The second decree entitled, “A Decree on Elimination of Jews from German
Economic Life” barred Jews from trades and crafts. I ask the Tribunal to
notice judicially that decree, which is our Document 2875-PS, cited in
1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1580.
The third decree entitled, “Decree for the Restoration of the Appearance
of the Streets of Jewish Economic Enterprises” took care of the
insurance question raised in the morning’s meeting by providing that
insurance due to the Jews for various losses sustained by them was to be
collected by the State. I ask the Court to notice judicially that decree
also. It is our Document 2694-PS and appears in 1938
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1581.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off for 10 minutes there?
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Albrecht, the Tribunal thinks that these methods,
which are really methods which we have already had under consideration,
might be presented in a more summary way than you have been dealing with
them, and if you can possibly shorten the matters with which you are
dealing now by summarizing more than you are, it will be more useful to
the Tribunal and will save time.
MR. ALBRECHT: My Lord, I think I am practically through with this point.
At any event I think I shall not have to take more than 5 or 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but I may say that the same observation will
apply to those who follow.
MR. ALBRECHT: May it please the Tribunal, the material I alluded to
before the recess, we feel, is merely illustrative of the energetic
manner in which the Defendant Göring took part in driving the Jews from
economic life at this period. Two other documents would seem to be
pertinent on this point.
I would like to offer our Document 069-PS as Exhibit Number USA-589,
which is a circular letter dated 17 January 1939 signed by the Defendant
Bormann, distributing a directive of the Defendant Göring with respect
to certain discriminations to be applied in the housing of the Jews. I
will be content with that summarization, if the Court please, and I do
not intend to read further from that document.
The second document I desire to offer is our Document 1208-PS, which I
offer as Exhibit Number USA-590. That is an order of the Defendant
Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, dated 10 December 1938,
prescribing the manner in which exploitation of Jewish property is to be
undertaken and warning that any profit resulting from the elimination of
Jews from economic activity is to go to the Reich.
There is no need, I believe, to read excerpts from the document, except
that I do wish to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that
Göring’s letter is addressed to all the chief agencies of the Reich, to
all the political leaders and leaders of the affiliated organizations of
the Party, to all Gauleiter, to all Reichsstatthalter (or governors),
and to the various local heads of the German Länder and subdivisions
thereof.
As the German armies moved into other countries, the anti-Jewish laws
were extended, often in a more stringent form, to the occupied
territories. Many of the decrees were not signed by the Defendant Göring
himself, but were issued on the basis of decrees signed by him.
Nevertheless, in his capacity as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan or
as Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense, the
Defendant Göring himself signed a number of anti-Jewish decrees for
occupied territories, including the decrees enumerated on Pages 47 and
48 of our brief, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice.
During the later years of the war the program of the Nazi conspirators
for the complete physical annihilation of all Jews in Europe achieved
its full fury. While the execution of this anti-Jewish program was for
the most part handled by the SS and the Security Police, the Defendant
Göring remains implicated to the last in the final efforts to achieve a
Nazi “solution” of the Jewish problem.
On 31 July 1941 he wrote a letter to the conspirator Heydrich, which is
the final document to which I wish to draw the Tribunal’s attention. It
is a fitting climax to our presentation on this defendant. The reason
why it was addressed to the notorious Heydrich, the predecessor of the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner, need not strain our imagination. This document
is our Document Number 710-PS, which has already been admitted as
Exhibit Number USA-509, in connection with the case on the Gestapo.
While it has already been read into evidence, with permission of the
Court, I would like to close my presentation with the reading of that
letter. Göring writes to Heydrich:
“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January
1939, which dealt with arriving at thorough furtherance of
emigration and evacuation solution of the Jewish problem, as
advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you to make all
necessary organizational and practical preparations for bringing
about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German
sphere of influence in Europe.
“Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to
co-operate with you.
“I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an over-all
plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material
measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired final
solution of the Jewish question.”
The presentation made to the Tribunal on the individual responsibility
of the Defendant Göring has been intended to be merely illustrative of
the mass of documentary evidence which reveals the leading part played
by this conspirator in every phase of the Nazi conspiracy. Thus, we
submit that the responsibility of Göring for the crimes with which he
has been charged under Count One and Count Two of the Indictment has
been established.
