RESULTS
The time has arrived when it is proper to take stock of gains and
losses, and to endeavour to appraise, at its true value, the work done
by the Australian Army Corps during its long-sustained effort of the
last six months of its fighting career.
It has become customary to regard the actual captures of prisoners and
guns as a true index of the degree of success which has attended any
series of battle operations. Every soldier knows, however, that such a
standard of judgment, applied alone, would render but scant justice.
The actual captures in any engagement depend more upon the state of
_moral_ of the enemy and the temperament of the attacking troops than
upon the military quality of the battle effort considered as a whole.
While large captures necessarily imply great victories, it does not by
any means follow that small captures imply the reverse.
Nevertheless, judged by such a purely arbitrary standard, the
performances of the Australian Army Corps during the period under
review are worthy of being set out in particular detail.
From March 27th, when Australian troops were for the first time
interposed to arrest the German advance, until October 5th, when they
were finally withdrawn from the line, the total captures made by them
were:
Prisoners 29,144
Guns 338
No accurate record was ever kept of the capture of machine guns,
trench mortars, searchlights, vehicles and travelling kitchens or
pharmacies, nor of the quantity of Artillery ammunition, which alone
must have amounted to millions of rounds.
During the advance, from August 8th to October 5th, the Australian
Corps recaptured and released no less than 116 towns and villages.
Every one of these was defended more or less stoutly. This count of
them does not include a very large number of minor hamlets, which
were unnamed on the maps, nor farms, brickfields, factories, sugar
refineries, and similar isolated groups of buildings, every one of
which had been fortified and converted by the enemy into a stronghold
of resistance.
Although the amount of territory reoccupied, taken by itself, is
ordinarily no criterion of value, the whole circumstances of the
relentless advance of the Australian Corps make it a convenient
standard of comparison. The total area of all the ground fought over,
from the occupation of which the enemy was ejected, amounted in the
period under consideration to 394 square miles.
A much more definite and crucial basis for evaluating the military
successes of the Corps is the number of enemy Divisions actually
engaged and defeated in the course of the operations. Very accurate
records of these have been kept, and every one of them was identified
by a substantial contribution to the list of prisoners taken. An
analysis of this investigation produced the following results:
The total number of separate enemy divisions engaged was thirty-nine.
Of these, twenty were engaged once only, twelve were engaged twice,
six three times, and one four times. Each time "engaged" represents
a separate and distinct period of line duty for the enemy Division
referred to.
Up to the time of the Armistice we had definitely ascertained that
at least six of these thirty-nine enemy Divisions had been entirely
disbanded as the result of the battering which they had received.
Their numberings have already been given. It is more than probable
that several other Divisions shared the same fate, by reason of the
number of prisoners actually taken, and the other casualties known to
have been inflicted. Up to the time when the signing of the Armistice
precluded further inquiries, absolutely conclusive evidence of their
disappearance had not been obtained.
In such an analysis it is possible to go even further, and to compare
the tangible results achieved with the relative strength of the forces
engaged. The Australian Army Corps of five Divisions represented 9½
per cent. of the whole of the remaining 53 Divisions of the British
Army engaged on the Western Front. Its captures in prisoners, by the
same comparison, and within the period reviewed--_i.e._, March 27th to
October 5th--was 23 per cent., in guns 23½ per cent., and in territory
reoccupied was 21½ per cent. of the whole of the rest of the British
Army.
The ratio, therefore, of the results to the strengths, as between the
five Australian Divisions and the whole of the rest of the British
Army, was as follows:
Prisoners 2.42 times.
Territory 2.24 "
Guns 2.47 "
It is not, however, by the mere numerical results disclosed by such a
comparison that the work of the Australian Army Corps should be judged.
If a broad survey be made of the whole of the 1918 campaign, I think
that the decisive part which the Corps took in it will emerge even more
convincingly.
Such a survey will show that the whole sequence of events may be
divided into five very definite and clearly-marked stages. The first
was the arrest and bringing to naught of the great German spring
offensive; the second was the conversion of the enemy's offensive
strategy into a distinct and unqualified defensive. Next followed the
great, initial and irredeemable defeat of August 8th, which, according
to the enemy's own admissions, was the beginning of the end. Then came
the denial to the enemy of the respite which he sought on the line of
the Somme, which might well have helped him to recover himself for
another year of war; and, finally, there was the overthrow of his great
defensive system, on which he relied as a last bulwark to safeguard his
hold upon French soil, a hold which would have enabled him to bargain
for terms.
It must never be forgotten that whatever claims may be made to the
contrary, Germany's surrender was precipitated by reason of her
military defeat in the field. Her submarine campaign, disappointing to
her expectations as it had been, was still a potent weapon. Her fleet
was yet intact. Our blockade was grievous, but she did in fact survive
it, even though it continued in force for a full eight months after
her surrender. The defection of Bulgaria and the collapse of Turkey
might conceivably be a source of increased military strength, even if
one of greater political weakness. Had she been able to hold us at bay
in France and Belgium for but another month or six weeks, she could
have been assured of a respite of three months of winter in which to
organize a levy en masse. Who can say that the stress of another winter
and the prospect of another year of war might not have destroyed the
Entente combination against her?
On these grounds I believe that the real and immediate reason for the
precipitate surrender of Germany on October 5th, 1918, was the defeat
of her Army in the field. It followed so closely upon the breaching
of the Hindenburg defences on September 29th to October 4th, that it
cannot be dissociated from that event as a final determining cause.
Whether this view be correct or not, I think that the claim may fairly
be made for the Australian Army Corps, that in each of the stages of
the operations which led to this military overthrow, the Corps played
an important, and in some of them a predominating, part. No better
testimony for such a conclusion can be adduced than the admissions of
Ludendorff himself.
Narrowing our survey of the closing events of the campaign to a
consideration of the fighting activities of the Australian Corps,
I would like to emphasize the remarkable character of that effort.
Deprived of the advantage of a regular inflow of trained recruits,
and relying practically entirely for any replenishments upon the
return of its own sick and wounded, the Corps was able to maintain
an uninterrupted fighting activity over a period of six months. For
the last sixty days of this period the Corps maintained an unchecked
advance of thirty-seven miles against the powerful and determined
opposition of a still formidable enemy, who employed all the mechanical
and scientific resources at his disposal.
Such a result alone, considered in the abstract and quite apart from
any comparison with the performances of other forces, is a testimony,
on the one hand, to the pre-eminent fighting qualities of the
Australian soldier considered individually, and, on the other hand, to
the collective capacity and efficiency of the military effort made by
the Corps. I doubt whether there is any parallel for such a performance
in the whole range of military history.
As regards the troops themselves, the outstanding feature of the
campaign was their steadily rising _moral_. Always high, it was, in
spite of fatigue and stress, never higher than in the closing days. A
stage had been reached when they regarded their adversary no longer
with cautious respect but with undisguised contempt.
On the part of the troops it was a remarkable feat of physical and
mental endurance to face again and yet again the stress of battle. To
the infantry a certain measure of periodical rest was accorded, but
the Artillery and technical services had scarcely any respite at all.
Almost every day of the whole period they worked and fought, night and
day, under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and under his drenching,
suffocating gas attacks, for our battery positions were the favourite
targets for his gas bombardments.
On the part of the staffs it was a period of ceaseless toil, both
mental and physical. The perfection of the staff work, its precision,
its completeness, its rapidity, its whole-souled devotion to the
service of the troops, were the necessary conditions for the victories
which were won.
Another outstanding feature was the uniformity of standard achieved
by all the five Divisions, as well as the wonderful comradeship which
they displayed towards each other. Omitting altogether the performances
of any one of them in the previous years of the war, it is noteworthy
that all so fully seized the opportunities that presented themselves,
that each could boast of outstanding achievements during this
period--the First Division for its capture of Lihons and the battles of
Chuignes and Hargicourt, the Second Division for Mont St. Quentin and
Montbrehain, the Third for Bray, Bouchavesnes and Bony, the Fourth for
Hamel and Hargicourt, and the Fifth for Péronne and Bellicourt.
[Illustration: MAP J.]
I must also pass in brief review the losses which the Corps suffered
during its advance. From August 8th to October 5th the total battle
casualties were as follows:
Killed 3,566
Died of wounds 1,432
Wounded 16,166
Missing 79
------
Total 21,243
Averaging these losses over all five Divisions for the whole period,
they amount to a wastage from all causes of seventy men per Division
per day, which must be regarded as extraordinarily moderate, having
regard to the strenuous nature of the fighting, the great results
achieved, and the much higher rate of losses incurred by Australian
troops during the previous years of the war. Even during periods of
sedentary trench warfare the losses averaged forty per Division per day.
The total losses of the Army Corps during this period were, indeed,
only a small fraction of Australia's contribution to the casualty roll
for the whole period of the war. It was the least costly period, for
Australia, of all the fighting that her soldiers underwent. Had it been
otherwise, the effort could not have been maintained for so long, nor
could the spirit of the troops have been sustained. It was the low cost
of victory after victory which spurred them on to still greater efforts.
Of the causes which contributed to so gratifying a result, much credit
must be given to the great development in 1918 of mechanical aids, in
the form of Tanks, and to a considerable augmentation of aeroplanes,
Artillery and Lewis guns. Of all these the Corps proved eager to avail
itself to the full.
But the main cause is, after all, the recognition of a principle of
text-book simplicity, which is that a vigorous offensive is in the
long run cheaper than a timorous defensive. No war can be decided by
defensive tactics. The fundamental doctrine of the German conception of
war was the pursuit of the unrelenting offensive; it was only when the
Entente Armies, on their part, were able and willing themselves to put
such a doctrine into practice that our formidable enemies were overcome.
