HARGICOURT
The great Hindenburg system, by which name it has come to be known
to English readers, or the "Siegfried Line," as it is called by the
Germans, was brought into existence during the winter of 1916 and early
spring of 1917 in order to fulfil a very definite strategic purpose.
This was to put into effect, on a stupendous scale, a very elementary
principle of minor tactics, namely, that field works are constructed
for the purpose of reducing the number of men required to defend a
given front or locality.
In themselves, field fortifications have, of course, no offensive value
whatever, but their use permits a reduced number of men to defend one
place, in order that a greater number of men may be available to attack
another place.
The German High Command proceeded to make use of this principle on a
scale previously unknown in history. The whole of the Western front,
in Belgium and France, was to be held defensively throughout 1917. The
military resources required to defend that front were to be reduced
to a minimum, by the provision of a line of defences protected by
powerful field works, believed to be impregnable. This would liberate
the greatest possible resources for the Eastern front, where an end
could be made of the Russians and Roumanians there. As soon as these
were disposed of, those troops, guns and aeroplanes could again be
transferred to the West, in order similarly to dispose of the remainder
of our Alliance.
This great strategic plan was carried out in its entirety until the
middle of 1918. It was the great Hindenburg line which had been the
kernel of the whole conception, and, until the days which we are now
approaching, it had remained, practically over its whole length, an
impregnable barrier against the assaults of the French and British.
It is to be remembered that the very basis which justified the
expenditure of such enormous labour on the creation of these defences
was the saving in man-power. It is an accepted principle of tactics
that in any given battle the advantage always rests heavily on the side
of the defence. Where numbers, resources and _moral_ are equal, no
attack can hope to succeed.
If, in the teachings before the war, it was correct to say that a
Commander should hesitate to attack unless he had a preponderance
of men and guns of at least two to one, such a dictum assuredly did
not take into account field defences of the permanent and elaborate
character of the Hindenburg Line. I should hardly venture to fix a
ratio of relative strength appropriate in such circumstances.
But this much is clear. The Germans had once already relied
successfully upon the impregnability of this great work. They had every
justification for believing that it would once again serve them to
keep us at bay for just a few weeks longer. Winter was very near, and
the Entente peoples might not have been able to hold together to face
another year of war.
We, on our part also, had as much justification for the resolve that
every sacrifice must be made to overthrow these defences before the end
of 1918, and for believing that it would require a great, concerted and
intense effort to succeed in this.
It is quite necessary, for a due appreciation of the magnitude of the
effort which was actually made, and of the wonderful success with which
it was rewarded, that the nature of the defences of the Hindenburg Line
should be clearly understood. This can best be done, I think, by making
an endeavour to realize the sense of security which the possession of
such a line of defence must have afforded to the enemy. We are here
interested only in that portion of the line which extends from St.
Quentin northwards towards Cambrai.
Between these two cities the country is higher than that adjoining
it on the north and the south. It forms, therefore, a watershed,
dividing the basin of the Somme from that of the Scheldt. Early in
the nineteenth century, Napoleon realized the ambitious project of
connecting these two river systems by a great Canal scheme, cutting
right through this high country from south to north.
The canal is called, in its southern reaches, Canal de St. Quentin.
Before Cambrai is reached it merges into the Canal de l'Escaut.
Throughout the whole of that portion which concerns us, it runs in a
deep cutting, reaching, for great stretches, a depth of 50 to 60 feet.
In certain places where the ground rises still higher, the canal passes
through in great tunnels. The southernmost, or Le Tronquoy Tunnel,
near St. Quentin, is but short; the northern boasts of the imposing
length of 6,000 yards, and extends from Bellicourt,[19] at its southern
portal, to Le Catelet at its northern one. From that point northwards
the canal flows in "open cut" which gradually becomes shallower as
Cambrai is approached.
The canal excavation--except where the tunnels occur--itself affords
an excellent military obstacle, the passage of which could be stoutly
contested by resolute troops well dug in on its eastern banks, for
the descent and ascent of the slopes could be obstructed by wire
entanglements, and swept with fire. The water alone, which is too deep
to be waded, would seriously impede infantry, while the passage of
tanks, guns and vehicles would be impossible once the few high level
bridges over the canal had been destroyed.
Such an obstacle would not, however, of itself fulfil the requirements
of modern war, with its searching and destructive Artillery fire.
