THE CHASE BEGINS
The preliminary movements of Divisions were duly carried out without
special difficulty. The Fifth Australian Division was relieved on
August 1st by a Division of the Third Corps, in that part of the Corps
front which lay north of the Somme, and passed into Corps Reserve, in a
rear area, there to undergo training with Tanks, and to prepare itself
for the work which it had to do.
The Fourth Australian Division, from Corps Reserve, took over the
French front, as far south as the Amiens--Roye road on August 2nd, and
on the next night took over from the Second Australian Division all
that part of its front which lay south of the railway, thus disposing
itself upon what was ultimately to become the battle front of the
Canadian Corps.
On the same night, the Second and Third Divisions, who had thus been
left in sole occupation of the sector which was to be the Australian
Corps battle front, carried out a readjustment of their own mutual
boundary, which would place each of these two Divisions upon its own
proper battle front.
On the night of August 4th, the Second and Third Divisions rearranged
their defensive dispositions so that each of them deployed only a
single Brigade for the passive defence of its front, and withdrew to
its rear area its remaining two Brigades, who were thus afforded three
clear days to complete their internal preparations.
The Canadian Corps commenced to arrive, and on August 4th two Canadian
Brigades relieved two Brigades of the Fourth Division, thereby
releasing them so that they also might commence to prepare for the
battle. It was originally intended that the last Brigade of the Fourth
Division should also be relieved by Canadians on August 6th, when
an untoward incident happened, which caused considerable alarm and
speculation; and it led to a modification of this part of the plan.
The 13th Australian Brigade (of the Fourth Division) was on August 4th
spread out upon a front of over six thousand yards. It had no option
but to leave the greater part of the front-line trenches unoccupied,
and to defend its area with a series of small, but isolated, posts.
On that night, one of these posts, in the vicinity of the road to
Roye,[15] was raided by the enemy, and the whole of its occupants,
comprising a sergeant and four or five men, were surrounded and taken
prisoner.
It was an unusual display of enterprise on the part of the enemy, at
this point of time and in this locality. Whether it had been inspired
by sneering criticisms from behind his line of the nature which have
been quoted, or whether signs of unusual movement or a changed attitude
on the part of our trench garrison had instigated a suspicion that
something was happening which required investigation, could only be
surmised. But the fact remained that five Australians had been taken,
at a place several miles south of the southernmost point hitherto
occupied by "the English."
The side-stepping of the Australian Corps southwards had thereby become
known to the enemy, and it was necessary to estimate the deductions
which he would be likely to draw from that discovery. Much depended
upon the behaviour of these prisoners. Would they talk? and, if so,
what did they know? That Australian captives would not volunteer
information likely to imperil the lives of their comrades, might be
taken for granted, but German Intelligence Officers had means at their
disposal to draw from prisoners, unwittingly, anything they might know.
We could only hope, under the circumstances, that these men really did
know nothing of our intention to attack; and that, if they had become
aware of the presence of Canadian troops in the rear areas, they would
believe the story which we had sedulously spread, that the Canadians
were merely coming to relieve the Australian Corps, so that it might
have a long rest after its heroic labours.
Not many weeks afterwards it was my good fortune to capture a German
Headquarters, in which were found Intelligence Reports containing a
narrative of this very incident. The importance of the capture of these
men had been recognized, and they had been taken far behind the lines
for an exhaustive examination. But, despite all efforts of the German
Intelligence Staff, they had refused to disclose anything whatever but
their names and units--which they were bound to do under the rules
of war. The report went on to praise their soldierly bearing and
loyal reticence, and held up these brave Australians as a model to be
followed by their own men, adding that such a demeanour could only earn
the respect of an enemy.
The alarm which this untoward happening created on our side of the line
led to a determination to redouble our precautions. The Army Commander
proposed, and I agreed, that the relief of the 13th Brigade by
Canadians, _prior_ to the eve of the battle, was out of the question,
as being too risky. It was decided that the 13th Brigade must remain in
the line until the very last.
This decision deprived General Maclagan of one of his three Brigades,
and as it would be asking too much of the Fourth Division to carry out
the rôle which had been allotted to it in the battle, with only two
Brigades, I decided that the only thing to be done was to transfer to
the Fourth Division, temporarily, one of the Brigades of the First
Division, which was to arrive from the north in the course of the next
three days.
