, that

Christ did reach the cup _non singulis sed uni, qui proximo, proximus

sequenti, et deinceps daret_. Hence it is that Hospinian(1222) thinks it

most likely that Christ brake the bread into two parts, _earumque alteram

dederit illi qui proximus ei ad dextram accumbebat, alteram vero ei qui ad

sinistram, ut isti deinceps proxime accumbentibus porrigerent, donec

singuli particulam sibi decerpsissent_.

CHAPTER VI.

ANOTHER POSITION BUILT UPON THE SAME GROUND.

_Sect._ 1. Our next position which we infer, is this: That it is not

indifferent to sit, stand, pass, or kneel, in the act of receiving the

sacramental elements of the Lord’s supper, because we are bound to follow

the example of Christ and his apostles, who used the gesture of sitting in

this holy action, as we prove from John xiii. 12; from Matt. xxvi. 20,

with 26; Mark xiv. 18, with 22.

Our opposites here bestir themselves, and move every stone against us.

Three answers they give us, which we will now consider.

First, They tell us that it is not certain that the apostles were sitting

when they received this sacrament from Christ, and that _adhuc sub judice

lis est_. Yet let us see what they have to say against the certainty

hereof.

Bishop Lindsey objecteth, that, between their eating of the paschal supper

and the administration of the sacrament to the disciples, five acts

intervened: 1. The taking of the bread; 2. The thanksgiving; 3. The

breaking; 4. The precept, “Take ye, eat ye;” 5. The word, whereby the

element was made the sacrament. In which time, saith he, the gesture of

sitting might have been changed.

_Ans._ It is first of all to be noted, that the apostles were sitting at

the instant when Christ took the bread, for it is said that he took bread

whilst they did eat; that is (as Maldonat(1223) rightly expoundeth it),

_Antequam surgerent, antequam mensae et ciborum reliquiae removerentur_;

and so we use to say that men are dining or supping so long as they sit at

table and the meat is not removed from before them. To Christ’s

ministering of the eucharistical supper together with the preceding

supper, Christians had respect when they celebrated the Lord’s supper

together with the love-feasts. _Probabile est eos ad Christi exemplum

respexisse, qui eucharistiam inter coenandum instituit_, saith

Pareus.(1224) But of this we need say no more; for the Bishop himself hath

here acknowledged no less than that they were sitting at that time when

Christ took the bread. Only he saith, that there were five acts which

intervened before the administration of the sacrament to the disciples

(whereof the taking of the bread was the first), and that in this while

the gesture of sitting might have been changed; which is as much as to

say, when he took the bread they were sitting, but they might have changed

this gesture, either in the time of taking the bread, or in the time of

thanksgiving, or in the time of breaking the bread, or whilst he said,

“Take ye, eat ye,” or lastly, in the time of pronouncing those words,

“This is my body” (for this is the word whereby, in the Bishop’s judgment,

the element was made the sacrament, as we shall see afterward).

Now but, by his leave, we will reduce his five acts to three; for thus

speaketh the text, “And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed it

and break it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat, this is

my body,” Matt. xxvi. 26; Mark xiv. 22. Whence it is manifest, that the

giving of the bread to the disciples, which no man, I suppose, will deny

to have been the administration of it, went before the two last acts which

the Bishop reckoneth out. Nothing, therefore, is left to him but to say,

that their gesture of sitting might have been changed, either in the

taking or in the blessing, or in the breaking, or else between the taking

and the blessing, or between the blessing and the breaking; yet doth the

text knit all the three together by such a contiguity and connection as

showeth unto us that they did all make up but one continued action, which

could not admit any interruption.

_Sect._ 2. I saw a prelate sit down to his breakfast, and, as he did eat,

he took some cups, and, having called for more, he said, he thanked God

that he was never given to his belly; and with that he made a promise to

one in the company, which he brake within two days after. Would any man

question whether or not the prelate was sitting when he made this promise,

forasmuch as between his sitting down to meat and the making of the

promise there intervened his taking of some cups, his calling for more,

and his pronouncing of these words, I thank God that I was never given to

my belly? Yet might one far more easily imagine a change of the prelate’s

gesture than any such change of the apostles’ gesture in that holy action

whereof we speak. Because the text setteth down such a continued, entire,

unbroken, and uninterrupted action, therefore Calvin gathereth out of the

text that the apostles did both take and eat the sacramental bread whilst

they were sitting. _Non legimus_, saith he,(1225) _prostratos adorasse,

sed ut erant discumbentes accepisse et manducasse. Christus_, saith

Martyr,(1226) _eucharistiam apostolis una secum sedentibus aut

discumbentibus distribuit_. G. J. Vossius(1227) puts it out of doubt that

Christ was still sitting at the giving of the bread to the apostles. And

that the apostles were still sitting when they received the bread,

Hospinian(1228) thinks it no less certain. They made no doubt of the

certainty hereof who composed that old verse which we find in

Aquinas:(1229)—

Rex sedet in coena, turba cinctus duodena;

Se tenet in manibus; se cibat ipse cibus.

Papists also put it out of controversy; for Bellarmine acknowledgeth(1230)

that the apostles could not externally adore Christ by prostrating

themselves in the last supper, _quando recumbere cum eo illis necesse

erat_; where we see he could guess nothing of the change of their gesture.

_Intelligendum est_, saith Jansenius,(1231) _dominum in novissima hac

coena, discubuisse et sedisse ante et post comestum agnum_. Dr Stella

sticketh not to say,(1232) _distribuit salvator mundi panem

discumbentibus_.

_Sect._ 3. But now having heard Bishop Lindsey, let us hear what

Paybody(1233) will say. He taketh him to another subterfuge, and tells us,

that though we read that Christ took bread whilst they did eat, yet can it

not be concluded hence that he took bread whilst they did sit; because,

saith he, “as they did eat,” is expounded by Luke (chap. xxii. 20) and

Paul (1 Cor. xi. 25) to be _after they had done eating_, or _after

supper_. Thus is their languages divided. Bishop Lindsey did yield to us,

that when Christ took bread they were sitting; and his conjecture was,

that this gesture of sitting might have been changed after the taking of

the bread. Paybody saw that he had done with the argument if he should

grant that they were sitting when Christ took bread, therefore he calleth

that in question. Vulcan’s own gimmers could not make his answer and the

Bishop’s to stick together.

But let us examine the ground which Paybody takes for his opinion. He

would prove from Luke and Paul, that when Matthew and Mark say, “As they

were eating, Jesus took bread,” the meaning is only this, _After supper,

Jesus took bread_; importing, that Christ’s taking of bread did not make

up one continued action with their eating, and that therefore their

gesture of sitting might have been changed between their eating of the

preceding supper and his taking of the sacramental bread.

Whereunto we answer, that there are two opinions touching the suppers

which Christ did eat with his disciples that night wherein he was

betrayed. And whichsoever the reader please to follow, it shall be most

easy to break all the strength of the argument which Paybody opposeth unto

us.

_Sect._ 4. First, then, some do think that Christ, having kept the

passover according to the law (which is not particularly related, but

supposed, by the evangelists), sat down to a common or ordinary supper, at

which he told the disciples that one of them should betray him. And of

this judgment are Calvin and Beza, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Pareus, upon Matt.

xxvi. 21; Fulk and Cartwright, against the Rhemists, upon 1 Cor. xi. 23;

Tolet and Maldonat, upon John xiii. 2; Cornelius Jansenius, _Conc.