May it please the Tribunal, this completes the presentation on the
individual responsibility of the Defendant Göring. We will now proceed
with the arrangement made with the British Delegation on the
presentation showing the individual responsibility of the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if the Tribunal
would be good enough to look at Appendix A of the Indictment on Page 28
of the English text (Volume I, Page 69) they will find the particulars
relating to this defendant, and they will find that the allegations
regarding him fall into three divisions.
After reciting the offices which he held, the appendix of the Indictment
goes on to say that the Defendant Ribbentrop used the foregoing
positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the
Führer in such a manner that he promoted the accession to power of the
Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment and
permitted the preparation for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment.
In the second section he participated in the political planning and
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in
violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances as set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.
In accordance with the Führer Principle, he executed and assumed
responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi
conspirators, as set forth in Count One of the Indictment.
Then the third section: He authorized, directed, and participated in War
Crimes, as set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes
against Humanity, set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including,
more particularly crimes against persons and property in occupied
territories. I hope that it might be useful to the Tribunal if I follow
the order of these allegations in the Indictment as we collected the
evidence for each of these in turn; I therefore proceed to deal first
with the allegation that this defendant promoted the accession to power
of the Nazi conspirators.
The Tribunal knows already that the defendant held various offices and
these are usefully collected in his own certified statement, which has
already been put in as Exhibit Number USA-5, Document 2829-PS. And I
think it would be convenient if I very briefly explained the different
activities and offices of the defendant which are dealt with in that
list. It will be seen from that list that he became a member of the Nazi
Party in 1932, but, according to the semi-official statement in _Das
Archiv_, he had begun to work for the Party before that time. That
semi-official statement goes on to say that he succeeded in extending
his business connections to political circles, having joined in 1930 the
service of the Party. At the time of the final struggle for power in the
Reich, Ribbentrop played an important, if not strikingly obvious part in
the bringing about of the decisive meetings between the representatives
of the President of the Reich and the heads of the Party, who had
prepared the entry of the Nazis into power on 30 January 1933. Those
meetings, as well as those between Hitler and Von Papen, took place in
Ribbentrop’s house in Berlin-Dahlem.
This defendant was therefore present and active at the inception of the
Nazi securing of power. After that, for a short period, he was adviser
to the Party on questions of foreign affairs. His title was first
“Adviser to the Führer on matters of foreign policy” and he later became
representative in matters of foreign policy on the staff of the deputy.
This was followed by membership in the Reichstag in November 1933 and in
the Party organizations he became an Oberführer in the SS and was
subsequently promoted to Gruppenführer and to Obergruppenführer.
Thereafter he attained official government positions.
On the 24th of April 1934 he was appointed delegate of the Reich
Government on matters of disarmament. That was after Germany had left
the disarmament conference. In this capacity he visited foreign
capitals. He was then given a more important and certainly a more
resounding title: the German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large; and it
was in that capacity that he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement
of 1935.
In 1936, after the Nazi Government had re-occupied the Rhineland
contrary to the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, the matter was
brought before the Council of the League of Nations, and the defendant
addressed the Council in defense of the action of Germany. His next
position began on 11 August 1936, when he was appointed Ambassador in
London. He occupied that position for a period of some 18 months, and
his activities there, while having their own interest, are not highly
relevant to the matters now before the Tribunal. But during that period,
in the capacity which he still had as German Minister Plenipotentiary at
Large, he signed the original Anticomintern Pact with Japan in November
1936 and also the additional pact by which Italy joined it in 1937.
Finally, so far as this part of the case is concerned, on 4 February
1938 this defendant was appointed Foreign Minister in place of the
Defendant Von Neurath and simultaneously was made a member of the Secret
Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinettsrat) established by decree of Hitler
of that date. That takes us up to the period of his holding the office
of Foreign Minister, and his actions in that capacity will be dealt with
in detail later on.
