King Edward VII died 6 May, 1910. During the early part of 1911, the
Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin report some indications of
a less unfriendly policy towards Germany on the part of the British
Government. In March of that year, Sir Edward Grey delivered a
reassuring speech on British foreign policy, on the occasion of the
debate on the naval budget. The Belgian Minister in Berlin says of this
that it should have produced the most agreeable impression in Germany if
one could confidently believe that it really entirely reflected the
ideas of the British Government. It would imply, he says, that "England
no longer wishes to give to the Triple Entente the aggressive character
which was stamped upon it by its creator, King Edward VII." He remarks,
however, the slight effect produced in Berlin by Sir E. Grey's speech,
and infers that German public feeling may have "become dulled by the
innumerable meetings and mutual demonstrations of courtesy which have
never produced any positive result," and he adds significantly that
"this distrust is comprehensible."
It must be remembered that at the time this speech was delivered,
England was under a secret agreement dating from 1904 to secure France's
economic monopoly in Morocco. England was also under a secret obligation
to France, dating from 1906, to support her in case of war with Germany.
It must be above all remembered that this latter obligation carried with
it a contingent liability for the Franco-Russian military alliance that
had been in effect for many years. Thus if Russia went to war with
Germany, France was committed, and in turn England was committed. The
whole force of the Triple Entente lay in these agreements; and it can
not be too often pointed out that they were _secret_ agreements. No one
in England knew until November, 1911, that in 1904 the British
Government had bargained with the French Government, in return for a
free hand in Egypt, to permit France to squeeze German economic
interests out of Morocco--in violation of a published agreement, signed
by all the interested nations, concerning the status of Morocco. No one
in England knew until 3 August, 1914, that England had for several years
been under a military and naval agreement with France which carried the
enormous contingent liability of the Franco-Russian military alliance.
No matter what appeared on the surface of politics; no matter how many
pacific speeches were made by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, no matter
what the newspapers said, no matter how often and how impressively Lord
Haldane might visit Berlin in behalf of peace and good feeling; _those
secret agreements held_, they were the only things that did hold, and
everything worked out in strict accordance with them and with nothing
else, least of all with any public understanding or any statement of
policy put out for public consumption. It was just as in the subsequent
case of the armistice and the peace--and this is something that has been
far too little noticed in this country. The real terms of the armistice
and of the peace were not the terms of the Fourteen Points or of any of
the multitudinous published statements of Allied war aims. On the
contrary, they were the precise terms of the secret treaties made among
the Allied belligerents during the war, and made public on their
discovery by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Tsarist
Foreign Office.
It is no wonder then, that the German Government was not particularly
impressed by Sir E. Grey's speech, especially as Germany saw France
helping herself to Moroccan territory with both hands, and England
looking on in indifferent complacency. In May, 1911, on a most
transparent and preposterous pretext, a French army was ordered to march
on Fez, the capital of Morocco. The German Government then informed
France that as the Algeciras Act, which guaranteed the integrity and
independence of Morocco, had thereby gone by the board, Germany would no
longer consider herself bound by its provisions. In June, 30,000 French
troops "relieved" Fez, occupied it and stayed there, evincing no
intention whatever of getting out again, notwithstanding that the
ostensible purpose of the expedition was accomplished; in reality, there
was nothing to accomplish. Two months before this _coup d'état_, Baron
Greindl, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, wrote to the Belgian Foreign
Office as follows:
Every illusion, if ever entertained on the value of the Algeciras
Act, which France signed with the firm intention of never
observing, must long since have vanished. She has not ceased for
one moment to pursue her plans of annexation; either by seizing
opportunities for provisional occupations destined to last for ever
or by extorting concessions which have placed the Sultan in a
position of dependence upon France, and which have gradually
lowered him to the level of the Bey of Tunis.
A week later, 29 April, Baron Guillaume, who had succeeded M. Leghait as
Belgian Minister in Paris, reported that "there are, so far, no grounds
for fearing that the French expedition will bring about any disturbance
of international policy. Germany is a calm spectator of events." He
adds, significantly, "England, having thrust France into the Moroccan
bog, is contemplating her work with satisfaction."
France professed publicly that the object of this expedition was to
extricate certain foreigners who were imperilled at Fez; and having done
so, she would withdraw her forces. The precious crew of concessionaires,
profiteers, and dividend-hunters known as the _Comité du Maroc_ had
suddenly discovered a whole French colony living in Fez in a state of
terror and distress. There was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Fez was
never menaced, it was never short of provisions, and there were no
foreigners in trouble. When the expeditionary force arrived, it found no
one to shoot at. As M. Francis de Pressensé says:
Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared
like dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off
a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious
gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the
show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records,
of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is
keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom
so dexterously conjured by the _Comité du Maroc_ for the benefit of
its aims, disappear in a night.
Nevertheless, the expeditionary force did not, in accordance with the
public professions of the French Government, march out of Fez as soon as
it discovered this ridiculous mare's nest. It remained there and held
possession of the Moorish capital. What was the attitude of the British
Government in the premises? On 2 May, in the House of Commons, Sir
Edward Grey said that "the action taken by France is not intended to
alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government can
not see why any objection should be taken to it."
Germany had remained for eight years a tolerant observer of French
encroachments in Morocco, and quite clearly, as Baron Greindl observes
in his report of 21 April, 1911, could not "after eight years of
tolerance, change her attitude unless she were determined to go to war,
and war is immeasurably more than Morocco is worth." In July, 1911,
however, while the French force of 30,000 was still occupying Fez,
Germany dispatched a gunboat, the "Panther," which anchored off the
coast of Agadir.