Alpini streamed down from the Cima di Falzarego and Sasso di Stria,
which they had occupied shortly before, and secured what was at first
but a precarious foothold on the stony lower eastern slope of the Col di
Lana. Indeed, it was little more than a toe-hold at first; but the
never-resting Alpini soon dug themselves in and became firmly
established. It was to the command of this battalion of Alpini that I
came on the 12th of July, after being given to understand that my work
was to be the taking of the Col di Lana regardless of cost.
[Sidenote: Scientific man-saving needed.]
"This was the first time that I--or any other Garibaldi, for that matter
(my grandfather, with his 'Thousand,' took Sicily from fifty times that
number of Bourbon soldiers) had ever had enough, or even the promise of
enough, men to make that 'regardless of cost' formula much more than a
hollow mockery. But it is not in a Garibaldi to sacrifice men for any
object whatever if there is any possible way of avoiding it. The period
of indiscriminate frontal attacks had passed even before I left France,
and ways were already being devised--mostly mining and better artillery
protection--to make assaults less costly. Scientific 'man-saving,' in
which my country has since made so much progress, was then in its
infancy on the Italian front.
[Sidenote: Out-gunned by the Austrians.]
[Sidenote: First time of gallery-barracks.]
"I found many difficulties in the way of putting into practice on the
Col di Lana the man-saving theories I had seen in process of development
in the Argonne. At that time the Austrians--who had appreciated the
great importance of that mountain from the outset--had us heavily
out-gunned while mining in the hard rock was too slow to make it worth
while until some single position of crucial value hung in the balance.
So--well, I simply did the best I could under the circumstances. The
most I could do was to give my men as complete protection as possible
while they were not fighting, and this end was accomplished by
establishing them in galleries cut out of the solid rock. This was, I
believe, the first time the 'gallery-barracks'--now quite the rule at
all exposed points--were used on the Italian front.
[Sidenote: Working under heavy fire.]
"There was no other way in the beginning but to drive the enemy off the
Col di Lana trench by trench, and this was the task I set myself to
toward the end of July. What made the task an almost prohibitive one was
the fact that the Austrian guns from Corte and Cherz--which we were in
no position to reduce to silence--were able to rake us unmercifully.
Every move we made during the next nine months was carried out under
their fire, and there is no use in denying that we suffered heavily. I
used no more men than I could possibly help using, and the Higher
Command was very generous in the matter of reserves, and even in
increasing the strength of the force at my disposal as we gradually got
more room to work in. By the end of October my original command of a
battalion had been increased largely.
[Sidenote: Austrians hold one side and summit.]
[Sidenote: Austrian position seems impregnable.]
"The Austrians made a brave and skilful defense, but the steady pressure
we were bringing to bear on them gradually forced them back up the
mountain. By the first week in November we were in possession of three
sides of the mountain, while the Austrians held the fourth side and--but
most important of all--the summit. The latter presented a sheer wall of
rock, more than 200 metres high, to us from any direction we were able
to approach it, and on the crest of this cliff--the only point exposed
to our artillery fire--the enemy had a cunningly concealed machine-gun
post served by fourteen men. Back and behind, under shelter in a rock
gallery, was a reserve of 200 men, who were expected to remain safely
under cover during a bombardment and then sally forth to any infantry
attack that might follow it. The handful in the machine-gun post, it was
calculated, would be sufficient, and more than sufficient, to keep us
from scaling the cliff before their reserves came up to support them;
and so they would have been if there had been _only_ an infantry attack
to reckon with. It failed to allow sufficiently, however, for the weight
of the artillery we were bringing up, and the skill of our gunners. The
apparent impregnability of the position was really its undoing.
[Sidenote: Machine-gun post key position.]
"This cunningly conceived plan of defense I had managed to get a pretty
accurate idea of--no matter how--and I laid my own plans accordingly.
All the guns I could get hold of I had emplaced in positions most
favorable for concentrating on the real key to the summit--the exposed
machine-gun post on the crown of the cliff--with the idea, if possible,
of destroying men and guns completely, or, failing in that, at least to
render it untenable for the reserves who would try to rally to its
defense.
[Sidenote: The Alpino thoroughly dependable.]
"We had the position ranged to an inch, and so, fortunately, lost no
time in 'feeling' for it. This, with the surprise incident to it, was
perhaps the principal element in our success; for the plan--at least so
far as _taking_ the summit was concerned--worked out quite as perfectly
in action as upon paper. That is the great satisfaction of working with
the Alpino, by the way: he is so sure, so dependable, that the 'human
fallibility' element in a plan (always the most uncertain quantity) is
practically eliminated.
[Sidenote: Alpini scale the cliff.]
