IX

If the official theory of German responsibility were correct, it would

be impossible to explain the German Government's choice of the year 1914

as a time to strike at "an unsuspecting and defenceless Europe." The

figures quoted in Chapter III show that the military strength of

Germany, relatively to that of the French-Russian-English combination,

had been decreasing since 1910. If Germany had wished to strike at

Europe, she had two first-rate chances, one in 1908 and another in 1912,

and not only let them both go by, but threw all her weight on the side

of peace. This is inexplicable upon the theory that animates the treaty

of Versailles. Germany was then in a position of advantage. The occasion

presented itself in 1908, in Serbia's quarrel with Austria over the

annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia, which was backing

Serbia, was in no shape to fight; her military strength, used up in the

Russo-Japanese war, had not recovered. France would not at this time

have been willing to go to war with Germany over her weak ally's

commitments in the Danube States. Germany, however, contented herself

with serving notice on the Tsar of her unequivocal support of Austria;

and this was enough. The Tsar accepted the _fait accompli_ of the

annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Serbia retired and cooled off;

and Turkey, from whom the annexed province was ravished, was compensated

by Austria. It is not to the point to scrutinize the propriety of these

transactions; the point is that Germany held the peace of Europe in the

hollow of her hand, with immense advantages in her favour, and chose not

to close her hand. The comment of a neutral diplomat, the Belgian

Minister in Berlin, is interesting. In his report of 1 April, 1909, to

the Belgian Foreign Office, he says:

The conference scheme elaborated by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward

Grey; the negotiations for collective representations in Vienna;

and the whole exchange of ideas among London, Paris and Petersburg,

were steadily aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary into a transaction

which would strongly have resembled a humiliation. This humiliation

would have affected Germany as directly and as sensibly as

Austria-Hungary, and would have struck a heavy blow at the

confidence which is inspired in Vienna by the alliance with

Germany. These machinations were frustrated by Germany's

absolutely unequivocal and decided attitude, from which she has

never departed in spite of all the urgings with which she has been

harassed. Germany alone has accomplished the preservation of peace.

The new grouping of the Powers, organized by the King of England,

has measured its forces with the alliance of the Central European

Powers, and has shown itself incapable of impairing the same. Hence

the vexation which is manifested.

The last two sentences of the foregoing seem to show--putting it

mildly--that the Belgian Minister did not suspect the German Government

of any aggressive spirit. In the same dispatch, moreover, he remarks:

As always, when everything does not go as the French, English or

Russian politicians want it to, the _Temps_ shows its bad temper.

Germany is the scapegoat.

Again, at the time of the Balkan War in 1912, Germany had an excellent

opportunity to gratify her military ambition, if she had any, at the

expense of an "unsuspecting and unprepared Europe"; not as advantageous

as in 1908 but more advantageous than in 1914. Serbia's provocations

against Austria-Hungary had become so great that the Austrian Archduke

(assassinated in 1914 at Sarajevo) told the German Emperor personally

that they had reached the limit of endurance. On this occasion also,

however, William II put himself definitely on the side of peace, and in

so doing left the Austrian Government somewhat disappointed and

discontented. Another neutral diplomat reports of the German Foreign

Minister that

whatever plans he may have in his head (and he has big ideas), for

winning the sympathies of the young Balkan Powers over to Germany,

one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that he is rigidly

determined to avoid a European conflagration. On this point the

policy of Germany is similar to that of England and France, both of

which countries are determinedly pacifist.

This is a fair statement of the English and French position in 1912.

There was a great revulsion of feeling in England after her close shave

of being dragged into war over Morocco and her sentiment was all for

attending to certain pressing, domestic problems. Besides, it was only

in November, 1911, and only through the indiscretion of a French

newspaper, that the British public (and the British Parliament as well)

had learned that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had secret articles

attached to it, out of which had emanated the imbroglio over Morocco;

and there was a considerable feeling of distrust towards the Foreign

Office. In fact, Sir E. Grey, the Foreign Minister, was so unpopular

with his own party that quite probably he would have had to get out of

office if he had not been sustained by Tory influence. Mr. W. T. Stead

expressed a quite general sentiment in the _Review of Reviews_ for

December, 1911:

The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of

Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war,

but we have not escaped the national and abiding enmity of the

German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the

foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open

secret, of this almost incredible crime against treaty-faith,

British interests and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate

fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men in the Foreign

Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the

one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in

doing so British interests, treaty-faith and the peace of the world

are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know.