Urgent telegrams were therefore despatched to accelerate the arrival
of one of the Brigades of the First Division. In due course the First
Australian Brigade (Mackay) arrived by four special trains on the
night of August 6th, in sufficient time to enable it to take its place
in General Maclagan's order of battle, in substitution for the 13th
Brigade. The 13th Brigade was destined to have some further stirring
adventures before it again joined its own Division.
The day preceding the great battle arrived all too soon. The prospect
of an advance had sent a thrill through all ranks and expectation
became tense. The use of the telephone had been ordered to be
restricted, especially in the forward areas; for it was known that the
enemy was in possession of listening apparatus, similar to our own, by
which conversations on the telephone could be tapped, and unguarded
references to the impending operations could be overheard.
Final inspections had, therefore, to be made, and final injunctions
administered, by Commanders and Staffs traversing long distances over
the extensive Corps area by motor car and horse, and even on foot. A
strange and ominous quiet pervaded the scene; it was only when the
explosion of a stray enemy shell would cause hundreds of heads to peer
out from trenches, gun-pits and underground shelters, that one became
aware that the whole country was really packed thick with a teeming
population carefully hidden away.
Later in the afternoon of that last day came another note of alarm. To
the Fourth and Fifth Australian Divisions had been allotted eighteen
Store and Carrying Tanks. These had been brought the night before,
into a small plantation lying about half a mile to the north of
Villers-Bretonneux, loaded to their utmost capacity with battle stores
of all descriptions: reserves of food and water, rifle ammunition, and
a large reserve of Stokes Mortar bombs; also considerable supplies of
petrol, to satisfy the ravenous appetites of the Tanks themselves.
This locality suddenly became the object of the closest attention by
the enemy's Artillery. He began to deluge it with such a volume of fire
that in less than half an hour a great conflagration had been started,
which did not subside until fifteen of the Tanks and all their valuable
cargo had been reduced to irretrievable ruin.
Had some unusually keen enemy observer perceived the presence of
Tanks in our area, and would that knowledge have disclosed to him
our jealously guarded secret? Fortunately, my Artillery Commander,
Brigadier-General Coxen, making his last rounds of the Battery
positions, was an eye-witness of the whole occurrence, and was able
to reassure me. A chance shell--the last of a dozen fired entirely at
random into our area--fell into the very centre of this group of Tanks,
and set fire to some of the petrol. The resulting cloud of smoke became
a signal to the enemy that something was burning which our men would
probably attempt to salve; and in consonance with an entirely correct
Artillery procedure, he at once concentrated a heavy fire upon the spot.
That incident is typical of the perturbations through which all
responsible Commanders have to pass on such occasions. The occurrence
was explained as accidental, and implied no premature discovery by the
enemy. Nothing remained but to repair the damage, and make special
arrangements to replenish the Stores which these Divisions had lost.
On the forenoon of the day before the battle, the following message was
promulgated to all the troops:
Corps Headquarters,
August 7th, 1918.
TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS.
For the first time in the history of this Corps, all five
Australian Divisions will to-morrow engage in the largest and most
important battle operation ever undertaken by the Corps.
They will be supported by an exceptionally powerful Artillery, and
by Tanks and Aeroplanes on a scale never previously attempted. The
full resources of our sister Dominion, the Canadian Corps, will
also operate on our right, while two British Divisions will guard
our left flank.
The many successful offensives which the Brigades and Battalions
of this Corps have so brilliantly executed during the past four
months have been but the prelude to, and the preparation for, this
greatest and culminating effort.
Because of the completeness of our plans and dispositions, of the
magnitude of the operations, of the number of troops employed, and
of the depth to which we intend to overrun the enemy's positions,
this battle will be one of the most memorable of the whole war;
and there can be no doubt that, by capturing our objectives, we
shall inflict blows upon the enemy which will make him stagger, and
will bring the end appreciably nearer.
I entertain no sort of doubt that every Australian soldier will
worthily rise to so great an occasion, and that every man, imbued
with the spirit of victory, will, in spite of every difficulty
that may confront him, be animated by no other resolve than grim
determination to see through to a clean finish, whatever his task
may be.