Evang._, cap. 131; Balthazar Meisnerus, _Tract, die Fest. Virid._, p. 256;

Johannes Forsterus, _Conc. 4, de Pass._, p. 538; Christophorus Pelargus,

in John xiii., quest. 2, and others. The reasons whereby their judgment is

confirmed are these:—

1. Many societies convened to the eating of the paschal supper by

twenties.(1234) And if twenty was often the number of them who convened to

the eating of the same (which also confirmeth their opinion who think that

other men and women in the inn did eat both the paschal and evangelical

supper together with the apostles in Christ’s company), it is not very

likely (say some) that all those were sufficiently satisfied and fed with

one lamb, which, after it was eight days old, was allowed to be offered

for the passover, as Godwin noteth.(1235) _Neque esus umus agni_, saith

Pareus, _toti familiae sedandae fami sufficere poterat._(1236)

2. The paschal supper was not for banquetting or filling of the belly, as

Josephus also writeth.(1237) _Non tam exsatiendae nutriendaeque naturae_,

saith Maldonat, _quam servandae legalis ceremoniae causa sumebatur_.(1238)

_Non ventri_, saith Pareus, _sed religionis causa fiebat_.(1239) But as

for that supper which Christ and his apostles did eat immediately before

the eucharistical, Cartwright doubts not to call it a carnal supper,(1240)

an earthly repast, a feast for the belly, which lets us know, that the

sacramental bread and wine was ordained, not for feeding their bodies,

which were already satisfied by the ordinary and daily supper, but for the

nourishment of the soul.

3. That beside the paschal and evangelical suppers, Christ and his

apostles had also that night another ordinary supper, Fulk proveth by the

broth wherein the sop was dipped,(1241) John xiii. 26. Whereas there was

no such broth ordained by the divine institution to be used in the paschal

supper.

4. That there were two suppers before the eucharistical they gather from

John xiii. For, first, the paschal supper was ended, ver. 2, after which

Christ washed his disciples’ feet. And thereafter we read, ver. 12,

_resumptis vestibus rursum ad caenam ordinariam consedisse._(1242) The

dividing of the passover into two services or two suppers had no warrant

at all from the first institution of that sacrament, for which cause they

think it not likely that Christ would have thus divided it according to

the device and custom of the Jews in latter times, for so much as in

marriage (and much more in the passover) he did not allow of that which

from the beginning was not so. Neither seemeth it to them any way

probable, that Christ would have interrupted the eating of the passover

with the washing of his disciples’ feet before the whole paschal supper

was ended, and they had done eating of it.

_Sect_. 5. But others (and those very judicious too) are of opinion, that

that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his

disciples’ feet, and at which he told them that one of them should betray

him, was not an ordinary or common supper (because the paschal supper was

enough of itself to satisfy them), but a part of the paschal supper. And

from the Jewish writers they prove that so the custom was to divide the

passover into two courses or services. As for that wherein Christ dipped

the sop, they take it to have been the sauce which was used in the paschal

supper, called _charoseth_, of which the Hebrews write, that it was made

of the palm tree branches, or of dry figs, or of raisins, which they

stamped and mixed with vinegar till it was thick as mustard, and made like

clay, in memory of the clay wherein they wrought in Egypt, and that they

used to dip both the unleavened bread and the bitter herbs into this

sauce. And as touching that place, John xiii., they expound it by the

custom of the Jews, which was to have two services or two suppers in the

passover; and take those words, ver. 2, “Supper being ended,” to be meant

of the first service, and sitting down again to supper, ver. 12, to be

meant of the second service.

_Sect._ 6. If those two opinions could be reconciled and drawn together

into one, by holding that that second course whereunto Christ sat down

after the washing of his disciples’ feet, was (for the substance of it) a

common supper, but yet it hath been and may be rightly called the second

service of the paschal supper, for that it was eaten the same night

wherein the paschal lamb was eaten, so should all the difference be taken

away; but if the maintainers of these opinions will not be thus agreed,

let the reader consider to which of them he will adhere.

If the first opinion be followed, then it will be most easily answered to

Paybody, that _inter coenandum instituta fuit eucharistia, cum jam rursum

mensoe accubuissent. Sed post coenam paschalem, et usum agni

legalis._(1243) When Matthew and Mark say, As they did eat, Jesus took

bread, they speak of the common or ordinary supper; but when Luke and Paul

say, that he took the cup after supper, they speak of the paschal supper,

which was eaten before the common supper.

Again, if the reader follow the other opinion, which holdeth that Christ

had no other supper that night before the evangelical except the paschal

only, yet still the answer to Paybody shall be easy; for whereas he would

prove from those words of Luke and Paul, “Likewise also the cup after

supper,” that when Matthew and Mark say, “As they did eat, Jesus took

bread,” their meaning is only this, “After supper Jesus took bread,” he

reasoneth very inconsiderately, forasmuch as Luke and Paul say not of the

bread, but of the cup only, that Jesus took it after supper. And will

Paybody say, that he took the cup so soon as he took the bread? If we will

speak with Scripture, we must say, that as they did eat the preceding

supper (to which we read they sat down) Jesus took bread; for nothing at

all intervened betwixt their eating of that other preceding supper, and

his taking of the eucharistical cup, there intervened the taking,

blessing, breaking, distributing, and eating of the bread.

Now, therefore, from that which hath been said, we may well conclude that

our opposites have no reason which they do or can object against the

certainty of that received tenet, that the apostles received from Christ

the sacramental bread and wine whilst they were sitting. Dr Forbesse

himself(1244) setteth down some testimonies of Musculus, Chamier, and the

professors of Leyden, all acknowledging that the apostles, when they

received the Lord’s supper, were still sitting.

_Sect._ 7. The second answer that our opposites hath given us, followeth:

They say, that though the apostles did not change their gesture of sitting

which they used in the former supper, when all this is granted to us, yet

there is as great difference betwixt our form of sitting and that form of

the Jews which the apostles used as there is betwixt _sedere_ and

_jacere_.

_Ans._ 1. Put the case it were so, yet it hath been often answered them,

that the apostles kept the table-gesture used in that nation, and so are

we bound herein to follow their example, by keeping the table-gesture used

in this nation. For this keeping of the usual table gesture of the nation

wherein we live is not a forsaking but a following of the commendable

example of the apostles, even as whereas they drank the wine which was

drunk in that place, and we drink the wine which is drunk in this place,

yet do we not hereby differ from that which they did.

2. The words used by the evangelists signify our form of sitting no less

than the Jewish, Calepine, Scapula, and Thomasius, in their dictionaries,

take ἀναπίπτω, ἀνακλίνω, ἀνακλίνομαι, ἀνάκειμαι, ποράκειμαι, κατάκειμαι,

and the Latin words _discumbo, recumbo, accumbo_ (used by Arias, Montanus,

Beza, Marlorat, Tremellius, &c., in their versions), not only for lying,

but also for such sitting as is opposed to lying, even for sitting upright

at table after our custom.

3. There is not so great a difference betwixt our form of sitting and that

which the Jews used as our opposites allege. For as Didoclavius showeth

out of Casaubon;(1245) their sitting at banquets was only with a leaning

upon the left arm, and so not lying, but sitting with a certain

inclination. When, therefore, we read of _lecti discubitorii tricliniares,

in quibus inter coenandum discumbebant_,(1246) we must understand them to

have been seats which compassed three sides of the table (the fourth side

being left open and void for them who served), and wherein they did sit

with some sort of inclination.

