BELLICOURT AND BONY
A full account of the battle plan for the forcing of the main
Hindenburg Line, on the front of the Australian Corps, would alone fill
a volume. Nothing but brief references to the main outlines of the plan
can be attempted here.
The forces now at my disposal, for immediate use, were greater than I
had ever before committed to a single operation. They comprised, in
all, five Divisions, of which two were American and three Australian,
besides the whole of the Corps troops. The total personnel employed
on that occasion, under my orders in one capacity or another, almost
reached 200,000 men.
Besides 58 Battalions of Infantry, there were over 20,000 technical
troops, including Engineers, Pioneers and Signallers, upwards of 1,000
guns of all calibres, more than 500 Machine Guns, over 200 Tanks, a
Brigade of Cavalry, a Battalion of Armoured Cars, and numerous Air
Squadrons. The subsidiary services made an imposing array, comprising
observation balloons, supply trains, ammunition columns, auxiliary
horse transport, ambulances, motor convoys and mechanical transport,
together with railway, veterinary, sanitary and labour units.
It was no small task correctly to apportion to each fighting unit and
to each service its appropriate place in the general scheme, so that
these great resources should be employed to the best advantage, without
overtaxing the capacity of any one of them. I had also to secure the
greatest measure of co-operation between them all, and the punctual
performance by each of the work prescribed.
In contrast with the great battle of August 8th, there was on this
occasion no possibility of securing any advantage from surprise.
The enemy command was bound to know quite as well as we did that we
intended to deliver an attack on a gigantic scale, and there is no
doubt that they put forth their utmost efforts, and marshalled their
fullest resources in men and guns, to meet it.
There was, therefore, no object to be served by any measures of
concealment, and our task could not be made any the harder through
heralding the approach of the actual attack by adequate Artillery
preparation.
The programme, therefore, began on the night of September 26th. There
was an intense Artillery action, extending over some sixty hours, with
every gun that could be brought to bear. This does not, of course,
imply that every individual gun or battery remained in action during
the whole of this period; ammunition supplies were not inexhaustible,
and gun detachments required periods of rest. But the programme of
times and targets was so arranged, and the tasks were so distributed
over the available batteries, that throughout this period there was no
respite for the enemy in any part of the field.
For some days prior to the opening of this bombardment, railway trains
and motor lorries had been working at the highest possible pressure, to
enable gunners to accumulate at their gun pits and in all their dumps
a sufficient supply of Artillery ammunition for this purpose. In the
short period which had elapsed since the forcing of the Somme, in the
early days of September, the railway diversion from Bray to Péronne had
been completed. The railway from Péronne to Roisel, although seriously
damaged by the enemy in many places, had been restored, and Roisel had
become the railhead for the delivery of ammunition. It was a noteworthy
performance, for all the Corps services concerned, to carry out the
whole supply of this battle in so smooth and expeditious a manner.
The first phase of this bombardment was of a novel character. For over
two years the enemy had been using a shell containing an irritant
and poisonous gas known to us as "mustard" gas. It was so called
only because of the smell. For a long time we had been promised that
the British Artillery service would shortly be supplied with a gas
shell, of similar character, but even more potent. It was, moreover,
anticipated that the German gas mask would prove no adequate protection
against this kind of gas.
At last the new shell was forthcoming, and the first shipment from
England, amounting to some fifty thousand rounds, was placed at the
disposal of the Australian Corps. My Artillery action, therefore,
opened with a concentrated gas bombardment for twelve hours, attacking
probable living quarters, occupied defences, and all known or suspected
approaches to them. Apart from being the first occasion, I believe that
it was also the only occasion during the war when our "mustard" gas
shell was used. No suitable opportunity for further use occurred before
the close of hostilities.
The gas bombardment was followed by forty-eight hours' destructive
bombardment with high explosive shell. This was directed partly against
the enemy's Artillery, as far as the short time available had permitted
us to locate his batteries.
