PIRATES AND FRENCH FRIGATES
Another pirate who was a thorn in the flesh to the East Indiamen was
a man named Jean Lafitte, who was born at St Malo. This man was no
stranger to the Eastern seas. He had been appointed mate of a French
East Indiaman which was bound from Europe to Madras. But on the way out
the ship encountered bad weather off the Cape of Good Hope, by which
she was so damaged that the captain determined to call at Mauritius:
and a quarrel having sprung up between Lafitte and the captain, the
former decided to quit the ship at the island. Now there were several
privateers or pirates fitting out at this island, and before long
Lafitte became captain of one of these vessels.
For a time he cruised about the seas robbing whatsoever ships he could,
but was eventually chased by an English frigate as far north as the
Equator: and from there he later on came south and proceeded to the
Bay of Bengal to obtain provisions. His ship was of 200 tons, with
only two guns and twenty-six men. This should be noted, because it
shows how much inferior as a fighting unit she was to any Indiaman.
Nevertheless whilst off the Bengal coast he fell in with the East
Indiaman _Pagoda_, which was armed with twenty-six 12-pounders and
had a crew of a hundred and fifty men. With this disparity in strength
it was obvious that Lafitte could only hope for victory by employing
artifice. So he manœuvred as if he were a pilot for the Ganges ready
at his station cruising about. The _Pagoda_ came along and was quite
taken in by this trickery, and, to cut the story short, when it was
all too late to get out of the trap, the East Indiaman found Lafitte’s
ship alongside, and the pirate, together with his men, suddenly leapt
on board the merchant ship, overcame every opposition and very speedily
captured the ship. And it was this same pirate who at a later date
became skipper of that notorious _Confiance_ of which we have had need
to speak in this volume.
We pass over the intervening period until we come to the year 1807,
when we find Lafitte during the month of October still on the prowl.
Off the Sand Heads he fell in with the East Indiaman _Queen_, a vessel
of about 800 tons, a crew of nearly four hundred, and carrying forty
guns. She was such a fine ship that this Frenchman determined to become
her owner. Compared with the pirate the _Queen_, with her tall masts
and high freeboard, her guns and crew, seemed absurdly superior to
the smaller vessel. But Lafitte was as plucky as he was adventurous,
and this apparent inequality only added zest to his plans. As the two
ships were getting nearer and nearer, he exhorted his men with that
wild, almost fanatical enthusiasm which was usually an electrifying
force to a band of desperadoes, and then having manœuvred his ship
with no little cleverness, brought her alongside the Indiaman. Just as
he did this the English vessel greeted him with a broadside, but the
Frenchman was expecting this, and ordered his men to lie flat on the
deck. And when the first fire had been made, the pirates all got up
again, and from the yards and tops hurled down bombs and grenades into
the Indiaman’s forecastle.
These tactics entirely surprised the _Queen’s_ captain, and great
havoc was wrought. Lafitte realising the amount of consternation which
had now been caused sent aboard the _Queen_ forty of his men with
pistols in their hands and daggers between their teeth, and as soon
as their feet touched the Indiaman’s deck they drove the terrified
and astonished crowd into the steerage, where the latter endeavoured
to defend themselves as best they could. Lafitte now reinforced his
forty men with another division, and himself went as their leader,
and the result was that the _Queen’s_ captain was killed and the rest
of the survivors were swept into one terror-stricken crowd. He then
caused a gun to be loaded with grape and pointed to the place where the
crowd were gathered, and threatened to blow them into eternity. Upon
this the English determined that further opposition was useless, and
surrendered. Lafitte therefore ceased his bloody slaughter, and became
possessor of the ship. The incident, when the news reached India,
caused a deep sensation, and the name of this scoundrel was spoken of
with horror. But as East Indiamen now began to traverse the Indian
Ocean only under powerful convoys, Lafitte found his opportunities very
few and rare, so he betook himself to other waters, to end his days
with a violent death.
[Illustration: THE “QUEEN,” EAST INDIAMAN.
(By courtesy of Messrs. T. H. Parker Brothers)]
We come now to the year 1810. About this time the French frigates
were very actively on the _qui vive_ for our East Indiamen and other
merchant ships, and the neighbourhood of Madagascar and Mauritius was
popular for setting forth to lie in wait for the victims. When any
prisoners were brought in here from the Company’s ships they were made
to form part of the crews of these French frigates. And if any British
soldiers were also found on board they were likewise destined to become
part of the frigates’ complement. Some were made so to do only by
vehement threats if they declined: while some others were base enough
to desert the English flag.