It was to be regarded more as the foundation upon which a complete
system of defences could be built, and as a last line of resistance _à
outrance_.
The canal had been, naturally, located by its engineers, in the lowest
ground available, so that its course closely follows the lines of the
minor valleys and depressions of the ground. On both sides, therefore,
the canal is flanked by somewhat higher ground, from which its
immediate banks can be overlooked. On the western side particularly,
there is a regular line of such higher plateaux on which the villages
of Villeret, Hargicourt and Ronssoy once stood.
It was clearly desirable both to deprive a besieger of such vantage
ground, and also to provide the canal defences with a stout outpost
defence. For these reasons, the Germans had constructed an elaborate
system of trenches on a line generally parallel to and on the average
a full mile west of the canal. These trenches had been perfected with
dug-outs, concrete machine gun and mortar emplacements, and underground
shelters. They were protected by belt after belt of barbed wire
entanglements, in a fashion which no one understood better, or achieved
more thoroughly, than the Germans.
But much more remained. Deep communication trenches led back to the
canal banks, in the sides of which tier upon tier of comfortable living
quarters for the troops had been tunnelled out. Here support and
reserve troops could live in safety and defy our heaviest bombardments.
They could be secretly hurried to the front trenches whenever danger
threatened.
There was, indeed, a perfect tangle of underground shelters and
passages. Roomy dug-outs were provided with tunnelled ways which led to
cunningly hidden machine-gun posts, and the best of care was taken to
provide numerous exits, so that the occupants should not be imprisoned
by the blocking of one or other of them by our bombardment. But it was
the barbed wire which formed the groundwork of the defence. It was
everywhere, and ran in all directions, cleverly disposed so as to herd
the attackers into the very jaws of the machine guns.
The stretch of 6,000 yards of the canal which had been tunnelled was,
however, both a hindrance and a benefit to the perfection of the
scheme. On the one hand, the advantage of the open cut, as a last
obstacle, was lost. Its place had to be taken by a second complete
system of trench and wire defences, roughly following the line of the
tunnel, but of course far above the latter. On the other hand, the
tunnel itself afforded secure living accommodation for a substantial
garrison.
The Germans had collected large numbers of canal barges, and had towed
them into the interior of the tunnel, mooring them end to end. They
served as living quarters and as depots for stores and munitions. It
was no great business to provide electric lighting for the tunnel.
Indeed, the leads for this purpose had been in existence before the
war. Here, again, underground shafts and ways were cut to enable the
troops rapidly to man the trenches and machine guns, and as rapidly to
seek a safe asylum from the heaviest shell fire.
The whole scheme produced, in fact, a veritable fortress--not one,
in the popular acceptation of the term, consisting of massive walls
and battlements, which, as was proved in the early days of the war
at Liége and Namur, can speedily be blown to pieces by modern heavy
artillery--but one defying destruction by any powers of gunnery, and
presenting the most formidable difficulties to the bravest of Infantry.
Even this was not all. On the east side of the St. Quentin Canal and
parallel to it were built still two further trench lines, both fully
protected by wire entanglements, and capable of determined defence. The
first of these is the Le Catelet line, about one mile distant from the
canal. It skirts and embraces the villages of Nauroy and Le Catelet,
while two miles still further east is the Beaurevoir line, the last or
most easterly of all the prepared defences which the Germans had in
France.
Neither of these latter trench systems was nearly so formidably
prepared as the main systems previously described, but together with
them they go to make up the whole Hindenburg defensive system. In this
region that system runs generally due north and south, with many minor
convolutions in its line. It is altogether some 4½ miles across from
west to east.
As its overthrow could not be attempted in a single operation, it is
necessary for clearness of description to give definite names to each
of the successive lines of trenches which go to form the whole defence
system. Taking them in the order in which we attacked them, from west
to east, they will be referred to as:
The Hindenburg Outpost line (known also in this part of
the field as the Hargicourt
line).
The Hindenburg main line (_i.e._, the Canal and Tunnel line).
The Le Catelet line.
The Beaurevoir line.
[Illustration: Australian Artillery--going into action at Cressaire
Wood.]
[Illustration: Battle of August 8th, 1918--German prisoners being
brought out of the battle under the fire of their own artillery.]