Another part of the bombardment was devoted to the approaches from
the enemy's rear to his forward defences. The object was to render
his roads and tracks unusable, and thereby to prevent the delivery
of rations, or, at any rate, of hot food to his garrisons, or of
ammunition to his guns. By these means we expected, by partially
starving him out, to impair the enemy's _moral_.
The main weight of the bombardment was, however, devoted to the
destruction of the enemy's defences, of which his barbed wire
entanglements were for us the most formidable feature. Much of this
wire was disposed in concealed positions, either in depressions of the
ground, or in sunken moats, artificially prepared. It was, therefore,
difficult to locate, and still more difficult for my gunners to direct
their fire upon it. Nevertheless, there was a considerable quantity of
wire which was plainly visible, and every band of entanglements through
which breaches could be blown was so much to the good, in clearing the
path for the Infantry assault.
[Illustration: Australian Light Horse--the 13th A.L.H. Regiment riding
into action on August 17th, 1918.]
[Illustration: The Sniper sniped--an enemy sniper disposed of by an
Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918.]
In earlier years it had been the custom to attack barbed wire with our
lighter guns, using shrapnel shell. This shell is, however, essentially
a "man-killing" projectile, and has no great destructive power against
field works. On the other hand, our heavier guns were scarcely more
useful for wire cutting, because the great craters which were made by
the explosion of their shells destroyed the wire only very locally,
and, by upheaving the ground, increased rather than reduced the
difficulties of the Infantry.
This was due to the employment of fuses, which permitted the
projectile, after striking, to bury itself in the ground for a small
fraction of time before igniting the explosive charge which it
contained. Hence the great shell craters. It was a very proper fuse to
use for destroying trenches, dug-outs, gun-pits and emplacements, but
of little use for cutting wire.
In due course the British service evolved an "instantaneous" fuse,
which became known to the gunners as the "106 Fuse." This had the merit
of being perfectly safe to handle, up to the moment of firing the gun,
but by means of a most ingenious mechanism it became highly sensitive
while the projectile was in flight between the gun and the target. The
result was that the very slightest obstacle met with, even a strand of
wire, was sufficient to set off the fuse and explode the shell. Even
if the shell met no obstacle before striking the earth, the explosion
would take place above instead of below the surface of the ground, and
would exert so great a horizontal force in all directions that great
bands of wire entanglements would be bodily uprooted, over considerable
areas, and literally blown to one side in a jumbled mass.
Our heavy guns, therefore, using 106 Fuses, became ideal wire cutters,
and it was in this way that much of the Artillery action during the
forty-eight hours prior to the battle was applied.
The Infantry and Field Artillery plan, which I prepared, was very
similar in its general character to the battle plan of August 8th.
It differed only in subordinate details due to local topographical
variations from the former conditions.
Of the five Divisions available, one--the Second Australian--was to
remain in Corps reserve, but handy. For that purpose it was brought up
from its rest near Cappy, by motor bus, to the vicinity of Péronne,
the move being completed by nightfall on September 27th.
The battle Divisions and their prior dispositions were as follows:
_Line Divisions:_
On the right, the 30th American Division, to attack with the
60th Brigade, and to employ the 59th Brigade to form a southern
defensive flank in the event of the failure of the Ninth Corps to
cross the Canal.
On the left, the 27th American Division, to attack with the
54th Brigade, and to employ the 53rd Brigade to form a northern
defensive flank, until such time as the Thirteenth Corps was ready
to pass through in a north-easterly direction.
_"Exploitation" Divisions:_
On the right, the 5th Australian Division, with the 8th and 15th
Brigades in the first line and the 14th Brigade following in
support.
On the left, the Third Australian Division, with the 10th and 11th
Brigades in the first line and the 9th Brigade following in support.
The total frontage was equally divided between the two pairs of
Divisions, being about 3,500 yards to each. The battle was to be
divided into two phases, the first to be executed by the Americans,
under a timed barrage, the second, under open warfare conditions, by
the Australians. It was intended that the Americans should penetrate to
the "green line," an average distance of 3,500 yards, which took in the
villages of Bellicourt, Nauroy, Bony and Gouy.
