If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our

prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,

at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries

to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This

assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate

the importance of the markets of three millions of people--increasing

in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to

agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so--to any

manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the

trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in

its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns,

to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for

instance, we had a government in America, capable of excluding Great

Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all

our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her

politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect

of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive

kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these questions have been

asked, upon other occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a

solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that prohibitions on our

part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could

prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would

be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were

wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be

materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her

own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits

be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and

risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable

deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the

competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British

commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the

management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will

justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a

state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of

the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities

of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present

system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets

of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most

substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British government,

and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions

and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent

effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see

themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations

toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a

federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union

under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not

very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of

the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if

thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be

more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies.

A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either

side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the

event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our

position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this

consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this

country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies,

it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable

us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price

would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By

a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the

arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance

of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may

dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that

the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other,

and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly

placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would

be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each

other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or

remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as

it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected

when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its

weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources

of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the

combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation

would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing

an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive

navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of

moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of the

little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable

course of nature.

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might

operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,

availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the

conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common

interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our

becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our

navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine

us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content

ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the

profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and

persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the

genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself

an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost,

and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom,

might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are

rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the

Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the

Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future

existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners

would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain

with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain

are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost

moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long

indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us

to be possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are

able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more natural

than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such

dangerous competitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.

All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously

participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of

mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of

seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the

principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal

resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.

To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various

ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the

quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and

support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources

of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or

partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single

part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated

America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential

establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance

certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood

for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting

texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy

might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of

signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national

economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater

plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn

from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external

or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more

than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of

a navy.

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance

the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not

only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation

to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be

replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free

circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise

will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of

different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or

unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another.

The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation

contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted

upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value

than with a small number of materials of the same value; arising

from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets.

Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and

unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can

scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter

predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would

be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation.

The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these

observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the

commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable

than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united

or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them

which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,

interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the

course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial,

as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of

government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of

a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the

regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper

discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our

interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American

affairs. The world may politically, as well as geographically, be

divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests.

Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her

negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended

her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively

felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted

her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the

rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound

philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a

physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and

with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even dogs cease

to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.(1) Facts have

too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It

belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach

that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it.

Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans

disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen

States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in

erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all

transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the

connection between the old and the new world!

PUBLIUS "Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."

FEDERALIST No. 12

The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have

been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of

revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by

all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most

productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a

primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of

gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the

precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,

it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to make

them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant,

the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious

manufacturer,--all orders of men, look forward with eager expectation

and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils. The

often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce has, from

indubitable experience, received a decision which has silenced the

rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has proved, to the

satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately

blended and interwoven. It has been found in various countries that, in

proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how

could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent

for the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the

cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing

the quantity of money in a state--could that, in fine, which is the

faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment

that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part

of the objects upon which they are exerted? It is astonishing that so

simple a truth should ever have had an adversary; and it is one, among

a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or

of too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the

plainest truths of reason and conviction.

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in

a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the

celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these

objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and

facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary

dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile,

cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is

situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory

are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from

the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can

boast but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to

owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the

preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the

strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be

seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of

view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It

is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the

people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is

impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.

Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the

collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been

uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained

empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of

popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident

to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every

experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the

different legislatures the folly of attempting them.

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be

surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of

Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more

tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more practicable,

than in America, far the greatest part of the national revenue is

derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from

excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter

description.

In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means

of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must

be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill

brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets

of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty

supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and

lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to

be laid hold of in any other way than by the imperceptible agency of

taxes on consumption.

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will

best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be

best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious

doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general

Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce,

so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from

that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for

the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it

must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties

more productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to

increase the rate without prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which

they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the facility

of communication in every direction; the affinity of language

and manners; the familiar habits of intercourse;--all these are

circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between

them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions

of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States or

confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the

temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The

temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not permit

those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the

avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by

water; and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the

adventurous stratagems of avarice.

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly

employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the

dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these

patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty

in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland

communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which

the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by

disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with respect to

each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The

arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily

armed, would be intolerable in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the

States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but

ONE SIDE to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from

foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to

hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would

attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would

have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well

after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination.

An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention

of any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed

vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at

a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the government

having the same interest to provide against violations everywhere,

the co-operation of its measures in each State would have a powerful

tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve by

Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be

relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great distance

from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places

with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade.

The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night,

as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring

nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a

direct contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to

one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe.

The difference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect

importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small

parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the additional

facilities of inland communication, must be palpable to every man of

discernment.

It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at

much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,

further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any

partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted,

that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three

per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent.,

and in Britain they exceed this proportion.(1) There seems to be nothing

to hinder their being increased in this country to at least treble their

present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal

regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a

ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported

into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons;

which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred thousand

pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should

tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally

favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the

health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of

national extravagance as these spirits.

The Federalist Papers(#1404) · 第 5 / 47 段