I refer the Tribunal without reading further, because I have already
summarized it, to the extract from _Das Archiv_, which is Document
D-472, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-130; also to the membership
extract of the SS, which consists in the examination of the descent of
SS leaders and which I insert as Exhibit GB-131. Again I shall not
trouble the Tribunal with the details. It shows his rank, which I have
already mentioned. There is no question of any honorary rank. It is
simply stated to be the rank of Gruppenführer, and of course, it gives
his ancestry in detail, in order to deal with the laws which related to
that subject. It also deals with his adoption in order to secure the
prefix of “von,” but the defendant has now to deal with much more
serious things than barren controversies with the _Almanach de Gotha_.
The only new document which I put before the Tribunal in this part of
the case is Exhibit GB-129, Document 1337-PS, which shows the
establishment of the Secret Cabinet Council and the membership of the
Foreign Minister. These are the activities of this defendant in the
earlier part of his career, and in the submission of the Prosecution
they show quite clearly that he assisted willingly, deliberately,
intentionally, and keenly in bringing the Nazis into power and into the
earlier stage of their obtaining control of the German State.
I now come to the second allegation in the Indictment, that this
defendant participated in political planning and preparation with the
Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances; and again it might
help the Tribunal if I took these quite shortly, in order of aggression,
and stated briefly the constituent allegations that we make and the
references to matters before the Tribunal, referring the Tribunal only
to any new document which shall come along.
The first is the Anschluss with Austria, and there the Tribunal will
remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at
Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and Von Papen met the
Austrian Chancellor Von Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister, Guido
Schmidt. The Tribunal will find the official account of that interview
in Document 2461-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-132. What the Tribunal
will find, I submit, is the truthful account of the interview in Exhibit
Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS, which is the diary of the
Defendant Jodl; and the relevant entries are those for 11 and 12
February 1938. They are extremely short, and I shall read—if the
Tribunal will be kind enough to allow me, they do show quite clearly the
case for the Prosecution—about the pressure that was used in Chancellor
Schuschnigg’s interview. It is at the foot of the first page in the
Document Book; Document 1780-PS is the number.
And on the 11th of February the Defendant Jodl writes:
“In the evening and on 12 February General K”—Keitel—“with
General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg,
together with G. Schmidt are being put under the heaviest
political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs
protocol.
“13 February: In the afternoon General K”—Keitel—“asks Admiral
C”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us
that the Führer’s order is to the effect that military pressure,
by shamming military action, should be kept up until the 15th.
Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and
submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.
“14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer
arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence
Office VII and initiates the different measures.
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military
preparations.”
It is rather interesting, after reading the frank statement of the
Defendant Jodl, to look at the pale words of the official statement
which I have also put in. That is the view of the meeting with
Schuschnigg, which the Prosecution placed before this Court.
Will the Tribunal be good enough to ignore an allegation that appears in
the trial brief that this defendant visited Mussolini before the
Anschluss, as is stated by a member of his staff at that time. It was
disputed by another member. Therefore, I would rather the Tribunal ruled
it out.
The next point on which there is no dispute is the telephone
conversation which took place between the Defendant Göring and the
Defendant Ribbentrop on the 13th of March 1938, when this defendant was
still in London. The Tribunal will remember that that was dealt with
fully by my friend, Mr. Alderman. It was passing on what the Prosecution
submits is a completely false statement: that there was no ultimatum.
The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the earlier telephone
conversations with the Defendant Göring in Vienna. Defendant Göring then
passed that on to the Defendant Ribbentrop in London in order that he
might propagate the story of there being no ultimatum, in political
circles in London. That appears in the telephone conversation, which is
Exhibit Number USA-76, Document 2949-PS, and, as I say, it is fully
dealt with in the transcript on Page 582 (Volume II, Page 425).
The third action which this defendant took occurred after his return
from London. Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in
February, he had gone back to London to clear up his business at the
embassy and he was still in London until after the Anschluss had
actually occurred, but his name appears as a signatory of the law making
Austria a province of the German Reich. That is Document 2307-PS, which
I now put in as Exhibit GB-133. And there is a reference in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, which is given. These were the actions of the
defendant with regard to Austria.