The Australians were to exploit eastward, but were limited to a further
advance of 4,000 yards, overrunning Joncourt, Estrées and Beaurevoir.
Should they reach that objective on the first day, they would have
passed the last-known wired line, and the country beyond would be
suitable for Cavalry. Accordingly, I allotted to the 5th Cavalry
Brigade, which had been placed under my orders, the rôle of passing
through the Australian Divisions, and carrying the exploitation still
further east, in the direction of Montbrehain and Brancourt.
As it turned out, the whole of the objectives named were in our
possession only on the forenoon of October 5th, instead of, as planned,
by September 30th. The actual battle developed on totally different
lines from those which I had planned, for reasons which I shall
relate in due course. Little object would therefore be served in an
explanation of the considerable mass of detailed arrangements which the
original plan involved; these would also, by reason of their technical
character, be more suitable for a text-book on tactics.
Suffice it to say that elaborate arrangements were made--and also
partly utilized--for the rapid construction of four main roads from
west to east, through the full width of the Hindenburg system. This
work was to follow on the heels of the advance. The rôles assigned
to the Tanks, the Barrage Artillery, the Mobile Artillery, the Heavy
Artillery and the Armoured Cars were similar in character, although
differing in detail from those carried out by them on August 8th.
On no previous occasion had the labour of preparation and the stress
upon all Commanders and Staffs been so heavy, but all responded nobly.
There were none who did not count the hours till zero hour, which was
fixed for 5.50 a.m. on September 29th.
In appraising the long sustained fighting on the front of the Fourth
Army which began on that day, and lasted a full week, regard must be
had to contemporary events. The American First Army attack on St.
Mihiel on September 11th had wrought fresh dislocation to the enemy's
resources, and had created another sore spot on his long front. On
September 26th the Americans and French again successfully attacked
between Verdun and Rheims. On September 27th, the First and Third
British Armies opened a great attack on a front of thirteen miles
before Cambrai and the magnificent Canadian Corps captured Bourlon Wood
and advanced to within a mile of Cambrai city. On September 28th, the
Second British Army and the Belgians attacked between Ypres and the
sea. All British Armies, except the Fifth, had, therefore, by that time
developed active battle fronts. On September 29th the first French Army
would co-operate with us, and on that day the battle front was to cover
a total length of twenty-five miles.
The simultaneous engagement of so large a portion of the enemy's
line in Belgium and France during the preceding three days had
piled difficulty upon difficulty for him, and it was therefore not
unreasonable to entertain two expectations--firstly, that our task
would be rendered easier by the wide dispersion of the enemy's
defensive energies, and, secondly, that he could hardly hope to survive
a definite breach in his great defensive line at so critical a place as
the Bellicourt tunnel. If that went he would be secure nowhere, and his
next possibility of making a stand would be on the line of the Meuse,
even if not the line of the Rhine.
The day broke with a familiar mist, and the attack was launched
punctually at the appointed time. Quite early in the day news came
in that the Ninth Corps on my right hand had achieved an astonishing
success, that Bellenglise had been captured, and that the deep canal
had been successfully crossed in several places. It was the 46th
Imperial Division to which this great success was chiefly due, a
success achieved by most careful preparation and gallant execution.
Lifebelts, rafts, boats, mats, portable bridges, and every device
which ingenuity could suggest had been prepared beforehand for the
actual crossing of the water in the canal. There can be no doubt
that this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract
attention from the Australian Corps front, materially assisted me in
the situation in which I was placed later on the same day.
The first reports from my own front were in every way satisfactory,
and it looked as if everything were going strictly to schedule. That
morning the stream of messages pouring into my Headquarters office,
from special observers, from the air, from the line divisions, from
the Artillery, and from my liaison officers with neighbouring Corps,
exceeded in volume and import anything I had met with in my previous
war experience. I have the typewritten précis of the "inwards" signal
traffic before me as I write. Those received and laid before me on that
day cover thirty closely typewritten foolscap pages.
