I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in
camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, with
the hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can be
imputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the one
could not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of the
despatches is explained by the difficulty of communication between
headquarters and the Sixth Corps.
The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt of
Sedgwick's despatch saying he would hold the corps south of the
river, was received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which was
exceptionally delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circumstances,
put into course of execution.
As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander's
artillery began dropping shells in the neighborhood of the bridges
and river banks; and Gen. Wilcox, with his own and Kershaw's brigades,
followed up Sedgwick's movements to the crossing, and used his artillery
freely.
When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwick
was taken aback by the receipt of Hooker's despatch of 1.20 A.M.,
countermanding the order to withdraw as above quoted.
The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, the
corps could not now re-cross, except by forcing the passage, as the
Confederates absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with a
heavy body of troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid of
Sedgwick, upon conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk of
his army upon Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any event
have successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice but to
go into camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the ford, and
guard the river.
The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days' engagements were
4,925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags,
fifteen guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundred
prisoners, and lost no material. These captures are not conceded by the
Confederate authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped in
such confusion as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements,
and material of all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of all
facts, and the due weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothing
was lost by the Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the dead
and wounded.
Gibbon's division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of the
river, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy's was taken up. Warren says,
"Gen. Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, and
retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsville
pretty nearly all day." This Warren plainly esteems a poor sample of
generalship, and he does not understand why Hooker did not order an
assault. "I think it very probable we could have succeeded if it had
been made." "Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted,"--"'tired' would
express it."
Lee's one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so as
to be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he could
now again turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who lay
listlessly expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently oblivious
of his maxim enjoined upon Stoneman, "that celerity, audacity, and
resolution are every thing in war."
Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate lines
at and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at once
ordered back to the old battle-field. "They reached their destination
during the afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm,
which continued throughout the night, and most of the following day."
(Lee.)
Wilcox and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road;
Mahone, Posey, and Perry, along the plank road.
Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mine
roads, and the latter rejoined his division.
The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to assault Hooker's
position at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by no
means idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its details,
was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to develop his
plans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the terrain would
have yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous blow would disable
his antagonist for this campaign, and he was unwilling to delay in
striking it.