Then we come to Czechoslovakia, and there you have an almost perfect
example of aggression at work in its various ways. Again I simply remind
the Tribunal of the outstanding points with the greatest brevity. First,
there is the question of stirring up trouble inside the country against
which aggression is going to be set forth.
This Defendant, as Foreign Minister, was concerned with the stirring up
of the Sudeten Germans under Henlein, and the contacts between the
Foreign Office and Henlein are shown in Exhibit Numbers USA-93, 94, 95,
and 96. These are Documents 3060-PS, 2789-PS, 2788-PS, and 3059-PS. They
have all been read by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but I simply give to the
Tribunal their effect on them, which is the stirring up of the Sudeten
German movement in order to act with the Government of the Reich.
Then, after that, the Defendant Ribbentrop was present on the 28th of
May 1938 at the conference with Hitler, at which the latter gave the
necessary instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. That was
dealt with previously on Page 742 of the transcript (Volume III, Page
42). And I want to put before the Tribunal Document 2360-PS, which is a
report of a speech of Hitler’s in the _Völkischer Beobachter_; and, if
the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, it is a useful date to
fix with regard to the aggression against Czechoslovakia, because that
was the day on which Hitler, on his own proclamation, had decided that
aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia. The extract which I
have taken is quite short and—if the Tribunal would look at the extract
which is on Page 1, columns 5 and 6, bottom—the important passage is:
“On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still
further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve
the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner.”
This was in January 1939. Then he goes on to say:
“On 28 May . . . I gave the order for the preparation of
military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2
October. . . .”
The important point is that the 28th of May was the date when the Fall
Grün for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders and it was thereafter
put into effect to come to fruition at the beginning of October. That is
the second stage: To lay well in advance your plans of aggression. The
third stage is to see that the neighboring states are not likely to
cause you trouble.
So we find that on the 18th of July 1938 this defendant had a
conversation with the Italian Ambassador Attolico, at which the attack
on Czechoslovakia was discussed. That is Exhibit Number USA-85, Document
2800-PS. And there were further discussions which are contained in
Exhibits USA-86 and 87, which are Documents 2791-PS and 2792-PS.
I think it is sufficient for me to say to the Tribunal that the effect
of these documents is that it was made clear to the Italian Government
that the German Government was going to move against Czechoslovakia.
The other country which was interested was Hungary, because Hungary had
certain territorial ideas with regard to parts of the Czechoslovakian
Republic.
So, on the 23rd and 25th of August, this defendant was present at the
discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian politicians
Imredy and Kania, and these are found in Exhibit Numbers USA-88 and 89,
Documents 2796-PS and 2797-PS.
This defendant endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and the
Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit itself to
action, although it was ready enough with sympathy. These are to be
found in the documents which I have mentioned. And, again, unless the
Tribunal desires, I shall not read any document that I summarize that
way.
Now I have already mentioned that there had been contact with the
Sudeten Germans. That was the long-term grievance that had to be
exploited. But the next stage was to have a short-term grievance and to
stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead. And so, between the
16th and 24th of September, we find the German Foreign Office, of which
this defendant was at the head, stirring up trouble in Prague; and that
is shown very clearly in Exhibits Numbers USA-97 to 101, which are
Documents 2858-PS, 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and 2856-PS. I have read
them in order of date. And it would be interesting for the Tribunal to
look at these. They ought to follow quite shortly the document they have
just been looking at, beginning with Document PS-2858. You will see the
sort of thing of which I am reminding the Tribunal. Here you have the
document of the 19th of September coming from the Foreign Office to the
German Embassy in Prague:
“Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein’s request to get
in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their
demands for autonomy during the next day.”
And the others deal with questions of arrest and the action that would
be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position
more difficult.
That was the contribution which this defendant made to the pre-Munich
crisis. After, as the Tribunal will remember, on the 29th of September
1938, the Munich Agreement was signed. That is GB-23, Document TC-23,
which I have already read to the Tribunal.
And, after that—I just remind the Tribunal of an interesting document
which shows the sort of action which the Wehrmacht expected and the
advice that the Wehrmacht expected from the Foreign Office.
