Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in July, 1911, after the
German gunboat "Panther" had anchored off the Moroccan coast, gave an
immense impulse to the jingo spirit in France, because it was taken as
definite assurance of England's good faith in seeing her secret
agreements through to a finish. M. Caillaux, the French Premier, appears
to have had his doubts, nevertheless, inasmuch as the British Foreign
Office did not give a straight reply to the French Foreign Office's
inquiry concerning British action in case the Germans landed a force in
Morocco. He says:
Are we to understand that our powerful neighbours will go right
through to the end with the resolve which they suggest? Are they
ready for all eventualities? The British Ambassador, Sir Francis
Bertie, with whom I converse, does not give me formal assurances.
It is said, of course, that he would see without displeasure the
outbreak of a conflict between France and Germany; his mind works
in the way attributed to a number of leading British officials at
the Foreign Office.
M. Caillaux here suggests the same suspicion of British intentions
which the Belgian diplomats at London, Paris and Berlin intimate
continually throughout their correspondence since 1905.[9] He
accordingly favoured a less energetic policy towards Germany, and was
thrown out of office. Count de Lalaing reported from London, 15 January,
1912, that the revelations which provoked this political crisis were
disagreeable for the English Government. "They seem to prove," he says,
"that the French Premier had been trying to negotiate with Berlin
without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his other
colleagues, and this is naturally disquieting to a Government whose
interests are bound up with those of France, and which accordingly can
ill tolerate any lapses of this kind." He adds:
These revelations have also strengthened the impression that M.
Caillaux had recently favoured an ultra-conciliatory policy towards
Germany, and this impression was felt all the more painfully in
English official circles, as the full extent of the tension between
London and Berlin caused by the Cabinet of St. James's loyal
behaviour towards the Cabinet at Paris had hardly been grasped.
People in England are reluctant to face the fact that they have
been 'more royalist than the King,' and have shown themselves even
less accommodating than the friend they were backing....
Accordingly the press unanimously hails with delight the departure
of M. Caillaux, and trusts that sounder traditions may be reverted
to without delay.
This comment on the position of M. Caillaux is one of the most
interesting observations to be found in these documents.