On the 3rd of July of the year just mentioned, just as the day was
dawning, the French frigates, _Bellone_ and _Minerve_, and the corvette
_Victor_, having stood leisurely up the Mozambique Channel, were about
thirty-six miles off the island of Mayotta, when they were sighted
by three outward-bound East Indiamen, who were steering to the north
before a fresh breeze from the south-south-east. The frigates were
about nine miles off to the north-north-east, close-hauled on the port
tack. A signal was made by the senior officer or commodore of the
British ships half-an-hour later, and the three Indiamen hauled their
wind on the port tack under double-reefed topsails, courses, jib and
spanker. The names of these vessels were the _Ceylon_ (commodore’s
flagship), _Windham_ and _Astell_, the commodore being Captain Henry
Meriton. At half-past seven the _Ceylon_ made the private signal, as
was customary. This was in accordance with the secret code provided by
the Admiralty: and if the strange ships had been British naval frigates
or fellow East Indiamen they would have answered in accordance with
the code. Failure to reply would have indicated that they were hostile.
Inasmuch as there was no reply in this case the East Indiamen’s
commodore ordered his ships to clear for action. There could be no
sort of doubt now, and every minute was valuable, for the enemy was
passing on the opposite tack. At half-past nine the _Astell_ was
carrying rather more sail than she could do with and made a signal to
that effect: the _Ceylon_ and _Windham_ therefore shortened sail to
keep her company. Captain Meriton now telegraphed to his two consorts
the following message: “As we cannot get away, I think we had better
go under easy sail and bring them to action before dark.” It was the
only thing to be done: otherwise the _Astell_ might have been lost.
The _Windham_, however, replied thus: “If we make all sail and get
into smooth water under the land we can engage to more advantage.” But
half-an-hour later, as the force of the wind had increased, it became
necessary for the East Indiamen to heave-to and take in a third reef
in their topsails. But even under this shortened canvas the ships
were making heavy weather of it. As a fact, they heeled over so much
that the high sea that was running made it quite impossible for the
lower-deck ports on the lee side to be kept open.
James, with his characteristic love of detail, has given full
particulars of this incident, and we can well watch with him what
followed. At 11.30 A.M. the _Minerve_ tacked in the wake of
the Indiamen and at about six miles away. Soon afterwards the _Bellone_
and the _Victor_ also went about. When Captain Meriton had watched
these tactics and observed the _Minerve_ coming up at a great rate
astern he made the following signal: “Form line abreast, to bear on
ships together, _Ceylon_ in the centre.” So the _Windham_, _Ceylon_
and _Astell_ formed a close line in the order named and awaited the
oncoming of the enemy, and the _Victor_ and _Minerve_ were approaching
rapidly on the starboard quarter, which was also the weather side.
Presently the _Minerve_ arrived abreast of the British centre, the
_Victor_ being ahead. Up went French colours, a shot was fired at the
_Windham_ and then a whole broadside was fired into the _Ceylon_,
which was so close astern of her consort as almost to touch her.
The _Astell_, however, was a long way to leeward and astern of the
_Ceylon_. When the corvette opened fire the action became general
between the _Minerve_ and _Victor_ of the one side and the _Windham_,
_Ceylon_ and _Astell_ on the other. But inasmuch as the _Ceylon_, by
reason of her situation, was just abeam of the frigate, this Indiaman
received a pretty hot time. After a little while the corvette found the
fire of the British too warm, so bore up and passed to leeward of the
_Astell_, and the captain of the latter becoming wounded severely, the
chief mate had to take command. It is quite certain that an officer
of a modern steamship liner is a much abler navigator than those who
served in the old East Indiamen. But it is unquestionable that even if
he were a Royal Naval Reserve officer, and had served for a year in
his Majesty’s fleet, he would not be such a master of tactics as his
forefathers who served in the “John” Company. I have not the slightest
doubt in asserting that if a European war broke out to-morrow every
officer in the British mercantile marine would render an excellent
account of himself for resource and bravery. Recent disasters and
rescues in mid-ocean have shown that the fine old British stuff still
goes to the making of our sailors. But if their ships were attacked
by cruisers the merchantman would have no opportunity for displaying
fighting tactics, since there is to-day a far greater difference
between the fighting qualities of a liner and a navy’s cruiser than
there existed between an armed East Indiaman and a French frigate. And
this even if we include the recently built _Aquitania_ of the Cunard
line, which happens to be the most heavily armed British liner which
ever put to sea.