The burden of the earlier messages all pointed to the same conclusion:
"30th Division crossed the Canal on time;" "1,000 prisoners, all going
well;" "Bony captured;" "Tanks fighting round Bellicourt at 9 a.m.;"
"Bellicourt taken."
Those, omitting formal parts, were the burden of all the telegrams up
to 10 a.m. They continued in such a favourable strain during the whole
of the time that the two American Divisions had command of the battle
front.
The time for their arrival at the first objective--_i.e._, the "green"
line--had been computed to be at 9 a.m. The Australian Divisions were
to cross the green line at 11 a.m., and at the same hour to take over
the command on the front of the battle. Two telegrams then came in
which caused me serious anxiety. It may be of interest to set them out
in detail:
Received at 11.10 a.m. from 30th American Division:
"Fighting in Bellicourt, owing to Germans having come down along
the Canal from the north. Fifth Australian Division hung up."
Received at 11.12 a.m. from Third Australian Division:
"We are dug in on west side of tunnel. Americans are held up in
front of us."
These were only the first symptoms of a miscarriage of the plans.
Evidences rapidly multiplied that all was not going well. But,
concurrently, there came a stream of messages from the air that our
troops and some of our Tanks were east of both Bellicourt and Le
Catelet.
The situation was therefore confused and uncertain, and it had to be
diagnosed without delay. I hastened forward with all possible speed
to get into personal touch with the situation and the Divisional
Commanders. I soon formed the conclusion that probably both American
Divisions had successfully followed our barrage, and that numbers of
their troops had really reached the green line, but that, once again,
the "mopping up" procedure had been neglected. The enemy had reappeared
in strength from underground _behind_ the Americans, and was holding up
the advance of the two Australian Divisions to the second phase of the
operation.
Subsequent developments and further inquiries entirely bore out these
conclusions. On the front of the 27th American Division there had been
difficulty from the start. A number of Tanks allotted to that Division
had been put out of action, some by direct hits from Artillery, others
by land mines. It was currently believed that these were not enemy
mines, but some which had been laid months before by our own Fifth Army
as a measure of protection against the possible use of Tanks by the
enemy.
This had given the 27th Division a bad start. Only two out of its
six assaulting Battalions had managed to catch up with and follow
the barrage. The remainder could not get forward as far even as the
Artillery start line. Those Americans who did follow the barrage
apparently forgot all about "mopping up." They reached Le Catelet and
Gouy and entered those villages, only to find themselves surrounded on
all sides by the enemy. A German officer prisoner informed us next day
that 1,200 of these Americans had been taken prisoner.
The 30th American Division did not fare so badly. They got a good start
with the barrage, but the broken condition of the ground, the intricate
trench system and the confusion of wire and dug-outs brought about a
loss of cohesion and of control. By the time Bellicourt was reached,
the attacking troops had fallen some distance behind the barrage, and
most of the weight had gone out of the attack.
Meanwhile, in this part of the field also, the enemy had reappeared
from underground, and was still in strength on the west side of
Bellicourt, now in the hands of the Americans, when the advanced guard
of the Fifth Australian Division came upon them.
It was an unexpected situation for the Fifth Division. But without a
moment's hesitation the leading troops took its measure. They deployed
from the Artillery formation[22] in which they had been previously
advancing into lines of skirmishers. After hard fighting in the face
of most vigorous resistance, they cleared away all opposition which
lay between them and Bellicourt, and, sweeping forward through that
village, carefully "mopping up" as they went, carried with them
considerable numbers of the Americans whom they found there.
While this was happening, the Third Australian Division, deprived of
the assistance either of Artillery or of Tanks, and in broad daylight,
found themselves confronted with the difficult problem of carrying out
the whole of the task which had been set for the 27th Division, because
the reappearance of the enemy upon the ground successfully passed over
by some of the Americans earlier in the day nullified all the value of
that success.