You have, on the 1st of October, Document C-2, which is Exhibit Number
USA-90, and that is a long document putting forward an almost infinite
variety of breaches of international law, which were likely to arise or
might have arisen from the action in regard to Czechoslovakia; and on
all these points the opinion of the Foreign Office is sought. That, of
course, remained a hypothetical question at that time because no war
resulted.
Then, if the Tribunal please, we come to the second stage in the
acquiring of Czechoslovakia: That is, having obtained the Sudetenland,
arranging so that there would be a crisis in Czechoslovakia which would
give an excuse for taking the rest. The Tribunal will remember the
importance of this because it is the first time that the German
Government went outside its own statement about not going beyond German
blood.
On that point, again, this defendant was active. On the 13th of March,
as events were moving to a climax, he sent a telegram to the German
Minister in Prague, who was under him, telling him to “make a point of
not being available if the Government there wants to get in touch with
you in the next few days.” That is Exhibit Number USA-116, Document
2815-PS.
At the same time this defendant saw a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks in
Berlin. At a conference with Hitler, at which this defendant was
present, Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi Slovaks, was directed to
declare an independent Slovak State, in order to assist in the
disintegration of Czechoslovakia. That is Exhibit Number USA-117,
Document 2802-PS, and the Tribunal might care to compare it with a
previous meeting with another Slovak, Tuka, a month before, which is
shown in Document 2790-PS, Exhibit Number USA-110. So that this
defendant was assisting in the task, again, of supporting internal
trouble.
Then on the 14th of March 1939, the next day, Hacha, the President of
Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. This defendant was present at the
meeting and the Tribunal will remember the usual pressure and threats
which resulted in the aged President’s purposing to hand over the
Czechoslovak State to Hitler. The Tribunal will find that subject dealt
with on Page 911 of the transcript (Volume III, from Page 158), and the
relevant exhibit is Exhibit Number USA-118, Document 2798-PS, which is
the minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Hacha that this defendant
attended. You will also find it dealt with in Exhibit Number USA-126,
Document 3061-PS, which is the Czechoslovakian Government report.
That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week
this defendant signed a treaty with Slovakia which I now put in. It is
Document 1439-PS, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-135, and the important
part is Article 2, under which the German Government was given the right
to construct military posts and installations and keep them garrisoned
within Czechoslovakia. Again, I am not going to read it at length, but I
hope the Tribunal will stop me if there are any of these documents which
they would like read instead of summarized.
In that way this defendant by the terms of that treaty, after completely
finishing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state, had got military
control in Slovakia.
Before I pass to Poland, there is one interesting little point on the
Northern Baltic which I put before the Tribunal to show how this
defendant could hardly keep his hands out of the internal affairs of
other countries, even when it did not seem a very important matter. The
Tribunal will remember that on the 3rd of April 1939, as shown in GB-4,
TC-53(a), Germany had occupied the Memelland. It would have appeared, as
far as the Baltic States were concerned, that the position was
satisfactory; but if the Tribunal will look at Document 2953-PS, which I
put in as Exhibit GB-136, and Document 2952-PS, which I put in as
GB-137, they will find that this defendant acted in close concert with
the conspirator Heydrich, who is dead, in stirring up trouble in
Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the “Woldemaras
supporters.” Document 2953-PS shows that Heydrich was passing to the
Defendant Ribbentrop the request for financial support for the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 2953?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the one I was going to
read. That is a letter from Heydrich to the Defendant Ribbentrop and it
says:
“Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop:
“Enclosed please find a further report about the ‘Woldemaras
supporters.’ As already mentioned in the previous report the
‘Woldemaras supporters’ are still asking for help from the
Reich. I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial
support brought up again by the ‘Woldemaras supporters’ set
forth on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the enclosed report and to make
a definite decision.
“The request of the ‘Woldemaras supporters’ for financial
support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms
should not, however, be made under any circumstances.”
Then, 2952-PS, the next document, is a fuller report, and at the end of
that there is added in handwriting, “I support small regular payments,
e.g., 2,000 to 3,000 marks quarterly.” It is signed “W,” who I
understand to be the Secretary of State.
I merely quoted that to show the extraordinary interference, even with
comparatively unimportant countries.