"It is almost certain that our sudden gust of concentrated gunfire
snuffed out the lives of all the men in the machine-gun post before
they had time to send word of our developing infantry attack to the
reserves in the gallery below. At any rate, these latter made no attempt
whatever to swarm up to the defense of the crest, even after our
artillery fire ceased. The consequence was that the 120 Alpini I sent to
scale the cliff reached the top with only three casualties, these
probably caused by rolling rocks or flying rock fragments. The Austrians
in their big 'funk-hole' were taken completely by surprise, and 130 of
them fell prisoners to considerably less than that number of Italians.
The rest of the 200 escaped or were killed in their flight.
[Sidenote: Difficulties of holding the summit.]
[Sidenote: An Austrian counter-attack.]
"So far it was so good; but, unfortunately, taking the summit and
holding it were two entirely different matters. No sooner did the
Austrians discover what had happened than they opened on the summit with
all their available artillery. We have since ascertained that the fire
of 120 guns was concentrated upon a space of 100 by 150 metres which
offered the only approach to cover that the barren summit afforded.
Fifty of my men, finding shelter in the lee of rocky ledges, remained
right out on the summit; the others crept over the edge of the cliff and
held on by their fingers and toes. Not a man of them sought safety by
flight, though a retirement would have been quite justified, considering
what a hell the Austrians' guns were making of the summit. The enemy
counter-attacked at nightfall, but despite superior numbers and the
almost complete exhaustion of that little band of Alpini heroes, they
were able to retake only a half of the summit. Here, at a
ten-metres-high ridge which roughly bisects the _cima_, the Alpini held
the Austrians, and here, in turn, the latter held the reinforcements
which I was finally able to send to the Alpini's aid. There, exposed to
the fire of the guns of either side (and so comparatively safe from
both), a line was established from which there seemed little probability
that one combatant could drive the other, at least without a radical
change from the methods so far employed.
[Sidenote: Idea of blowing up positions.]
"The idea of blowing up positions that cannot be taken otherwise is by
no means a new one. Probably it dates back almost as far as the
invention of gunpowder itself. Doubtless, if we only knew of them, there
have been attempts to mine the Great Wall of China. It was, therefore,
only natural that, when the Austrians had us held up before a position
it was vitally necessary we should have, we should begin to consider the
possibility of mining it as the only alternative. The conception of the
plan did not necessarily originate in the mind of any one individual,
however many have laid claim to it. It was the inevitable thing if we
were not going to abandon striving for our objective.
[Sidenote: Engineering operation of great magnitude.]
"But while there was nothing new in the idea of the mine itself, in
carrying out an engineering operation of such magnitude at so great an
altitude and from a position constantly exposed to intense artillery
fire there were presented many problems quite without precedent. It was
these problems which gave us pause; but finally, despite the prospect of
difficulties which we fully realized might at any time become
prohibitive, it was decided to make the attempt to blow up that portion
of the summit of the Col di Lana still held by the enemy.
[Sidenote: Gelasio Caetani the engineer.]
"The choice of the engineer for the work was a singularly fortunate one.
Gelasio Caetani--he is a son of the Duke of Sermoneta--had operated as a
mining engineer in the American West for a number of years previous to
the war, and the practical experience gained in California and Alaska
was invaluable preparation for the great task now set for him. His
ready resource and great personal courage were also incalculable assets.
[Sidenote: Miners from North America.]
"Well, the tunnel was started about the middle of January, 1916. Some of
my men--Italians who had hurried home to fight for their country when
the war started--had had some previous experience with hand and machine
drills in the mines of Colorado and British Columbia, but the most of
our labor had to gain its experience as the work progressed. Considering
this, as well as the difficulty of bringing up material (to say nothing
of food and munitions), we made very good progress.
[Sidenote: Mining under constant fire.]
[Sidenote: Thirty-eight shells a minute.]
"The worst thing about it all was the fact that it had to be done under
the incessant fire of the Austrian artillery. I provided for the men as
best as I could by putting them in galleries, where they were at least
able to get their rest. When the enemy finally found out what we were up
to they celebrated their discovery by a steady bombardment which lasted
for fourteen days without interruption. During a certain forty-two hours
of that fortnight there was, by actual count, an average of thirty-eight
shells a minute exploding on our little position.
[Sidenote: Silencing an Austrian battery.]
"We were constantly confronted with new and perplexing problems--things
which no one had ever been called upon to solve before--most of them in
connection with transportation. How we contrived to surmount one of
these I shall never forget. The Austrians had performed a brave and
audacious feat in emplacing one of their batteries at a certain point,
the fire from which threatened to make our position absolutely
untenable. The location of this battery was so cunningly chosen that not
one of our guns could reach it; and yet we _had_ to silence it--and for
good--if we were going to go on with our work. The only point from
which we could fire upon these destructive guns was so exposed that any
artillery we might be able to mount there could only count on the
shortest shrift under the fire of the hundred or more 'heavies' that the
Austrians would be able to concentrate upon it. And yet (I figured),
well employed, these few minutes might prove enough to do the work in.