Yet Bishop Lindsey is bold to aver,(1247) that the usual table gesture of

the Jews was lying along, and this he would prove from Amos vi. 4, “They

lie upon beds of ivory, they stretch themselves out upon their couches.”

_Ans._ 1. If we should yield to this prelate his own meaning wherein he

taketh these words, yet how thinks he that the gesture of drunkards and

gluttons, which they used when they were pampering themselves in all

excess of riot, and for which also they are upbraided by the Spirit of

God, was either the ordinary table-gesture of the Jews, or the gesture

used by Christ and his apostles in their last supper?

2. If any gesture at all be touched in those words which the prelate

citeth, it was the gesture they used when they lay down to sleep, and not

their table-gesture when they did eat; for _mitta_ and _ngheres_ (the two

words which Amos useth) signify a bed or a couch wherein a man useth to

lay himself down to sleep. And in this sense we find both these words,

Psal. vi. 7, “All the night make I my bed (_mittathi_) to swim: I water my

couch (_ngharsi_) with my tears.” The Shunnamite prepared for Elisha a

chamber, and therein set for him a bed (_mitta_), and a table, and a

stool, and a candlestick, 2 Kings iv. 10. The stool or chair was for

sitting at table, but _mitta_, the bed, was for lying down to sleep. Now,

the prelate, I hope, will not say, that the _lecti tricliniares_, wherein

the Jews used to sit at table, and which compassed three sides of the same

(as hath been said), were their beds wherein they did lie and sleep all

night.

But, 3. The place must be yet more exactly opened up. That word which is

turned in our English books, _they lie_, cometh from the radix _schachav_,

which in Pagnin’s lexicon is turned _dormire_. We find, Ruth iii. 7,

_lischcav_, which Arias Montanus turned _ad dormiendum_, to sleep. Our own

English translation, 2 Sam. xi. 9, saith, “_Uriah slept_,” where the

original hath _vauschcav_; and the very same word is put most frequently

in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, where they speak of the

death of the kings of Judah and Israel. Pagnin turneth it _et dormivit_;

and our English translators everywhere, “And he slept with his fathers,”

&c. These things being considered, we must, with Calvin, read the place of

Amos thus: _Qui decumbunt vel dormiunt in lectis._ The other word which

the prophet useth is _seruchim_. Our English version turneth it, “They

stretch themselves out;” but Pagnin, Buxtorff, Tremellius, and Tarnovius,

come nearer the sense, who read _redundantes, superfluentes_, or

_luxuriantes_; which sense the English translation also hath in the

margin. The Septuagints followed the same sense, for they read,

κατασπαταλὼντες, _i.e._, _living in pleasure_. So, 1 Tim. v. 6, _she that

lived in pleasure_, σπαταλῶσοι; and, James v. 5, _Ye have lived in

pleasure_, ἐσπαταλησατε. The radix is _sarach_, _redundavit_, or

_luxuriavit_. So, Exod. xxvi. 12, _sarach_, and, verse 13, _saruach_, is

put for a surplusage or superfluous remainder, _redundans superfluum_, as

Tremellius readeth. Now, then, it is evident that the thing which Amos

layeth to the charge of those who were at ease in Zion, in the words which

the prelate citeth against us, is, that they slept upon beds of ivory

(such was their softness and superfluity), and swimmed in excessive

pleasures upon their couches; and, incontinent, their filthy and muddy

stream of carnal delicacy and excessive voluptuousness which defiled their

beds, led him back to the unclean fountain out of which it issued, even

their riotous pampering of themselves at table; therefore he subjoineth,

“And eat the lambs out of the flock,” &c. For _ex mensis itur ad cubilia,

ex gula in venerem_, saith Cornelius à Lapide, commenting upon the same

text. Thus have I cleared the place in such sort, that the Bishop cannot

but shoot short of his aims; wherefore I go on to other replies.

4. If the apostles, when they received the Lord’s supper, or the Jews,

when they did eat at table, were lying all along, how could their mouths

receive drink unspilt? or how could they have the use of both their arms?

which the Bishop himself would not, I am sure, gainsay, if he would once

try the matter in his own person, and essay to eat and drink whilst lying

along.

5. The words used by Matthew, chap. xxvi. 10, and by Mark, chap. xiv. 18,

where they speak of Christ sitting down with the twelve, is also used by

John, chap. vi. 11, where he speaketh of the peoples’ sitting down upon

the grass to eat the loaves and fishes: and will any man think that the

people did eat lying along upon the grass, where they might far better sit

upright?

6. If our opposites like to speak with others, then let them look back

upon the testimonies which I have alleged before. Jansenius putteth

_discubuisse et sedisse_; Martyr, _sedentibus aut discumbentibus_. Pareus

useth the word _consedisse_; Meisnerus,(1248) _consedendo; Evangelista_,

saith Dr Stella,(1249) _dicit dominum discubuisse, id est sedisse ad

mensam_.

7. If they like to speak to themselves: Camero,(1250) speaking of John’s

leaning on Christ’s bosom at supper, saith, _Christus autem sedebat

medius_; Dr Morton saith,(1251) it cannot be denied that the gesture of

Christ and his apostles at the last supper was sitting,—only, saith he,

the evangelists leave it uncertain whether this sitting was upright, or

somewhat leaning.

_Sect._ 8. Their third answer is, that Christ’s sitting at the last supper

is no more exemplary and imitable than the upper chamber, or the night

season, or the sex and number of communicants, &c.

_Ans._ 1. As for the sex and number of communicants, Dr Fulk(1252) rightly

observeth, that it is not certain from Scripture that twelve men only, and

no women, did communicate (as Bishop Lindsey(1253) would have us certainly

to believe); but suppose it were certain,(1254) yet for this, and all the

other circumstances, which are not exemplary, there were special reasons

either in the urgency of the legal necessity, or in the exigency of

present and accidental occasions, which do not concern us: whereas the

gesture of sitting was freely and purposely chosen, and so intended to be

exemplary, especially since there was no such reason moving Christ to use

this gesture of sitting as doth not concern us.

The Bishop saith,(1255) that his sitting at the former supper might have

been the reason which moved him to sit at the eucharistical supper; but if

Christ had not purposely made choice of the gesture of sitting as the

fittest and most convenient for the eucharistical supper, his sitting at

the former supper could be no reason to move him, as may appear by this

example: There are some gentlemen standing in a nobleman’s waiting-room;

and after they have stood there a while, the nobleman cometh forth; they

begin to speak to him, and, as they speak, still they stand. Now, can any

man say that the reason which moveth them to stand when they speak to the

nobleman, is, because they were standing before he came to them? So doth

the Bishop come short of giving any special reason for Christ’s sitting

which concerneth not us. He can allege no more but Christ’s sitting at the

former supper, which could be no reason, else he should have also risen

from the eucharistical supper to wash the disciples’ feet, even as he rose

from the former supper for that effect. Wherefore, we conclude, that

Christ did voluntarily, and of set purpose, choose sitting as the fittest

and best beseeming gesture for that holy banquet.

Finally, Hooker’s(1256) verdict of the gesture of Christ and his apostles

in this holy supper is, “That our Lord himself did that which custom and

long usage had made fit; we, that which fitness and great decency hath

made usual.” In which words, because cause he importeth that they have

better warrants for their kneeling than Christ had for his sitting (which

is blasphemy), I leave them as not worthy of an answer. Howsoever, let it

be noted that he acknowledged, by kneeling they depart from the example of

Christ.

