I
The present course of events in Europe is impressing on us once more the
truth that military victory, if it is to stand, must also be
demonstrably a victory for justice. In the long run, victory must appeal
to the sense of justice in the conquered no less than in the conquerors,
if it is to be effective. There is no way of getting around this. Mr.
Gilbert K. Chesterton is right when he says that if the South had not
finally accepted the outcome of the Civil War as being on the whole
just, Lincoln would have been wrong in trying to preserve the Union;
which is only another way of expressing Lincoln's own homely saying that
nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. The present
condition of Europe is largely due to the fact that the official
peacemakers have not taken into their reckoning the German people's
sense of justice. Their mistake--it was also Mr. Wilson's great
mistake--was in their disregard of what Bismarck called the
imponderabilia. The terms of the peace treaty plainly reflect this
mistake. That is largely the reason why the treaty is to-day inoperative
and worthless. That is largely why the Governments of Europe are
confronted with the inescapable alternative: they can either tear up the
treaty and replace it by an understanding based on justice, or they can
stick to the treaty and by so doing protract indefinitely the dismal
succession of wars, revolutions, bankruptcies and commercial
dislocations that the treaty inaugurated.
That is the situation; and it is a situation in which the people of the
United States have an interest to preserve--the primary interest of a
creditor, and also the interest of a trader who needs a large and stable
market. It is idle to suppose that American business can prosper so long
as Europe remains in a condition of instability and insolvency. Our
business is adjusted to the scale of a solvent Europe, and it can not be
readjusted without irreparable damage. Until certain matters connected
with the war are resolutely put under review, Europe can not be
reconstructed, and the United States can not be prosperous. The only
thing that can better our own situation is the resumption of normal
economic life in Europe; and this can be done only through a thorough
reconsideration of the injustices that have been put upon the German
people by the conditions of the armistice and the peace treaty.
Of these injustices, the greatest, because it is the foundation for all
the rest, is the imputation of Germany's sole responsibility for the
war. The German people will never endure that imputation; they should
never be expected to endure it. Nothing can really be settled until the
question of responsibility is openly and candidly re-examined, and an
understanding established that is based on facts instead of on official
misrepresentation. This question is by no means one of abstract justice
alone, or of chivalry and fair play towards a defeated enemy. It is a
question of self-interest, immediate and urgent. However it may be
regarded by the American sense of justice and fair play, it remains, to
the eye of American industry and commerce, a straight question of
dollars and cents. The prosperity of the United States, as we are
beginning to see, hangs upon the economic re-establishment of Europe.
Europe can not possibly be settled upon the present terms of peace; and
these terms can not be changed without first vacating the theory of
Germany's sole responsibility, because it is upon this theory that the
treaty of Versailles was built. This theory, therefore, must be
re-examined in the light of evidence that the Allied and Associated
Governments have done their best either to ignore or to suppress. Hence,
for the American people, the way to prosperity lies through a searching
and honest examination of this theory that has been so deeply implanted
in their mind--the theory of a brigand-nation, plotting in solitude to
achieve the mastery of the world by fire and sword.
Americans, however, come reluctantly to the task of this examination,
for two reasons. First, we are all tired of the war, we hate to think of
it or of anything connected with it, and as far as possible, we keep it
out of our minds. Second, nearly every reputation of any consequence in
this country, political, clerical, academic and journalistic, is already
committed, head over ears, to the validity of this theory. How many of
our politicians are there whose reputations are not bound up
inextricably with this legend of a German plot? How many of our
newspaper-editors managed to preserve detachment enough under the
pressure of war-propaganda to be able to come forward to-day and say
that the question of responsibility for the war should be re-opened? How
can the pro-war liberals and ex-pacifists ask for such an inquest when
they were all swept off their feet by the specious plea that _this_ war
was a different war from all other wars in the history of mankind? What
can our ministers of religion say after the unreserved endorsement that
they put upon the sanctity of the Allied cause? What can our educators
say, after having served so zealously the ends of the official
propagandists? From our journalists and men of letters what can we
expect--after all his rodomontade about Potsdam and the Potsdam gang,
how could we expect Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for instance, to face the fact
that the portentous Potsdam meeting of the Crown Council on 5 July,
1914, _never took place at all_? There is no use in trying to put a
breaking-strain upon human nature, or, on the other hand, in assuming a
pharisaic attitude towards its simplest and commonest frailties. It is
best, under the circumstances, merely to understand that on this
question every institutional voice in the United States is tongue-tied.
Press, pulpit, schools and universities, charities and foundations,
forums, all are silent; and to expect them to break their silence is to
expect more than should be expected from the pride of opinion in average
human nature.