As was briefly related in the early part of this work, Hooker issued
orders to Gen. Stoneman, the commanding-officer of the Cavalry Corps of
the Army of the Potomac, on the 12th of April, to move the succeeding
day for the purpose of cutting the communications of the enemy. The
order read as follows:--
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 12, 1863.
Commanding Officer, Cavalry Corps.
I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that you
will march at seven o'clock A.M., on the 13th inst., with all your
available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the
enemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command between him
and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat,
and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his
discomfiture and defeat.
To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the
Rappahannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of
the enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to
mask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy, by
the people in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert
suspicion it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in
pursuit of Jones's guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the
Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further suggests
that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock, some point
to the west of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, which can only be
determined by the circumstances as they are found on the arrival of your
advance.
In the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to run against Fitz Hugh
Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which
it is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to
your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your command.
At Gordonsville, the enemy have a small provost-guard of infantry, which
it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without delaying your
forward movement. From there it is expected that you will push forward
to the Aquia and Richmond Railroad, somewhere in the vicinity
of Saxton's Junction, destroying along your whole route the
railroad-bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, lines of
telegraphic communication, etc. The general directs that you go prepared
with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectually.
As the line of the railroad from Aquia to Richmond presents the shortest
one for the enemy to retire on, it is most probable that he will avail
himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of
it, for this purpose; in which event you will select the strongest
positions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in
order to check or prevent it; and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon
his flanks, attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is
exhausted and out of supplies.
Moments of delay will be hours and days to the army in pursuit.
If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will
endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night,
on the march, and in camp, unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his
column large slices, the general desires that you will not fail to take
small ones. Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be
Fight, Fight, FIGHT; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the
general as the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to
oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly mounted,
and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. Keep them
from Richmond, and sooner or later they must fall into our hands.
The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary
object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication with
Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat over those
lines; and he wishes to make every thing subservient to that object. He
desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts,
and attack him wherever you find him.
If, in your operations, an opportunity should present itself for you
to detach a force to Charlottesville, which is almost unguarded, and
destroy depots of supplies said to be there, or along the line of the
Aquia Railroad, in the direction of Richmond, to destroy bridges,
etc., or the crossings of the Pamunkey, in the direction of West Point,
destroying the ferries, felling trees to prevent or check the crossing,
they will all greatly contribute to our complete success.
You may rely upon the general's being in communication with you before
your supplies are exhausted.
Let him hear from you as often as necessary and practicable.
A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock for
Kelly's Ford, with one battery, and a regiment to the United-States Ford
and Banks's Ford, to threaten and hold those places.
It devolves upon you, general, to take the initiative in the forward
movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must
depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success.
Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in
war, and especially is it the case with the command you have, and the
enterprise on which you are about to embark.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
In pursuance of which order, the corps broke camp near Belle-Plain, and
encamped on the evening of April 13, beyond Morrisville. On April 14, it
moved down to the vicinity of the bridge at Rappahannock station, which,
after a slight skirmish by Gregg, was taken possession of. Beverly
Ford, some miles above, was also examined, and the north bank occupied.
Preparations for an early move on the morning of the 14th were made.
Gen. Buford, commanding the cavalry reserve, remained at Kelly's Ford
during the 14th, in order to draw the attention of the Confederates to
that point, and indulged in a little artillery skirmish.
During the night a heavy rain set in, and before morning the river was
no longer fordable by the artillery and pack-trains.
As is well known, it takes no great rainfall to swell the Rappahannock
and Rapidan rivers, and their tributaries, to the proportion of
torrents. Nor are more than a few hours necessary to raise these rivers
and runs, and even the dry ravines, to an impassable depth. Gregg
mentions in his report that a small stream, which, on the 13th, could
be crossed at one step, had swelled to such a flood, that when, on the
15th, a regiment was obliged to cross it, there were lost one man and
two horses by drowning.
So that, after crossing one division, Stoneman found that it would
probably be isolated on account of the impracticability of crossing the
rest of the corps, and consequently ordered its immediate return. And
this was accomplished none too soon, by swimming the horses.
On reporting all these facts to Hooker, Stoneman was ordered to go into
camp, where he remained, along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, until
the 27th.
The following letter is of interest, in this connection, as showing how
keen Mr. Lincoln's intuitions occasionally were.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D.C., April 15, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning,
and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives
me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be
calculated upon. Gen. S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the
expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of
which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance from
the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To
reach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan)
to cross; and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how many
days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be
done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often.
I am very anxious.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.