During the winter of 1917-1918 the British Fifth Army and the Germans
had faced each other in this region for many months. On our side, also,
a system of field defences had been developed. They fell far short,
indeed, of the completeness and ingenuity of the German works, because
the latter had been constructed at leisure, long before, while ours had
been built under the very fire of the German guns.
For months the opposing Artilleries had pounded the country to pieces,
effaced every sign of civilization, and churned up the ground in all
directions over a belt some three miles wide. Heaps of broken bricks
marked the sites of once prosperous villages. Broken telegraph poles,
charred tree trunks, twisted rails, a chaos of mangled machinery, were
the only remains of what had once been gardens, orchards, railways
and factories. The whole territory presented the aspect of a rolling,
tumbled desert from which life itself had been banished.
This was the region whose western verge the vanguard of the Australian
advance approached on September 11th, on a frontage of about 8,000
yards, the northern extremity directed on Bellicourt, the southern on
Bellenglise. That is to say, if our further advance had but continued
unimpeded in the same due easterly direction, it would have brought us
square upon the open excavation of the canal, and just clear and to the
south of the Bellicourt--Le Catelet tunnel. Some significance attached
to this circumstance, as will later appear.
Now, some little time before, an event of peculiar interest had
occurred. This was the capture, on another front, of a very
ordinary-looking transport vehicle loaded high with miscellaneous
baggage. Little escaped the inquisitive eyes of the British
Intelligence Service, which speedily discovered that among this baggage
there safely reposed a large collection of maps and documents. On
examination these proved to be nothing less than the complete Defence
Scheme of the whole "Siegfried" system, in that very sector which now
lay before the Australian Corps.
These papers were carefully overhauled and arranged. There were
dozens of accurately drawn detailed maps, and minute descriptions of
every tactical feature of the defences. The position of every gun
emplacement was given; every searchlight, machine-gun pit, observation
post, telephone exchange, command station and mortar emplacement was
clearly marked; the topographical and tactical features of the ground
were discussed in minute detail, and plans for the action of every
individual unit of the garrisons were fully displayed.
Naturally, an army of translators and copying clerks was set to work
upon this precious find, and my Intelligence Service was kept busy for
many days in making for me digests of those items likely to prove of
special interest. It had, of course, to be remembered that the Defence
Scheme had been brought into operation for the campaign of 1917, and it
remained to be seen to what extent it might by now have become obsolete.
It was hardly to be expected that the enemy would adhere to it in its
entirety, especially if he were aware, as I was bound to assume that
he was, that all this information had fallen into our hands. But the
Scheme contained a full exposition of many important topographical
facts which it was in any case beyond his power to alter, and which it
was of priceless value for me to know.
Although I had to devote hour upon hour to a concentrated study of
these papers, it proved to be in greater part labour in vain so far
as the Australian Corps was concerned, because it ultimately came
about that although I did carry out the attack upon the Hindenburg
outpost line in my present sector, the attack upon the Hindenburg
main line, which I was, later, called upon to make, took place in the
next adjoining sector to the north, _i.e._, the Bellicourt tunnel
sector, to which these captured documents only incidentally referred.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Corps, under Braithwaite, ultimately got the
full benefit of these discoveries.
The production of these documents on September 10th formed the
starting point of the discussions which were now initiated in the
Fourth Army upon the question of the series of operations necessary
to overthrow the Hindenburg defences. General Rawlinson, on September
13th, asked his three Corps Commanders (Butler, now restored to
health and back at duty, Braithwaite and myself) to meet him at my
newly-installed hutted camp at Assevillers. There, quite informally,
over a cup of afternoon tea, the great series of operations took birth
which so directly helped to finish the war.
It was decided that the operation must necessarily be divided into
two main phases--separated in point of time by an interval of several
days for further preparation. All of us recognized the impossibility
of overrunning, in a single day, so deep and formidable a system of
defences, in such tortured country, and in weather which was already
becoming unsettled.
The first phase was to be an attempt to capture the Hindenburg outpost
line, along the whole Army front. The French and the Third British
Armies were to be asked to make a synchronized attack on the same
objective. The three Corps of the Fourth Army were to attack upon the
frontages and in the sectors on which they then stood. The date was
left undecided, but all were to be ready at three days' notice.
One important consideration was the meagre supply of Tanks available.