It may be that hereafter I may be charged with responsibility for
so relentlessly and for so long committing the troops of the Corps
to a sustained aggressive policy. Such criticisms have already been
whispered in some quarters. But I am sure that they will not be shared
by any of the men whom it was my privilege to command. They knew that
an offensive policy was the cheapest policy, and the proof that they
accepted it as the right one was their ever-rising _moral_ as the
campaign developed.
"Feed your troops on victory," is a maxim which does not appear in
any text-book, but it is nevertheless true. The aim and end of all
the efforts and of all the heavy sacrifices of the Australian nation
was victory in the field. Nothing that could be done could lead more
swiftly and more directly to its fulfilment than an energetic offensive
policy. The troops themselves recognized this. They learned to believe,
because of success heaped upon success, that they were invincible. They
were right, and I believe that I was right in shaping a course which
would give them the opportunity of proving it.
There are some aspects of the Australian campaign to which, before
closing this memoir, I should like to make brief reference. Success
depended first and foremost upon the military proficiency of the
Australian private soldier and his glorious spirit of heroism. I do
not propose to attempt here an exhaustive analysis of the causes
which led to the making of him. The democratic institutions under
which he was reared, the advanced system of education by which he was
trained--teaching him to think for himself and to apply what he had
been taught to practical ends--the instinct of sport and adventure
which is his national heritage, his pride in his young country, and the
opportunity which came to him of creating a great national tradition,
were all factors which made him what he was.
Physically the Australian Army was composed of the flower of the
youth of the continent. A volunteer army--the only purely volunteer
army that fought in the Great War--it was composed of men carefully
selected according to a high physical standard, from which, happily,
no departure was made, even although recruiting began to fall off in
the last year of the war, and there were some who had proposed a more
lenient recruiting examination. The cost to Australia of delivering
each fighting man, fully trained, to the battle front was too great to
permit of any doubt whether the physical quality of the raw material
would survive the wear and tear of war.
Mentally, the Australian soldier was well endowed. In him there was a
curious blend of a capacity for independent judgment with a readiness
to submit to self-effacement in a common cause. He had a personal
dignity all his own. He had the political sense highly developed, and
was always a keen critic of the way in which his battalion or battery
was "run," and of the policies which guided his destinies from day to
day.
His intellectual gifts and his "handiness" made him an apt pupil. It
was always a delight to see the avidity with which he mastered the
technique of the weapons which were placed in his hands. Machine guns,
Lewis guns, Mills' bombs, Stokes' mortars, rifle grenades, flares,
fuses, detonators, Very lights, signal rockets, German machine guns,
German stick bombs, never for long remained a mystery to him.
At all schools and classes he proved a diligent scholar, and astonished
his instructors by the speed with which he absorbed and bettered his
instruction. Conservatism in military methods was no part of his creed.
He was always mentally alert to adopt new ideas and often to invent
them.
His adaptability spared him much hardship. He knew how to make himself
comfortable. To light a fire and cook his food was a natural instinct.
A sheet of corrugated iron, a batten or two, and a few strands of wire
were enough to enable him to fabricate a home in which he could live at
ease.
Psychologically, he was easy to lead but difficult to drive. His
imagination was readily fired. War was to him a game, and he played
for his side with enthusiasm. His bravery was founded upon his sense
of duty to his unit, comradeship to his fellows, emulation to uphold
his traditions, and a combative spirit to avenge his hardships and
sufferings upon the enemy.
Taking him all in all, the Australian soldier was, when once
understood, not difficult to handle. But he required a sympathetic
handling, which appealed to his intelligence and satisfied his instinct
for a "square deal."
Very much and very stupid comment has been made upon the discipline
of the Australian soldier. That was because the very conception and
purpose of discipline have been misunderstood. It is, after all, only
a means to an end, and that end is the power to secure co-ordinated
action among a large number of individuals for the achievement of a
definite purpose. It does not mean lip service, nor obsequious homage
to superiors, nor servile observance of forms and customs, nor a
suppression of individuality.
Such may have been the outward manifestations of discipline in times
gone by. If they achieved the end in view, it must have been because
the individual soldier had acquired in those days no capacity to act
intelligently and because he could be considered only in the mass. But
modern war makes high demands upon the intelligence of the private
soldier and upon his individual initiative. Any method of training
which tends to suppress that individuality will tend to reduce his
efficiency and value. The proverbial "iron discipline" of the Prussian
military ideal ultimately broke down completely under the test of a
great war.
In the Australian Forces no strong insistence was ever made upon the
mere outward forms of discipline. The soldier was taught that personal
cleanliness was necessary to ensure his health and well-being, that a
soldierly bearing meant a moral and physical uplift which would help
him to rise superior to his squalid environment, that punctuality meant
economy of effort, that unquestioning obedience was the only road to
successful collective action. He acquired these military qualities
because his intelligence taught him that the reasons given him were
true ones.
In short, the Australian Army is a proof that individualism is the
best and not the worst foundation upon which to build up collective
discipline. The Australian is accustomed to team-work. He learns it
in the sporting field, in his industrial organizations, and in his
political activities. The team-work which he developed in the war was
of the highest order of efficiency. Each man understood his part and
understood also that the part which others had to play depended upon
the proper performance of his own.
The gunner knew that the success of the infantry depended upon his own
punctilious performance of his task, its accuracy, its punctuality,
its conscientious thoroughness. The runner knew what depended upon
the rapid delivery at the right destination of the message which he
carried. The mule driver knew that the load of ammunition entrusted
to him must be delivered, at any sacrifice, to its destined battery;
the infantryman knew that he must be at his tape line at the appointed
moment, and that he must not overrun his allotted objective.
The truest test of battle discipline was the confidence which every
leader in the field always felt that he could rely upon every man to
perform the duty which had been prescribed for him, as long as breath
lasted, and that he would perform it faithfully even when there was no
possibility of any supervision.
Thus the sense of duty was always very high, and so also was the
instinct of comradeship. A soldier, a platoon, a whole battalion would
sooner sacrifice themselves than "let down" a comrade or another unit.
There was no finer example of individual self-sacrifice, for the
benefit of comrades, than the Stretcher-bearer service, which suffered
exceedingly in its noble work of succouring the wounded, and exposed
itself unflinchingly to every danger.
The relations between the officers and men of the Australian Army were
also of a nature which is deserving of notice. From almost the earliest
days of the war violence was done to a deep-rooted tradition of the
British Army, which discouraged any promotion from the ranks, and
stringently forbade, in cases where it was given, promotion in the same
unit. It was rare to recognize the distinguished service of a ranker;
it was impossible for him to secure a commission in his own regiment.
The Australian Imperial Force changed all that. Those privates,
corporals and sergeants who displayed, under battle conditions, a
notable capacity for leadership were earmarked for preferment. If their
standard of education was good, they received commissions as soon as
there were vacancies to fill; if not, they were sent to Oxford or
Cambridge to be given an opportunity of improving both their general
and their special military knowledge.
As a general rule, they came back as commissioned officers to the very
unit in which they had enlisted or served. They afforded to all its men
a tangible and visible proof of the recognition of merit and capacity,
and their example was always a powerful stimulus to all their former
comrades.
There was thus no officer caste, no social distinction in the whole
force. In not a few instances, men of humble origin and belonging
to the artisan class rose, during the war, from privates to the
command of Battalions. The efficiency of the force suffered in no
way in consequence. On the contrary, the whole Australian Army
became automatically graded into leaders and followers according
to the individual merits of every man, and there grew a wonderful
understanding between them.
The duties and responsibilities of the officers were always put upon
a high plane. They had, during all military service with troops, to
dress like the men, to live among them in the trenches, to share their
hardships and privations, and to be responsible for their welfare. No
officer dared to look after his own comfort until every man or horse
or mule had been fed and quartered, as well as the circumstances of
the moment permitted. The battle prowess of the Australian regimental
officer and the magnificent example he set have become household words.
[Illustration: The Toll of Battle--an Australian gun-team destroyed by
an enemy shell, September 1st, 1918.]
[Illustration: Inter-Divisional Relief--The 30th American and the 3rd
Australian Divisions passing each other in the "Roo de Kanga," Péronne,
during the "relief" after the capture of the Hindenburg Line, October
4th, 1918.]
Then there must be a word of recognition of the work of the devoted and
able Staffs. It was upon them, after all, that the principal burden of
the campaign rested. Upon them, their skill and industry, depended the
adequacy of all supplies and their proper distribution, the precision
of all arrangements for battle, the accuracy of all maps, orders and
instructions, the clearness of messages and reports, the completeness
of the information on which the Commander must base his decisions, and
the correct calculations of time and space for the movement of troops,
guns and transport. Their watchword was "efficiency."
"The Staff Officer is the servant of the troops." This was the ritual
pronounced at the initiation of every Staff Officer. It was a doctrine
which contributed powerfully to the success of the staff work as a
whole. It meant that the Staff Officer's duties extended far beyond
the mere transmission of orders. It became his business to see that
they were understood, and rightly acted upon, and to assist in removing
every kind of difficulty in their due execution. The importance of
accurate and reliable staff work can be understood when it is realized
that no mistake can happen without ultimately imposing an added stress
upon the most subordinate and most helpless of all the components of an
Army--the private soldier. An error in a clock time, the miscarriage
of a message, the neglect to issue an instruction, a misreading of an
order, an omission from a list of names, a mistake in a computation,
an incomplete inventory, are bound in the long run to involve an added
burden somewhere upon some private soldier.