In these sea-fights, then, between the Indiamen and their foreign
enemies we have a condition that is not comparable with anything
to-day. It belongs to the past absolutely, and therefore the difference
between the captains of yesterday and to-day is also different, and
that not merely owing to the fact that one commanded a ship propelled
by sails, whereas his successor handles a steamship. We cannot help
admiring the many-sided ability of the East Indiamen captains. Taking
them by and large, with all their defects in respect of smuggling
and other delinquencies which need not be enlarged upon, they were
extraordinarily successful in most complicated circumstances. It
is characteristic of any kind of seaman, in whatever service he is
enrolled, that he is adaptable, but could you find a greater strain
imposed on any man than that which had to be borne by the commanders
of the vessels whose history we are considering? As exponents of
the art of pure seamanship they were never beaten, unless by their
immediate successors, who made such wonderful passages during the
clipper-ship era. And certainly as tacticians and fighting men they
had few superiors even in the Royal Navy of that time. I feel that
it is only just to emphasise these points, for with the transition
from one period of the ship to another the ability of our mercantile
officers has changed not in degree but in kind: and very shortly the
last link—in the person of a steamship captain who formerly commanded
a sailing ship—connecting the ships of yesterday with to-day will
have been broken for ever. No one can fail to admire the consummate
cleverness with which a modern mercantile captain brings a gigantic
liner through a narrow, twisting channel in a strong tideway and berths
his ship so quietly as not to break the proverbial eggshell. No one can
help being struck with the scientific and practical ability by which
perfect land-falls are made and punctual voyages are carried through
even in thick weather. The captains of the Indiamen of yesterday were
never called upon to bear the kind of responsibility which attaches to
a man who has a 40,000-ton ship and 5000 lives under his care. But at
the same time our modern commanders in the merchant service have never
yet been called upon to think out battle tactics and manœuvre so as to
fight a superior enemy without losing one’s ship or cargo.
This was always the anxiety which an East Indiaman’s skipper had to
think of. Was he justified in remaining to fight: or was his chief duty
to run away? His command was not primarily a fighting ship, but a means
of trade. And even if he got his ship safe in port would he incur the
displeasure of the Honourable East India Company’s directors? His job
was too valuable to be thrown away by an error of judgment. It would be
a fine feather in his cap if he could follow the example of Commodore
Dance, and he was sure to be well rewarded by his Company. To deal a
smashing blow at the nation’s enemy would ensure fame for this captain
to the end of his days and after. But—_if_ he should forget that his
first duty was to get the valuable cargo home he might find himself a
broken man and not a hero.
Such, then, was the position of Captain Meriton in the incident we are
discussing. He had to take in the situation at a glance and form a
quick but not hasty judgment, and then act accordingly, flinging out
his signals and disposing his squadron. At four o’clock the _Minerve_
went ahead and then bore down as if intending to get alongside the
_Windham_. Now this was a mode of attack which the Indiamen in the
present instance had reason to fear least of all, for they chanced to
have plenty of soldiery on board. The _Windham_ therefore made sail so
as to strike the French frigate on the port side at the quarter, whilst
the _Ceylon_ and _Astell_ closed on their consort so as to assist in
this manœuvre. However, the _Windham_ had been greatly damaged in
regard to her sails and rigging, so did not possess enough way to act
as she had hoped. The result was that the _Minerve_ was able to cross
her bows only a few yards away. All this time the three Indiamen had
kept up an incessant and well-aimed musketry fire from their troops on
board.
Just as the _Minerve_ got out of gun-shot—that is to say, about a
mile away—the _Astell_ passed astern of the _Windham_ and became the
headmost and weathermost ship. The _Windham_ was now the sternmost
and leewardmost vessel of the three, and the _Minerve_, true to the
best tradition of tactics employed by Nelson and other great admirals,
endeavoured to cut the _Windham_ off from the other two: but the best
laid schemes of clever tacticians sometimes do not fructify: for the
_Minerve_ now lost her main and mizen topmasts, and there came a lull
in the contest, though not for long. It was now six in the evening, and
the _Bellone_, followed by the _Victor_, began a most destructive fire
on the _Windham_. Taking up her position presently a little farther
on, the _Bellone_ began to attack the commodore’s ship, whilst with
her foremost guns she attacked the _Astell_. The _Victor_ was some
distance away, and so her fire at the _Windham_ was not so effective.
