Mr. Asquith's citation of a "solemn international obligation" refers to
the so-called Belgian treaties. It will be remembered that the case of
Belgium was the great winning card played by the Allied Governments for
the stakes of American sympathies; and therefore we may here properly
make a survey, somewhat in detail, of the status of Belgium at the
outset of the war.
Belgium had learned forty years ago how she stood under the treaties of
1831 and 1839. When in the late 'eighties there was likelihood of a
Franco-German war, the question of England's participation under these
treaties was thoroughly discussed, and it was shown conclusively that
England was not obligated. Perhaps the best summary of the case was that
given by Mr. W. T. Stead in the _Pall Mall Gazette_ in the issues of 4
and 5 February, 1887. After an examination of the treaties of 1831, 1839
and 1870--an examination unfortunately too long to be quoted here--Mr.
Stead briefly sums up the result of his investigation in the following
statement:
There is therefore no English guarantee to Belgium. It is possible
perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; but the case may be
summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever
except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany;
(2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium
at all; and (3) is given, not to Belgium but to the Netherlands.
This was the official view of the British Government at the time, and it
is reflected in the celebrated letter signed "Diplomaticus" in the
_Standard_ of 4 February, to which Mr. Stead refers; which, indeed, he
makes the guiding text for his examination. The _Standard_ was then the
organ of Lord Salisbury's Government, and it is as nearly certain as
anything of the sort can be, that the letter signed "Diplomaticus" was
written by the hand of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury
himself.
How Mr. Asquith's Government in August 1914 came suddenly to extemporize
a wholly different view of England's obligations to Belgium is
excellently told by that inveterate diarist and chronicler, Mr. Wilfred
Scawen Blunt:
The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war
with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of
Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that
had been made. These, though given verbally and with reservations
as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of
personal honour, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding
the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions[5] in
this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back
from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless
have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they
failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at
Paris to be binding that President Poincaré, when the crisis came,
had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement
made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to
keep.
Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to
fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith,
with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet meeting brought
forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other
to lay before a British jury, and by representing the
neutrality-treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on
England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no
word) obtained the Cabinet's consent, and war was declared.
Belgium was not thought of by the British Cabinet before 2 August, 1914.
She was brought in then as a means of making the war go down with the
British people. The fact is that Belgium was thoroughly prepared for
war, thoroughly prepared for just what happened to her. Belgium was a
party to the military arrangements effected among France, England and
Russia; for this we have the testimony of Marshal Joffre before the
Metallurgic Committee in Paris, and also the record of the
"conversations" that were carried on in Brussels between the Belgian
chief of staff and Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. On 24 July, 1914, the day when
the Austrian note was presented to Serbia (the note of which Sir E. Grey
had gotten an intimation as early as 16 July by telegraph from the
British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen), the Belgian Foreign
Minister, M. Davignon, promptly dispatched to all the Belgian embassies
an identical communication containing the following statement, the
significance of which is made clear by a glance at a map:
All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has
been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have
been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of
its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put
in a state of defence.
It was on the eastern frontier, we perceive, therefore--not on the
western, where Belgium might have been invaded by France--that all the
available Belgian military force was concentrated. Hence, to pretend any
longer that the Belgian Government was surprised by the action of
Germany, or unprepared to meet it; to picture Germany and Belgium as cat
and mouse, to understand the position of Belgium otherwise than that she
was one of four solid allies under definite agreement worked out in
complete practical detail, is sheer absurdity.