It was about 2 p.m. before I had succeeded in gathering sufficient
reliable information about the situation to enable me to arrive at
a decision how to deal with it. By that hour the Fifth Division had
advanced through Nauroy, and had passed across the Le Catelet line
in that vicinity. The Third Division had managed to get obliquely
astride of the line of the tunnel, its right being well across the
main Hindenburg wire, while its left was still in the vicinity of the
American start line of that morning. They had, however, succeeded in
finally capturing Quennemont Farm. The whole of their advance into such
a position had been hotly contested.
My troops were therefore, to all intents and purposes, astride of the
Hindenburg main line, one Division wholly on the east and the other
Division mainly on the west of it. The southern end of the tunnel was
in my possession, the northern end was not.
My decision was forthwith to abandon the original plan which had taken
so many days and so much labour to prepare, to take immediate measures
for securing our gains for the day, and to organize a continuation of
the battle next day on totally different lines. These were to conquer
the remainder of the main Hindenburg trench system, in which the ruin
of the village of Bony was the key position, by attacking it from the
south towards the north, instead of from the west towards the east.
The first step in this plan was to ensure effective tactical contact
between the right flank of the Third Division and the left flank of
the Fifth Division. I framed an order that both Divisions should take
immediate steps to such an end. Telephone communication with both
Gellibrand and Hobbs being momentarily interrupted, I was about to
forward written orders by dispatch rider to each of them to the effect
mentioned.
Before the messenger had time to leave, however, messages came in from
both Divisional Commanders, each reporting that he had just secured
tactical touch with the other in exactly the way which I wanted. I
consider this a remarkable example of unity of thought. Each, without
being able to consult the other or myself, had taken the very course
which each correctly anticipated that I should decide to have taken.
The German General Staff used to boast in their writings that no other
Army approached theirs in this capacity for initiative by subordinates
on lines in thorough unison with each other and with the policies of
the higher command.
That the situation on my front, now held exclusively by Australians,
would have been secure that night against a determined counter-attack
I did not doubt, even though the fourteen Australian Battalions now
holding a line of some 9,000 yards would scarcely average 400 rifles
apiece. However, nothing more than small local counter-attacks was
attempted, and the hold which I had gained upon the main defences was
not slackened. I feel sure, nevertheless, that the success of the
Ninth Corps on my right in swarming across the canal from Bellenglise
to Bellicourt had much to do with my immunity from interference; the
enemy probably found himself with quite enough to do there in trying
to re-establish his line further in rear, and this forbade him to
materialize sufficient troops for any general counter-attack.
While I have felt obliged to state the facts in regard to the partial
failure of the two American Divisions to carry out their part of my
battle plan, I desire, nevertheless, to do full justice to these
troops. I have no hesitation in saying that they fought most bravely,
and advanced to the assault most fearlessly; that the leaders, from the
Divisional Generals downwards, did the utmost within their powers to
ensure success. Nor must the very bad conditions under which the 27th
Division had to start be forgotten. Our American Allies are, all things
considered, entitled to high credit for a fine effort.
But it is, nevertheless, true that in this battle they demonstrated
their inexperience in war, and their ignorance of some of the
elementary methods of fighting employed on the French front. For these
shortcomings they paid a heavy price. Their sacrifices, nevertheless,
contributed quite definitely to the partial success of the day's
operations, and although the comprehensive plan, which was to have
carried my front beyond Beaurevoir on the very first day, had to be
abandoned, the day's fighting ended with the two Australian Divisions
in quite a satisfactory position for a continuance of the operations on
the next day.
To this there was, however, one important qualification. Air observers
continued to report the presence of American troops between the
Hindenburg Line and Le Catelet, and also in the latter village. Late
that night an Australian Artillery liaison officer managed to make his
way back into our lines with the story that he had actually advanced
with a battalion of Americans into Le Catelet, and that they were still
there, although practically surrounded.
The 27th Division made many attempts to get into communication with
them, but without avail. Beyond the report previously alluded to that
they had subsequently been made prisoner, I have no information of
their ultimate fate; but when patrols of the Third Division entered the
village forty-eight hours later, there was no longer any sign of them.