The operations of August had been costly, not to say extravagant, in
Tanks, and General Elles' repair workshops, manned largely by very
competent Chinese coolie mechanics, had been working night and day ever
since to repair the minor damages, and new Tanks were steadily arriving
from England to replace those damaged beyond repair. But no large
contingent of Tanks was to be expected until towards the end of the
month. The upshot was that I was to be content with only eight Tanks
for use in the contemplated operation.
Late the same afternoon I communicated to Generals Maclagan and Glasgow
an outline of the probable rôle of their respective Divisions in the
very near future.
In the meantime, the front-line troops had not been idle. My orders
were that the First and Fourth Divisions were to carry the line
forward as far as possible towards the Hindenburg outpost line, without
committing the Corps to an organized attack. They were to operate by
vigorous patrol action against enemy points of resistance, for the
enemy had evidently no intention of quietly giving up the ground which
lay between us and the Hindenburg outpost line. On the contrary, he
had posted strong rearguards on every point of tactical value, and did
his best to keep us as long as possible at arm's length, and beyond
striking distance of his first great line of defence.
These orders were entirely to the taste of the two Divisions now in the
line. The First Division had served its apprenticeship to that very
kind of fighting in the Merris area in the previous spring, and the
Fourth Division did not mean to be a second best. Each Division stood
on a one-Brigade front, being ordered to keep its other two Brigades
well out of harm's way and resting, for any great effort that might be
required.
The next few days witnessed some daring exploits on the part of the
13th Brigade of the Fourth Division and the 2nd Brigade of the First
Division in the capture of tactical points, and in the bloody repulse
of all attempts by the enemy to recapture them. In this way our line
was carried up to and a little beyond what had been the old British
reserve line of trenches of March, 1918, which lay within 5,000
yards of the final objective of the first phase of the contemplated
operations.
On September 16th I called together the whole of the Commanders
who were to participate in the next great battle, Maclagan (Fourth
Division), Glasgow (First Division), Courage (Tanks), Chamier (Air
Force), Fraser (Heavy Artillery), and the four Generals of my own
Staff. The conference took place in a Y.M.C.A. marquee erected near
Maclagan's Headquarters, and I was able to announce that the date had
been fixed for September 18th.
The contemplated battle presented only a few novel features. The
methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this time we
all began to understand each other so well that most of what I had to
say could almost be taken for granted. Each Commander was ready to
anticipate the action that would be required of him, almost as soon as
I had unfolded the general plan.
The shortage of Tanks was a source of much anxiety to me. I felt that
it would mean a heavier risk to the Infantry, and the contemplation
of losses among our splendid men, which might be lessened by the
more liberal use of mechanical aids, always sorely troubled me. I
endeavoured to meet the situation by adopting two unusual expedients.
The first was to _double_ the machine-gun resources of the two battle
Divisions. This was effected by bringing up the complete machine-gun
battalions of the Third and Fifth Divisions, and adding them to those
of the line Divisions. This gave me a total of 256 Vickers Machine Guns
on a frontage now reduced to 7,000 yards. It enabled me to deliver
so dense a machine-gun barrage, advancing 300 yards ahead of the
infantry, that to quote the words of a German Battalion Commander who
was captured on September 18th: "The small-arms fire was absolutely too
terrible for words. There was nothing to be done but to crouch down in
our trenches and wait for you to come and take us."
The other expedient was amusing, although no less effective. This was
to make up for the shortage of real Tanks by fabricating a number of
dummy ones. As soon as the word went round Engineers and Pioneers vied
with each other in rapid "Tank" manufacture. Dumps and stores were
clandestinely robbed of hessian, paint, wire nails, and battens, and
some weird monstrosities were produced. The best and most plausible of
them were selected, and actually used on the day of the battle. Four
men dragged out each dummy, before dawn, into a position from which
it was bound to be seen by the enemy and there abandoned it. There
is little doubt that this trick contributed its share to the day's
astonishing success.
Once again, also, I put into practice the principle of an Artillery
barrage plan reduced to the utmost simplicity. This, as already
described, consisted in having the line, on which were to fall the
shells from the whole of the barrage guns employed, perfectly straight
across the whole front, so as to avoid all complexities in fire
direction.