CHAPTER VII.

OTHER POSITIONS BUILT UPON THE FORMER GROUND.

_Sect._ 1. The third consequence which we infer upon our former rule of

following the example of Christ is, that it is not a thing indifferent to

omit the repetition of those words, “This is my body,” enunciatively and

demonstratively in the act of distributing the eucharistical bread; and

far less is it indifferent so to omit this demonstrative speech in the

distribution, as in place of it to surrogate a prayer to preserve the soul

and body of the communicant unto everlasting life. Our reason is, because

Christ (whose example herein we ought to follow) used no prayer in the

distribution, but that demonstrative enunciation, “This is my body.” But

we go forward.

_Sect._ 2. The fourth position we draw from the same rule is, that it is

not indifferent for a minister to omit the breaking of the bread at the

Lord’s table after the consecration and in the distribution of it, because

he ought to follow the example of Christ, who, after he had blessed the

bread, and when he was distributing it to them who were at table, brake

it,(1257) _manibus comminuendo panem acceptum in partes_, but had it not

carved in small pieces before it was brought to the table. Hence G. J.

Vossius(1258) doth rightly condemn those who, though they break the bread

_in multas minutias_, yet they break it not _in actu sacramentali_. Such a

breaking as this (he saith well) is not _mystica_, but _coquinaria_.

_Sect._ 3. The fifth position, drawn from the very same ground is, that it

is not indifferent for a minister, in the act of distribution, to speak in

the singular number, _Take thou, eat thou, drink thou_; because he should

follow the example of Christ, who, in the distribution, spake in the

plural number, _Take ye, eat ye, drink ye_; and he who followeth not

Christ’s example herein, by his speaking in the singular to one, he maketh

that to be a private action betwixt himself and the communicant, which

Christ made public and common by his speaking to all at one time.

_Sect._ 4. How idly Bishop Lindsey(1259) answereth to these things, it

cannot but appear to every one who considereth that we do not challenge

them for not breaking the bread at all,—for not pronouncing at all these

words, “This is my body,” or for never pronouncing at all these speeches

in the plural, _Take ye, eat ye, drink ye_,—but for not breaking the bread

in the very act of distribution,—for not pronouncing demonstratively those

words, “This is my body,” in the very act of distribution,—for not

speaking in the plural number, “Take ye,” &c.—in the very act of

distribution, as Christ did, having no other reasons to move him than such

as concern us. Why, then, did not the Bishop say something to the point

which we press him with? or shall we excuse him because he had nothing to

say to it?

_Sect._ 5. Now, last of all, we find yet another point, whereby the

Bishop(1260) departeth from the example and mind of Christ. He saith that,

by the sacramental word, “This is my body,” the bread is made the

sacrament, &c.; and that without this word, &c., all our prayers and

wishes should serve to no use. Where he will have the bread to be

otherwise consecrated by us than it was consecrated by Christ; for that

Christ did not consecrate the bread to be the sacrament of his body by

those words, “This is my body,” it is manifest, because the bread was

consecrated before his pronouncing of those words; or else what meaneth

the blessing of it before he brake it? It was both blessed and broken, and

he was also distributing it to the disciples, before ever he said, “This

is my body.” Beza saith, _Benedictionem expresse ad panis consecrationem

et quidem singularem, refert; et omnes nostri referunt, consecrationem

intelligentes, &c._ Pareus saith,(1261) _Qua ex communi cibo, in

spiritualis alimoniae sacramentum transmutetur._ Wherefore we must not

think to sanctify the bread by this prescript word, “This is my body,” but

by prayer and thanksgiving, as Christ did. Our divines hold against the

Papists,(1262) _Verba illa quoe in sacramento sunt consecrata, non esse

paucula quoedam proscripta; sed praecipue verba orationis, quoe non sunt

proescripta_; and that, “through use of the prayers of the church, there

is a change in the elements.”(1263) Dr Fulk objecteth(1264) against

Gregory Martin, “Your popish church doth not either as the Greek

liturgies, or as the churches in Ambrose and Augustine’s time, for they

hold that the elements are consecrated by prayer and thanksgiving.” I know

none who will speak with Bishop Lindsey in this point except Papists: yet

Cornelius à Lapide could also say, _Eucharistia conficitur et conditur

sacris precibus_.(1265)

_Sect._ 6. I say not that these words, “This is my body,” have no use at

all in making the bread to be a sacrament; but that which giveth us

dislike is,

1. That the Bishop maketh not the word and prayer together, but the word

alone, to sanctify the bread and wine. Now, if both the word and prayer be

necessary to sanctify the creatures for the food of our bodies, 1 Tim. iv.

5, much more are they necessary to sanctify them for the food of our

souls. _Neque enim solis domini verbis consecratio sit, sed etiam

precibus._(1266) The fathers, saith Trelcatius,(1267) had not only respect

to those five words, “For this is my body,” _dum eucharistiam fieri

dixerunt mystica precc, invocatione nominis divini, solemni benedictione,

gratiarum actione._ 2. That he makes not the whole word of the institution

to sanctify the bread, but only that one sentence, “This is my body;”

whereas Christ’s will is declared, and, consequently, the elements

sanctified by the whole words of the institution,(1268) “Jesus took the

bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat,

this is my body which is broken for you, this do in remembrance of me,”

&c.

That he acknowledged not the bread, though sanctified by prayer, to be the

sacrament, except that very word be pronounced, “This is my body.” Now,

when a minister hath, from Christ’s will and institution, declared that he

hath appointed bread and wine to be the elements of his body and blood,

when he hath also declared the essential rites of this sacrament.

And, lastly, when, by the prayer of consecration, he hath sanctified the

bread and wine which are present, put the case, that all this while those

prescript sentences, “This is my body,” “This cup is the New Testament in

my blood,” have not been pronounced, yet what hindereth the bread and wine

from being the sacramental elements of the Lord’s body and blood? It is

sounder divinity to say, that the consecration of a sacrament doth not

depend _ex certa aliqua formula verborum_.(1269) For it is evident that,

in baptism, there is not a certain form of words prescribed, as Bellarmine

also proveth;(1270) because Christ saith not, “Say, I baptise thee in the

name,” &c.: so that he prescribeth not what should be done. Aquinas

likewise holdeth,(1271) that the consecration of a sacrament is not

absolutely tied to a certain form of words. And so saith Conradus

Vorstius,(1272) speaking of the eucharist. Wherefore Vossius(1273) doth

rightly condemn the Papists, _quod consecrationem non aliis verbis fieri

putant, quam istis, hoc est corpus meum, et hic est sanguis meus_.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE NOT THINGS INDIFFERENT TO THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND;

BECAUSE SHE DID ABJURE AND REPUDIATE THEM BY A MOST SOLEMN AND GENERAL

OATH.

_Sect._ 1. Having spoken of the nature of things indifferent, and showed

which things be such; also of the rule whereby to try the indifferency of

things: which rule we have applied to certain particular cases;—it

remaineth to say somewhat of the main and general purpose, which is

principally questioned in this last part of our dispute, viz., whether

cross, kneeling, holidays, bishopping, and the other controverted

ceremonies wherewith our church is pressed this day, be such things as we

may use freely and indifferently? The negative (which we hold) is strongly

confirmed by those arguments which, in the third part of this our dispute,

we have put in order against the lawfulness of those ceremonies.