A number of small parties of Americans were, however, encountered and
relieved as the further advance of the Third Division progressed during
the next two days.
The situation was profoundly embarrassing. With the mass of Artillery
at my disposal, it would have been a simple matter to cover the further
advance of the Third Division so amply as to make it easy to master the
northern half of the tunnel defences, especially if attacked end on.
But so long as American troops or wounded were presumed to be lying out
in front, I dared not use Artillery at all, except on a very restricted
scale. I felt justified, however, in bombarding isolated localities
which patrols had definitely ascertained to be still in enemy hands;
but nothing in the shape of adequate artillery support to the Infantry
could be attempted.
During the night of September 29th orders were issued to the Second
American Corps to withdraw all advanced troops that could be reached,
and to concentrate their regiments for rest and reorganization, so as
to be ready as soon as possible for re-employment. Very considerable
numbers of American soldiers had become mixed up with the Australian
Battalions, and, in their eagerness, had gone forward with them,
regardless of the particular rôles or objectives which had been
originally assigned to them. It was found to be a matter of some
difficulty to induce these men to withdraw from the fighting and to
rejoin their own units, so keen were they to continue their advance.
I also ordered the Second Australian Division to be brought up by bus
from the Péronne area, and to take up a position of readiness just west
of the Hindenburg Line. I foresaw that with the nature of the fighting
before the Third and Fifth Divisions, it would not be very long before
they would have to be relieved, and there was still the Beaurevoir
line of trenches to be overcome before the Hindenburg system could be
claimed as taken in its entirety. This move was duly carried out, and
the Second Division became available by the evening of October 1st in
close support of the battle front.
The orders to the two line Divisions for September 30th were to attack
generally in a north-easterly direction. The immediate objectives
of the Third Division were Bony village, the "Knob" and the northern
entrance to the tunnel. The flanks of the two Divisions were to meet
on the Railway Spur, and the right of the Fifth Division was to swing
forward in the direction of Joncourt, in sympathy with any advance made
by the Ninth Corps to the south of them.
There was, as explained, no possibility of attempting anything like
a methodical advance covered by a co-ordinated Artillery barrage.
Progress would depend upon the tenacity and skilful leading of the
front-line troops, and reliance must be had more upon the bayonet and
the bomb than upon external aids. It was, in a peculiar degree, a
private soldier's battle.
The night of September 29th brought steady rain, and everybody was
drenched to the skin. September 30th was a day of intense effort, slow
and methodical hand-to-hand fighting, in a perfect tangle of trenches,
with every yard of the advance vigorously contested; but by nightfall
the line of the Third Division had advanced fully 1,000 yards. Its
left had pivoted on the "Knoll," to the west of the Hindenburg Line.
Gillemont Farm was by then securely in their hands; they had reached
the southern outskirts of Bony village. Their right was well across the
line of the canal, and joined the left flank of the Fifth Division on
the Railway Spur. The Fifth Division had cleared the Le Catelet trench
line of the enemy, and its right was by now well to the east of Nauroy.
Another day's fighting was still before both Divisions, but the effect
of the successful efforts of September 30th was speedily felt on
October 1st. Overnight the enemy must have made up his mind that it
was hopeless to try to retain any further hold upon the tunnel line,
and his further resistance melted rapidly away. On October 1st events
moved quickly; by 10 a.m. the Fifth Division reported the capture of
Joncourt. By midday the whole of the village of Bony was in our hands,
and at the same hour the air observers reported our patrols rapidly
approaching the "Knob" and Le Catelet village.
By nightfall of October 1st the whole operation had been successfully
completed. The northern entrance to the tunnel, the "Knob" and the
whole of the Railway Spur were in our hands; our line ran just west of
Le Catelet and east of Estrées and Joncourt; all isolated parties of
Americans and all American wounded had been gathered in, and the whole
situation had been satisfactorily cleared up from an Artillery point of
view.