[Sidenote: A young giant endeavors to climb with a gun.]
"And then there arose another difficulty. The smallest gun that would
stand a chance of doing the job cut out for it weighed 120 kilos--about
265 pounds; this just for the gun alone, with all detachable parts
removed. But the point where the gun was to be mounted was so exposed
that there was no chance of rigging up a cable-way, while the incline
was so steep and rough that it was out of the question to try to drag it
up with ropes. Just as we were on the verge of giving up in despair, one
of the Alpini--a man of Herculean frame who had made his living in
peace-time by breaking chains on his chest and performing other feats of
strength--came and suggested that he be allowed to carry the gun up on
his shoulders. Grasping at a straw, I let him indulge in a few 'practice
man[oe]uvres'; but these only showed that, while the young Samson could
shoulder and trot off with the gun without great effort, the task of
lifting himself and his burden from foothold to foothold in the
crumbling rock of the seventy-degree slope was too much for him.
[Sidenote: Men pull man and gun to position.]
"But out of this failure there came a new idea. Why not let my strong
man simply support the weight of the gun on his shoulder--acting as a
sort of ambulant gun-carriage, so to speak--while a line of men pulled
him along with a rope?
We rigged up a harness to equalize the pull on the broad back, and, with
the aid of sixteen ordinary men, the feat was accomplished without a
hitch. I am sorry to say, however, that poor Samson was laid up for a
spell with racked muscles.
"The gun--with the necessary parts and munition--was taken up in the
night, and at daybreak it was set up and ready for action. It fired just
forty shots before the Austrian 'heavies' blew it--and all but one or
two of its brave crew--to pieces with a rain of high-explosive. But the
troublesome Austrian battery was put so completely out of action that
the enemy never thought it worth while to re-emplace it.
[Sidenote: Italians mine and Austrians countermine.]
[Sidenote: The final explosion.]
"That is just a sample of the fantastic things we were doing all of the
three months that we drove the tunnel under the summit of the Col di
Lana. The last few weeks were further enlivened by the knowledge that
the Austrians were countermining against us. Once they drove so near
that we could feel the jar of their drills, but they exploded their mine
just a few metres short of where it would have upset us for good and for
all. All the time work went on until, on the 17th of April, the mine was
finished, charged, and 'tamped.' That night, while every gun we could
bring to bear rained shell upon the Austrian position, it was exploded.
A crater 150 feet in diameter and sixty feet deep engulfed the ridge the
enemy had occupied, and this our waiting Alpini rushed and firmly held.
Austrian counterattacks were easily repulsed, and the Col di Lana was at
last completely in Italian hands."
* * * * *
During the late spring and summer of 1916, there was waged in France
that great series of battles participated in by both British and French
armies known as the battles of the Somme. Next to the defense of Verdun,
they formed the most important military operations on the western front
during that year. These battles are described in the narrative which
follows.
[Illustration: WESTERN BATTLE FRONT, AUGUST, 1916]
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
SIR DOUGLAS HAIG
[Sidenote: An offensive summer campaign planned.]
The principle of an offensive campaign during the Summer of 1916 had
already been decided on by all the Allies. The various possible
alternatives on the western front had been studied and discussed by
General Joffre and myself, and we were in complete agreement as to the
front to be attacked by the combined French and British armies.
Preparations for our offensive had made considerable progress; but as
the date on which the attack should begin was dependent on many doubtful
factors, a final decision on that point was deferred until the general
situation should become clearer.
[Sidenote: British armies and supplies increasing.]
Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before the Summer was
too far advanced, and with due regard to the general situation, I
desired to postpone my attack as long as possible. The British armies
were growing in numbers and the supply of munitions was steadily
increasing. Moreover, a very large proportion of the officers and men
under my command were still far from being fully trained, and the longer
the attack could be deferred the more efficient they would become. On
the other hand, the Germans were continuing to press their attacks at
Verdun, and both there and on the Italian front, where the Austrian
offensive was gaining ground, it was evident that the strain might
become too great to be borne unless timely action were taken to relieve
it. Accordingly, while maintaining constant touch with General Joffre
in regard to all these considerations, my preparations were pushed on,
and I agreed, with the consent of his Majesty's Government, that my
attack should be launched, whenever the general situation required it,
with as great a force as I might then be able to make available.
[Sidenote: Pressure on Italian front.]
[Sidenote: Heroic French defense at Verdun.]