Notwithstanding we have thought fit to add somewhat more in this place.

And, first, we say, whatsoever be the condition of the ceremonies in their

own nature, they cannot be indifferently embraced and used by the church

of Scotland, which hath not only once cast them forth, but also given her

great oath solemnly to the God of heaven, both witnessing her detestation

of the Roman Antichrist’s “five bastard sacraments, with all his rites,

ceremonies, and false doctrine, added to the ministration of the true

sacraments, without the word of God; all his vain allegories, rites,

signs, and traditions, brought in the kirk, without or against the word of

God;” and likewise “promising, and swearing to continue,” as well “in the

discipline and use of the holy sacraments,” as “in the doctrine,” of this

reformed church of Scotland, which then first she embraced and used after

she was truly reformed from Popery and popish abuses. And this which I say

may be seen in the general Confession of Faith, sworn and subscribed by

his Majesty’s father, of everlasting memory, anno 1580, and by the several

parochines in the land, at his Majesty’s strait command; which also was

renewed and sworn again, anno 1596, by the General Assembly, by provincial

assemblies, by presbyteries and particular parish churches.

_Sect._ 2. No reformed church in Europe is so strictly tied by the bond of

an oath and subscription, to hold fast her first discipline and use of the

sacraments, and to hold out popish rites, as is the church of Scotland.

And who knoweth not that an oath doth always oblige and bind, _quando est

factum de rebus certis et possibilibus, vere ac sine dolo præmeditate, ac

cum judicio, juste, ad gloriam Dei, et bonum proximi_?(1274) What one of

all those conditions was here wanting? Can we then say any less than a

pope said before us:(1275) _Non est tutum quemlibet contra juramentum suum

venire, nisi tale sit, quod servatum vergat in interitum salutis æternæ_?

O damnable impiety, which maketh so small account of the violation of the

aforesaid oath, which hath as great power to bind us as that oath of the

princes of Israel made to the Gibeonites, had to bind their posterity, 2

Sam. xxi. 1, 2; for it was made by the whole incorporation of this land,

and hath no term at which it may cease to bind. Nay (in some respects) it

bindeth more straitly than that oath of the princes of Israel. For, 1.

That was made by the princes only; this by prince, pastors, and people: 2.

That was made rashly (for the text showeth that they asked not counsel

from the mouth of the Lord); this with most religious and due

deliberation: 3. That was made to men; this to the great God: 4. That

sworn but once; this once and again.

_Sect._ 3. Some of our opposites go about to derogate somewhat from the

binding power of that oath of the princes of Israel. They are so nettled

therewith that they fitch hither and thither. Dr Forbesse(1276) speaketh

to the purpose thus: _Juramentum Gibeonitis praestitum contra ipsius Dei

mandatum, et inconsulta Deo, non potuissent Josuae et Israelitae opere

perficere nisi Deus, extraordinarie de suo mandato dispensasset,

compassione poenitentis illius populi Gibeonitei, et propter honorem sui

nominis, ut neque foedifragorum fautor, neque supplicium paenitentium

aspernator esse videretur._

_Ans._ 1. If the oath was against the commandment of God, what dishonour

had come to the name of God though he had not patronised the swearers of

it, but hindered them from fulfilling their oath? If a Christian swear to

kill a pagan, and hereafter repent of his oath, and not perform it, can

there any dishonour redound thereby to the name of Christ? The Doctor,

forsooth, must say so.

2. Where hath he read of the repentance of the Gibeonites, which God would

not despise?

3. If an oath made against the commandment of God (the breach of the

commandment being dispensed with) bindeth so strictly and inviolably as

that oath of the princes of Israel did, how much more ought we to think

ourselves strictly and inviolably bound, by the solemn oath of the church

of Scotland, which was not repugnant but most consonant to the word of

God, even our adversaries themselves being judges? for thus speaketh one

of them: _Quod antem jurarunt nostrates, __ non erat illicitum, sed a

nobis omnibus jure praesture potest ac debet_;(1277) so that the Doctor

hath gained nothing, but loosed much, by that which he saith of the

Israelites’ oath: he hath even fanged himself faster in the snare which he

thought to escape.

O but, saith the Doctor, that which they did, either in swearing or in

performing their oath, against the express commandment of God, we may not

draw into an ordinary example.

_Ans._ It was against the commandment of God; no man will say that we

should follow either their swearing or their performing of their oath.

Yet, in the meantime, the Doctor is pressed with this argument, that if

their unlawful oath (in the case of God’s dispensation) did bind their

posterity, much more doth that oath of the church of Scotland (which the

Doctor hath acknowledged lawful and commendable) bind us this day.

_Sect._ 4. But, 4. Albeit the Doctor hath hereby given us scope and

advantage enough against himself; nevertheless, for the truth’s sake, I

add, that it cannot be showed how that oath of the princes of Israel was

against the express commandment of God; but it rather appeareth that it

was agreeable to the same. For, as Tremellius(1278) hath it noted, that

commandment, Deut. xx., whereby the Israelites were commanded to save

alive nothing in the cities of the Canaanites, was to be only understood

of such cities among them as should make war with them, and be besieged by

them. But the Gibeonites were not of this sort; for they sought their

lives before the Israelites came to them. And by the same means Rahab and

her father’s house got their life, because they sought it, Josh. ii.

Calvin also serveth:(1279) _Jussos fuisse Israelitas pacem omnibus

offere._ And Junius, upon Deut. xx., distinguisheth well two laws of war

given to Israel.

The first law is concerning offering peace to all; which law is general

and common as well to the Canaanites as to foreign nations: “When thou

comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it.

And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, then it shall be that

all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and

they shall serve thee.” Which commandment was afterward observed by

Israel; of whom we read, “That when Israel was strong, they put the

Canaanites to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out,” Josh. xvii.

13; Judges i. 28: by Solomon also, who did not cut off the people that

were left of the Hittites and the Amorites, but only made them to pay

tribute, 2 Chron. viii. 7, 8. That which I say is further confirmed by

another place, Josh. xi. 19, 20, where it is said, “There was not a city

that made peace with the children of Israel save the Hivites, the

inhabitants of Gibeon; all other they took in battle. For it was of the

Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in

battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no

favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses.” From

which words it appeareth, that if the Canaanites had made peace with the

children of Israel, they were to show them favour; and that they were

bound by the commandment of the Lord to destroy them, then only, and in

that case, if they would not accept peace, but make war; whence it cometh,

that the cause of the destruction of the Canaanites is imputed to their

own hardness and contumacy in not accepting of peace, and not to any

commandment which God had given to Israel for destroying them. In a word,

it was _voluntas signi_, which, in one place, Deut. xx. 10, showed the

Israelites what was their duty, namely, to offer peace to all, even to the

Canaanites, and not to cut them off if they should accept the peace; but

it was _voluntas beneplaciti_, which, as we read in another place, Deut.

vii. 2, decreed to deliver the Canaanites before the Israelites, that is,

to harden their hearts to come against them in battle, and so to overrule

the matter, by a secret and inscrutable providence, that the Israelites

might lawfully and should certainly destroy them and show them no mercy.

Even as that same God who, by one word, showed unto Abraham what was his

duty, bidding him offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2, by another word

signified unto him what he had decreed to be done, forbidding him to lay

his hand upon the lad, or to do anything unto him, ver. 12. But this, I

know, will be very unsavoury language to many Arminianised conformitants.