The Staff of the Australian Army Corps, its Divisions and Brigades,
consisted during the last six months almost entirely of Australians,
many of them belonging to the permanent military forces of the
Commonwealth, but more still men who, before the war, followed civilian
occupations. Among both categories the quality of the staff work
steadily grew in efficiency, speed and accuracy, and during the last
period of active fighting it reached a very high standard indeed.
Had it been otherwise, I could not have carried out either the rapid
preparations for several of the greater battles, or the frequent and
complex interchanges of Divisions which alone rendered it possible
for me to keep up a continuous pressure on the enemy, or the
readjustments throughout the whole of the very large area always under
my jurisdiction which became necessary as the advance proceeded.
No reference to the staff work of the Australian Corps during the
period of my command would be complete without a tribute to the work
and personality of Brigadier-General T. A. Blamey, my Chief of Staff.
He possessed a mind cultured far above the average, widely informed,
alert and prehensile. He had an infinite capacity for taking pains.
A Staff College graduate, but not on that account a pedant, he was
thoroughly versed in the technique of staff work, and in the minutiæ of
all procedure.
He served me with an exemplary loyalty, for which I owe him a debt of
gratitude which cannot be repaid. Our temperaments adapted themselves
to each other in a manner which was ideal. He had an extraordinary
faculty of self-effacement, posing always and conscientiously as the
instrument to give effect to my policies and decisions. Really helpful
whenever his advice was invited, he never obtruded his own opinions,
although I knew that he did not always agree with me.
Some day the orders which he drafted for the long series of
history-making military operations upon which we collaborated will
become a model for Staff Colleges and Schools for military instruction.
They were accurate, lucid in language, perfect in detail, and always
an exact interpretation of my intention. It was seldom that I thought
that my orders or instructions could have been better expressed, and no
Commander could have been more exacting than I was in the matter of the
use of clear language to express thought.
Blamey was a man of inexhaustible industry, and accepted every task
with placid readiness. Nothing was ever too much trouble. He worked
late and early, and set a high standard for the remainder of the large
Corps Staff of which he was the head. The personal support which he
accorded to me was of a nature of which I could always feel the real
substance. I was able to lean on him in times of trouble, stress and
difficulty, to a degree which was an inexpressible comfort to me.
To the Commanders of the Five Divisions I have already made detailed
allusion. They were all renowned leaders. To all the Brigadiers of
Infantry and Artillery and to the Heads of the Administrative Services
who laboured under them, the limitations of space forbid my making any
individual reference. But they were all of them men to whose splendid
services Australia owes a deep debt of gratitude. In their hands the
honour of Australia's fighting men and the prestige of her arms were in
safe keeping.
None but men of character and self-devotion could have carried the
burden which they had to bear during the last six months of the war.
In spite of stress and difficulty, unremitting toil and wasted effort,
weary days and sleepless nights, fresh task piling upon the task but
just begun, labouring even harder during periods of so-called rest
than when their troops were actually in the line, this gallant band of
leaders remained steadfast of purpose, never faltered, never lost their
faith in final victory, never failed to impress their optimism and
their unflinching fighting spirit upon the men whom they commanded.
It may be appropriate to end this memoir on a personal note. I have
permitted myself a tone of eulogy for the triumphant achievements of
the Australian Army Corps in 1918, which I have endeavoured faithfully
to portray. Let it not be assumed on that account that the humble part
which it fell to my lot to perform afforded me any satisfaction or
prompted any enthusiasm for war. Quite the contrary.
From the far-off days of 1914, when the call first came, until the
last shot was fired, every day was filled with loathing, horror, and
distress. I deplored all the time the loss of precious life and the
waste of human effort. Nothing could have been more repugnant to me
than the realization of the dreadful inefficiency and the misspent
energy of war. Yet it had to be, and the thought always uppermost was
the earnest prayer that Australia might for ever be spared such a
horror on her own soil.
There is, in my belief, only one way to realize such a prayer. The
nation that wishes to defend its land and its honour must spare no
effort, refuse no sacrifice to make itself so formidable that no enemy
will dare to assail it. A League of Nations may be an instrument for
the preservation of peace, but an efficient Army is a far more potent
one.
The essential components of such an Army are a qualified Staff, an
adequate equipment and a trained soldiery. I state them in what I
believe to be their order of importance, and my belief is based upon
the lessons which this war has taught me. In that way alone can
Australia secure the sanctity of her territory and the preservation of
her independent liberties.
Such a creed is not militarism, but is of the very essence of national
self-preservation. For long years before the war it was the creed of a
small handful of men in Australia, who braved the indifference and even
the ridicule of public opinion in order to try to qualify themselves
for the test when it should come. Four dreadful years of war have
served to convince me of the truth of that creed, and to confirm me in
the belief that the men of the coming generation, if they love their
country, must take up the burden which these men have had to bear.
APPENDIX A
GROUPING INTO AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONS OF ARTILLERY AND
INFANTRY BRIGADES, DURING THE PERIOD MAY TO OCTOBER,
1918, AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING THEM.
FIRST DIVISION (Glasgow):
_Artillery_, 1st and 2nd Brigades (Anderson).
_Infantry_, 1st Brigade (Mackay).
2nd " (Heane).
3rd " (Bennett).
SECOND DIVISION (Rosenthal):
_Artillery_, 4th and 5th Brigades (Phillips).
_Infantry_, 5th Brigade (Martin).
6th " (Robertson).
7th " (Wisdom).
THIRD DIVISION (Gellibrand):
_Artillery_, 7th and 8th Brigades (Grimwade).
_Infantry_, 9th Brigade (Goddard).
10th " (McNicoll).
11th " (Cannan).
FOURTH DIVISION (Maclagan):
_Artillery_, 10th and 11th Brigades (Burgess).
_Infantry_, 4th Brigade (Brand).
12th " (Leane).
13th " (Herring).
FIFTH DIVISION (Hobbs):
_Artillery_, 13th and 14th Brigades (Bessel-Browne).
_Infantry_, 8th Brigade (Tivey).
14th " (Stewart).
15th " (Elliott).
The 3rd, 6th and 12th Artillery Brigades were Corps Troops not forming
part of any Division. The 9th Artillery Brigade was disbanded at the
end of 1916.
APPENDIX B
In order to illustrate the nature of the individual fighting carried
out by the Australian Corps, during the period covered by this book,
the following very small selection has been made from the official
records of deeds of gallantry by individual soldiers. In every one of
these twenty-nine cases, the VICTORIA CROSS has been awarded by His
Majesty the King:
No. 4061, SERGEANT STANLEY ROBERT MACDOUGALL, 47th Battalion, A.I.F.
"At DERNANCOURT, on morning of 28th March, 1918, the enemy
attacked our line, and his first wave succeeded in gaining an
entry. Sergt. MacDougall, who was at a post in a flank company,
realized the situation, and at once charged the enemy's second
wave single-handed with rifle and bayonet, killing 7 and capturing
Machine Gun which they had. This he turned on to them, firing
from the hip, causing many casualties, and routing that wave. He
then turned his attention to those who had entered, until his
ammunition had run out, all the time firing at close quarters, when
he seized a bayonet and charged again, killing three men and a
German officer, who was just about to kill one of our officers. He
then used a Lewis Gun on the enemy, killing many and enabling us to
capture 33 prisoners. His prompt action saved the line and enabled
us to stop the enemy advance."
LIEUTENANT PERCY VALENTINE STORKEY, 19th Battalion, A.I.F.
"Lieut. Storkey was in charge of a platoon which took part in
the attack at BOIS DE HANGARD on morning of 7th April, 1918. On
emerging from the wood, the enemy trench line was encountered, and
Lieut. Storkey found himself with 6 men. While continuing his move
forward, a large enemy party--about 80 to 100 strong--armed with
several machine guns, was noticed to be holding up the advance of
the troops on the right. Lieut. Storkey immediately decided to
attack this party from the flank and rear, and while moving forward
to the attack, was joined by Lieut. Lipscomb and four men. Under
the leadership of Lieut. Storkey, this small party of 2 officers
and 10 other ranks charged the enemy position with fixed bayonets,
driving the enemy out, killing and wounding about 30 and capturing
the remainder, viz.: 3 officers and 50 men, also one machine gun."
LIEUTENANT CLIFFORD WILLIAM KING SADLIER, 51st Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry on the night of 24-25th April, 1918,
during a counter-attack by his Battalion on strong enemy positions
south of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, east of Amiens. Lieut. Sadlier's
platoon, which was on the left of the Battalion, had to advance
through a wood, where they encountered a strong enemy machine-gun
post, which caused casualties and prevented the platoon from
advancing. Although himself wounded, this officer at once collected
his bombing section, and led them against the machine guns,
succeeding in killing the crews and capturing two of the guns. By
this time Lieut. Sadlier's party were all casualties, and he alone
attacked a third enemy machine gun with his revolver, killing the
crew of four and taking the gun. In doing so, he was again wounded,
and unable to go on."
No. 1914, SERGEANT WILLIAM RUTHVEN, 22nd Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous bravery and daring in action during the
attack at VILLE-SUR-ANCRE, near Albert, on 19th May, 1918.
During the advance Sergeant Ruthven's Company suffered numerous
casualties, and his Company Commander was severely wounded. He then
assumed command of his portion of the assault, took charge of the
Company Headquarters, and rallied the sections in his vicinity.