The work to be done to-morrow will perhaps make heavy demands upon
the endurance and staying powers of many of you; but I am confident
that, in spite of excitement, fatigue, and physical strain, every
man will carry on to the utmost of his powers until his goal is
won; for the sake of AUSTRALIA, the Empire and our cause.
I earnestly wish every soldier of the Corps the best of good
fortune, and a glorious and decisive victory, the story of which
will re-echo throughout the world, and will live for ever in the
history of our home land.
JOHN MONASH,
Lieut.-General.
Cmdg. Australian Corps.
Not many days afterwards a copy of this order fell into the hands
of the enemy, and the use he tried to make of it, to his own grave
discomfiture, as the event proved, is an interesting story which will
be told in due course.
Zero hour was fixed for twenty minutes past four, on the morning
of August 8th. It needs a pen more facile than I can command to
describe, and an imagination more vivid to realize the stupendous
import of the last ten minutes. In black darkness, a hundred thousand
infantry, deployed over twelve miles of front, are standing grimly,
silently, expectantly, in readiness to advance, or are already crawling
stealthily forward to get within eighty yards of the line on which the
barrage will fall; all feel to make sure that their bayonets are firmly
locked, or to set their steel helmets firmly on their heads; Company
and Platoon Commanders, their whistles ready to hand, are nervously
glancing at their luminous watches, waiting for minute after minute
to go by--and giving a last look over their commands--ensuring that
their runners are by their sides, their observers alert, and that the
officers detailed to control direction have their compasses set and
ready. Carrying parties shoulder their burdens, and adjust the straps;
pioneers grasp their picks and shovels; engineers take up their stores
of explosives and primers and fuses; machine and Lewis gunners whisper
for the last time to the carriers of their magazines and belt boxes
to be sure and follow up. The Stokes Mortar carrier slings his heavy
load, and his loading numbers fumble to see that their haversacks of
cartridges are handy. Overhead drone the aeroplanes, and from the
rear, in swelling chorus, the buzzing and clamour of the Tanks grows
every moment louder and louder. Scores of telegraph operators sit by
their instruments with their message forms and registers ready to
hand, bracing themselves for the rush of signal traffic which will set
in a few moments later; dozens of Staff Officers spread their maps
in readiness, to record with coloured pencils the stream of expected
information. In hundreds of pits, the guns are already run up, loaded
and laid on their opening lines of fire; the sergeant is checking the
range for the last time; the layer stands silently with the lanyard in
his hand. The section officer, watch on wrist, counts the last seconds:
"A minute to go"--"Thirty seconds"--"Ten seconds"--"Fire."
And, suddenly, with a mighty roar, more than a thousand guns begin
the symphony. A great illumination lights up the Eastern horizon;
and instantly the whole complex organization, extending far back to
areas almost beyond earshot of the guns, begins to move forward; every
man, every unit, every vehicle and every Tank on their appointed
tasks and to their designated goals; sweeping onward relentlessly and
irresistibly. Viewed from a high vantage point and in the glimmer of
the breaking day, a great Artillery barrage surely surpasses in dynamic
splendour any other manifestation of collective human effort.
The Artillery barrage dominates the battle, and the landscape. The
field is speedily covered with a cloak of dust, and smoke and spume,
making impossible any detailed observation, at the time, of the course
of the battle as a whole. The story can only be indifferently pieced
together, long after, by an attempted compilation of the reports of
a hundred different participants, whose narratives are usually much
impaired by personal bias, by the nervous excitement of the moment, and
by an all too limited range of vision. That is why no comprehensive
account yet exists of some of the major battles of the war, and why
those partial narratives hitherto produced are so often in conflict.
In so great a battle as this, only the broad facts and tangible results
can be placed on record without danger of controversy. The whole
immense operation proceeded according to plan in every detail, with a
single exception, to which I must specially refer later on. The first
phase, controlled as it was by the barrage time-table, necessarily
ended punctually, and with the whole of the green line objective in our
hands. This success gave us possession of nearly all the enemy's guns,
so that his artillery retaliation speedily died down.
The captures in this phase were considerable, and few of the garrisons
of the enemy's forward offensive zone escaped destruction or capture.
The Second and Third Divisions had a comparative "walk over," and they
had come to a halt, with their tasks completed, before 7 a.m.