The first line on which the barrage fell was called the Artillery
"Start Line," and from such a line the barrage advanced, by regular
leaps or "lifts" of 100 yards at a time, in perfectly parallel lines,
until the final objective was reached. Now, experience had shown that
such a start line for the Artillery should be at least 200 yards in
advance of the line on which the Infantry were to form up ready for
the assault. A liberal margin of space had to be allowed, in order to
minimize the risks to our own Infantry.
The Artillery "Start Line" was defined on our fighting maps. The guns
were laid upon it by methods which depended upon accurate surveys,
on the ground, of the exact position of every gun. When that had
been determined, the map and compass helped to decide the range and
alignment upon which the gun should open fire.
On the map, also, was drawn another line 200 yards short of, or on our
side of the Artillery "Start Line," and this was called the Infantry
"Start Line." It then became necessary to determine, upon the actual
ground, the position of this Infantry Start Line, and to mark it in
such a way that the Infantry would be enabled to take up their correct
positions. This would ensure that the Infantry would know that the fall
of our opening barrage would be 200 yards in advance of the line so
marked.
This delicate work of marking out of the Infantry Start Line on the
ground was invariably entrusted to the Engineers attached to the
Brigades co-operating in the attack. The marking was done by laying out
and pegging down broad tapes of white linen, which could be recognized
in the dim light of early dawn. The whole work, had, of course, to be
done unobserved by the enemy, and it was always a dangerous task.
Only the fact that we were in possession of reliable large scale
maps, recording every feature of the ground, made it possible for
the Engineers, resourceful as they were, to do this delicate work
with reasonable accuracy. The battered condition of the country was
always a difficulty; for it was never easy to recognize, on the
ground, reference points, such as a road intersection, or the corner
of a field, or a crucifix or similar land mark, which might aid the
surveyors in getting their bearings.
[Illustration: MAP G]
The Infantry Start Line had, naturally, to be located so that the
ground upon which the tapes were to be pegged down was ground which
was already within our possession, or accessible to us without coming
dangerously near the enemy. It was a necessary consequence that
portions of our always irregular front line of posts or trenches would
lie beyond or on the enemy's side of the tape line.
It was always a rule of our practice, therefore, that any Infantry
posted in advance of the taped line should be withdrawn, behind the
tapes, an hour before the time of Zero. It was also customary to order
that all assaulting troops should be spread, in their appropriate
dispositions, along the tape line, also one hour before Zero.
The result of these arrangements was that for the last hour before the
actual opening of the battle, all Infantry intended to take part in
the assault was deployed along the tapes in a perfectly straight line,
all along the battle front, while no troops previously in occupation
of posts or trenches in advance of the tapes were left out in front,
exposed to the risk of either being hit by our own Artillery, or
mistaken, in the half light of dawn, for enemies by our own Infantry.
Complex and difficult as these arrangements may appear from this
description, they worked out in actual practice with the utmost
smoothness. The resulting simplification of the Artillery plans, in
this as in similar previous battles, more than justified their adoption.
A liberal use was also made of direction boards, which marked the
routes by which each separate body of assaulting Infantry should,
during the last night, march from its place of assembly to the taped
line or "jumping off" line, and also to mark the position which it was
to take up upon that line. Each board had painted upon it the name of
the unit to which it referred. Such preparatory measures, troublesome
as they were, greatly reduced the risk of any confusion or mistake, and
lessened the fatigue of the assaulting troops.
The moon would set, on the morning of the battle, at 3.37 a.m., and the
sun would rise at 6.27 a.m. Zero hour, for the opening of the attack,
was therefore fixed for twenty minutes past five.
Operations began inauspiciously. A soaking rain set in some two hours
before, and made movement over the broken, clayey surface anything but
pleasant. Although the troops were soon drenched to the skin, this did
not in any way damp their spirits. It probably added much to the misery
of the enemy, who could hardly fail to realize that, on any morning, a
fresh attack might break upon him.
Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days, but in
nothing so much as in the employment of what I have more than once
referred to as "set-piece" operations. The term is one which should
convey its own meaning. It is the direct result of the great extension,
which this war has introduced, of mechanical warfare. It is a
"set-piece" because the stage is elaborately set, parts are written for
all the performers, and carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole
performance is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes
according to plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or
of interesting developments.
