An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on the summit of his

country's honors, when he looked forward to the time at which he must

descend from the exalted eminence for ever, and reflected that no

exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse;

such a man, in such a situation, would be much more violently tempted to

embrace a favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of

his power, at every personal hazard, than if he had the probability of

answering the same end by doing his duty.

Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability of the

government to have half a dozen men who had had credit enough to be

raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the

people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were

destined never more to possess?

A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the

community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief

magistrate in the exercise of his office. That experience is the parent

of wisdom, is an adage the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as

well as the simplest of mankind. What more desirable or more essential

than this quality in the governors of nations? Where more desirable or

more essential than in the first magistrate of a nation? Can it be

wise to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban of

the Constitution, and to declare that the moment it is acquired, its

possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it was

acquired, and to which it is adapted? This, nevertheless, is the precise

import of all those regulations which exclude men from serving their

country, by the choice of their fellowcitizens, after they have by a

course of service fitted themselves for doing it with a greater degree

of utility.

A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be the banishing men from

stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence

might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety. There

is no nation which has not, at one period or another, experienced an

absolute necessity of the services of particular men in particular

situations; perhaps it would not be too strong to say, to the

preservation of its political existence. How unwise, therefore, must be

every such self-denying ordinance as serves to prohibit a nation

from making use of its own citizens in the manner best suited to

its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing the personal

essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of the chief

magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for

another, even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental to the

community, inasmuch as it would substitute inexperience to experience,

and would tend to unhinge and set afloat the already settled train of

the administration.

A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would operate as

a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration. By

necessitating a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it

would necessitate a mutability of measures. It is not generally to be

expected, that men will vary and measures remain uniform. The contrary

is the usual course of things. And we need not be apprehensive that

there will be too much stability, while there is even the option of

changing; nor need we desire to prohibit the people from continuing

their confidence where they think it may be safely placed, and where,

by constancy on their part, they may obviate the fatal inconveniences of

fluctuating councils and a variable policy.

These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle

of exclusion. They apply most forcibly to the scheme of a perpetual

exclusion; but when we consider that even a partial exclusion would

always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious

object, the observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully

to one case as to the other.

What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages?

They are represented to be: 1st, greater independence in the magistrate;

2d, greater security to the people. Unless the exclusion be perpetual,

there will be no pretense to infer the first advantage. But even in that

case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may

sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections, no friends, for

whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing by a firm conduct,

to make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression that a time

is fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only MAY, but

MUST, be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an

inferior, footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his

independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement.

As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to

entertain doubts concerning it. If the exclusion were to be perpetual,

a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any

case to entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield

to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his

passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. And

if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will

of the people, he might induce them to consider as a very odious

and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision which was

calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their

attachment to a favorite. There may be conceived circumstances in which

this disgust of the people, seconding the thwarted ambition of such

a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever

reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office,

by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional

privilege.

There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to

continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion,

to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best

speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far

more certain and decisive.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 73

The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

From the New York Packet. Friday, March 21, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive

authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident

that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the

executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and

nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary

and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious

to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in

most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses,

to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. These

expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms, would no doubt

convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be

distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue

is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found that

a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were

necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be

wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the

Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of

the legislative body.

It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention

which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is

there provided that "The President of the United States shall, at stated

times, receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be

increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been

elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument

from the United States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine

any provision which would have been more eligible than this. The

legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to

declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time

for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power

to alter it, either by increase or diminution, till a new period

of service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his

fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity

by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its members,

will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any

other emolument than that which may have been determined by the first

act. He can, of course, have no pecuniary inducement to renounce or

desert the independence intended for him by the Constitution.

The last of the requisites to energy, which have been enumerated, are

competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to

be vested in the President of the United States.

The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the qualified

negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses

of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all bills

with objections, to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws,

unless they should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the

component members of the legislative body.

The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights,

and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already

suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment

delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and

the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own

defense, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable

principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or

qualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches.

Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable

to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might

gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions,

or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the

legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in

the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the

legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of

just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us,

that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought

to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense.

But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a

shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against

the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the

legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects

of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public

good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.

The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated

by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would

possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless

this presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the

executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body.

But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than

solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition

of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition

that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may

sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of

other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes

pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes

hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflexion, would

condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon

the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is

to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing

of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the

measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the

situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger

of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those

missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or

interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of any kind

should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in

relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and

mislead every one of them.

It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes

that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well

as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with

those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and

mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character

and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution

calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in

the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as much

more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater

stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly

be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the

advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.

Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the legislative

body in a free government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial

of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the

negative would generally be employed with great caution; and there

would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the

exercise of it. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign

attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand

sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint

resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. He would not fail to

exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure

disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being

reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking

the displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the

legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture

to exert his prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or

extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede

to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed

since the negative of the crown has been exercised.

If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch,

would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration,

how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of

the United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the

executive authority of a government wholly and purely republican?

It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his

power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An

argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very

source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in

appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow, that because it

might be rarely exercised, it would never be exercised. In the case

for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the

constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public

good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness

would avail himself of his constitutional means of defense, and would

listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former

supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest

in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the

sanction of his constituents, who, though they would naturally incline

to the legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their

partiality to delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye

to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are

men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty

at every hazard.

But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will

both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the

executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of

a considerable part of the legislative body. Instead of an absolute

negative, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative

already described. This is a power which would be much more readily

exercised than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by

his single VETO, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration;

subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one

third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections.

He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should

prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the

legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting

the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct and

categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh,

and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative

objections to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are

addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be

more apt to be exercised; and for this very reason, it may in practice

be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen

that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of

both branches of the legislature at the same time; and this, too, in

spite of the counterposing weight of the Executive. It is at any rate

far less probable that this should be the case, than that such views

should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of

this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and unperceived,

though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits,

are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot

control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of

opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no

such external impediments were to be feared.

This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this

State vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the

chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has

been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with

success. And its utility has become so apparent, that persons who,

in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from

experience become its declared admirers.(1)

I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the formation

of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the

constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two

strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is that the

judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an

improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary

capacities; the other is that by being often associated with the

Executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political

views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by

degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments. It

is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation

than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to

place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the

Executive.

PUBLIUS

1. Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the convention is

of this number.

FEDERALIST No. 74

The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of

the Executive.

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 25, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief of the

army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several

States when called into the actual service of the United States." The

propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the

same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in

general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those

of them which have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with

a council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in

him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction

of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the

exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies

the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and

employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the

definition of the executive authority.

"The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal

officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating

to the duties of their respective officers." This I consider as a mere

redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides would result

of itself from the office.

He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for offenses

against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Humanity

and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of

pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The

criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity,

that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt,

justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense

of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided,

it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to

the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the

rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were

calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that

the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally

inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of

weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a

different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence

from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of

obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or

censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one

man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government,

than a body of men.

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