Gen. Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War
comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him
with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a report
of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it to
some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsville
is thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of the
Eleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap to
arrest Jackson, "and if possible to seize, and at all hazards hold, the
high ground abandoned by that corps," he says:--
"Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported
that the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my
position, and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the
valley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this
was communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace
out a new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that
night, as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the
enemy should renew the attack the next morning."
"The position" at Dowdall's "was the most commanding one in the
vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his
artillery to enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps."
"To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries were
established upon it, would have required slender columns of infantry,
which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it." Slender
columns of infantry were at this time among Hooker's pet ideas.
"Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as
practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with
the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left."
"The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o'clock in the morning,
and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring
into action until eleven o'clock, when orders were given for the army
to establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The
position I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and I
kept the troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling
me to hear of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick." Thus much
Hooker.
The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially
that to which the operation of Saturday had led.
The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and
Twelfth Corps, supported by Whipple's Second brigade (Bowman's), in
front to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry.
In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile
from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest
less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in
its front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear,
deepening to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry's division
held this line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had
fought over since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat
later was Whipple's First brigade (Franklin's). Berdan's sharpshooters
formed a movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown
out by Berry from his own troops.
A section of Dimick's battery was trained down the road.
Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank
road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to
it; while Mott's brigade was massed in rear of Williams's right.
Near Williams's left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came
Geary's division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the
day before; and on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not
materially changed its position since Friday.
The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared
fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high
crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview.
At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until just
before daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as
an almost impregnable point d'appui, and which, so long as it was held,
practically prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee's
severed wings, had lain Birney's and Whipple's divisions. This point
they had occupied, (as already described,) late the evening before,
after Sickles and Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson's
right brigades. But Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession
of this height would enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the
other's lines; and before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move
back to Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp had
to be bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all but
Graham had been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade by
Archer of Hill's command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove
height; but it was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and
caisson stalled in the swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, and
was directed to place his two divisions so as to strengthen the new line
at Fairview.
Reynolds's corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat
blind instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, from
the Rapidan to the junction of Ely's and United-States Ford roads, in
a location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh and
eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into action
at all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his enforced
inactivity.
The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relieved
Meade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds's left, (having rapidly
moved to the cross roads at dusk on Saturday;) while Meade with the rest
of his corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into position
to support this entire line on the extreme right of the Army of
the Potomac. Thus three strong army corps henceforth disappear from
effective usefulness in the campaign.
The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectified
during the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of A.
P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archer
on the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extending
towards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was in
reserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refused
from the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible drive
Sickles from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view to
forcing a connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry by
the Catharpen road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with like
purpose.
Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble's division; while
Rodes, who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, now
made the third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on the
right of the line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grove
crest, and at Melzi Chancellor's, in the clearing, where the Eleventh
Corps had met its disaster.
There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry's, Whipple's,
and Birney's divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams's of the
Twelfth,) consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the whole
of Jackson's corps, now reduced to about the same effective; while
Anderson, on the left of the plank road, feeling out towards the
Furnace, and McLaws on the right, with seventeen thousand men between
them, confronted our left centre, consisting of Geary of the Twelfth,
and Hancock of the Second Corps, numbering not much above twelve
thousand for duty.
Owing to Hooker's ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability to
concentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contest
in which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederate
success to offset our intrenchments.
The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk and
freshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever,
unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and River
roads.
Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker's confidence, thus explains his
understanding of the situation Saturday night: "The position of the
Third Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson's cavalry" (?
corps), "cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee's
right. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained on
our side; and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive
battle. By our leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing of
the enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force
was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of
annihilating it. To render this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick,
with the Sixth Corps, (about twenty thousand strong,) was to leave his
position in front of the enemy's lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon
Gen. Lee's rear at daylight."
This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it was
impracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee's rear by daylight. The
balance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even if
unassisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success.
To examine into its manner of execution.