The Balkan war took place in 1912, and the whole history of the year
shows the most mighty efforts of European politicians--efforts which
seem ludicrous and laughable in spite of their tragic quality--to avert
with their left hand the war which they were bringing on with their
right. Mr. Lloyd George is right in saying that no one really wanted
war. What every one wanted, and what every one was trying with might and
main to do, was to cook the omelette of economic imperialism without
breaking any eggs. There was in all the countries, naturally, a jingo
nationalist party which wanted war. In Russia, which was then busily
reorganizing her military forces which had been used up and left
prostrate by the war with the Japanese, the pan-Slavists were
influential and vociferous, but they were not on top. In England there
was a great popular revulsion against the behaviour of the Government
which had so nearly involved the English in a war against Germany the
year before; and Mr. Asquith's Government, which was pacifist in
tendency, was meeting the popular sentiment in every way possible,
_short of the one point of revealing the secret engagements which bound
it to the French Government and contingently to the Russian Government_.
Lord Haldane undertook an official mission to Berlin, which was attended
with great publicity and was popularly supposed to be of a pacificatory
nature; and really, within the limits of the Franco-English diplomatic
agreement, it went as far as it could in the establishment of good
relations. In fact, of course, it came to nothing; as long as the
diplomatic agreement remained in force, it could come to nothing,
nothing of the sort could come to anything; and the diplomatic agreement
being guarded as a close secret, the reason why it must come to nothing
was not apparent. The German Government also made tremendous efforts in
behalf of peace; and it must be noted by those who accept the theory
upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, that if Germany had wished
or intended at any time to strike at the peace of Europe, now was the
moment for her to do so. Instead, the German Emperor in person, and the
German Government, through one of its best diplomatic agents, Baron von
Marschall, met every pacific overture more than half-way, and
themselves initiated all that could be thought of. "There is no doubt,"
wrote Baron Beyens from Berlin, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Kiderlen-Wächter) are
passionately pacifists." Baron Beyens again says, 28 June, 1912, "The
Emperor is persistent and has not given up hopes of winning back English
sympathies, just as he has succeeded up to a certain point in obtaining
the confidence of the Tsar, by the force of his personal attractions."
Those who believe in the extraordinary notion of an unprepared and
unsuspecting Europe, should read the diplomatic history of the year
1912, when all the chief office-holders in England and on the Continent
were struggling like men caught in a quicksand, or like flies on
fly-paper, to avert, or if they could not avert, to defer the inevitable
war.
In one country, however, the jingo nationalist and militarist party came
on top; and that country was France. M. Caillaux was succeeded by
Raymond Poincaré; and in January, 1913, Poincaré became President of the
Republic. Up to 1912, the people of France were increasingly indisposed
to war and were developing a considerable impatience with militarism,
and the French Government was responsive to this sentiment. It knew, as
Baron Guillaume remarked at the time of the Agadir incident, that "a war
would be the death-knell of the Republic." M. Caillaux seems to have
measured the feelings of his countrymen quite well. Baron Guillaume says
that after the dispatch of the "Panther," the British Cabinet's first
proposal was that the British and French Governments should each
immediately send two men-of-war to Agadir; and that the French Cabinet
strongly objected. Again, he says in his report of 8 July, 1911, "I am
persuaded that Messrs. Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn given to
the Moroccan affair by their predecessors in office. They were quite
ready to give way, provided they could do so without humiliation."
The speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, however, which was
taken by the French (and how correctly they took it became apparent on 3
August, 1914) as a definite assurance of British support against
Germany, gave the militarist-nationalist party the encouragement to go
ahead and dominate the domestic politics of France. It put the
Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé element on its feet and stiffened its
resolution, besides clearing the way in large measure for its
predominance. On 14 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume reports from Paris
thus:
The new President of the Republic enjoys a popularity in France
to-day unknown to any of his predecessors.... Various factors
contribute to explain his popularity. His election had been
carefully prepared in advance; people are pleased at the skilful
way in which, while a Minister, he manoeuvred to bring France to
the fore in the concert of Europe; he has hit upon some happy
phrases that stick in the popular mind.
The career of M. Poincaré, in fact, and his management of popular
sentiment, show many features which _mutatis mutandis_, find a parallel
in the career of Theodore Roosevelt. Baron Guillaume adds, however, this
extremely striking observation concerning the popularity of M. Poincaré:
But above all, one must regard it as a manifestation of the old
French chauvinistic spirit, which had for many years slumbered, but
which had come to life again since the affair of Agadir.
In the same communication to the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume
remarks:
M. Poincaré is a native of Lorraine, and loses no opportunity of
telling people so. He was M. Millerand's colleague, and the
instigator of his militarist policy.
Finally, the first word that he uttered at the very moment when he
learned that he was elected President of the Republic, was a
promise that he would watch over and maintain all the means of
national defence.
M. Poincaré had not been in office two months when he recalled the
French Ambassador at Petersburg, M. Georges Louis, and appointed in his
stead M. Delcassé. Concerning this stupendous move, Baron Guillaume
reported 21 February, 1913, to the Belgian Foreign Office thus:
The news that M. Delcassé is shortly to be appointed Ambassador at
Petersburg burst like a bomb here yesterday afternoon.... He was
one of the architects of the Franco-Russian alliance, and still
more so of the Anglo-French _entente_.
Baron Guillaume goes on to say that he does not think that M. Delcassé's
appointment should be interpreted as a demonstration against Germany;
but he adds:
I do think, however, that M. Poincaré, a Lorrainer, was not sorry
to show, from the first day of entering on his high office, how
anxious he is to stand firm and hold aloft the national flag. That
is the danger involved in having M. Poincaré at the Elysée in these
anxious days through which Europe is passing. It was under his
Ministry that the militarist, slightly bellicose instincts of the
French woke up again. He has been thought to have a measure of
responsibility for this change of mood.
M. Georges Louis, who had represented the French Government at
Petersburg for three years, was a resolute opponent of the militarist
faction in France, and was therefore distinctly _persona non grata_ to
the corresponding faction in Russia. At the head of this faction stood
Isvolsky, who was a friend of M. Poincaré and a kindred spirit; hence
when M. Poincaré became Premier, an attempt was made to oust M. Louis,
but it was unsuccessful. M. Delcassé, on the other hand, is described by
Mr. Morel as "the man identified more than any other man in French
public life with the anti-German war-party." Mr. Morel, in commenting on
the appointment of M. Delcassé quotes the following from a report sent
by the Russian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in Petersburg.
It was written four days after the appointment of M. Delcassé, and quite
bears out the impression made upon the Belgian agents.[10]
When I recall his [M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London]
conversations with me, and the attitude of Poincaré, the thought
comes to me as a conviction, that of all the powers France is the
only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon
it without great regret.... She [France] has, either rightly or
wrongly, complete trust in her army; the old effervescing minority
has again shown itself.