"Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in
the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more
than a few days' rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted
his communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his
army, or forced him to retreat."
They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be
of use, found in their line of march. "The citizens were in many cases
entirely stripped of the necessaries of life."
Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enough
to throw his main body in Lee's rear, so as substantially to cut
his communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. To
accomplish this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, which
should keep whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinity
of Orange Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column was
beyond their reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select a
rallying point on the Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene
of operations. Every thing was to be subordinate to cutting the
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.
If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and
day for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad,
he might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee's line
of supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected his
strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor of
his operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick.
Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, to
accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but
it would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the
disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more.
His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem to
understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a
body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, to
perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to
destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a
couple of guns.
And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the
raiders got back to camp.
Hooker's criticism in this instance is quite just: "On the 4th, the
cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of
it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and
the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our
prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the
enemy's communications had been interrupted. An examination of the
instructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official
report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer
ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever
accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of
cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the
time it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. But
instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent
which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after,
Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested
that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to
suppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and
determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and
inclinations."