Later the same night our patrols entered Le Catelet, which lay in a
hollow below us, and found the village deserted except for a number of
enemy wounded. The enemy, during that day, relinquished his last hold
upon the famous tunnel defences, and withdrew precipitately eastwards
to the Beaurevoir hill and northwards towards Aubencheul. Our total
captures during the three days' operations amounted to 3,057 prisoners
and 35 guns.
It had been a stiff fight, and the endurance of the Infantry had
been highly tested. The skill displayed by the Third Division in the
course of the close trench fighting of September 30th was particularly
noteworthy. The stress upon Major-General Gellibrand and his Staff
and Infantry Brigadiers had been severe. The several Brigades and
Battalions had unavoidably become seriously mixed up. Control became
very difficult, but was never completely lost.
This was illustrated by the following incident of the day's fighting. I
had ascertained that the whole of the Infantry of the Division had been
committed, and there were no reserves in the hands of the Divisional
Commander. One Battalion of the 9th Brigade was fighting under the
orders of the 11th Brigade, another under that of the 10th Brigade.
I took exception to this, and directed that a Divisional reserve
should be immediately reconstituted. In spite of the difficulties of
communication, Gellibrand contrived to carry this intricate order into
effect during the very climax of the fight.
Gellibrand was a man of interesting personality, more a philosopher
and student than a man of action. His great personal bravery and his
high sense of duty compensated in a great measure for some tendency to
uncertainty in executive action. He had been a professional soldier,
but before the war had retired into civil life. When the call came,
he received a junior Staff appointment with the First Division, but
his outstanding merits soon gained him promotion. As a Brigadier, he
had, during 1916 and 1917, successfully led several of the Australian
Brigades. His command of the Third Division during the last five months
of active fighting was characterized by complete success in battle. His
temperament and methods sometimes involved him in embarrassments on the
administrative side of his work; but he succeeded in retaining to the
last the whole-hearted confidence of his troops.
I feel certain from my close observation of the course of events on
September 30th and October 1st, that much of the success of the battle
was due to Gellibrand's personal tenacity, and the assiduous manner
in which he kept himself in personal touch from hour to hour with the
forward situation and progress of his troops.
Immediately upon the conclusion of the fighting I issued the following
message:
"Please convey to all Commanders, Staffs and troops of the Third
and Fifth Australian Divisions my sincere appreciation of and
thanks for their fine work of the past three days. Confronted at
the outset of the operations with a critical situation of great
difficulty, and hampered by inability to make full use of our
Artillery resources, these Divisions succeeded in completely
overwhelming a stubborn defence in the most strongly fortified
sector of the Western Front. This was due to the determination
and resource of the leaders and the grit, endurance and fighting
spirit of the troops. Nothing more praiseworthy has been done by
Australian troops in this war."
The operations entrusted to the Corps had, by the night of October 1st,
been substantially completed. Although the Beaurevoir defence line
still lay to the east of us, the main canal defences, as far as the
Le Catelet line, had been pierced, and a way had been opened for the
Thirteenth Corps to pass across the line of the tunnel to be launched
upon its task of turning the enemy out of the northern continuation of
the Hindenburg Line by envelopment from the south.
It was impossible to call upon the Third and Fifth Divisions for any
further effort. Their work had been most exhausting. Furthermore,
the steady drain upon their resources, after sixty days of almost
continuous battle activity, had so reduced their fighting strength,
that a very drastic reorganization had become necessary. This could
only be effected by a complete withdrawal from the fighting zone.
Accordingly, arrangements were put in hand for the immediate relief of
these two Divisions. The Fifth Australian was relieved by the Second
Australian Division, and the Third Australian Division by a Division
of the Thirteenth Corps. Both the relieved Divisions, in the course of
the next few days, followed the First and Fourth Australian Divisions
into the grateful rest area which had been provided to the west and
south-west of Amiens, and before they were again called upon for
further front-line service hostilities had ended.
FOOTNOTES:
[22] "Artillery Formation" is an advance in numerous small infantry
columns irregularly spaced both in frontage and depth. "Line of
Skirmishers" is an advance in successive lines of men, the intervals
between the men being from two to five paces, and between the lines
from 50 to 100 paces.