FOOTNOTE:

[11] On 10 March of the following year, Mr. Asquith, replying to a

question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England was

under an "obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry

in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed

force out of this country to operate in Europe." On 24 March, he made

similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King. On

14 April, Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in the most

categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with any

foreign Power! On 3 May, the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt,

declared publicly that he "could conceive no circumstances in which

Continental operations would not be a crime against the people of this

country." On 28 June, the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr.

Acland, declared publicly that "in no European question were we

concerned to interfere with a big army." On 1 July, Lord Loreburn, Lord

Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said "that any British Government would be

so guilty towards our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is

more than I can believe." On 28 April, 1914, and again on 11 June, Sir

E. Grey confirmed, in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's assertion,

made 10 and 24 March, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with

Continental Powers.

Yet, curiously the professions of politicians are still trusted, and

people still expect something from their machinations; they expected

something substantial from the recent conference in Washington, on the

limitation of armaments, for instance--a striking and pathetic example

of the strength of superstition.

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