Then we pass to the aggression against Poland, and again the Tribunal
has had that fully dealt with by my friend Colonel Griffith-Jones; but
again it might be useful if I just separated the various periods so that
the Tribunal would have these in mind. The first was what one might call
the Munich period, up to the end of September 1938; and at that time no
language was too good for Poland. The Tribunal will remember the point.
The important documents showing that aspect of the case are GB-30, which
is Document 2357-PS, Hitler’s Reichstag speech on the 20th of February
1938, and then GB-31, Document TC-76, which is the secret Foreign Office
memorandum of the 26th of August 1938, and GB-27, Document TC-73, Number
40. TC-73 is the Polish _White_ _Book_ and 40 is the number of the
document in the book. That is a conversation between M. Lipski, the
Polish Ambassador, and this defendant.
Finally in this group is TC-73, Number 42, Hitler’s speech at the
Sportpalast on the 26th of September 1938, in which he said that this
was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed an
almost violent affection for the Poles.
Now the next stage was between Munich and the rape of Prague, and then
in the next stage—part of the German aggressions in Czechoslovakia
having been accomplished and parts still remaining to be done—there is
a slight change but still a friendly atmosphere. That begins with a
conversation between this defendant and M. Lipski, which is contained in
Exhibit GB-27, Document TC-73, Number 44.
There this defendant put forward very peaceful suggestions for the
settlement of the Danzig issue. The Polish reply is in GB-28, TC-73.
THE PRESIDENT: You did not give the date of those, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord: The first one is 25 October 1938;
the Polish reply which says that it is unacceptable that Danzig should
return to the Reich, but making suggestions for a bilateral agreement,
is the 31st of October 1938. Between these dates, the Tribunal will
remember according to Document C-137, Exhibit GB-33, dated the 21st of
October the German Government had made its preparation to occupy Danzig
by surprise. But although these preparations were made, still some 2
months later, on the 5th of January 1939, while the rape of Prague had
not taken place, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign
Minister, a new solution. That is contained in Document TC-73,
Number-48, Exhibit GB-34, the interview of Hitler and Beck on the 5th of
January 1939.
Then this defendant saw M. Beck on the next day and said there was no
violent solution of Danzig, but a further building up of friendly
relations. That is contained in GB-35, Document TC-73, Number 49. Not
content with that, this defendant went to Warsaw on the 25th of January
and, according to the report of his speech contained in Document
2530-PS, GB-36, talked of the continued progress and consolidation of
friendly relations; and that was capped by Hitler’s Reichstag speech on
the 30th of January 1939, in the same sort of tone, contained in GB-37,
TC-73, Number 57. That was the second stage—the mention of Danzig in
honeyed words, because, of course, the rape of Prague had not been
attained.
Then one has to remember, as one comes to the summer, the meeting at the
Reich Chancellery on the 23rd of May 1939, which is reported in Document
L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. It has been read many times to the
Tribunal, and I remind them of only this point: That that is the
document where Hitler makes it quite clear, and states in his own words,
that Danzig has nothing to do with the real Polish question. He had to
deal with Poland because he wanted Lebensraum in the East. That is the
effect of that portion of the document which has been read so often to
the Tribunal—that Danzig was merely an excuse.
It is important to have in mind, if I may respectfully suggest it, that
that meeting was on the 23rd of May 1939, because there is an
interesting corroboration of the attitude of mind—in showing how
clearly this Defendant Ribbentrop had adopted the attitude of mind of
Hitler—in the introduction to Count Ciano’s diary, which was put in as
Exhibit Number USA-166, Document 2987-PS; but I do not think this part
of the diary, the introduction, has been read before to the Court. It is
Document 2897-PS, and it comes two after L-79, which is the “Little
Schmundt” file, just after the Obersalzberg document. It is set out in
the trial brief, if the Tribunal will care to follow it there. Count
Ciano says:
“In the summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claims against
Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had
several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any
intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these
denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure for
myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his
residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were
waiting to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as
he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace
administrative matter. ‘Well, Ribbentrop,’ I asked him, while we
were walking in the garden, ‘What do you want? The Corridor or
Danzig?’ ‘Not any more, . . .’ and he stared at me through those
cold Musée Grevin eyes, ‘We want war.’”