By the end of May, 1916, the pressure of the enemy on the Italian front
had assumed such serious proportions that the Russian campaign was
opened early in June, and the brilliant successes gained by our allies
against the Austrians at once caused a movement of German troops from
the western to the eastern front. This, however, did not lessen the
pressure on Verdun. The heroic defense of our French allies had already
gained many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy very
heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In view, therefore,
of the situation in the various theatres of war, it was eventually
agreed between General Joffre and myself that the combined French and
British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June.
[Sidenote: Objects of new offensive.]
The object of that offensive was threefold:
(i.) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.
(ii.) To assist our allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any
further transfer of German troops from the western front.
(iii.) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.
[Sidenote: Enemy attempts at interference.]
While my final preparations were in progress the enemy made two
unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my arrangements. The first,
directed on May 21, 1916, against our positions on the Vimy Ridge, south
and southeast of Souchez, resulted in a small enemy gain of no strategic
or tactical importance; and rather than weaken my offensive by involving
additional troops in the task of recovering the lost ground, I decided
to consolidate a position in rear of our original line.
[Sidenote: A position lost and retaken.]
The second enemy attack was delivered on June 2, 1916, on a front of
over one and a half miles from Mount Sorrell to Hooge, and succeeded in
penetrating to a maximum depth of 700 yards. As the southern part of the
lost position commanded our trenches, I judged it necessary to recover
it, and by an attack launched on June 13, 1916, carefully prepared and
well executed, this was successfully accomplished by the troops on the
spot.
Neither of these enemy attacks succeeded in delaying the preparations
for the major operations which I had in view.
These preparations were necessarily very elaborate and took considerable
time.
[Sidenote: Vast stores accumulated.]
[Sidenote: Shelter and communication facilities prepared.]
Vast stocks of ammunition and stores of all kinds had to be accumulated
beforehand within a convenient distance of our front. To deal with these
many miles of new railways--both standard and narrow gauge--and trench
tramways were laid. All available roads were improved, many others were
made, and long causeways were built over marshy valleys. Many additional
dugouts had to be provided as shelter for the troops, for use as
dressing stations for the wounded, and as magazines for storing
ammunition, food, water, and engineering material. Scores of miles of
deep communication trenches had to be dug, as well as trenches for
telephone wires, assembly and assault trenches, and numerous gun
emplacements and observation posts.
[Sidenote: Mining operations.]
Important mining operations were undertaken, and charges were laid at
various points beneath the enemy's lines.
[Sidenote: Water supply insured.]
Except in the river valleys, the existing supplies of water were
hopelessly insufficient to meet the requirements of the numbers of men
and horses to be concentrated in this area as the preparations for our
offensive proceeded. To meet this difficulty many wells and borings were
sunk, and over one hundred pumping plants were installed. More than one
hundred and twenty miles of water mains were laid, and everything was
got ready to insure an adequate water supply as our troops advanced.
[Sidenote: Spirit of the troops.]
Much of this preparatory work had to be done under very trying
conditions, and was liable to constant interruption from the enemy's
fire. The weather, on the whole, was bad, and the local accommodations
totally insufficient for housing the troops employed, who consequently
had to content themselves with such rough shelter as could be provided
in the circumstances. All this labor, too, had to be carried out in
addition to fighting and to the everyday work of maintaining existing
defenses. It threw a very heavy strain on the troops, which was borne by
them with a cheerfulness beyond all praise.
[Sidenote: Formidable enemy position on the Somme and the Ancre.]
The enemy's position to be attacked was of a very formidable character,
situated on a high, undulating tract of ground, which rises to more than
500 feet above sea level, and forms the watershed between the Somme on
the one side and the rivers of Southwestern Belgium on the other. On the
southern face of this watershed, the general trend of which is from
east-southeast to west-northwest, the ground falls in a series of long
irregular spurs and deep depressions to the valley of the Somme. Well
down the forward slopes of this face the enemy's first system of
defense, starting from the Somme near Curlu, ran at first northward for
3,000 yards, then westward for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt, where it
turned nearly due north, forming a great salient angle in the enemy's
lines.
Some 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the River
Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and, still running northward, passed
over the summit of the watershed, about Hebuterne and Gommecourt, and
then down its northern spurs to Arras.
On the 20,000-yard front between the Somme and the Ancre the enemy had a
strong second system of defense, sited generally on or near the southern
crest of the highest part of the watershed, at an average distance of
from 3,000 to 5,000 yards behind his first system of trenches.
[Sidenote: German methods of making position impregnable.]
During nearly two years' preparation he had spared no pains to render
these defenses impregnable. The first and second systems each consisted
of several lines of deep trenches, well provided with bomb-proof
shelters and with numerous communication trenches connecting them. The
front of the trenches in each system was protected by wire
entanglements, many of them in two belts forty yards broad, built of
iron stakes interlaced with barbed wire, often almost as thick as a
man's finger.
[Sidenote: Veritable fortresses.]
[Sidenote: Machine-gun emplacements.]