The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular leaps, at
regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand, and incapable of
alteration once the battle has begun. Should the rate prove too slow
and the Infantry could have advanced more quickly, it cannot be helped,
and no great harm is done. On the other hand, if there be any risk of
the barrage rate being too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen
minutes are often introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry
line, or any part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch
up.
Following the barrage, comes line upon line of infantry in skirmishing
order, together with the line of Tanks when such are used. The foremost
lines advance to capture and hold the ground, the lines in rear to "mop
up" and deal with the enemy either showing fight or hiding underground,
the rearmost lines collect prisoners or our own wounded, or carry
supplies, tools and ammunition.
In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully
covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute
Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully silenced by
our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens, nothing can happen,
except the regular progress of the advance according to the plan
arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly and methodically across
the ground until it reaches the line laid down as the final objective.
Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for 80 to
100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery programme is ended
the battle is either completely won, or to all intents and purposes
completely lost. If the barrage for any reason gets away from our
Infantry, and they are relegated to hand to hand fighting in order
to complete their advance, the battle immediately assumes a totally
different character, and is no longer a set-piece affair.
It will be obvious, therefore, that the more nearly such a battle
proceeds according to plan, the more free it is from any incidents
awakening any human interest. Only the externals and only the large
aspects of such battles can be successfully recorded. It is for this
reason that no stirring accounts exist of the more intimate details of
such great set-pieces as Messines, Vimy, Hamel and many others. They
will never be written, for there is no material upon which to base
them. The story of what did take place on the day of battle would be a
mere paraphrase of the battle orders prescribing all that was to take
place.
On the other hand battles such as the second phase of August 8th,
the battle for Mont St. Quentin, and the later battles of Bony and
Beaurevoir were not set-piece operations. Therefore the developments
from hour to hour, and even from moment to moment, are full of intense
human interest, and replete with tales of individual courage and
initiative. Some day, when all the material has been gathered, an abler
pen than mine will write their story.
If the reader will bear in mind all these considerations, with special
reference to the battle of Hargicourt on September 18th he will
realize that, in describing the dispositions, the objectives, the
time-table and the preparations for the battle, I have told practically
all that there is to tell of the course it took, except only as regards
the results actually achieved, in ground won and prisoners taken.
It has been difficult, nevertheless, to refrain from dwelling in detail
upon the performances and experiences in battle of the individual
fighting men. Any attempt to do so would, however, prove hopelessly
inadequate. The numbers engaged were always so large, their activities
so varied, the conditions of each battle so different in detail, that
to do adequate justice and avoid unfair discrimination would make
impossible demands upon the space available to me.
Popular interest naturally centres upon the Infantry, not only because
they are the most numerous, but also because they are invariably in
the forefront of the battle and often in immediate contact with the
enemy. Without the slightest disparagement to the important rôle of the
Infantryman and to the valour which its performance demands, it must
never be forgotten that the work of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers,
Machine Gunners, Trench Mortars, Air Service and Tanks is in every way
equally important and essential to the success of any battle operation.
Yet it is equally true that no battle can be won without the Infantry.
In a deliberately prepared battle it is not too much to say that the
rôle of the Infantry is not, as a rule, the paramount one, provided
that all goes well and that there is no breakdown in any part of the
battle plan. That does not, however, imply that the Infantry task makes
no high demand upon courage and resolution. On the contrary, these
are the essentials upon which the success of the Infantry rôle and
therefore of the whole battle depends.
The primary duty of the Infantry, in an assault covered by an Artillery
barrage, is to follow up the barrage closely. The barrage is nothing
more nor less than a steady shower of shells, bursting over the very
heads of the leading lines of Infantry, and striking the ground some 80
to 120 yards in front of them. This shower is usually so dense that
three to four shells per minute fall on every twenty yards of frontage.
It is so intense a fire that no enemy, however courageous, could remain
exposed to it. It falls on one line for three or four minutes, while
the Infantry lie down flat. Suddenly, the barrage "lifts" or advances
100 yards. At a signal from the platoon or company commander the whole
line rises and rushes at top speed to catch up to the barrage, again to
throw itself flat upon the ground.
