The unfortunate course of events during the early winter of 1862-63 had
resulted in a grievous loss of morale in the Army of the Potomac. The
useless slaughter of Marye's Heights was, after a few weeks, succeeded
by that most huge of all strategic jokes, the Mud March; and
Gen. Burnside retired from a position he had never sought, to the
satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the warm personal
regard, of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years had robbed of strength,
but not of gallantry, was relieved at his own request; Franklin was
shelved. Hooker thus became senior general officer, and succeeded to the
command.
No man enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac. He
had forced himself upon its notice. From Bull Run, after which action he
is said to have remarked to Mr. Lincoln that he knew more than any one
on that field; through Williamsburg, where he so gallantly held his own
against odds during the entire day, and with exhausted ammunition, until
relieved by Kearney; before Richmond; during the Seven Days; in the
railroad-cutting at Manassas; at Antietam, where he forced the fighting
with so much determination, if not wisdom, on the Union right; up
to Fredericksburg, where, after a personal protest to his commanding
officer, he went in and fought his troops "until he thought he had lost
as many men as he was ordered to lose,"--Hooker's character as man and
soldier had been marked. His commands so far had been limited; and he
had a frank, manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was
in constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his appearance
always attracted attention; and he was as well known to almost every
regiment as its own commander. He was a representative man.
It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washington
pseudo-strategists who were his military advisers, could not
distinguish, in selecting a chief who should be capable of leading the
Army of the Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, who
achieves brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader,
upon whose sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only the
instruction for health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, of
each of his subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correct
decision and immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopic
changes of a campaign or a battle-field. It required more knowledge of
the requisites of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, than
Mr. Lincoln had had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of the
army, to insure a happy choice.
And, doubtless, Hooker's self-assertiveness, success as a brigade,
division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability,
shared equally in procuring his appointment. No one will deny Hooker's
capacity in certain directions, or up to a given test. His whole career
shows an exceptional power in "riding to orders." But he sadly lacked
that rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary to lead a
hundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as Lee.
Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker's character than the
odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at
the time of his appointment, here following:--
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
Jan. 26, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
General,--I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac.
Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient
reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some
things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe
you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also
believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are
right. You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not
an indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable
bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during Gen.
Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition,
and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to
the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer. I
have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that
both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was
not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command.
Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now
ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The
Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is
neither more nor less than it has done or will do for all commanders.
I much fear that the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army, of
criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will
now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down.
Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good
out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of
rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go
forward, and give us victories.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
Hooker was appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest
words, took leave of the army.
The troops received their new chief with a heartiness and confidence,
which, since McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker
was to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of this
weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary changes he at once
began to make,--for Hooker never lacked the power of organization,--were
accepted with alacrity; and a spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded
speedily to what had been almost a defiant obedience.
The army was in a lamentably low state of efficiency. Politics mingled
with camp duties; and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with
an entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the Potomac
to accomplish any thing, were pronounced. Desertions occurred at the
rate of two hundred a day, facilitated by relatives, who sent from home
civilian clothing to soldiers at the front. Hooker states that he found
2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as absent on the rolls
of the army, a large proportion from causes unknown. Sharp and efficient
measures were at once adopted, which speedily checked this alarming
depletion of the ranks. Furloughs in reasonable quantity were allowed to
deserving men and a limited number of officers. Work was found for
the rank and file in drill and outpost duty sufficient to prevent idle
habits. The commissariat was closely watched, and fresh rations more
frequently issued, which much improved the health of the army. The
system of picket-duty was more thoroughly developed, and so vigilantly
carried out as to impress its importance upon, as well as teach its
details to, the troops.
The cavalry, hitherto distributed by regiments throughout the army, was
now consolidated into one corps, and from this time became a valuable
element in the service, for it daily grew in efficiency. And such
opportunities of doing field-work as a body were afforded it as
circumstances allowed.
The grand divisions of Burnside were abolished, and the army divided
into seven infantry corps.
The testimony of all general officers of the Army of the Potomac concurs
in awarding the highest praise to Hooker for the manner in which he
improved the condition of the troops during the three months he was in
command prior to Chancellorsville. Himself says before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War: "During the season of preparation the army made
rapid strides in discipline, instruction and morale, and early in April
was in a condition to inspire the highest expectations." And Swinton
well sums up: "Under Hooker's influence the tone of the army underwent a
change which would appear astonishing had not its elastic vitality been
so often proved."
On the 30th of April the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of
provost-guard, consisted of about a hundred and thirty thousand men
under the colors,--"for duty equipped," according to the morning
report,--distributed among the several army corps as follows:--
{ Wadsworth, }
1st Corps, Gen. Reynolds.. { Robinson, } 16,908
{ Doubleday, }
{ Hancock, }
2d Corps, Gen. Couch .. { Gibbon, } 16,893
{ French, }
{ Birney, }
3d Corps, Gen. Sickles.. { Berry, } 18,721
{ Whipple, }
{ Griffin, }
5th Corps, Gen. Meade.. { Humphreys, } 15,724
{ Sykes, }
{ Brooks, }
6th Corps, Gen. Sedgwick.. { Howe, } 23,667
{ Newton, }
{ Devens, }
11th Corps, Gen. Howard.. { Schurz, } 12,977
{ Steinwehr, }
12th Corps, Gen. Slocum.. { Williams, } 13,450
{ Geary, }
{ Pleasonton, }
Cavalry Corps, Gen. Stoneman. { Gregg, } 11,541
{ Averell, }
{ Buford, Reserve Brigade,}
Artillery, Gen. Hunt, about 400 guns. Artillery reserve 1,610
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Total. . . . . . . . . 131,491