"I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that we
contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the
enemy's last assault with ease. The troops are in good position. Gen.
Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you
how to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at five
P.M. Look to the safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, by
way of Fredericksburg or Banks's Ford: the latter would enable you to
join us more readily."
The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P.M. next day,
and was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, in
his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, rather
apologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on the
score of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflects
the ideas of Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence,
fathered by Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that there
was then no idea of retiring across the river.
And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not,
in tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick,
either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his mind
plainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet failings.
And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in good-will,
ability, or conduct, it is strange that there should not be some
apparent expression of it. It was only when he was driven to extremity
in explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit suggested
Sedgwick as an available scapegoat.
During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid
himself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker's defences.
And, trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his
opponent's lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson's remaining three
brigades to the forces opposing Sedgwick's wing, leaving only Jackson's
corps, now numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with
his eighty thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself
repaired to the battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the
intention of driving Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again
concentrate all his powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville.
By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox's,
and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only
a few of Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and
instructed to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to join
McLaws, feeling our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining the
left of our line to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down to
the plank road.
At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge,
that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut
him off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as a
possible outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to
throw a force about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford;
but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this
affair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any
serious movement to cut him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had already
formed Howe's division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen,
from the river to the plank road.
In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from
Sedgwick only general--in fact, vague--and rare instructions, as to the
dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular
manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon
information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line,
over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men.
The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this
condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across
Banks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a
disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick had
scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five thousand,
and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with the
left on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's Ford,
running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south
side for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which
Wheaton had held the night before. This was a long, weak position,
depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under the
circumstances, well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery,
under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen. Newton's division held the right of
this line, facing west; Gen. Brooks had Russell's brigade, also posted
so as to face west, on the left of Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert
faced south, the former resting his left somewhere near Howe's right
brigade. This portion of the line was, on Monday afternoon, re-enforced
by Wheaton's brigade of Newton's division, withdrawn from the extreme
right; and here it rendered effective service at the time the attack
was made on Howe, and captured a number of prisoners. The bulk of Howe's
division lay facing east, from near Guest's house to the river. The
whole line of battle may be characterized, therefore, as a rough convex
order,--or, to describe it more accurately, lay on three sides of a
square, of which the Rappahannock formed the fourth. This line protected
our pontoon-bridges at Scott's Dam, a mile below Banks's Ford.
No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where
he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks's Ford,
and attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight.
Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till
night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker's
caution to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the
information that he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far
away to direct him with intelligence.
Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, till
Tuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later page.
Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall's
brigade of Gibbon's division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and
occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated
with McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; but
McLaws, not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the
troops Early and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of
Anderson, whom he knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem
Church.
Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been
making preparations for a demonstration against Hooker's left at
Chancellorsville, and had there amused himself by shelling a park
of supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at the
crossing of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived about
eleven A.M. at the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he was
got into line on Early's left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so
stubbornly defended against Brooks.
Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by
one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg.
The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary
reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick's centre by a vigorous assault;
and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch
of the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in
our front.
"Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to
the broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of
ascertaining the disposition of the enemy's forces." (Lee.) But more
or less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day,--to cover the
disposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately to
ascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held by
Sedgwick's divisions.
Not until six were Lee's preparations completed to his satisfaction; but
about that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a general
advance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of the
line, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill on
which Downman's house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up the
hills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre.
On Early's left came Anderson, whose brigades extended--in order,
Wright, Posey, Perry--to a point nearly as far as, but not joining,
McLaws's right at about Shed's farm; Mahone of Anderson's division
remained on McLaws's extreme left, where he had been placed on account
of his familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilcox
occupied his ground of Sunday.
Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command the
Union artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws's line.
It was Alexander's opening fire which was the signal for the general
assault.
The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and was
held in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. "The speedy
approach of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the success
of the attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river." "His right
brigades, under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the
direction of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they could
only join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing
the obscurity, and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision
between our own troops. Their movements were consequently slow." (Lee.)
Early's assault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns,
and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began,
and Hays's and Hoke's brigades (says Early) were thrown into some
confusion by coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, below
Guest's house. Barksdale remained at Marye's hill, with Smith on his
left in reserve.
The weakness of Howe's long line, obliged that officer carefully to
study his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to an
interior line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed his
reserves accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line,
held by Gen. Neill's brigade, and two regiments of Grant's, was a
small covering of woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficient
artillery, were concentrated. The main assault was made upon his left
by Hoke and Hays. Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe's firm
front, though made with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous attack
upon his right was by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed back,
and, by suddenly advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturing
nearly all the Eighth Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by the
over-advance of our eager troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon's
brigade, which was enabled to move down a ravine in rear of Howe's
right, and compelled its hasty withdrawal.
Meanwhile Neill's brigade, on Howe's left, was overpowered by Early's
fierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we had
lost nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to the
previously selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hoke
and Hays, the Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and
Butler's regular battery, sent to Howe's support by Sedgwick, opened
upon them so sharp a fire, that they retired in headlong confusion,
largely increased by the approaching darkness. This terminated the fight
on the left, and Howe's line was no further molested during the night.
Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked by
McLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has been
laid down. It is one of those frequent assertions, made in the best of
faith, but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of a
recent combat and from unreliable evidence.