Captain Meriton now endeavoured to close with the French frigate in
order that he might be able to give full opportunity to the troops’
musketry, but had the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the neck
from grape-shot. The command therefore fell to the chief mate, Mr T. W.
Oldham. But the latter, being himself wounded not many seconds later,
was obliged to yield the command to the second mate, Mr T. Fenning. By
seven o’clock the poor _Ceylon_, which had endured much, was in a sorry
plight. Her two principal officers had been wounded, her masts, rigging
and sails were all damaged badly, all the guns on her upper deck had
been disabled and five on the lower deck. Her hull, too, had been so
badly holed that she was leaking to such an extent that she made three
feet an hour. In addition, many of her people had been killed and
wounded.
She therefore came out of the firing-line and passed astern of the
_Bellone_, which was engaging the _Windham_ all the time. And then
there appears to have been some misunderstanding. The _Windham_ hailed
the _Astell_ time after time, asking her to join in making an attempt
to board the _Bellone_: but the _Astell_ put out her lights, crowded on
sail, and went off, receiving a heavy parting fire from the frigate.
As for the _Ceylon_, there was nothing left for her to do but to haul
down her colours, and she then had the humiliation of being taken
possession of by a prize crew sent off in a boat from the _Minerve_. As
the _Ceylon_ passed the _Windham_, the former hailed the latter that
she had struck. The _Windham_ was therefore now left alone: and since
she, too, was considerably damaged as to her masts and rigging, so that
it was impossible to set sail, she doggedly continued the action, so
that the _Astell_ might be able to make good her escape. Nine of the
_Windham’s_ guns had been put out of action, many of her crew had been
killed or wounded, so finally she too had to haul down her colours, and
was taken possession of by the _Bellone_. Meanwhile the _Victor_ had
gone in pursuit of the _Astell_, but the latter was able to get right
away owing to the extreme darkness of the night and the length of time
which had been taken in securing the two prizes.
The result of this fight, which had lasted almost from dawn till after
dark, was melancholy: but the Indiamen had fought very gallantly, and
it is not always that success comes to those who seem assuredly most
to deserve it. Each of these merchant ships was of 800 tons, and their
armament was quite unequal to that of the French frigates, which had
no cargo to carry and could mount more numerous guns. There were
about two hundred and fifty troops on board each of these Indiamen,
in addition to a hundred lascars, but there were only about twelve
or a score of British seamen. So in respect of numbers the merchant
ships were quite inferior to the trained men-of-war’s-men of the
French. The _Ceylon_ lost four seamen, one lascar and two soldiers
killed. Her captain, chief mate, seven of her seamen, one lascar, one
lieutenant-colonel and ten soldiers had been wounded—a pretty heavy
toll to pay. The _Windham_ had a seaman, three soldiers and two lascars
killed: and seven soldiers, two lascars and three of her officers and
half-a-dozen others wounded. The _Astell_ had four seamen and the same
number of soldiers killed: whilst her captain, her fifth mate, nine
seamen, a lascar, five cadets and twenty soldiers were all wounded.
Everyone in these Indiamen had fought splendidly against heavy odds.
The commodore had fulfilled his part as well as the difficulty of
the situation allowed him. Soldier and sailor alike had done their
level best. How did the East India Company eventually consider this
forlorn fight? It may be said at once that, in spite of the result, the
directors showed their appreciation of their servants by presenting
each of these three captains with the sum of £500, whilst the rest of
the officers and men were also handsomely rewarded. The captain of the
_Astell_ received a pension of £460 a year from the East India Company,
whilst the officers and crew were presented with the sum of £2000
between them. It is said that one of the _Astell’s_ seamen, a man named
Andrew Peters, nailed the pennant to the maintopmast-head and was
killed as he was on his way down: and the _Astell’s_ colours were shot
away no fewer than three times.
To show their appreciation of the _Astell’s_ fine defence the Admiralty
granted the ship’s company protection from impressment for three years.
But even all this exhibition of approbation must have been unable to
wipe out from officers and men the miserable recollection of having
been compelled to yield to the nation’s deadly enemy.
FOOTNOTES: