Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thus
discovered check.
Pollard says: "Lee calmly watched this" (Sedgwick's) "movement, as well
as the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated the
enemy's design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division of
his own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking the
result of fighting him in detail."
Lossing states Lee's object as twofold: to retain Banks's Ford, so as to
divide Hooker's army, and to keep his right wing in the Wilderness.
Let us listen to Lee himself. In his report he says he was convinced on
Thursday, as Sedgwick continued inactive, that the main attack would
be made on his flank and rear. "The strength of the force which had
crossed, and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the
principal effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter."
He states that on April 14 he was informed that Federal cavalry was
concentrating on the upper Rappahannock. On the 21st, that small bodies
of infantry had appeared at Kelley's Ford. These movements, and the
demonstrations at Port Royal, "were evidently intended to conceal the
designs of the enemy," who was about to resume active operations.
The Federal pontoon bridges and troops below Fredericksburg "were
effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river's bed
and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the other side
completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river."
"As at the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select
positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than
incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his
crossing."
At the time of Hooker's flank movement, there were between the
Rappahannock and Rapidan no troops excepting some twenty-seven hundred
cavalry under Stuart, forming Lee's extreme left. But Stuart made up
for his small numbers by his promptness in conveying to his chief
information of every movement and of the size of every column during
Hooker's passage of the rivers. And the capture of a few prisoners
from each of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps enabled him and
his superior to gauge the dimensions of the approaching army with fair
accuracy.
But until Thursday night the plan of Hooker's attack was not
sufficiently developed to warrant decisive action on the part of Lee.
Of the bulk of the Confederate forces, Early's division was ahead at
Hamilton's Crossing, intrenched in an almost impregnable position.
On Wednesday, April 29, the rest of Jackson's corps was moved up from
below, where Doubleday's and Morrow's demonstrations had until now kept
it.
A. P. Hill's and Trimble's divisions were in the second and third lines
on this wing; while Anderson and McLaws, the only troops of Longstreet's
corps left with the Army of Northern Virginia, held the intrenchments
along the river above Fredericksburg. Barksdale was in the town.
Pendleton with the reserve artillery was at Massaponax.
When, from Sedgwick's inactivity and the information received from
Stuart, Lee, on Wednesday afternoon, had been led to suspect that the
main attack might be from the columns crossing above, he had immediately
ordered Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville with Wright's brigade, and
with Mahone and Posey from United-States Ford, so soon as that position
was compromised, leaving a few companies there to dispute its possession
as long as possible.
We have seen how Anderson engaged Meade near Chancellorsville as the
latter advanced, and then retired to a position near Mine-Run road. Here
was the crest of a hill running substantially north and south. Gen. Lee
had already selected this line; and Col. Smith, his chief engineer, had
drawn up a plan of intrenchments. Anderson detailed men, who, during the
night, threw up some strong field-works.
Late Thursday night Lee appears first fully to have matured his plan for
parrying Hooker's thrust.
Barksdale's brigade was left at Fredericksburg, where during the winter
it had been doing picket-duty, to form the left of the line remaining
to oppose Sedgwick. Part of Pendleton's reserve artillery was near by;
while Early, commanding this entire body, held Hamilton's Crossing.
He had a force of eighty-five hundred muskets, and thirty pieces of
artillery.
The rest of his army Lee at once took well in hand, and moved out to
meet the Army of the Potomac. McLaws was hurried forward to sustain
the line taken up by Anderson. He arrived on the ground by daylight of
Friday, and went into position in rifle-pits on the right about Smith's
Hill.
Jackson, equally alert, but having a longer distance to march from the
extreme right along the military road, arrived about eight A.M., took
command, and, as was his wont, ordered an immediate advance, throwing
Owens's regiment of cavalry forward to reconnoitre.
Posey and Wright followed Owens on the plank road, with Alexander's
battalion of artillery. Mahone, and Jordan's battery detached from
Alexander, marched abreast of his right, on the pike.
McLaws followed Mahone, and Wilcox and Perry were called from Banks's
Ford to sustain this column, which McLaws directed; while Jackson,
following on the plank road, watched the operations of the left.