I remind the Tribunal how closely that corroborates the statement that
Hitler had made at his Chancellery conference on the 23rd of May: That
it was no longer a question of Danzig or the Corridor, it was a question
of war to achieve Lebensraum in the East.
Then I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, that the Fall Weiss for
operation against Poland is dated the 3rd and 11th of April 1939, which
certainly shows that preparations were already in hand.
And then there is another reference in Count Ciano’s diary which also
has not been read and which makes this point quite clear. Again, if the
Tribunal will take it as set out in the trial brief, I will read it, as
it has not been read before:
“I have collected the conference records of verbal transcripts
of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Here I shall
note only some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is
evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming
German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many
times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel
embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is
preparing to do.
“The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which
might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain
that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded
they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by
the demon of destruction.
“Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not
hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this
doesn’t shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this
view carries in German opinion.
“The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is
reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a
word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear
conscience. He has not.”
Whatever other defects there may have been about Count Ciano, there
cannot be an appreciation of the situation which is more heavily
corroborated by supporting documents than his diagnosis of the situation
in the summer of 1939.
Then we come to the next stage in the German plan, which was sharp
pressure on the claim for Danzig shown immediately after Czechoslovakia
had been finally dealt with on the 15th of March. It is shown how
closely it followed the completion of the rape of Prague. The first
sharp raising of the claim was on the 21st of March, as shown in Exhibit
GB-38, Document TC-73, Number 61. And that developed, as the Tribunal
has heard from Colonel Griffith-Jones.
Then we come to the last days before the war, and one interesting side
light is that Herr Von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of
St. James, returned from London on the 18th of August 1939; and I put in
the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Ribbentrop, which is
Document D-490. I put that in as GB-138.
I do not intend to read it to the Tribunal because it can be summarized
in this way: That the Defendant Ribbentrop has certainly no recollection
of ever having seen the German Ambassador to the Court of St. James
after his return. He thinks he would have remembered him if he had seen
him and he accepts the probability that he did not see him. And there is
the point, when it was well-known that war with Poland would involve
England and France, that either he was not sufficiently interested in
opinion in London to take the trouble to see his ambassador or else, as
he rather suggests, that he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career
diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account, either
by himself or by Hitler. In either case, he was completely uninterested
in anything which his ambassador might have to tell him of opinion in
London or the possibility of war. And I conceive myself speaking with
great moderation in putting it this way. That in the last days before
the 1st of September 1939 this defendant did whatever he could to avoid
peace with Poland and to avoid anything which might hinder the incursion
of the war which we know he wanted. He did that, well knowing that war
with Poland would involve Great Britain and France. These details were
given in full by Colonel Griffith-Jones; I am not going through them
again. But I have, for the convenience of the Tribunal, referred to the
transcript at Pages 1000 to 1059 (Volume III, Pages 219 to 261), and M.
Lipski summarized all that took place in his report of the 10th of
October 1939, which is Document TC-73, Number 147, which is Exhibit
GB-27.
Now these are the actions of this defendant in the Polish matter. I am
glad to inform the Tribunal that with regard to the other countries they
are very much shorter than with regard to Poland.
I now come to Norway and Denmark. I remind the Tribunal of the fact, if
it cares to take cognizance thereof, that on the 31st of May 1939 the
Defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed a non-aggression pact
with Denmark which provided that “the German Reich and the Kingdom of
Denmark will under no circumstances go to war or employ force of any
other kind against one another.” This is Exhibit GB-77, Document TC-24.
And just to fix the date, the Tribunal will remember that on the 9th of
April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Denmark and at the same time
they invaded Norway.
With regard to Norway there are three documents which show that this
defendant was fully informed of the earlier preparations for that act of
aggression. The Tribunal will remember that my friend, Major Elwyn
Jones, did indicate with some particularity the relations between
Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg. But Rosenberg in this case also
required the help of the Defendant Ribbentrop and, if the Tribunal would
be good enough to turn to Document 957-PS, which I am putting in as
GB-139, they will see the first of the documents which connect this
defendant with the earlier Quisling activities.