The "open warfare" phase commenced at twenty minutes past eight,
and both the red and the blue lines were captured in succession
half-an-hour ahead of scheduled time. This capture covered the whole
length of my front except the extreme left, where a half expected
difficulty arose, but one which exercised no influence upon the day's
success.
The Canadians, on my right, had a similar story to tell; they had
driven far into the enemy's defences, exactly as planned. In spite of
the difficulties of observation, the recurrence of a ground mist of the
same nature as we had experienced at Hamel, and the long distances over
which messages and reports had to travel--the stream of information
which reached me, by telegraph, telephone, pigeon and aeroplane was so
full and ample that I was not left for a moment out of touch with the
situation.
The "inwards" messages are, naturally, far too voluminous for
reproduction; but a brief selection from the many "outwards" messages
telegraphed during that day to the Fourth Army Headquarters, and which,
on a point of responsibility, I made it an invariable rule to draft
myself, will give some indication of the course of events as they
became known:
_Sent at 7 a.m._: "Everything going well at 6.45 a.m. Heavy ground
mist facilitating our advance, but delaying information. Infantry
and Tanks got away punctually. Our attack was a complete surprise.
Gailly Village and Accroche Wood captured. Enemy artillery has
ceased along my whole front. Flanks Corps apparently doing well."
_Sent at 8.30 a.m._: "Although not definitely confirmed, no doubt
that our first objective green line captured along whole Corps
front including Gailly, Warfusee, Lamotte and whole Cerisy Valley.
Many guns and prisoners taken. Infantry and Artillery for second
phase moving up to green line."
_Sent at 10.55 a.m._: "Fifteenth Battalion has captured Cerisy with
300 prisoners. Advance to red line going well."
_Sent at 11.10 a.m._: "Have taken Morcourt and Bayonvillers and
many additional prisoners and guns. We are nearing our second
objective and have reached it in places. My Cavalry Brigade has
passed across our red line. We are now advancing to our final
objective blue line."
_Sent at 12.15 p.m._: "Hobbs has captured Harbonnières and reached
blue line final objective on his whole front."
_Sent at 1.15 p.m._: "Australian flag hoisted over Harbonnières
at midday to-day. Should be glad if Chief would cable this to our
Governor-General on behalf of Australian Corps."
_Sent at 2.5 p.m._: "Total Australian casualties through dressing
stations up to 12 noon under 600. Prisoners actually counted exceed
4,000. Many more coming in."
_Sent at 4.40 p.m._: "Captured enemy Corps H.Q. near Framerville
shortly after noon to-day." (This was the 51st German Corps).
_Sent at 8 p.m._: "Corps captures will greatly exceed 6,000
prisoners, 100 guns, including heavy and railway guns, thousands of
machine guns, a railway train, and hundreds of vehicles and teams
of regimental transport. Total casualties for whole Corps will not
exceed 1,200."
The vital information, which it is imperative for the Corps Commander
to have accurately and rapidly delivered throughout the course of a
battle, is that relating to the actual position, at any given moment
of time, of our front line troops; showing the locations which they
have reached, and whether they are stationary, advancing or retiring.
For it has to be remembered that the whole Artillery resources of the
Corps were pooled and kept under his own hand; and it was imperative
that any changes in the Artillery action or employment must be quickly
made, so as to extend the utmost help to any Infantry which might get
into difficulties.
Thus, for example, the failure of any body of Infantry to enter and
pass beyond a wood or a village, would be a sure indication that
such locality was still held in strength by the enemy, and it would
be appropriate to "switch" Artillery fire upon it, in order to drive
him out. But such a proceeding would be anything but prudent if the
information on which such action was to be based were already an hour
old.
Transmission of messages from the front line troops to the
nearest telephone terminal is usually slow and uncertain, and the
retransmission of such messages, in succession, by Battalions,
Brigades and Divisions only prolongs the delay. The normal process is
in consequence far too dilatory for the exigencies of actual battle
control.
A vastly superior method had therefore to be devised, and recourse
was had to the use of aeroplanes. The No. 3 Australian Squadron soon
acquired great proficiency in this work. They were equipped with
two-seater planes, carrying both pilot and observer, and the work was
called "Contact Patrol."
