I must not reply flippantly, Make them all Wards in Chancery; yet that
would be enough to put any sensible person on the track of the reply.
One would think, to hear the way in which people sometimes ask the
question, that not only does marriage prevent the difficulty from ever
arising, but that nothing except divorce can ever raise it. It is true
that if you divorce the parents, the children have to be disposed
of. But if you hang the parents, or imprison the parents, or take the
children out of the custody of the parents because they hold Shelley's
opinions, or if the parents die, the same difficulty arises. And as
these things have happened again and again, and as we have had plenty of
experience of divorce decrees and separation orders, the attempt to
use children as an obstacle to divorce is hardly worth arguing with. We
shall deal with the children just as we should deal with them if their
homes were broken up by any other cause. There is a sense in which
children are a real obstacle to divorce: they give parents a common
interest which keeps together many a couple who, if childless, would
separate. The marriage law is superfluous in such cases. This is shewn
by the fact that the proportion of childless divorces is much larger
than the proportion of divorces from all causes. But it must not be
forgotten that the interest of the children forms one of the most
powerful arguments for divorce. An unhappy household is a bad nursery.
There is something to be said for the polygynous or polyandrous
household as a school for children: children really do suffer from
having too few parents: this is why uncles and aunts and tutors
and governesses are often so good for children. But it is just the
polygamous household which our marriage law allows to be broken up, and
which, as we have seen, is not possible as a typical institution in
a democratic country where the numbers of the sexes are about equal.
Therefore polygyny and polyandry as a means of educating children fall
to the ground, and with them, I think, must go the opinion which has
been expressed by Gladstone and others, that an extension of divorce,
whilst admitting many new grounds for it, might exclude the ground of
adultery. There are, however, clearly many things that make some of our
domestic interiors little private hells for children (especially
when the children are quite content in them) which would justify any
intelligent State in breaking up the home and giving the custody of the
children either to the parent whose conscience had revolted against the
corruption of the children, or to neither.
Which brings me to the point that divorce should no longer be confined
to cases in which one of the parties petitions for it. If, for instance,
you have a thoroughly rascally couple making a living by infamous means
and bringing up their children to their trade, the king's proctor,
instead of pursuing his present purely mischievous function of
preventing couples from being divorced by proving that they both desire
it, might very well intervene and divorce these children from
their parents. At present, if the Queen herself were to rescue some
unfortunate child from degradation and misery and place her in a
respectable home, and some unmentionable pair of blackguards claimed the
child and proved that they were its father and mother, the child
would be given to them in the name of the sanctity of the home and the
holiness of parentage, after perpetrating which crime the law would
calmly send an education officer to take the child out of the parents'
hands several hours a day in the still more sacred name of compulsory
education. (Of course what would really happen would be that the couple
would blackmail the Queen for their consent to the salvation of the
child, unless, indeed, a hint from a police inspector convinced them
that bad characters cannot always rely on pedantically constitutional
treatment when they come into conflict with persons in high station).
The truth is, not only must the bond between man and wife be made
subject to a reasonable consideration of the welfare of the parties
concerned and of the community, but the whole family bond as well. The
theory that the wife is the property of the husband or the husband of
the wife is not a whit less abhorrent and mischievous than the theory
that the child is the property of the parent. Parental bondage will go
the way of conjugal bondage: indeed the order of reform should rather
be put the other way about; for the helplessness of children has already
compelled the State to intervene between parent and child more than
between husband and wife. If you pay less than 40 pounds a year rent,
you will sometimes feel tempted to say to the vaccination officer, the
school attendance officer, and the sanitary inspector: "Is this child
mine or yours?" The answer is that as the child is a vital part of
the nation, the nation cannot afford to leave it at the irresponsible
disposal of any individual or couple of individuals as a mere small
parcel of private property. The only solid ground that the parent can
take is that as the State, in spite of its imposing name, can, when all
is said, do nothing with the child except place it in the charge of
some human being or another, the parent is no worse a custodian than a
stranger. And though this proposition may seem highly questionable at
first sight to those who imagine that only parents spoil children, yet
those who realize that children are as often spoilt by severity and
coldness as by indulgence, and that the notion that natural parents are
any worse than adopted parents is probably as complete an illusion as
the notion that they are any better, see no serious likelihood that
State action will detach children from their parents more than it does
at present: nay, it is even likely that the present system of taking
the children out of the parents' hands and having the parental duty
performed by officials, will, as poverty and ignorance become the
exception instead of the rule, give way to the system of simply
requiring certain results, beginning with the baby's weight and ending
perhaps with some sort of practical arts degree, but leaving parents and
children to achieve the results as they best may. Such freedom is, of
course, impossible in our present poverty-stricken circumstances. As
long as the masses of our people are too poor to be good parents or good
anything else except beasts of burden, it is no use requiring much more
from them but hewing of wood and drawing of water: whatever is to be
done must be done FOR them mostly, alas! by people whose superiority
is merely technical. Until we abolish poverty it is impossible to push
rational measures of any kind very far: the wolf at the door will compel
us to live in a state of siege and to do everything by a bureaucratic
martial law that would be quite unnecessary and indeed intolerable in a
prosperous community. But however we settle the question, we must make
the parent justify his custody of the child exactly as we should make
a stranger justify it. If a family is not achieving the purposes of a
family it should be dissolved just as a marriage should when it, too, is
not achieving the purposes of marriage. The notion that there is or
ever can be anything magical and inviolable in the legal relations of
domesticity, and the curious confusion of ideas which makes some of our
bishops imagine that in the phrase "Whom God hath joined," the word
God means the district registrar or the Reverend John Smith or William
Jones, must be got rid of. Means of breaking up undesirable families are
as necessary to the preservation of the family as means of dissolving
undesirable marriages are to the preservation of marriage. If our
domestic laws are kept so inhuman that they at last provoke a furious
general insurrection against them as they already provoke many private
ones, we shall in a very literal sense empty the baby out with the bath
by abolishing an institution which needs nothing more than a little
obvious and easy rationalizing to make it not only harmless but
comfortable, honorable, and useful.