The other law of war which Junius, upon Deut. xx., observeth, prescribed

to the Israelites how they should deal with them who refused their peace.

And here only was the difference made betwixt the cities which were very

far off and the cities of the Canaanites, Deut. xx. 15, 16; but the first

law was common, as hath been proven.

Joseph Hall seemeth to deny that the oath of the princes of Israel had any

power to bind, but upon another ground than Dr Forbesse took to himself.

“It would seem very questionable (saith Hall(1280)) whether Joshua needed

to hold himself bound to this oath; for fraudulent conventions oblige not;

and Israel had put in a direct caveat of their vicinity.”

_Ans._ I marvel how it could enter in his mind to think this matter

questionable, since the violation of that oath was afterwards punished

with three years’ famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2. Yet let us hearken to his

reasons. One of them is forged; for the princes of Israel who sware unto

them put in no caveat at all. The text saith only in the general, that

they sware unto them, Josh. ix. 15. As touching his other reason, it is

answered by Calvin,(1281) _Juris jurandi religio_, saith he, _eousque

sancta apud nos esse debet, ne erroris praetextu à pactis discedemus,

etiam in quibus fuimus decepti_. Which, that it may be made more plain

unto us, let us, with the Casuists, distinguish a twofold error in

swearing.(1282) For if the error be about the very substance of the thing

(as when a man contracts marriage with one particular person, taking her

to be another person) the oath bindeth not; but if the error be only about

some extrinsical or accidental circumstance (such as was the error of the

Israelites’ taking the Gibeonites to dwell afar off when they dwelt at

hand), the oath ceaseth not to bind.

_Sect._ 6. This much being said for the binding power of that oath of the

church of Scotland, let us now consider what shifts our opposites use to

elude our argument which we draw from the same; where, first, there

occurreth to us one ground which the Bishop of Edinburgh doth everywhere

beat upon in the trace of this argument, taken out of the 21st article of

the Confession of Faith, wherein we find these words: “Not that we think

that any policy and an order in ceremonies can be appointed for all ages,

times, and places; for as ceremonies, such as men have devised, are but

temporal, so may and ought they to be changed when they foster rather

superstition than that they edify the kirk using the same: ‘whereupon the

Bishop concludeth,(1283) that none who sware the aforesaid article could,

without breach of this oath, swear that the ceremony of sitting at the

receiving of the sacrament could be appointed for all ages, times, and

places.’ ”

_Ans._ None of us denieth that article: we all stand to it. For that which

it pronounceth of ceremonies must be understood of alterable

circumstances, unto which the name of ceremonies is but generally and

improperly applied, as we have showed elsewhere;(1284) neither can we, for

professing ourselves bound by an oath ever to retain sitting at the

receiving of the sacrament in this national church of Scotland, be

therefore thought to transgress the said article.

For, 1. The article speaketh of ceremonies devised by men, whereof sitting

at the sacrament is none, being warranted (as hath been showed) by

Christ’s own example, and not by man’s device.

2. The article speaketh of such ceremonies as rather foster superstition

than edify the church using the same; whereas it is well known that

sitting at the communion did never yet foster superstition in this church;

so that the Bishop did very unadvisedly reckon sitting at the communion

among those ceremonies whereof the article speaketh.

_Sect._ 7. But the Bishop hath a further aim, and attempteth no less than

both to put the blot of perjury off himself and his fellows, and likewise

to rub it upon us, telling us,(1285) “That no man did by the oath oblige

himself to obey and defend that part of discipline which concerneth these

alterable things all the days of his life, but only that discipline which

is unchangeable and commanded in the word. Yea (saith he), we further

affirm, that every man who sware to the discipline of the church in

general, by virtue of the oath standeth obliged, not only to obey and

defend the constitution of the church that was in force at the time of

making his oath, but also to obey and defend whatsoever the church

thereafter hath ordained, or shall ordain, &c., whether thereby the former

constitution be established or altered,” &c. The same answer doth Dr

Forbesse also return us.(1286)

_Ans._ 1. Here is a manifest contradiction; for the Bishop saith that

every man did, by this oath, oblige himself only to obey and defend that

discipline which is unchangeable and commanded in the word. And yet again

he seemeth to import (that which Dr Forbesse plainly avoucheth(1287)),

that every man obliged himself by the same oath to obey and defend all

that the church should afterwards ordain, though thereby the former

constitutions be altered. The Bishop doth, therefore, apparently

contradict himself; or, at the best, he contradicteth his fellow-pleader

for the ceremonies.

2. That ancient discipline and policy of this church which is contrary to

the articles of Perth, and whereunto we are bound by the oath, was well

grounded upon God’s word, and therefore should not have been ranked among

other alterable things.

3. Whereas the Bishop is of opinion that a man may, by his oath, tie

himself to things which a church shall afterwards ordain, he may consider,

that such an oath were unlawful, because not sworn in judgment, Jer. iv.

2. Now this judgment which is required as one of the inseparable

companions of a lawful oath, is not _executio justitiae_, but _judicium

discretionis_, as Thomas teacheth;(1288) whom Bullinger and Zanchius(1289)

do herein follow. But there is no judgment of discretion in his oath who

swears to that he knows not what, even to that which may fall out as

readily wrong as right.

4. Whereas the Bishop and the Doctor allege that every man who sware to

the discipline of this church standeth obliged to obey all that the church

ordained afterward, they greatly deceive themselves.

For, 1. The discipline spoken of in the promissory part of the oath must

be the same which was spoken of in the assertory part. Now that which is

mentioned in the assertory part cannot be imagined to be any other but

that which was then presently used in this church at the time of giving

the oath; for an assertory oath(1290) is either of that which is past or

of that which is present: and the assertory part of the oath whereof we

speak was not of any discipline past and away, therefore of that which was

present. Moreover, Thomas(1291) doth rightly put this difference betwixt

an assertory and a promissory oath, that the matter of a promissory oath

is a thing to come, which is alterable, as concerning the event. _Materia

autem juramenti assertorii, quod est de praeterito vel praesenti, in

quandam necessitatem jam transiit, et immutabilis facta est._ Since, then,

the discipline spoken of in the assertory part was no other than that

which was used in this church when the oath was sworn; and since the

promissory part is illative upon, and relative unto the matter of the

assertory part; therefore we conclude the discipline spoken of in the

promissory part could be no other than that which was then presently used

in this church at the swearing of the oath.

2. Since the doctrine mentioned in that oath is said to have been

professed openly by the King’s Majesty, and the whole body of this realm,

before the swearing of the same, why should we not likewise understand the

discipline mentioned in the oath to be that which was practised in this

realm before the swearing of the same?

3. This is further proved by the word _continuing_. We are sworn to

continue in the obedience of the doctrine and discipline of this church;

but how can men be said to continue in the obedience of any other

discipline than that which they have already begun to obey? This the

Bishop seems to have perceived, for he speaks only of defending and

obeying, but not of continuing to obey, which is the word of the oath, and

which proveth the discipline there spoken of and sworn to to be no other

than that which was practised in the church when the oath was sworn. 4.

Whilst we hold that he who sweareth to the present discipline of a church,

is not by virtue of this oath obliged to obey all which that church shall

ordain afterward, both the school and the canon law do speak for us. The

school teacheth, that _canonicus qui jurat se servaturum statuta edita in

aliquo collegio, non tenetur ex juramenta ad servandum futura_;(1292) the

canon law judgeth, that _qui jurat servare statuta edita, &c., non tenetur

ex juramento ad novitur edita._(1293)

_Sect._ 8. But we are more fully to consider that ground whereby the

Bishop thinketh to purge himself, and those of his sect, of the breach of

the oath. He still allegeth,(1294) that the points of discipline for which

we contend are not contained in the matter of the oath. Now, as touching

the discipline of this church which is spoken of in the oath, he

questioneth what is meant by it.(1295)

_Ans._ 1. Put the case, it were doubtful and questionable what is meant by

the word discipline in the oath; yet _pars tutior_ were to be chosen. The

Bishop nor no man among us can certainly know, that the discipline meant

and spoken of in the oath by those that swear it, comprehendeth not under

it those points of discipline which we now contend, and which this church

had in use at the swearing of the oath. Shall we, then, put the breach of

the oath in a fair hazard? God forbid; for, as Joseph Hall(1296) noteth

from the example of Joshua and the princes, men may not trust to shifts

for the eluding of an oath. Surely the fear of God’s name should make us

tremble at an oath, and to be far from adventuring upon any such shifts.

2. The Bishop doth but needlessly question what is meant by the discipline

whereof the oath speaketh; for howsoever in ecclesiastical use it signify

oftentimes that policy which standeth in the censuring of manners, yet in

the oath it must be taken in the largest sense, namely, for the whole

policy of the church; for, 1. The whole policy of this church did at that

time go under the name of discipline;(1297) and those two books wherein

this policy is contained were called The Books of Discipline. And, without

all doubt, they who sware the oath meant by _discipline_ that whole policy

of the church which is contained in those books. Howbeit (as the preface

of them showeth) discipline doth also comprehend other ecclesiastical

ordinances and constitutions which are not inserted in them. 2. Doctrine

and discipline, in the oath, do comprehend all that to which the church

required, and we promised, to perform obedience; therefore the whole

policy of the church was meant by _discipline_, forasmuch as it was not

comprehended under doctrine.

_Sect._ 9. The Bishop(1298) objecteth three limitations, whereby he

thinketh to seclude from the matter of the oath that policy and discipline

which we plead for.

First, he saith, that the matter of the oath is the doctrine and

discipline revealed to the world by the gospel, and that this limitation

excludeth all ecclesiastical constitutions which are not expressly or by a

necessary consequence contained in the written word.

2. That the matter of the oath is the doctrine and discipline which is

received, believed and defended, by many notable churches, &c., and that

this limitation excludeth all these things wherein the church of Scotland

hath not the consent of many notable churches, &c.

3. That the doctrine and discipline which is the matter of the oath, is

particularly expressed in the Confession of Faith, &c., and that in this

confession of faith, established by parliament, there is no mention made

of the articles controverted, &c.

_Ans._ I might here show how he confoundeth the preaching of the evangel

with the written word; likewise how falsely he affirmeth, that the points

of discipline for which we plead, are neither warranted by the Scripture

nor by the consent of many notable churches. But to the point: These words

of the oath, “We believe, &c., that this is the only true Christian faith

and religion, pleasing God, and bringing salvation to man, which now is by

the mercy of God revealed to the world by the preaching of the blessed

evangel, and received, believed and defended, by many and sundry notable

kirks and realms, but chiefly by the kirk of Scotland, the King’s Majesty,

and three Estates, &c., as more particularly expressed in the Confession

of our Faith, &c.,” are altogether perverted by the Bishop; for there is

no discipline spoken of in these words, but afterward. Why, then, talks he

of a discipline revealed to the world by the gospel, having the consent of

many notable churches, and expressed in the Confession of Faith? And if

the Bishop will have any discipline to be meant of in these words, he must

comprehend it under the Christian faith and religion, which bringeth

salvation unto man. But this he cannot do with so much as the least show

of reason. Thus put we an end to the argument taken from the oath of God,

wishing every man amongst us, out of the fear of God’s glorious and

fearful name, duly to regard and ponder the same.

CHAPTER IX.

A RECAPITULATION OF SUNDRY OTHER REASONS AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE

CEREMONIES.

_Sect._ 1. That the ceremonies are not indifferent to us, or such things

as we may freely practise, we prove yet by other reasons:

For, 1. They who plead for the indifferency of the ceremonies must tell us

whether they call them indifferent _in actu signato_, or _in actu

exercito_; or in both these respects. Now, we have proven,(1299) that

there is no action deliberated upon, and wherein we proceed with the

advice of reason, which can be indifferent _in actu exercito_, and that

because it cannot choose, but either have all the circumstances which it

should have (and so be good), or else want some of them, one or more (and

so be evil). And for the indifferency of the ceremonies _in actu signato_,

though we should acknowledge it (which we do not), yet it could be no

warrant for the practice of them, or else the believing Gentiles might

have freely eaten of all meats, notwithstanding of the scandal of the

Jews, for the eating of all meats freely was still a thing indifferent,

_in actu signato_.

_Sect._ 2. The ceremonies are not indifferent _eo ipso_, that they are

prescribed and commended unto us as indifferent; for, as Aquinas(1300)

resolveth out of Isidore, every human or positive law must be both

_necessaria ad remotionem malorum_ and _utilis ad consecutionem bonorum_.

The guides of God’s church have not power to prescribe any other thing

than that which is good and profitable for edifying; for they are set not

as lords over Christ’s inheritance, but as ministers for their good: “It

seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, (say the apostles and elders to

the churches,) to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary

things,” Acts xv. 28. They would not, you see, have enacted a canon about

those things, howbeit indifferent in their own nature, had they not found

them necessary for the eschewing of scandal. And as for the civil

magistrate, he also hath not power to prescribe any thing which he

pleaseth, though it be in itself indifferent; “for he is the minister of

God unto thee for good,” saith the Apostle, Rom. xiii. 4. Mark that word,

_for good_,—it lets us see that the magistrate hath not power given him to

enjoin any other thing than that which may be for our good. _Non enim sua

causa dominantur_, saith Calvin;(1301) _sed publico bono; neque effroeni

potentia proediti sunt, sed quoe subditorum saluti sit obstricta_. Now,

the first and chief good which the magistrate is bound to see for unto the

subjects, is (as Pareus showeth(1302)), _bonum spirituale_. Let us, then,

either see the good of the ceremonies, or else we must account them to be

such things as God never gave princes nor pastors power to enjoin; for

howsoever they have power to prescribe many things which are indifferent,

that is to say, neither good nor evil in their general nature, yet they

may not command us to practise any thing which in the particular use of it

is not necessary or expedient for some good end.

3. The ceremonies are not indifferent, because, notwithstanding that they

are prescribed and commended unto us as things in themselves indifferent,

yet we are by the will and authority of men compelled and necessitated to

use them. _Si vero ad res suo natura medius accedat coactio_, &c., then,

say the Magdeburgians.(1303) Paul teacheth, Col. ii., that it is not

lawful to use them freely: “If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments

of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to

ordinances (touch not, taste not, handle not, which are all to perish with

the using), after the commandments and doctrines of men.” Hence is

Tertullian taxed(1304) for inducing a necessity in things indifferent.

Now, with how great necessity and co-action the ceremonies are imposed

upon us, we have made it evident elsewhere.(1305)

_Sect._ 4. 4. Whatever be the quality of the ceremonies in their own

nature, they are not indifferent to us; neither may we freely practice

them, because Papists make advantage of them, and take occasion from them

to confirm sundry of their errors and superstitions, as we have likewise

elsewhere made evident.(1306) Now, _cum adiaphora rapiuntur __ ad

confessionem, libera esse desinunt_, saith the Harmony of

Confessions.(1307) Mark _rapiuntur_. Though they get no just occasion,

yet, if they take occasion, though unjustly, that is enough to make us

abstain from things indifferent. _Etiam ea_, saith Balduine,(1308) _quoe

natura sunt sua liberoe observationis, in statu confessionis, cum ab

adversariis eorum mutatio postulatur, fiunt necessaria._

_Sect._ 5. 5. Things which are most indifferent in themselves become evil

in the case of scandal, and so may not be used. So hold the Century

writers;(1309) so Pareus;(1310) so Zanchius;(1311) so Chemnitius;(1312) so

Augustine;(1313) and so hath the Apostle taught.(1314) But that out of the

practice of the ceremonies there groweth active scandal unto the weak, we

have most clearly proven.(1315) Wherefore, let them be in their own nature

as indifferent as anything can be, yet they are not indifferent to be used

and practised by us; and whosoever swalloweth this scandal of Christ’s

little ones, and repenteth not, the heavy millstone of God’s dreadful

wrath shall be hanged about his neck, to sink him down in the bottomless

lake; and then shall he feel that which before he would not understand.

_Sect._ 6. 6. It is not enough for warrant of our practice that we do

those things which are indifferent or lawful in themselves, except they be

also expedient to be done by us according to the Apostle’s rule, 1 Cor.

vi. 12. But I have proven that many and weighty inconveniences do follow

upon the ceremonies,(1316) as namely, that they make way and are the

ushers for greater evils; that they hinder edification, and in their

fleshly show and outward splendour, obscure and prejudice the life and

power of godliness; that they are the unhappy occasions of much injury and

cruelty against the faithful servants of Christ, that they were bellows to

blow up, and are still fuel to increase the church-consuming fire of

woeful dissentions amongst us, &c. Where also we show,(1317) that some of

our opposites themselves acknowledge the inconveniency of the ceremonies;

wherefore we cannot freely nor indifferently practise them.

_Sect._ 7. 7. These ceremonies are the accursed monuments of popish

superstition, and have been both dedicated unto and employed in the public

and solemn worship of idols, and therefore (having no necessary use for

which we should still retain them) they ought to be utterly abolished, and

are not left free nor indifferent to us, which argument I have also made

good elsewhere,(1318) and in this place I only add, that both

Jerome,(1319) Zanchius, and Amandus Polanus,(1320) do apply this argument

to the surplice, holding, that though it be in itself indifferent, yet

_quia in cultu idololatrico veste linea utuntur clerici papaxi, et in ea

non parum sanctimoniae ponunt superstitiosi homines; valedicendum est, non

solum cultui idololatrico, sed etiam omnibus idololatriae monumentis,

instrumentis et adminiculis_. Yea, Joseph Hall himself, doth herein give

testimony unto us, for upon Hezekiah’s pulling down of the brazen serpent,

because of the idolatrous abuse of it, thus he noteth:(1321) “God

commanded the raising of it, God commanded the abolishing of it.

Superstitious use can mar the very institutions of God, how much more the

most wise and well-grounded devices of men!” And further, in the end of

this treatise, entitled, _The Honour of the Married Clergy_, he adjoineth

a passage taken out of the epistle of Erasmus Roterodamus to Christopher,

Bishop of Basil, which passage beginneth thus: “For those things which are

altogether of human constitution must (like to remedies in diseases) be

attempered to the present estate of matters and times. Those things which

were once religiously instituted, afterwards, according to occasion, and

the changed quality of manners and times, may be with more religion and

piety abrogated.” Finally, If Hezekiah be praised for breaking down the

brazen serpent (though instituted by God) when the Israelites began to

abuse it against the honour of God, how much more (saith Zanchius(1322))

are our reformers to be praised, for that they did thus with rites

instituted by men, being found full of superstitious abuse, though in

themselves they had not been evil!

_Sect._ 8. 8. The ceremonies are not indifferent, because they depart too

far from the example of Christ and his apostles, and the purer times of

the church; for instead of that ancient Christian-like and soul-edifying

simplicity, religion is now by their means busked with the vain trumpery

of Babylonish trinkets, and her face covered with the whorish and

eye-bewitching fairding of fleshly show and splendour; and I have also

showed particularly(1323) how sundry of the ceremonies are flat contrary

to the example of Christ and his apostles and the best times.

_Sect._ 9. 9. The ceremonies make us also to conform, and like the

idolatrous Papists, whereas it is not lawful to symbolise with idolaters,

or to be like them in a ceremony of man’s devising, or anything which hath

no necessary use in religion; such a distance and a dissimilitude there is

required to be betwixt the church of Christ and the synagogue of Satan;

betwixt the temple of God and the kingdom of the beast; betwixt the

company of sound believers and the conventicles of heretics who are

without; betwixt the true worshippers of God and the worshippers of idols,

that we cannot, without being accessory to their superstitious and false

religion, and partaking with the same, appear conform unto them in their

unnecessary rites and ceremonies. Durandus tells us,(1324) that they call

Easter by the Greek and not by the Hebrew name, and that they keep not

that feast upon the same day with the Jews, and all for this cause, lest

they should seem to Judaise. How much more reason have we to abstain from

the ceremonies of the church of Rome lest we seem to Romanise! But I say

no more in this place, because I have heretofore confirmed this argument

at length.(1325)

_Sect._ 10. 10. The ceremonies, as urged upon us, are also full of

superstition; holiness and worship are placed in them, as we have proven

by unanswerable grounds,(1326) and by testimonies of our opposites

themselves. Therefore were they never so indifferent in their own general

nature, this placing of them in the state of worship maketh them cease to

be indifferent.

_Sect._ 11. 11. The ceremonies against which we dispute are more than

matters of mere order, forasmuch as sacred and mysterious significations

are given unto them, and by their significations they are thought to teach

men effectually sundry mysteries and duties of piety. Therefore they are

not free nor indifferent, but more than men have power to institute; for

except circumstances and matters of mere order there is nothing which

concerneth the worship of God left to the determination of men, and this

argument also hath been in all the parts of it fully explained and

strengthened by us,(1327) which strongly proveth that the ceremonies are

not indifferent, so much as _quo ad speciem_. _Quare doctrina à nobis

tradita_ (these be Zanchius’ words(1328)) _non licere nobis, aliis externi

cultus ceremoniis Deum colere, quam quas ipse in sacris literis per

apostolis proescripsit, firma ac certa manet_.

_Sect._ 12. 12. Whatsoever indifferency the ceremonies could be thought to

have in their own nature, yet if it be considered how the church of

Scotland hath once been purged from them, and hath spued them out with

detestation, and hath enjoyed the comfortable light and sweet beams of the

glorious and bright shining gospel of Christ, without shadows and figures,

then shall it appear that there is no indifferency in turning back to weak

and beggarly elements, Gal. v. 9. And thus saith Calvin(1329) of the

ceremonies of the _interim_, that granting they were things in themselves

indifferent, yet the restitution of them in those churches which were once

purged from them, is no indifferent thing. Wherefore, O Scotland!

“strengthen the things which remain, that are ready to die,” Rev. iii. 2.

Remember also from whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do the first

works; or else thy candlestick will be quickly removed out of his place,

except thou repent, Rev. ii. 5.