As the leading wave approached its objective, it was subjected to
heavy fire from an enemy Machine Gun at 30 to 40 yards' range,
directly in front. This N.C.O., without hesitation, at once sprang
out, threw a bomb which landed beside the post, and immediately
rushed the position, bayoneting one of the crew and capturing the
gun. He then encountered some of the enemy coming out of a shelter.
He wounded two, captured six others in the same position, and
handed them over to an escort from the leading wave, which had now
reached the objective. Sergeant Ruthven then reorganized our men in
his vicinity, and established a post in the second objective. Enemy
movement was then seen in a sunken road about 150 yards distant.
Without hesitation, and armed only with a revolver, he went over
the open alone and rushed the position, shooting two Germans who
refused to come out of their dug-out. He then single-handed mopped
up this post, and captured the whole of the garrison, amounting in
all to 32, and kept them until assistance arrived to escort them
back to our lines. During the remainder of the day this gallant
N.C.O. set a splendid example of leadership, moving up and down his
position under fire, supervising consolidation and encouraging his
men."
No. 1327, CORPORAL PHILLIP DAVEY, M.M., 10th Battalion, A.I.F.
"In a daylight operation against the enemy position near MERRIS on
June 28th, 1918, Corporal Davey's platoon advanced 200 yards and
captured part of enemy line. While the platoon was consolidating,
the enemy pushed a machine gun forward under cover of a hedge,
and opened fire from close range, inflicting heavy casualties and
hampering work. Alone Corporal Davey moved forward in the face of
a fierce point-blank fire, and attacked the gun with hand grenades,
putting half the crew out of action. Having used all available
grenades, he returned to the original jumping-off trench, secured
a further supply and again attacked the gun, the crew of which had
in the meantime been reinforced. He killed the crew, 8 in all, and
captured the gun. This gallant N.C.O. then mounted the gun in the
new post and used it in repelling a determined counter-attack,
during which he was severely wounded in both legs, back and
stomach."
No. 3399, PRIVATE (LANCE-CORPORAL) THOMAS LESLIE AXFORD, M.M., 16th
Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and initiative during the operations
against VAIRE and HAMEL WOODS, east of Corbie, on the morning
of the 4th July, 1918. When the barrage lifted and the Infantry
advance commenced, the platoon of which he is a member was able
to reach the first enemy defences through gaps which had been cut
in the wires. The adjoining platoon got delayed in uncut barbed
wire. This delay enabled the enemy machine guns to get into action,
and enabled them to inflict a number of casualties among the men
struggling through the wires, including the Company Commander,
who was killed. L.-Corporal Axford, with great initiative and
magnificent courage, at once dashed to the flank, threw his bombs
amongst the machine-gun crews; followed up his bombs by jumping
into the trench, and charging with his bayonet. Unaided he killed
ten of the enemy and took 6 prisoners; he threw the machine
guns over the parapet, and called out to the delayed platoon to
come on. He then rejoined his own platoon, and fought with it
during the remainder of the operations. Prior to the incidents
above-mentioned, he had assisted in the laying out of the tapes for
the jumping-off position, which was within 100 yards of the enemy.
When the tapes were laid, he remained out as a special patrol to
ensure that the enemy did not discover any unusual movement on our
side."
No. 1936, PRIVATE HENRY DALZIEL, 15th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For his magnificent bravery and devotion to duty during operations
near HAMEL WOOD, east of Corbie, on 4th July, 1918. He was No. 2
of a Lewis Gun Section, and at the commencement of our advance his
Company met with determined resistance from Pear Trench strong
point, which was strongly garrisoned and manned by numerous machine
guns. This strong point, undamaged by our artillery fire, was
protected by strong wire entanglements. A heavy concentration of
machine-gun fire caused heavy casualties and held up our advance.
His Lewis Gun came into action and silenced enemy guns in one
direction, when another enemy gun opened up from another direction.
Private Dalziel dashed at it, and with his revolver killed or
captured the entire crew and gun, and allowed our advance to
continue. He was severely wounded in the hand, but carried on and
took part in the capture of the final objective. He twice went
over open ground under heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire
to where our aeroplanes had dropped some boxes of ammunition,
and carried back a box on each occasion to his gun, and though
suffering from considerable loss of blood, he filled magazines and
served his gun until severely wounded through the head."
No. 1689A, CORPORAL WALTER ERNEST BROWN, D.C.M., 20th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For gallant service on the morning of 6th July, 1918, north-east
of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, east of Amiens. This N.C.O. was one of an
advanced party from his Battalion making arrangements with the
Battalion then in the line for relief by his own Battalion. As
such he was under no obligation to participate in any offensive
operations before his Battalion took over the line. During the
night of 5th-6th July the Company to which he was attached
carried out a minor operation resulting in the capture of a small
system of enemy trench. Early on the morning of 6th July an enemy
strong post, about 70 yards distant, caused the occupants of the
newly-captured trench great inconvenience by persistent sniping.
It was decided to rush this post. Hearing of this, Corporal Brown,
on his own initiative, crept out along the shallow trench towards
the enemy post, and then made a dash across No Man's Land towards
this post. An enemy machine gun opened fire from another trench,
and he had to take cover by lying down. He later made another dash
forward, and succeeded in reaching his objective. With a Mills
grenade in his hand, he stood at the door of a dug-out and called
on the occupants to surrender. One of the enemy rushed out, a
scuffle ensued, and Corporal Brown knocked him down with his fist.
Loud cries of 'Kamerad' were then heard, and from the dug-out an
officer and eleven other ranks appeared. Driving them before him,
Corporal Brown brought back the complete party as prisoners to our
line."
LIEUTENANT ALBERT CHALMERS BORELLA, M.M., 26th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For exceptional gallantry in the attack near VILLERS-BRETONNEUX,
on the 17th-18th July, 1918. Whilst leading his platoon with the
first wave, Lieut. Borella noticed an enemy machine gun firing
through our barrage--he ran out ahead of his men into the barrage,
shot two German machine gunners with his revolver, and captured the
gun. He then led his party, now reduced to ten men and two Lewis
Guns, further on, against JAFFA TRENCH, which was very strongly
held, but using his revolver, and later a rifle, with great effect,
Lieut. Borella shot down the enemy right and left, and set such a
splendid example, that the garrison were quickly shot and captured.
Two large dug-outs were bombed here and thirty prisoners taken.
After reorganization the enemy counter-attacked twice in strong
force, on the second occasion outnumbering Lieut. Borella's platoon
by ten to one; but he showed such coolness and determination, that
the men put up an heroic resistance, and twice repulsed the enemy
with very heavy loss. It is estimated that from 100 to 150 Germans
were killed in this vicinity. When Lieut. Borella refused his left
flank about 40 yards during the first counter-attack he sent his
men back one at a time, and was himself the last to leave, under
heavy fire."
LIEUTENANT ALFRED EDWARD GABY, 28th Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the attack east of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, near Amiens, on the
morning of 8th August, 1918, this officer led his Company with
great dash, being well in front. On reaching the wire in front of
the enemy trench, strong opposition was encountered. The enemy were
holding a strong point in force about 40 yards beyond the wire, and
commanded the gap with four machine guns and rifles. The advance
was at once checked. Lieut. Gaby found another gap in the wire,
and entirely by himself approached the strong point, while machine
guns and rifles were still being fired from it. Running along the
parapet, still alone, and at point-blank range, he emptied his
revolver into the garrison, drove the crews from their guns, and
compelled the surrender of 50 of the enemy, with four machine guns.
He then quickly reorganized his men and led them on to his final
objective, which he captured and consolidated. On the morning of
the 11th August, 1918, during an attack east of FRAMERVILLE, Lieut.
Gaby again led his Company with great dash on to the objective. The
enemy brought heavy rifle and machine-gun fire to bear upon the
line, but in the face of this heavy fire Lieut. Gaby walked along
his line of posts, encouraging his men to quickly consolidate the
line. While engaged on this duty he was killed by an enemy sniper."
No. 2742, PRIVATE ROBERT MATTHEW BEATHAM, 8th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack
north of ROSIÈRES on 9th August, 1918. Private Beatham showed
such heroism and courage, that he inspired all officers and men
in his vicinity in a wonderful manner. When the advance was held
up by heavy machine-gun fire, Private Beatham dashed forward and,
assisted by one man, bombed and fought the crews of four enemy
machine guns, killing ten of them and capturing ten others. The
bravery of the action greatly facilitated the advance of the whole
Battalion and prevented casualties. In fighting the crew of the
first gun he was shot through the right leg, but continued in the
advance. When the final objective was reached and fierce fighting
was taking place, he again dashed forward and bombed the machine
gun that was holding our men off, getting riddled with bullets and
killed in doing so."
No. 506, SERGEANT PERCY CLYDE STATTON, M.M., 40th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous gallantry and initiative in action near
PROYART on 12th August, 1918. The platoon commanded by Sergeant
Statton reached its objective, but the remainder of the Battalion
was held up by heavy machine-gun fire. He skilfully engaged two
machine-gun posts with Lewis Gun fire, enabling the remainder of
his Battalion to advance. The advance of the Battalion on his left
had been brought to a standstill by the heavy enemy machine-gun
fire, and the first of our assaulting detachments to reach the
machine-gun posts were put out of action in taking the first gun.
Armed only with a revolver, in broad daylight, Sergeant Statton at
once rushed four enemy machine-gun posts in succession, disposing
of two of them, killing five of the enemy. The remaining two posts
retired and were wiped out by Lewis Gun fire. This N.C.O.'s act had
a very inspiring effect on the troops who had been held up, and
they cheered him as he returned. By his daring exploit he enabled
the attacking troops to gain their objective. Later in the evening,
under heavy machine-gun fire, he went out again and brought in two
badly-wounded men."
