The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles,
furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having more
or less remote or immediate effect upon each other.
The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantly
called upon to manoeuvre explains "why the numerous bloody battles
fought between the armies of the Union and of the secessionists should
have been so indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too,
will help to relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequently
made at home and abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in
battle,--battles that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests,
where artillery and cavalry could play no part; where the troops could
not be seen by those controlling their movements; where the echoes and
reverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall the
strongest hearts engaged, and yet the noise would often be scarcely
heard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the generals on
either side, shut out from sight and from hearing, had to trust to the
unyielding bravery of their men till couriers from the different parts
of the field, often extending for miles, brought word which way the
conflict was resulting, before sending the needed support. We should not
wonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual exhaustion
of both contending forces, but rather, that, in all these struggles of
Americans against Americans, no panic on either side gave victory to the
other, like that which the French under Moreau gained over the Austrians
in the Black Forest." (Warren.)
The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz., to drive their
opponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite their
right and left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road to
Fredericksburg, where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish this
end, they attacked the centre of Hooker's army,--the right centre
particularly,--which blocked their way towards both objects.
It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it is
abundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony already
quoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy's plans, he had acquired
full knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart's corps
was still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought the
evening before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially changed
their position in front of Geary and Hancock. He could have ascertained,
by an early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps-commanders did
so on their own responsibility,) that there was no enemy whatsoever
confronting his right and left flanks, where three corps, the First,
Fifth, and Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the foe. And
the obvious thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to hold these
flanks, which were protected by almost insuperable natural obstacles, as
well as formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous troops well
in hand, as a central reserve, in the vicinity of headquarters, to be
launched against the attacking columns of the enemy, wherever occasion
demanded.
Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses of
Saturday, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half the
number. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was put
to good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. On
the other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely a
quarter was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for duty
was given no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking the
onset of the elated champions of the South.
Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker's inertness.
There was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with his
fresh and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front by
Hunting Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strong
column from his front, and take Stuart's line of battle in reverse.
Indeed, a short march of three miles by the Ely's Ford, Haden's Ford,
and Greenwood Gold Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy,
would have enabled Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank,
or seize Dowdall's clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negative
all Stuart's efforts in front of Fairview. Or an advance through the
forest would have accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground was
difficult, and cut up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground had
been, in this campaign, no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor would
it have been to Reynolds, had he been given orders to execute such a
manoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in his testimony: "The action raged
with the greatest fury near us on our left." "I thought that the simple
advance of our corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be very
beneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds once or twice contemplated
making this advance on his own responsibility. Col. Stone made a
reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable."
The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corps
on the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine and
River roads to attack McLaws's right flank. Barely three miles would
have sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operating
distance of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fit
for such work, after its defeat of Saturday night. But testimony is
abundant to show that the corps was fully able to do good service early
on Sunday morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flight
from Dowdall's had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hooker
was apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcely
deem them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meade
available for the work proposed.
Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hooker
conceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wing
under Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Hercules
instead of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculations
were that Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin's and Pollock's
crossings, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilize
his corps, pass the river, capture the heights, where in December a few
Southern brigades had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, march
a dozen miles, and fall upon Lee's rear, all in the brief space of four
or five hours. And it was this plan he chose to put into execution,
deeming others equal to the performance of impossibilities, while
himself could not compass the easiest problems under his own eye.
To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of the
performances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would be
but fair. But Sedgwick's execution of his orders must stand on its own
merits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere.
An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker's sluggishness, is that
he was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, between
nine and ten A.M., on the porch of the Chancellor House, listening
to the heavy firing at the Fairview crest, when a shell struck and
dislodged one of the pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck and
stunned him; and he was doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitated
for work.
But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to have
entirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander,
but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the general
direction of affairs himself.
And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker's thorough inability to grasp
the situation, and handle the conditions arising from the responsibility
of so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at latest Friday
morning. And from this time his enervation was steadily on the increase.
For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday morning's conflict
was already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at early dawn so to
dispose his forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams if over-matched,
or to broach some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy's attention to his
own safety.
It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. But the
odium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are guiltless
of the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the prime
source of this fallacy has been Hooker's ever-ready self-exculpation by
misinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while his subordinates
have held their peace. And this is not alone for the purpose
of vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and its
corps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired to
reiterate what has already been said,--that it is in all appreciation of
Hooker's splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in this
campaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain Hooker's
courage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever commanded an
army corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for. But Hooker
could not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his predecessor,
he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to himself.
Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved the
shifting of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of his
subordinates,--principally Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullest
estimation of Hooker's brilliant conduct on other fields, is in no wise
incompatible with the freest censure for the disasters of this unhappy
week. For truth awards praise and blame with equal hand; and truth in
this case does ample justice to the brave old army, ample justice to
Hooker's noble aides.
The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately the
intentions of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Saturday night.
It was self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held in
check, so long as Jackson's corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed,
they would have necessarily remained on the defensive so long as
isolated. Instead, then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one division
of the Twelfth, to confront Jackson's magnificent infantry, had Hooker
withdrawn an entire additional corps, (he could have taken two,) and
thrown these troops in heavy masses at dawn on Stuart, while Birney
retained Hazel Grove, and employed his artillery upon the enemy's flank;
even the dauntless men, whose victories had so often caused them to deem
themselves invincible, must have been crushed by the blows inflicted.
But there is nothing at all, on this day, in the remotest degree
resembling tactical combination. And, long before the resistance of our
brave troops had ceased, all chances of successful parrying of Lee's
skilful thrusts had passed away.
Hooker's testimony is to the effect that he was merely lighting on
Sunday morning to retain possession of the road by which Sedgwick was
to join him, and that his retiring to the lines at Bullock's was
predetermined.
The following extract from the records of the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, illustrates both this statement, and Hooker's method of
exculpating himself by crimination of subordinates. "Question to Gen.
Hooker.--Then I understand you to say, that, not hearing from Gen.
Sedgwick by eleven o'clock, you withdrew your troops from the position
they held at the time you ordered Gen. Sedgwick to join you.
"Answer.--Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantage
I was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference in
corps-commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone and
character to his corps. Some of our corps-commanders, and also officers
of other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight."
But, apart from the innuendo, all this bears the stamp of an
after-thought. If an army was ever driven from its position by fair
fighting, our troops were driven from Chancellorsville. And it would
seem, that, if there was any reasonable doubt on Saturday night that
the Army of the Potomac could hold its own next day, it would have been
wiser to have at once withdrawn to the new lines, while waiting for the
arrival of Sedgwick. For here the position was almost unassailable, and
the troops better massed; and, if Lee had made an unsuccessful assault,
Hooker would have been in better condition to make a sortie upon the
arrival of the Sixth Corps in his vicinity, than after the bloody and
disheartening work at Fairview.
Still the inactivity of Hooker, when Sedgwick did eventually arrive
within serviceable distance, is so entire a puzzle to the student of
this campaign, that speculation upon what he did then actually assume
as facts, or how he might have acted under any other given conditions,
becomes almost fruitless.