Hooker proposed to open his flank attack by cutting Lee's
communications. Accordingly, on April 12, Gen. Stoneman, commanding the
Cavalry Corps, received orders to march at seven A.M. next day, with
his whole force except one brigade. He was to ascend the Rappahannock,
keeping well out of view, and masking his movement with numerous small
detachments,--alleging a chase of Jones's guerillas in the Shenandoah
valley, as his objective. The river was to be crossed west of the Orange
and Alexandria Railroad. At Culpeper he was to destroy or disperse Fitz
Lee's brigade of some two thousand cavalry, and at Gordonsville the
infantry provost-guard; thence to push down the Virginia Central to the
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying every thing along the
road. As the enemy would probably retreat by the latter route, he was to
select strong points on the roads parallel to it, intrench, and hold
his ground as obstinately as possible. If Lee retreated towards
Gordonsville, he was to harass him day and night. The Confederates had
but five thousand sabres to oppose him. "Let your watchword be, Fight!
and let all your orders be, Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" exclaimed enthusiastic
Joe Hooker in this order. The primary object was to keep the
Confederates from retreating to Richmond; and Stoneman was to rely on
Hooker's being up with him in six days, or before his supplies were
exhausted. If possible, he was to detach at the most available points
parties to destroy every thing in the direction of Charlottesville, and
of the Pamunkey.
The Cavalry Corps, except Pleasonton's brigade, which accompanied
Hooker's headquarters during this movement, left on the 13th. On the
15th Stoneman threw a division across the river at Rappahannock station,
where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses the river. But a sudden
rise in consequence of heavy rains obliged this division to return by
swimming the horses. Gen. Lee says, referring to this check, that "their
efforts to establish themselves on the south side of the river were
successfully resisted by Stuart." But the rise in the river was the
actual cause. There was no crossing of swords.
At the time the cavalry marched, an infantry brigade and a battery were
sent to Kelley's Ford, and a regiment to United-States Ford, to hold
these crossings against scouting parties, or any counter-demonstration
on the part of the enemy.
The river did not fall so that Stoneman could pass at that point until
the 27th, when it was too late to accomplish valuable results under the
orders of the 12th; for the whole army was now on the march. Between the
15th and 27th the cavalry, under instructions from Hooker, remained in
camp along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained why it might not
have crossed higher up, and have utilized these precious two weeks. It
could not have been of less use than it was, and might possibly have
been able to call Stuart's entire force away from Lee's army. Nor was
it impossible, in part at least, to do the work cut out for it. Even
to threaten Lee's communications would have seriously affected the
singleness of purpose he displayed in this campaign.
But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon the
manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, as a
matter almost apart from the one under consideration.
And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first
effort of this ill-fated campaign.
It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force
of an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is
illustrated in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker
left himself but a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery,
to do the scouting for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had he
retained a sufficient force to march with the main body, there would no
doubt have been at least a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sent
out to near Old Wilderness Tavern and along the Orange plank road to
the junction of the Brock road. Jackson's movements would then have been
fully known.
The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps
when in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an
army.