The train of powder, however, had been laid by the diplomatic
engagements. Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into collision in the
spring of 1913 over the Scutari incident. In December, 1912, M. Sazonov
had urged Serbia to play a waiting game in order to "deliver a blow at
Austria." But on 4 April, 1913, Baron Beyens reports from Berlin that
the arrogance and contempt with which the Serbs receive the Vienna
Cabinet's protests over Scutari
can only be explained by their belief that St. Petersburg will
support them. The Serbian chargé d'affaires was quite openly saying
here lately that his Government would not have persisted in its
course for the last six months in the face of the Austrian
opposition had they not received encouragement in their course from
the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, who is a diplomatist of M.
Isvolsky's school.... M. Sazonov's heart is with his colleagues who
are directing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels his
influence with the Tsar being undermined by the court-party and the
pan-Slavists. Hence his inconsequent behaviour.
The military activity which the Russian Government displayed in 1913
gives interest to this estimate of M. Sazonov's position. No doubt to
some extent the estimate was correct; M. Sazonov, like Sir E. Grey, was
probably, when it was too late, much disquieted by the events which
marshalled him the way that he was going. In 1914, this military
activity gained extraordinary intensity. The Russian army was put upon a
peace-footing of approximately 1,400,000, "an effective numerical
strength hitherto unprecedented," said the St. Petersburg correspondent
of the London _Times_. From January to June, the Russian Government made
immense purchases of war material. In February, it concluded a loan in
Paris for the improvement of its strategic roads and railways on the
German frontier. Russia, as was generally known at the time, had her eye
on the acquisition of Constantinople; and in the same month, February, a
council of war was held in St. Petersburg to work out "a general
programme of action in order to secure for us a favourable solution of
the historical question of the Straits." In March, the St. Petersburg
newspaper which served as the mouthpiece of the Minister of War,
published an article stating that Russia's strategy would no longer be
"defensive" but "active." Another paper spoke of the time coming when
"the crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army would be an
unavoidable decision." In the same month, Russia raised a heavy tariff
against the importation of German grain and flour; thus bearing out the
evidence of German trade-reports that even at this time Germany was
still exporting grain to Russia--a most extraordinary proceeding for a
nation which contemplated a sudden declaration of war before the next
harvest. In the same month, the Russian Government brought in military
estimates of £97 million. It exercised heavy pressure on the French
Government in the protracted political turmoil over the maintenance of
the Three Years Service law. In April, "trial mobilizations" were begun,
and were continued up to the outbreak of the war. In May, M. Sazonov
informed the Tsar that the British Government "has decided to empower
the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and
Russian naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing technical
conditions for possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia
and France." In the same month, a complete mobilization of all the
reserves of the three annual contingents of 1907-1909 was ordered for
the whole Russian Empire, as a "test," to take place in the autumn. In
the same month the Russian Admiralty instructed its agent in London,
Captain Volkov, as follows:
Our interests on the Northern scene of operations require that
England keeps as large a part of the German fleet as possible in
check in the North Sea.... The English Government could render us a
substantial service if it would agree to send a sufficient number
of boats to our Baltic ports to compensate for our lack of means of
transport, before the beginning of war-operations.
This document, revealed by the Soviet Government in 1919, is pretty
damaging to the assumption of an "unprepared and unsuspecting Europe";
especially as Professor Conybeare has given publicity to the fact that
"before the beginning of war-operations" those English boats were there,
prompt to the minute, empty, ready and waiting.
In June, the Russian Ambassador warned the Russian naval staff in London
that they must exercise great caution in talking about a landing in
Pomerania or about the dispatch of English boats to the Russian Baltic
ports before the outbreak of war, "so that the rest may not be
jeopardized." On 13 June, the newspaper-organ of the Russian Minister
of War published an inspired article under the caption: "Russia is
Ready: France must be Ready."
Two weeks later, the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis
Joseph, was murdered at Sarajevo, a town in Bosnia, by Serbian officers.
The murder was arranged by the Serbian Major Tankesitch, of the
pan-Slavist organization known as the Black Hand; and this organization
was fostered, if not actually subsidized, by the Russian Minister at
Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the pupil and _alter ego_ of M. Isvolsky, and the
architect and promoter of the Balkan League!