government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the
Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will
not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives
cannot, more than suffice for very different purposes; their private
fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be
sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be
in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests
her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be
exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now,
the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability
of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members
of government, standing on as different foundations as republican
principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to
the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this
apprehension. But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still
further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible
to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may
be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore
can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant
by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to
purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves,
is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and
to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which
all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give
themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of
the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust,
so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain
portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the
existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of
some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the
inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for
self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can
restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 56
The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of
Representatives)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 16, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it
will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its
constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed
number of representatives with the great extent of the United States,
the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests,
without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will
distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best
answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these
peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to
be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and
interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do
not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every
attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In
determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a
particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within
the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of
most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are
commerce, taxation, and the militia.
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been
elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws
and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives
would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.
Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be
involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark
is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal
collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of
the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in
sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected
within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts,
and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in
either, which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of
the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State,
framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of
themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and
must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in
many cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legislature,
than to review the different laws, and reduce them in one general act.
A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him,
might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union,
without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected that
whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases
requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects will
be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given
to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State
codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State
were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within
itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of
local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several
volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors
of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of members
sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from
another circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only
bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local
knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases
have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the
State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the
State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a
very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
(The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater
force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of
discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout
each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but
little in different parts of the same State.)(E1)
(With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any
circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to
be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or
level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the
only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches
general principles of organization, movement, and discipline, which
apply universally.)(E1)
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove
the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any
respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the
extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and
the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information,
so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and
difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a
single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by
itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified.
A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a
proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each
individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in
one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole
State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any
part of it. On a comparison of the different States together, we find
a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances
connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the
federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few
representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with them a
due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much
information to acquire concerning all the other States. The changes
of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the
different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time
on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the
contrary. At present some of the States are little more than a society
of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of
industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced
population, and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller
representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken
care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper
increase of the representative branch of the government.
The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many
political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and
which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,
corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The
number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot
be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these
eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and
fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and
sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and
twenty-three persons.(1) It cannot be supposed that the half thus
elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add
any thing either to the security of the people against the government,
or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the
legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are
more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive
magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They
might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more
than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We
will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend
the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not reside
among their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them, and
have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these
concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the
depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions that
is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights
and explain the situation of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND
SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of
executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of
legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that
a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these
circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable,
in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature
concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the
weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House
of Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest
assurance, that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS
will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the
interests which will be confided to it.
PUBLIUS
1. Burgh's "Political Disquisitions."
E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.
FEDERALIST No. 57
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense
of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will
be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy
with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious
sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal
Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the
objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the
principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place,
to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst
they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining
rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means
relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are
numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of
the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the
people.
Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the
House of Representatives that violates the principles of republican
government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many?
Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly
conformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the
rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of
obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who
exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch
of the legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit
may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No
qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil
profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the
inclination of the people.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of
their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find
it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their
fidelity to their constituents.
In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the
preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume that in general
they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which
entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to
the nature of their engagements.
In the second place, they will enter into the public service under
circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at
least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to
marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart
from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and
benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against
human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but
too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the
universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of
the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.
In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his
constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His
pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his
pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions.
Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring
characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men
deriving their advancement from their influence with the people,
would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from
innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people.
All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without
the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the
House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members
an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the
sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation
can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to
anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise
of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from
which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful
discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal
of it.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they
can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves
and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has
always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can
connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them
that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few
governments have furnished examples; but without which every government
degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the
House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of
themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the genius
of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and
above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of
America--a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by
it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not
obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will
be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their
constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords
by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great
mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient
to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that
government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not
the genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government
provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the
identical means on which every State government in the Union relies for
the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand
by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to
the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government,
yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be
champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their
own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will
immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them?
Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode
prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, he
could suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification
of property was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of
eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or fortunes;
or at least that the mode prescribed by the State constitutions was in
some respect or other, very grossly departed from. We have seen how far
such a supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor would
it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference
discoverable between the two cases is, that each representative of the
United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst
in the individual States, the election of a representative is left to
about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended that this difference is
sufficient to justify an attachment to the State governments, and an
abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the
objection turns, it deserves to be examined.
Is it supported by REASON? This cannot be said, without maintaining
that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit
representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than
five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as in so
great a number a fit representative would be most likely to be found, so
the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues
of the ambitious or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.
Is the CONSEQUENCE from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or
six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right
of suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of
their public servants, in every instance where the administration of the
government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for
that number of citizens?
Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in the last paper,
that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little
exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.
Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here, and which
favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is
eligible as a representative of a county, unless he possess real estate
of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor of a
city or borough, unless he possess a like estate of half that annual
value. To this qualification on the part of the county representatives
is added another on the part of the county electors, which restrains
the right of suffrage to persons having a freehold estate of the annual
value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to the present
rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances, and
notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be
said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the
ruins of the many.