This was strong language and it went without challenge, for too many

Englishmen felt that way. In France, the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé

combination was getting well into the saddle; but with English public

opinion in this notably undependable condition, English support of

France, in spite of the secret agreement binding the two governments,

was decidedly risky. Thereupon France also was "determinedly pacifist."

Now if Germany had been the prime mover in "the most dangerous

conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations," why did she not

take advantage of that situation?

Russia, too, was "determinedly pacifist" in 1912, and with good reason.

There was a party of considerable influence in the Tsar's court that was

strongly for going to war in behalf of Serbia, but it was finally headed

off by the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who knew the state of public

opinion in England and its effect on France, and knew therefore that the

French-Russian-English alliance was not yet in shape to take on large

orders. It is true that the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé war-party in

France had proof enough in 1912 that it could count on the British

Government's support; and what France knew, Russia knew. Undoubtedly,

too, the British Government would somehow, under some pretext or other,

possibly Belgian neutrality, have contrived to redeem its obligations as

it did in 1914. But the atmosphere of the country was not favourable and

the thing would have been difficult. Accordingly, Sazonov saw that it

was best for him to restrain Serbia's impetuosity and truculence for

the time being--Russia herself being none too ready--and accordingly he

did so.

But how? The Serbian Minister at Petersburg says that Sazonov told him

that in view of Serbia's successes "he had confidence in our strength

and believed that we would be able to deliver a blow at Austria. For

that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive, and

consider it merely as a temporary halting-place on the road to further

gains." On another occasion "Sazonov told me that we must work for the

future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria."

The Serbian Minister at Bucharest says that his Russian and French

colleagues counselled a policy of waiting "with as great a degree of

preparedness as possible the important events which must make their

appearance among the Great Powers." How, one may ask, was the Russian

Foreign Office able to look so far and so clearly into the future? If

German responsibility for the war is fundamental, a _chose jugée_, as

Mr. Lloyd George said it is, this seems a strange way for the Russian

Foreign Minister to be talking, as far back as 1912. But stranger still

is the fact that the German Government did not jump in at this juncture

instead of postponing its blow until 1914 when every one was apparently

quite ready to receive it. When the historian of the future considers

the theory of the Versailles treaty and considers the behaviour of the

German Government in the crisis of 1908 and in the crisis of 1912, he

will have to scratch his head a great deal to make them harmonize.

X

By the spring of 1913, the diplomatic representatives of the Allied

Danube States made no secret of the relations in which their Governments

stood to the Tsar's Foreign Office. The Balkan League was put through by

Russian influence and Russia controlled its diplomacy. Serbia was as

completely the instrument of Russia as Poland is now the instrument of

France. "If the Austrian troops invade Balkan territory," wrote Baron

Beyens on 4 April, 1913, "it would give cause for Russia to intervene,

and might let loose a universal war." Now, if Germany had been plotting

"with ruthless, cynical determination," as Mr. Lloyd George said,

against the peace of Europe, what inconceivable stupidity for her not to

push Austria along rather than do everything possible to hold her back!

Why give Russia the benefit of eighteen months of valuable time for the

feverish campaign of "preparedness" that she carried on? Those eighteen

months meant a great deal. In February, 1914, the Tsar arranged to

provide the Serbian army with rifles and artillery, Serbia agreeing to

put half a million soldiers in the field. In the same month Russia

negotiated a French loan of about $100 million for improvements on her

strategic railways and frontier-roads. During the spring, she made

"test" mobilizations of large bodies of troops which were never

demobilized, and these "test" mobilizations continued down to the

outbreak of the war; and in April Russian agents made technical

arrangements with agents of the British and French Admiralties for

possible combined naval action.

Yes, those eighteen months were very busy months for Russia. True, she

came out at the end of them an "unprepared and unsuspecting" nation,

presumably, for was not all Europe unprepared and unsuspecting? Is it

not so nominated in the Versailles treaty? One can not help wondering,

however, how it is that Germany, "carefully, skilfully, insidiously,

clandestinely planning in every detail" a murderous attack on the peace

of Europe, should have given Russia the inestimable advantage of those

eighteen months.