The first one, Document 957-PS, is a letter from Defendant Rosenberg to
this defendant and it begins:
“Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop:
“Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed
report to Geheimrat Von Grundherr, who will address you on this
subject. We agreed the other day that 200,000 to 300,000
Reichsmarks would be made immediately available for the said
purpose. Now it turns out that . . . Grundherr states that the
second instalment can be made available only after 8 days. But
as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request
you to make it possible that this second instalment be given to
him at once. With a longer absence . . . the connection with
your representatives would also be broken up, which just now,
under certain circumstances, could be very unfavorable.
“Therefore I think it is in everybody’s interest, if Party
Comrade Scheidt goes back immediately.”
That was the 24th of February.
Now the next document, 004-PS, is a report from Rosenberg to Hitler, and
if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 4—this is on the
Quisling activities—they will find that that passage is sufficient to
show how this defendant was connected with it. This is a report from
Rosenberg to Hitler:
“Next to a financial support which was paid by the Reich in
foreign currency, Quisling, as further help, was at the same
time promised deliveries of goods which were urgently needed by
Norway, such as coal and sugar. The shipments were to be
conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be established
in Germany, or through specially selected existing firms while
Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin had already
conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygaardsvold
Government, as, for instance, the Minister of Supply and
Commerce, and had been assured permission for the import of
coal. At the same time the coal transports were to serve
possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch
Quisling’s political action in Oslo with German help. It was
Quisling’s plan to send a number of selected, particularly
reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in
a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as
area and language specialists to German special troops, who were
to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political
action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading
opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all
military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately
following this political action and upon an official request of
Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military
occupation of Norway was to take place. All military
preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan
contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a
great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure.
For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at
the same time it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians
were concerned.
“In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal
Göring, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Ministerial Director
in the office of the Four Year Plan, Wohlthat, only of the
intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named
confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in a
conference between Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz, and
Hagelin. Since Wohlthat received no further instructions from
the General Field Marshal, Foreign Minister Von
Ribbentrop—after a consultation with Reichsleiter
Rosenberg—consented to expedite these shipments through his
office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the
Führer it was also arranged at this conference to pay Quisling
through Scheidt as liaison 10,000 English pounds per month for
the next 3 months, commencing on the 15th of March, to support
his work.”
This was paid through Scheidt, the man who was mentioned before.
Now the other document, D-629, is a letter from Defendant Keitel to the
Defendant Ribbentrop, dated the 3rd of April 1940. I need trouble the
Tribunal only with the first paragraph. The Defendant Keitel says:
“Dear Herr Von Ribbentrop:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by
command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has
therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions
connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at
your disposal for the political preparation of this operation
is, on the contrary, very much shorter. I believe myself,
therefore, to be acting in accordance with your ideas in
transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the
Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in
Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but
also I include a series of requests which certainly concern the
Wehrmacht only indirectly but which are, however, of the
greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task.”
Then he proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with
certain commanders. The important point for which I read it to the
Tribunal—as far as I know, for the first time—is that there we have
the Defendant Keitel saying quite clearly that the military occupation
of Denmark and Norway has been long in preparation. And it is
interesting when one looks back to the official life of Ribbentrop,
which, is contained in the archives and is Document D-472. I am quoting
a sentence only because of the interesting contrast:
“With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9th of April
1940 only a few hours before the landing of British troops in
these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers.”
Then it goes on to Holland and Belgium.
It is quite clear that, whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was
ignorant, this Defendant Ribbentrop had been up to his neck in the
Quisling plottings, and it is made clear to him well a week before the
invasion started, that the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Keitel had long
been preparing this particular act of aggression.
I think, My Lord, that is really all the evidence on the aggression
against Norway because, again, the story was put forward fully by my
friend, Major Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, 'Defense' versus
'Defence'. Unlike prior Blue Series volumes I and II, all German and
eastern European names and terms include accents and umlauts: hence
Führer and Göring, etc. throughout; and Himmler's speech in 'Weselsburg'
has been corrected to the town's name of 'Wezelsburg'.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in
the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document's presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945- 1 October 1946 (Vol. 4)_,
by Various.]