LIEUTENANT LAWRENCE DOMINIC MCCARTHY, 16th Battalion, A.I.F.
"This officer is especially brought to notice for his wonderful
gallantry, initiative and leadership on the morning of the 23rd
August, 1918, when an attack was being made near MADAME WOOD, west
of Vernandivukkers. The objectives of this Battalion were attained
without serious opposition. The Battalion on the left flank were
less fortunate. Here several well-posted machine-gun posts were
holding up the attack, and heavy fire was being brought to bear on
our left flank. When Lieut. McCarthy realized the situation, he at
once engaged the nearest machine-gun post; but still the attacking
troops failed to get forward. This officer then determined to
attack the nearest post. Leaving his men to continue the fire
fight, he, with two others, dashed across the open and dropped
into a disused trench which had been blocked. One of his two men
was killed whilst doing this. He was now right under the block
over which the enemy machine gun was firing. The presence of head
cover prevented the use of bombs. He therefore tunnelled a hole
through the bottom of the block, through which he inserted his head
and one arm. He at once shot dead the two men firing the gun. He
then crawled through the hole he had made, and by himself charged
down the trench. He threw his limited number of Mills bombs among
the German garrison and inflicted more casualties. He then came
in contact with two German officers, who fired on him with their
revolvers. One of these he shot dead with his revolver, the other
he seriously wounded. He then charged down the trench, using his
revolver and throwing enemy stick bombs, and capturing three more
enemy machine guns. At this stage, some 700 yards from his starting
point, he was joined by the N.C.O., whom he had outdistanced when
he crawled through the hole in the trench block mentioned above.
Together they continued to bomb up the trench, until touch was
established with the Lancashire Fusiliers, and in the meanwhile
yet another machine gun had been captured. A total of 5 machine
guns and 50 prisoners (37 unwounded and 13 wounded) was captured,
while Lieut. McCarthy during his most amazing and daring feat
had, single-handed, killed 20 of the enemy. Having cleared up a
dangerous situation, he proceeded to establish a garrison in the
line. Whilst doing this he saw a number of the enemy getting away
from neighbouring trenches. He at once seized a Lewis Gun and
inflicted further casualties on the enemy."
LIEUTENANT WILLIAM DONOVAN JOYNT, 8th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack
on HERLEVILLE WOOD, near Chuignes, on 23rd August, 1918. Early
in the advance Lieut. Joynt's Company Commander was killed; he
immediately took charge of the Company and led them with courage
and skill. A great deal of the success of the operation in this
portion of the sector was directly due to his magnificent work.
When the advance was commenced the Battalion was moving into
support to another Battalion. On approaching Herleville Wood,
the troops of the leading Battalion lost all their officers and
became disorganized. Under very heavy fire, and having no leaders,
they appeared certain to be annihilated. Lieut. Joynt grasped
the situation, and rushed forward in the teeth of very heavy
machine-gun and artillery fire over the open. He got the remaining
men under control, and worked them into a piece of dead ground,
until he could reform them. He manoeuvred his own men forward,
and linked them up with the men of the other Battalion. He then
made a personal reconnaissance, and found that the fire from the
wood was holding the whole advance up, the troops on his flanks
suffering very heavy casualties. Dashing out in front of his men,
he called them on, and by sheer force of example inspired them into
a magnificent frontal bayonet attack on the wood. The audacity
of the move over the open staggered the enemy, and Lieut. Joynt
succeeded in penetrating the wood and working through it. By his
leadership and courage a very critical situation was saved, and
on this officer rests to the greatest extent the success of the
Brigade's attack. When the Battalion on our left was held up on
Plateau Wood, and was suffering severe casualties, Lieut. Joynt,
with a small party of volunteers, worked right forward against
heavy opposition, and by means of hand-to-hand fighting forced his
way round the rear of the wood, penetrating it from that side, and
demoralizing the enemy to such an extent that a very stubborn and
victorious defensive was changed into an abject surrender. He was
always in the hardest pressed parts of the line, and seemed to
bear a charmed life. He was constantly ready to run any personal
risk and to assist flank units. He continually showed magnificent
leadership, and his example to his men had a wonderful effect on
them, causing them to follow him cheerfully in his most daring
exploits. He continued to do magnificent work until he was badly
wounded by shell fire in the legs."
No. 23, PRIVATE (LANCE-CORPORAL) BERNARD SYDNEY GORDON, 41st Battalion,
A.I.F.
"During the operations of the 26-27th August, 1918, east of BRAY,
this N.C.O. showed most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to
duty in the face of the enemy. He led his section through heavy
enemy shelling to its objective, which he consolidated. Then
single-handed he attacked an enemy machine gun which was enfilading
the Company on his right, killed the man on the gun, and captured
the post, which contained one officer (a Captain) and 10 men.
After handing these over at Company Headquarters, he returned alone
to the old system of trenches, in which were many machine guns;
entered a trench and proceeded to mop it up, returning with 15
prisoners in one squad and 14 in another, together with two machine
guns. Again he returned to the system, this time with a Trench
Mortar gun and crew, and proceeded to mop up a further portion of
the trench, bringing in 22 prisoners, including one officer and
3 machine guns. This last capture enabled the British troops on
our left to advance, which they had not been able to do owing to
machine-gun fire from these posts. His total captures were thus 2
officers and 61 other ranks, together with 6 machine guns, and with
the exception of the Trench Mortar assistance, it was absolutely an
individual effort and done entirely on his own initiative."
No. 726, PRIVATE GEORGE CARTWRIGHT, 33rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous valour and devotion to duty. On the morning
of the 31st August, 1918, during the attack on ROAD WOOD,
south-west of Bouchavesnes, near Péronne, Private Cartwright
displayed exceptional gallantry and supreme disregard for
personal danger in the face of a most withering machine-gun
fire. Two Companies were held up by a machine-gun firing from
the south-western edge of the wood. Without hesitation, this man
stood up, and walking towards the gun, fired his rifle from his
shoulder. He shot the No. 1 Gunner; another German manned the gun,
and he killed him; a third attempted to fire the gun and him he
also killed. Private Cartwright then threw a bomb at the post, and
on its exploding, he rushed forward, captured the gun and nine
Germans. Our line then immediately rushed forward, loudly cheering
him. This magnificent deed had a most inspiring effect on the whole
line; all strove to emulate his gallantry. Throughout the operation
Private Cartwright displayed wonderful dash, grim determination and
courage of the highest order."
LIEUTENANT EDGAR THOMAS TOWNER, M.C., 2nd Australian Machine Gun
Battalion.
"On 1st September, 1918, in the attack on MONT ST. QUENTIN, near
Péronne, this officer was in charge of 4 Vickers guns operating on
a front of 1,500 yards. During the early stages of the advance an
enemy machine gun was causing casualties to our advancing Infantry.
Locating the gun, Lieut. Towner dashed ahead alone, and succeeded
in killing the crew with his revolver, capturing the gun, and
then, by turning it against the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties
on them. Advancing then past a copse from which the enemy were
firing, he brought his guns into action, placing his fire behind
the enemy and cutting them off. On their attempting to retire
before the advancing Infantry, and finding they were prevented by
this machine-gun fire, the party of 25 Germans surrendered. He then
reconnoitred alone over open ground exposed to heavy machine-gun
and snipers' fire, and by the energy, foresight and the promptitude
with which he brought fire to bear on further enemy groups, enabled
the Infantry to reach a sunken road. On moving his guns up to
the sunken road, he found himself short of ammunition, so went
back across the open under heavy fire and obtained a German gun,
and brought it and boxes of ammunition into the sunken road. Here
he mounted and fired the gun in full view of the enemy, causing
the enemy to retire further, and enabling Infantry on the flank,
who were previously held up, to advance. Enemy machine gunners
having direct observation, flicked the earth round and under this
gun, and played a tattoo along the top of the bank. Though one
bullet went into his helmet and inflicted a gaping scalp wound, he
continued firing. Subsequently he refused to go out to have his
wound attended to, as the situation was critical and his place
was with his men. Later in the day the Infantry were obliged to
retire slightly, and one gun was left behind. Lieut. Towner, seeing
this, dashed back over the open, carried the gun back in spite of
terrific fire, and brought it into action again. He continued to
engage the enemy wherever they appeared, and put an enemy machine
gun out of action. During the following night he insisted on doing
his tour of duty along with the other officers, and his coolness
and cheerfulness set an example which had a great effect on the
men. To steady and calm the men of a small detached outpost, he
crawled out among the enemy posts to investigate. He remained out
about an hour, though enemy machine guns fired continuously on the
sector, and the Germans were moving about him. He moved one gun up
in support of the Infantry post, and patrolled the communication
saps which ran off this post into the German line during the
remainder of the night. Next morning, after his guns assisted in
dispersing a large party of the enemy, he was led away utterly
exhausted, 30 hours after being wounded."
No. 2358, SERGEANT ALBERT DAVID LOWERSON, 21st Battalion, A.I.F.
"At MONT ST, QUENTIN, north of Péronne, on the 1st September,
1918, this N.C.O. displayed courage and tactical skill of the
very highest order during the attack on this village. Very strong
opposition was met with early in the attack, and every foot of
ground was stubbornly contested by the enemy located in very
strong positions. This N.C.O.'s example during the fighting was
of the greatest value. He moved about, regardless of the heavy
enemy machine-gun fire, directing his men, encouraging them to
still greater effort, and finally led them on to the objective.