So long as no enemy are encountered, these successive rushes may go
on without check for hundreds of yards. If during the course of any
rush, trenches or strong points are met with and they contain enemy
who do not immediately surrender, prompt use must be made of rifle and
bayonet. But it is the primary business of the leading line of Infantry
to push on and not to delay by engaging in close combat. The second and
third lines of Infantry are there to "mop up," that is, to dispose, by
destruction or capture, of any enemy overrun or ignored by the leading
line. Where Tanks co-operate that is also their special business, and
when it has been attended to they go forward at top speed to rejoin the
leading line.
In such a methodical way the advance continues until the final
objective is reached. This event can be recognized by the Infantry
in any of three ways, firstly by reference to the clock time; for
the arrival of the barrage at any line on the map or ground occurs
in pursuance of a definite time-table; secondly by the topographical
features, and thirdly by the expedient of maintaining the barrage
stationary at the final objective for fifteen to thirty minutes. In
some battles, I also adopted the device of firing from every gun in the
barrage, three rounds of smoke shell in rapid succession, as a signal
to the Commanders of the leading line of Infantry to call the final
halt, to select a good line for trenches, and to dig-in rapidly, a
process technically called "consolidation."
It would be too much to hope that in an attack covering a front of four
or five miles, every part of the line should be able to advance without
any check whatever up to the final halting place. But the expectation
always is that by far the greater part of the whole line will be able
to do so. If, here and there along the front, platoons or even whole
companies were to be held up or delayed by special difficulties or
obstacles such as thickets, or copses strongly manned by the enemy, or
by belts of wire, or village ruins, such breaks in the general line of
advance would matter but little to the success of the operations as a
whole. The gaps discovered in the leading line of Infantry, when it
had come to a halt at the final objective, would be speedily filled by
supporting troops from both flanks of the gap, and thereby the enemy
holding out further back, would be completely enveloped. His surrender
would follow as soon as he realized his position, and that he had been
cut off from any contact with his friends in his rear.
Such is the normal course of the Infantry action in a pitched battle.
It makes great demands upon the iron resolution of the Infantryman to
push on vigorously against all obstacles, and to put forth his utmost
physical powers to keep up with the barrage, especially when the ground
is wet and sticky, or when uncut wire has to be crawled through. All
this he must do, utterly regardless of the enemy fire which may be
directed against him, whether from Artillery or machine guns. His best
hope of immunity is always to make his rush rapidly and determinedly,
and to get to ground immediately that he reaches the halting place,
close up to the barrage, when signalled by his officer.
Very different from such a stereotyped procedure is the action of the
Infantry in any operation or any part of an operation which partakes
of the character of open warfare. The main tactical purpose is still,
as before, to advance to the seizure of an appointed objective, but
there is no barrage, no time-table, no fixity of route, no prescribed
formation or procedure. Everything must be left to the judgment,
initiative and enterprise of the leader on the spot.
The tactical unit of Infantry is the platoon. The action of a whole
battalion is compounded merely of the separate actions of its sixteen
platoons, each performing the separate rôle, in a general plan, that
may be laid down by the Battalion Commanders, some to advance and
fight, some to act in support, some to lie in reserve, some to engage
in a flank attack, others to fetch and carry food, water and munitions.
The platoon is commanded by a Lieutenant and comprises four sections,
each under a Sergeant or Corporal. There are two sections of riflemen,
a Lewis gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. Each section may
consist of from five to eight men. Let it be supposed that it is the
business of the platoon to capture a small farmhouse which the enemy
has fortified and in which he is holding out. Always supposing that the
enemy garrison is not of a strength requiring more than one platoon
for its capture the normal action of the attacking platoon would be
somewhat as follows. The Lewis gun section would, from a concealed
position, on one flank, keep the place under steady fire. The rifle
grenadiers from the same or another flank would fire smoke grenades to
make a smoke screen. One section of riflemen would endeavour to sneak
up depressions and ditches or along hedges, so as to get well behind
the farm and threaten it by fire from the rear. The other section of
riflemen would choose some direct line of attack, over ground which
offered concealment to them until they were close enough to take the
objective with a rush.
Such in very bare outline is merely an imaginary example, but it is
sufficient to show the amount of skill, resource and energy required on
the part not only of the leader, but also of every man in the platoon.
The secret of success of the Australian open fighting lay in the
extraordinary vigour, judgment and team-work which characterized the
many hundreds of little platoon battles which were fought on just such
lines as I have tried to suggest in this example.
It will be readily seen that no comprehensive description is possible
which would present an adequate picture of the widely varying
activities of the Australian Infantryman in this campaign. There is
only one source from which reliable narratives of individual fighting
can be gathered, and that source is so voluminous that space forbids
any but a meagre attempt to supply extracts from it. I refer to
the recommendations made by Commanders for honours and rewards for
individual acts of gallantry. A very small selection of these has been
made and is presented in an appendix to this book.[20]
But to return to my narrative of September 18th. On that day each
Division attacked on a frontage of two Brigades. No serious opposition
was encountered except at La Verguier, which was not far from our
start line. Nevertheless, the whole of the "red" line, which was the
objective of the "set-piece" phase of the day's battle, was in our
possession, throughout the whole length of the Corps front, well before
10 o'clock.
This gave us complete possession of the old British front line of
March, 1918; but the Hindenburg outpost line yet lay before us, still
distant another 1,500 to 2,000 yards. This latter line was to be the
ultimate or exploitation objective of the day's operations, and I could
hardly have dared to hope that a trench system of such considerable
strength, which had defied the Fifth Army for so long, would fall into
our hands so easily as it did.
Glasgow's Division pushed on without pause, and before nightfall had
overwhelmed the garrison of the Hindenburg outpost line along its
front. Maclagan's Division also fought its way forward to within
500 yards of that line. But the troops were by then very exhausted;
all movement was in full view of the enemy; and the ground was very
difficult. After a consultation with Maclagan I decided to rest the
troops, and to make an attempt to reach the final objective (blue line)
that same night.
Advantage was taken of this pause to advance the Artillery, so that
the enemy's defences could be thoroughly bombarded before the final
assault. At 11 o'clock the same night, the Fourth Division again
attacked, and after severe fighting also captured the whole of the
objective trench system.
It was a great victory. The Hindenburg outpost line had been
vanquished. From it we could now look down upon the St. Quentin Canal,
and sweep with fire the whole of the sloping ground which lay between
us and the Canal, denying the use of that ground to the enemy, and
making it impossible for him to withdraw the guns and stores which
littered the area.
The overwhelming nature of the success can best be realized by the
following almost incredible analysis of the material results of the
day's fighting. The First Division attacked with a total strength of
2,854 Infantry. They suffered only 490 casualties (killed and wounded).
They captured 1,700 prisoners, apart from the large numbers who were
killed, and the wounded enemy who made good their escape.
The Fourth Division had a total assaulting strength of 3,048 of all
ranks, of whom 532 became casualties. Their captures of live prisoners
amounted to 2,543.
In addition, the Corps gathered in upwards of 80 guns, which had been
overrun, and had to be abandoned by the enemy.
There is no record in this war of any previous success on such a scale,
won with so little loss.
The Corps on either flank of me had successes of varying quality. The
Ninth Corps on the south had reached the red line, but the exploitation
phase of the operation was not pressed until a later day. The Third
Corps, on my left, however, made indifferent progress. Their line still
bent back sharply from my left flank, and none of the enemy's outpost
system had been gained. This portion of the Army front was that which
lay square opposite the Bellicourt tunnel, and the fact that in this
part of the field the Fourth Army had not yet mastered the Hindenburg
outpost system was to be fraught with very serious difficulties for me,
not many days later.
The general plan propounded by General Rawlinson on September 13th had
been realized in part, although not in its entirety. The successes
gained on September 18th were nevertheless sufficiently important and
decisive to justify immediate preparations for working out the plan
for a great, combined and final effort to sweep the enemy out of the
remainder of the last lines of defence which he had established in
France.
The First and Fourth Australian Divisions had, however, as it turned
out, fought their last fight in the war. Their long and brilliant
fighting career, which had been opened three and a half years before,
the one on the cliffs of Gallipoli, and the other in the desert of
Egypt, thus ended in a blaze of glory. Although a number of the
officers and non-commissioned officers of both these Divisions were
called upon, very shortly after, to render one more valuable service to
the Australian Corps, the Divisions themselves were destined, because
of the termination of hostilities, not again to make their appearance
on any battle front. Their labours ended, the troops were taken by
motor bus and railway to a coastal district lying to the south-west of
Amiens, there to rest and recuperate in the contemplation of a noble
past devoted to the service of the Empire.
FOOTNOTES:
[19] See Map H.
[20] See Appendix B.