On reaching the objective, he saw that the left attacking party
had not met with success, and that the attack was held up by an
enemy strong post, heavily manned with 12 machine guns. Under the
heaviest sniping and machine gun fire Sergeant Lowerson rallied
seven men around him into a storming party, and deployed them to
attack the post from both flanks, one party of three being killed
immediately. He himself then rushed the strong point, and, with
effective bombing, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and
captured the post containing 12 machine guns and 30 prisoners.
Though severely wounded in the right thigh, he refused to leave the
front line until the prisoners had been dispatched to the rear, and
the organization and consolidation of the post by our men had been
completed. When he saw that the position was thoroughly secure,
he returned to the rear, but refused to leave the Battalion until
forced to evacuate two days later by the seriousness of his wound.
This act was the culminating point of a series of most gallant
performances by this N.C.O. during the fighting extending over a
week."
No. 1584A, PRIVATE WILLIAM MATTHEW CURREY, 53rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the attack on PÉRONNE, on the morning of 1st September,
1918, Private Currey displayed most conspicuous gallantry and
daring. During the early stage of the advance the Battalion was
suffering heavy casualties from a 77 mm. Field Gun, that was
firing over sights at very close range. Private Currey, without
hesitation, rushed forward, and despite a withering machine-gun
fire that was directed on him from either flank, succeeded in
capturing the gun single-handed after killing the entire crew.
Later, when continuing the advance, an enemy strong point,
containing 30 men and two machine guns, was noticed, which was
holding up the advance of the left flank. Private Currey crept
around the flank, and engaged the post with a Lewis Gun, causing
many casualties. Finally, he rushed the post single-handed,
killing four, wounding two, and taking one prisoner, the survivors
running away. It was entirely owing to his gallant conduct that
the situation was relieved, and the advance enabled to continue.
After the final stage of the attack, it was imperative that one of
the Companies that had become isolated should be withdrawn. This
man at once volunteered to carry the message, although the ground
to be crossed was very heavily shelled and continuously swept by
machine-gun fire. He crossed the shell and bullet-swept area three
times in the effort to locate the Company, and on one occasion his
box respirator was shot through by machine-gun bullets, and he was
gassed. Nevertheless, he remained on duty, and after finding the
isolated Company, delivered the message, and returned with very
valuable information from the Company Commander. Owing to the gas
poisoning from which he was suffering Currey had shortly afterwards
to be evacuated."
No. 6939, PRIVATE ROBERT MACTIER, 23rd Battalion, A.I.F.
"On the morning of 1st September, 1918, during the operation
entailing capture of MONT ST. QUENTIN, this man stands out for
the greatest bravery and devotion to duty. Fifteen minutes before
zero two bombing patrols were sent to clear up several enemy
strong points close to our line, but they met with very stubborn
resistance and no success, and the Battalion was unable to move on
to its Jumping Off Trench. Mactier, single-handed and in daylight,
then jumped out of the trench from the leading Company, rushed past
the block, closed with and killed the machine-gun garrison of 8 men
with his revolver and bombs, and threw the enemy machine gun over
the parapet. He rushed forward another 20 yards and jumped into
another strong point held by a garrison of 6 men, who immediately
surrendered. Continuing to the next block through the trench, an
enemy gun, which had been enfilading our flank advancing troops,
was swung on to him; but he jumped out of the trench into the open,
and disposed of this third post and gun crew by bombing them from
the rear. Before he could get into this trench, he was killed by
enemy machine gun at close range. In the three posts which Mactier
rushed, 15 of the enemy were found killed and 30 taken prisoners."
No. 1876, CORPORAL ALEXANDER HENRY BUCKLEY, 54th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at PÉRONNE
during the operations on 1st-2nd September, 1918. After passing
the first objective, his half Company and part of the Company on
the flank were held up by an enemy machine-gun nest. With one man
he rushed the post, shooting 4 of the occupants and taking 22
prisoners. Later on, reaching a moat, another machine-gun nest
commanded the only available foot-bridge. Whilst this was being
engaged from a flank, this N.C.O. endeavoured to cross the bridge
and rush the post, but was killed in the attempt. Throughout the
advance he had displayed great initiative, resource and courage,
being a great inspiration to his men. In order to avert casualties
amongst his comrades and to permit of their advance, he voluntarily
essayed a task which practically meant certain death. He set a fine
example of self-sacrificing devotion to duty and bravery."
No. 2631, CORPORAL ARTHUR CHARLES HALL, 54th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For most conspicuous gallantry, brilliant leadership and devotion
to duty during the operations at PÉRONNE on 1st and 2nd September,
1918. A machine-gun post in the enemy front line was holding up
the advance; alone, this N.C.O. rushed the position, shot 4 of the
occupants as he advanced, and captured 9 others and 2 machine guns.
Then, crossing the objective with a small party, he reconnoitred
the approaches to the town, covering the infiltration of the
remainder of the Company. During the mopping up he continuously--in
advance of the main party--located enemy posts of resistance, and
then personally led parties to the assault. In this way he captured
many small parties of prisoners and machine-guns. On the morning
of 2nd September, during a heavy barrage on the newly consolidated
position, a man of his platoon was severely wounded. Seeing that
only immediate medical attention could save him, Corporal Hall
volunteered and carried the man out of the barrage, handed him to
a stretcher-bearer, and immediately returned to his post. This
Company was heavily engaged throughout the day, only one Officer
remaining unwounded."
No. 1153, PRIVATE (LANCE-CORPORAL) LAURENCE CARTHAGE WEATHERS, 43rd
Battalion, A.I.F.
"On the 2nd September, 1918, during operations north of PÉRONNE,
Lance-Corporal Weathers was one of an advanced bombing party
operating well forward of our attacking troops. Just before the
attack reached its final objective it was held up by the enemy,
who occupied a trench in great numbers. After an hour's continuous
fighting Lance-Corporal Weathers went forward alone in face of
heavy enemy fire and located a large body of them. He immediately
attacked the enemy with bombs and killed the senior officer; then
made his way back to our lines and, securing a further supply of
bombs and taking three men with him, he went forward and again
attacked under very heavy fire. On reaching the enemy position,
he jumped up on the parapet of the trench and threw bombs among
the Bosche. He then signalled for his comrades to come up, and the
remainder of the enemy, seeing this, surrendered. When counted, the
number of prisoners totalled 100 and 3 machine guns."
No. 3244, PRIVATE JAMES PARK WOODS, 48th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during the
operations near LE VERGUIER, north-west of St. Quentin, on the 18th
September, 1918. Woods formed one of a party of three to patrol
the right flank. He encountered a very formidable enemy strong
point, consisting of about 25 men with four heavy and two light
machine guns. This strong point commanded the greater portion of
our position, and it was of the utmost importance to us, insomuch
as it gave us a commanding view of the whole canal system. The
strong point was situated at the junction of four enemy fire
trenches, apparently sited with a view to protecting the approaches
to the village of Bellenglise. Private Woods, appreciating the
great importance of this position, and realizing the necessity
for its immediate capture, fearlessly attacked with his rifle and
bayonet, capturing one of the enemy and wounding the second with
his bayonet, forcing the remainder to retire. After the capture of
the strong point, it was found that one of the party was wounded.
Private Woods, although himself slightly gassed, stubbornly
defended the post. The enemy ascertaining that only two men opposed
them, immediately attempted to recapture the strong point. The
counter-attack by the enemy was carried out with at least 30 men
attacking up the three trenches and across the open ground. This
meant that Private Woods was attacked from both flanks and the
front. He fearlessly jumped on the parapet, and opened fire on
the attacking enemy, inflicting several casualties. During this
operation he was exposed to very heavy machine-gun, rifle fire
and bombing, but with dogged determination he kept up his fire,
thus holding up the enemy until help arrived, enabling the enemy
counter-attack to be repulsed with heavy losses. The capture of
this strong post was the means of securing our flank, which had
previously been in the air, and also enabled us to get in touch
with the troops on our flank."
No. 6594, SERGEANT GERALD SEXTON, 13th Battalion, A.I.F.
"In the attack near LE VERGUIER, north-west of St. Quentin, on
the 18th September, 1918, Sergeant Sexton displayed the most
conspicuous bravery and performed deeds which, apart from their
gallant nature, were in a great measure responsible for the
Battalion's success. On the southern edge of the village of Le
Verguier the enemy fought hard, and serious opposition had to
be crushed. During the whole period of the advance, Sergeant
Sexton was to the fore dealing with enemy machine guns by firing
from the hip as he advanced, rushing enemy posts, and performing
feats of bravery and endurance, which are better appreciated when
one realizes that all the time he fired his Lewis Gun from the
hip without faltering or for a moment taking cover. Immediately
the attack commenced, Sergeant Sexton's Lewis Gun Section was
confronted by an enemy machine gun. He called out to his section
to follow, rushed the machine gun and killed the crew. He then
called out to the rest of the Company to follow, but they had not
gone far when they encountered some bombers and riflemen about 70
yards in front of the Company. Sexton rushed the trench, firing
his gun from the hip, and killed or took prisoner all the members
of the post. Continuing, he entered a copse, and killed or took
prisoner another party of the enemy. The advance continued over the
ridge at Le Verguier to where Sexton was met by Lieut. Price, who
pointed out a party of the enemy manning a bank, and a field gun
in action which was causing casualties and holding up a Company.
There was also a trench mortar in action. Sergeant Sexton did not
wait, but firing a few short bursts as he advanced, and calling
out to his section to follow, rushed down the bank and killed the
gunners on the field gun. Dashing out on to a flat under fire from
two hostile machine guns directed on him, he killed 12 more of the
enemy. Paying no heed to the machine-gun fire, he returned to the
bank, and after firing down some dug-outs, induced about 30 of the
enemy to surrender. Owing to his action the Company on the left
of the Battalion was able to continue the advance where they had
been definitely held up, and were suffering from the effects of the
field gun. When the advance was continued from the first to the
second objective, the Company was again held up by two machine guns
on the right and one on the left. In conjunction with a Platoon,
Sexton engaged the machine gun on the left, firing all the while
from the upright position, a fearless figure which, according to
eye-witnesses, inspired everyone. To have taken cover would have
been more prudent, but Sexton realized that prompt action was
essential, and did not wait to assume the prone position. Silencing
this gun, he turned his attention to the two machine guns on the
right and silenced them. He then moved forward into a trench,
killing quite a number of the enemy and, advancing along a sap,
took a few prisoners. Further on he was responsible for a few more
small posts, and, on the final objective, being given a responsible
post on the left of his Company, he engaged a machine gun which
was firing across the Company front, and thus enabled his Company
to dig in. This completed, he went forward down a sunken road and
captured several more prisoners."
MAJOR BLAIR ANDERSON WARK, D.S.O., 32nd Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the period 29th September-1st October, 1918, in the
operations against the HINDENBURG LINE at BELLICOURT, and the
advance through NAUROY, ETRICOURT, MAGNY LA FOSSE and JONCOURT,
Major Wark, in command of the 32nd Battalion, displayed most
conspicuous gallantry and set a fine example of personal bravery,
energy, coolness, and control under extremely difficult
conditions. On 29th September, under heavy artillery and
machine-gun fire at very close range from all sides and in a dense
fog, Major Wark, finding that the situation was critical, moved
quickly forward alone and obtained sufficient information regarding
the situation in front to be able to lead his command forward. At
this time American troops were at a standstill and disorganized,
and Major Wark quickly organized more than 200 of them, and
attached them to his leading Companies and pressed forward. By
his prompt action in the early stages of the battle he narrowly
averted what would have resulted in great confusion on the part
of the attack-troops. Still moving fearlessly at the head of his
leading Companies, and at most times far out in advance, attended
only by a runner, he cheered his men on, and they swept through the
Hindenburg defences towards Nauroy. Pushing quickly through Nauroy,
and mopping up the southern portion of the village, the process
yielding 50 prisoners, the Battalion swung towards Etricourt.
Still leading his assaulting Companies, he observed a battery of
77 mm. guns firing point-blank into his rear Companies and causing
heavy casualties. Calling on a few of his men to him he rushed the
battery, capturing the 4 guns and 10 of the crew; the remainder of
the crew fled or were killed. Moving rapidly forward with only two
N.C.O.'s, he surprised and captured 50 Germans near Magny la Fosse.
Quickly seizing this opportunity, he pushed one Company forward
through the village and made good the position. Having captured
his objectives for the day, and personally reconnoitring to see
that his flanks were safe, he found his command in a very difficult
and dangerous position, his left flank being exposed to the extent
of 3,000 yards on account of the 31st Battalion not being able
to advance. He, after a strenuous day's fighting, set about the
selection and reorganization of a new position, and effected a
junction with British troops on the right and 31st Battalion on the
left, and made his line secure. At 6 a.m. on 30th September, he
again led his command forward to allow of the troops on the right
being able to advance. The men were tired and had suffered heavily,
but he personally led them, and his presence amongst them inspired
them to further efforts. On October 1st, 1918, his Battalion was
ordered to advance at very short notice. He gave his orders for the
attack, and personally led his troops forward. A nest of machine
guns was encountered, causing casualties to his men. Without
hesitation and regardless of personal risk, he dashed forward
practically into the muzzles of the guns and under an exceptionally
heavy fire and silenced them, killing or capturing the entire
crews. Joncourt and Mill Ridge were then quickly captured and his
line consolidated. His men were practically exhausted after the
three days' heavy fighting, but he moved amongst them from post
to post, across country swept by heavy and continuous shell and
machine-gun fire at point-blank range, urged them on and the line
was made secure. Throughout he displayed the greatest courage and
devotion to duty, coupled with great tact and skill, and his work,
together with the reports based on his own personal observations,
which he forwarded, were invaluable to the Brigade. It is beyond
doubt that the success achieved by the Brigade during the heavy
fighting on 29th and 30th September and 1st October was due to this
officer's gallantry, determination, skill and great courage."
No. 1717, PRIVATE JOHN RYAN, 55th Battalion, A.I.F.
"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, and for saving a
very dangerous situation under particularly gallant circumstances
during an attack against the Hindenburg defences on 30th September,
1918. In the initial assault on the enemy's positions this
soldier went forward with great dash and determination, and was
one of the first men of his Company to reach the trench which
was their objective. Seeing him rush in with his bayonet with
such exceptional skill and daring, his comrades were inspired and
followed his example. Although the enemy shell and machine-gun fire
was extremely heavy, the enemy trench garrison was soon overcome.
In the assault the attacking troops were weakened by casualties,
and, as they were too few to cover the whole front of attack, a
considerable gap was left between Private Ryan's Battalion's left
and the unit on the flank. The enemy counter-attacked soon after
the objective was reached, and a few succeeded in infiltrating
through the gap, and taking up a position of cover in rear of
our men, where they commenced bombing operations. The section of
trench occupied by Private Ryan and his comrades was now under fire
from front and rear, and for a time it seemed that the enemy was
certain to force his way through. The situation was critical and
necessitated prompt action by someone in authority. Private Ryan
found that there were no officers or N.C.O.'s near; they had become
casualties in the assault. Appreciating the situation at once, he
organized the few men nearest him, and led them out to attack the
enemy with bomb and bayonet. Some of his party fell victims to the
enemy's bombs, and he finally dashed into the enemy position of
cover with only 3 men. The enemy were three times their number,
but by skilful bayonet work they succeeded in killing the first
three Germans on the enemy's flank. Moving along the embankment,
Private Ryan alone rushed the remainder of the enemy with bombs.
It was while thus engaged he fell wounded, but his dashing bombing
assault drove the enemy clear of our positions. Those who were not
killed or wounded by his bombs fell victims to our Lewis Gunners
as they retired across No Man's Land. A particularly dangerous
situation had been saved by this gallant soldier, whose display of
determined bravery and initiative was witnessed by the men of the
two attacking Battalions, who, inspired and urged by it, fought
skilfully and bravely for two days."
LIEUTENANT JOSEPH MAXWELL, M.C., D.C.M., 18th Battalion, A.I.F.
"On 3rd October, 1918, he took part as a Platoon Commander in an
attack on the BEAUREVOIR-FONSOMME Line near Estrées, north of St.
Quentin. His Company Commander was severely wounded soon after the
jump off, and Lieut. Maxwell at once took charge of the Company.
When the enemy wire was reached, they were met by a hail of
machine-gun fire, and suffered considerable casualties, including
all other officers of the Company. The wire at this point was six
belts thick, each belt being 20 to 25 feet wide. Lieut. Maxwell
pushed forward single-handed through the wire, and attacked the
most dangerous machine gun. He personally killed three of the crew,
and the remaining four men in the post surrendered to him with a
machine gun. His Company followed him through the wire and captured
the trenches forming their objective. Later, it was noticed that
the Company on his left was held up in the wire by a very strong
force on the left flank of the Battalion. He at once organized a
party and moved to the left to endeavour to attack the enemy from
the rear. Heavy machine-gun fire met them. Lieut. Maxwell again
dashed forward single-handed at the foremost machine gun, and
with his revolver shot five of its crew, so silencing the gun.
Owing to the work of this party, the left Company was then able
to work a small force through the wire, and eventually to occupy
the objective and mop up the trenches. In the fighting prior to
the mopping up, an English-speaking prisoner, who was captured,
stated that the remainder of the enemy were willing to surrender.
Lieut. Maxwell and two men, with this prisoner, walked to a post
containing more than twenty Germans. The latter at once seized and
disarmed our men. Lieut. Maxwell waited his chance, and then with
an automatic pistol which he had concealed in his box respirator,
shot two of the enemy and with the two men escaped. They were
pursued by rifle fire, and one was wounded. However, Lieut. Maxwell
organized a small party at once, attacked and captured the post."
SECOND LIEUTENANT GEORGE MORBY INGRAM, M.M., 24th Battalion, A.I.F.
"During the attack on MONTBREHAIN, east of Péronne, on 5th October,
1918, this officer was in charge of a platoon. About 100 yards
from the Jumping Off Trench severe enemy machine-gun fire was
encountered from a strong post which had escaped our Artillery
fire, and the advance was thus held up. Lieut. Ingram dashed out,
and, under cover of the fire of a Lewis Gun, rushed the post at
the head of his men. This post contained 9 machine guns and 42
Germans, who fought until our men were within 3 yards of them.
They were killed to a man--Lieut. Ingram accounting for no less
than 18 of them. A number of enemy posts were then observed to be
firing on our men from about 150 yards further forward, and the
Company moved forward to attack them, but severe casualties were
sustained. The Company Commander had been badly wounded, and the
Company Sergeant-Major and several others, who attempted to lead
the advance, were killed. Our barrage had passed on, and no Tanks
were near. Lieut. Ingram quickly seized the situation, rallied his
men in the face of murderous fire, and, with magnificent courage
and resolution, led them forward. He himself rushed the first post,
shot 6 of the enemy, and captured a machine gun, thus overcoming a
very serious resistance. By this time the Company had been reduced
from 90 to about 30 other ranks; but this officer, seeing enemy
fire coming from a quarry, to his left front, again led his men
forward and rushed the quarry. He jumped into the quarry amongst
enemy wire, and his men followed and proceeded to mop up a large
number of the enemy who were in bivouacs there. He then observed an
enemy machine gun firing from the ventilator of a cellar, through a
gap in the wall of a house about 20 yards away. Without hesitation
and entirely alone he scrambled up the edge of the quarry, ran
round the rear of the house, and entering from the far side, shot
the enemy gunner through the ventilator of the cellar. He fired
several more shots into the cellar, then, seeing some enemy jumping
out of the window of the house, he burst open a door, rushed to
the head of the stairs leading into the cellar, and forced 62 of
the enemy to surrender. He now found he was out of touch with the
Company on his left flank, so went out alone and made a personal
reconnaissance under heavy fire, and succeeded in gaining touch
with the left Company, which had lost all its officers. Having
returned to his Company, he personally placed a post on his left
flank to ensure its safety, and then reconnoitred and established
two posts on his right flank. All this was done in the face of
continuous machine-gun and shell fire."
[Illustration: Australian Artillery--moving up to the front, through
the Hindenburg wire, October 2nd, 1918.]
[Illustration: Advance during Battle--Third Division Infantry and Tanks
advancing to the capture of Bony, October 1st, 1918.]
APPENDIX C
CORPS ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF AUGUST 8TH, 1918
The following were the complete orders issued by the Australian Army
Corps for the Battle of August 8th, 1918. They form only a small part
of the whole of the orders which were required for the operation. There
were, in addition, detailed orders by the Corps Artillery Headquarters,
the Heavy Artillery, the Chief Engineer, and each of the five Divisions
and fifteen Brigades, and also by the Administrative Services of the
Corps.
On the question of the form of the orders, the most expedient course
was found to be the one here adopted--namely, that of issuing a
numbered series of Battle Instructions, each dealing comprehensively
with a separate subject matter:
BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1
1. The Australian Corps will attack the enemy from the
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX--CHAULNES Railway exclusive to the River SOMME,
inclusive, at a date and hour to be notified.
The Canadian Corps will co-operate on the right, south of the railway
(inclusive), and the Third Corps on the left, north of the SOMME.
2. _General Method of Attack._--The Australian Corps will attack on a
two-division front. The attack will be carried out in three phases.
Divisional boundaries and objectives are shown on the attached map.
(i) _First Phase._--The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will form
up on a taped line prior to ZERO, and will attack with Tanks under
a creeping artillery barrage. Their objective is shown by a GREEN
line on the attached map.
On arrival at their objective they will consolidate.
(ii) _Second Phase._--The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions,
organized in brigade groups, will advance in open warfare
formations, from the first objective passing through 2nd and 3rd
Australian Divisions respectively. Their objective is shown in RED
on the map.
(iii) _Third Phase._--The 5th and 4th Australian Divisions will
exploit their success and seize the old British line of Defences
marked BLUE on the map, and establish themselves defensively on
this line.
(iv) The 1st Australian Division will be in Corps Reserve.
(v) A detailed programme of the action will be issued.
3. _Assembly._--In order to free as many troops from line duty as
possible, 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions will arrange to hold the
front with one infantry brigade on each Divisional sector. This will be
completed before daybreak on 5th August.
To prevent any troops arriving at their objectives in an exhausted
condition through a long march, troops detailed to the farthest
objectives must be quartered nearest the starting line prior to ZERO.
The brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not holding the line
will be quartered in rear of all brigades of 5th and 4th Australian
Divisions respectively prior to ZERO night. This will be completed
before daybreak on 5th August.
The allotment of areas for quartering during this stage will be made
by mutual arrangement between Divisional Commanders concerned. The
allotment of routes and times of movement in accordance with the Corps
programme will be arranged similarly.
On ZERO night the brigades of 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions not in
the line will make their approach march to their tape lines through the
area occupied by 5th and 4th Australian Divisions respectively.
4. _Artillery._
(i) The Artillery available consists of:
18 Field Artillery Brigades.
12 Heavy Artillery Brigades.
(ii) G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will command all artillery of the
Corps during the first phase of the operation.
(iii) For the second phase G.O.C., R.A., Aust. Corps, will allot:
(_a_) Three Field Artillery Brigades to 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions
for distribution to infantry brigade groups. These will include the
5th and 4th Aust. Divisional Artillery respectively.
(_b_) Three brigades of Field Artillery and one battery of 60-pdr.
Heavy Artillery allotted to each of the 5th and 4th Aust. Divisions
for employment as may be ordered by the Divisional Commanders.
(_c_) The remainder of the Field Artillery and the Heavy Artillery
to Corps Reserve.
(iv) Heavy Artillery will be pushed forward by G.O.C., R.A., to
protect the troops in the second objective.
5. _Tanks._--Instructions for the distribution and employment of Tanks
will be issued later.
6. _Engineers._--Engineers and Pioneers will be distributed for work as
follows from midnight on 6th-7th instant:
(i) Corps Pool under Chief Engineer--
1 Field Coy. from 4th Aust. Div.
1 Field Coy. from 5th Aust. Div.
2 Field Coys. from 2nd Aust. Div.
2 Field Coys. from 3rd Aust. Div.
3 Army Troops Coys. Engineers.
5th Aust. Pioneer Bn.
3rd Aust. Pioneer Bn.
(ii) With Divisions:
2nd Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 2nd and 3rd Aust. Divisions. 2
Coys. to each.
4th Aust. Pioneer Bn. will serve 4th and 5th Aust. Divisions. 2
Coys. to each.
Divisional Commanders will control:
2nd Aust. Division--1 Field Coy. and 2nd Aust. Pioneer
Bn. (less 2 Coys.).
3rd Aust. Division--1 Field Coy. and 2 Coys. 2nd Aust.
Pioneer Bn.
4th Aust. Division--2 Field Coys. and 4th Aust. Pioneer
Bn. (less 2 Coys.).
5th Aust. Division--2 Field Coys. and 2 Coys. 4th Aust.
Pioneer Bn.
Tunnellers will be detailed to each division for dug-out exploration.
Chief Engineer, Aust. Corps, will arrange for the distribution in
accordance with this.
Chief Engineer will issue instructions for the withdrawal and storing
of demolition charges of bridges for which the Corps is responsible,
and for the return of engineer personnel employed on this work to their
units.
7. Deputy Director of Medical Services will arrange for the
distribution of medical units.
BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2
SECRECY
(_a_) It is of first importance that secrecy should be observed and the
operation carried out as a surprise.
Commanders will take all possible steps to prevent the scope or date of
the operation becoming known except to those taking part. Any officer,
N.C.O., or man discussing the operation in public, or communicating
details regarding it to any person, either soldier or civilian, not
immediately concerned, will be severely dealt with.
(_b_) All movement of troops and transport will take place by night,
whether in the forward or back areas of the Australian Corps, on and
after 1st August, except where absolutely necessary to move by day.
(_c_) O.C., No. 3 Squadron, A.F.C., will arrange for aeroplanes to
fly over the Australian Corps Army area during days when flying is
possible, and to report to Corps H.Q. any abnormal movement of troops
or transport within our lines.
(_d_) Work on back lines will be continued as at present, so that there
may be no apparent change in our attitude.
(_e_) Commanders will ensure that the numbers of officers reconnoitring
the enemy's positions is limited to those for whom such reconnaissance
is essential.
Nothing attracts attention to an offensive more than a large number of
officers with maps looking over the parapet and visiting Observation
Posts.
Commanding Officers of units holding the front line should report at
once to higher authority any disregard of these orders.
BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3
COMMUNICATIONS AND HEADQUARTERS
1. Communications will be carefully organized to ensure the maintenance
of communication throughout the advance and after its conclusion.
2. (i) Headquarters of Divisions will be established as follows:
2nd Australian Division--GLISY.
5th Australian Division--BLANGY-TRONVILLE Château.
Advanced Headquarters in
dug-outs at Railway cutting.
3rd Australian Division--BUSSY.
4th Australian Division--CORBIE.
(ii) Headquarters of Brigades and battalions will be selected in
advance, as far as this can be done, and all concerned will be notified
of their proposed locations.
3. Report Centres in advance of the heads of buried cables will be
selected in each Divisional Sector and details prepared for the
organization of communications back to cable head.
4. The following mounted troops are detailed to Divisions:
To 2nd Australian Division--1 Troop 13th L.H.
3rd Australian Division--1 Troop 13th L.H.
4th Australian Division--2 Troops 13th L.H.
5th Australian Division--2 Troops 13th L.H.
Divisions will inform O.C., 13th Light Horse, as to the time and place
at which the Light Horse will report.
The Cyclist Section now with Divisions will remain.
5. The employment of wireless will be exploited to the full.
6. Popham panels will be employed for communication between Infantry
and Aeroplanes.
BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 4
ARTILLERY
(_a_) Ammunition will be dumped at or near gun positions as follows:
18-pdr. 600 rounds.
4.5" Howitzer 500 rounds.
60-pdr. 400 rounds.
6" guns 400 rounds.
6" Howitzers 400 rounds.
8" Howitzers 400 rounds.
9.2" Howitzers 400 rounds.
12" Howitzers 200 rounds.
Arrangements should be made to commence dumping this ammunition as soon
as feasible. Echelons will be kept full.
(_b_) Boundaries between Corps as regards bombardment and
counter-battery work coincide with the boundaries between Corps shown
on map issued with Australian Corps "Battle Instructions No. 1," dated
1st August, 1918.
BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 5