The "plane" flying quite low, usually at not more than 500 feet, the
observer would mark down by conventional signs on a map the actual
positions of our Infantry, of enemy Infantry or other facts of prime
importance, and he often had time to scribble a few informative notes
also. The "plane" then flew back at top speed to Corps H.Q., and the
map, with or without an added report, was dropped in the middle of an
adjacent field, wrapped in a weighted streamer of many colours. It was
then brought by cyclists into the Staff Office.
Relays of Contact planes were on such service all day on every battle
day, and although it was a hazardous duty few planes were lost. The
total time which elapsed between the making of the observation at the
front line and the arrival of the information in the hands of the Corps
Staff was seldom more than ten minutes.
There can be no doubt that the whole operation was a complete surprise
both to the troops opposed to us and to the German High Command.
It became abundantly clear, in the following days, that no proper
arrangements existed for rapidly reinforcing this part of the front in
the event of an attack by us, but that these had to be extemporized
after the event. This discovery points to the conclusion that the
enemy had once again come to regard the British Army as a negligible
quantity, a mistake for which he paid an even heavier price than when
he made it in the early days of the war.
As an indication that even the Divisions in the line whose duty it
primarily was to know, had no suspicions of an impending attack, comes
the story of a German medical officer who was captured in his pyjamas
in Warfusee village, and who confessed that being awakened by our
bombardment and thinking it was merely a raid, he left his dug-out to
see what was afoot, and thought he must be still dreaming when he saw
our Pioneers a few hundred feet away, busily at work repairing the main
road.
There was only one blemish in the whole day's operations. Not serious
in relation to the whole, it nevertheless gravely hampered the work
of the left Brigade of the Fourth Division. In short, the Third Corps
Infantry failed to reach their ultimate objective line, and the enemy
remained in possession of the Chipilly spur and of all the advantages
which that possession conferred upon him.
The advance of my left flank, from the green to the red line, along the
margin of the plateau bordering the Somme, was left exposed to his full
view, while the river valley itself remained under the domination of
his rifle fire, at quite moderate ranges. But worse than all, a battery
of his Field Artillery emplaced just above the village of Chipilly
remained in action, and one after another, six of the nine Tanks which
had been allotted to the 4th Brigade were put out of action by direct
hits from these guns.
The possibility was one which had been considered and measures to meet
it were promptly taken. Maclagan, whose right Brigade in due course
reached the blue line according to programme, making in its progress a
splendid haul of prisoners and guns, took immediate steps to "refuse"
his left flank, _i.e._, to bend it back towards Morcourt, and to
establish, with a reserve battalion, a flank defence along the river,
facing north from Cerisy to Morcourt.
Both these villages were, however, successfully captured, and "mopped
up," which meant that all the enemy and machine guns lurking in them
were accounted for. But the river valley was not captured, and became,
until the situation was ultimately cleared up, a kind of No Man's Land
between the enemy still holding the Chipilly spur on the north, and the
Fourth Division on the south of the river.
The ultimate conquest of the Chipilly Bend forms no part of that
day's story. What were the reasons for the failure of the Third Corps
to complete its allotted task may have been the subject of internal
inquiry, but the result of any such was not made known. The official
report for the day was to the effect that the enemy on this front
had resisted strongly, that fighting had been fierce, and that no
progress could be made. But one is compelled to recognize that
such language was often an euphemistic method of describing faulty
Staff co-ordination, or faulty local leadership. There would be no
justification, however, for questioning the bravery of the troops
themselves.
It has already been foreshadowed that the experiences on that day of
the contingent of sixteen Armoured Motor-cars under Lieutenant-Colonel
Carter would form sensational reading, and the story of August 8th
would not be complete without at least a brief reference to their
exploits.
It was nearly midnight when Carter, with a Staff Officer, got back to
Corps H.Q. to render their report. They were scarcely recognizable,
covered as they were from head to feet, with grime and grease. They had
had a busy time. The substance of what they had to tell was taken down
at the time almost verbatim, and reads as follows:
"Got Armoured Cars through to Warfusee-Abancourt. When we reached
the other side of No Man's Land we found that the road was good
but a number of trees (large and small) had been shot down and
lay right across it in places. Obstacles removed by chopping up
the smaller trees and hauling off the big ones by means of a
Tank. Pioneers helped us to clear the road all the way down. We
did not come up to our advancing troops until they were almost
near the Red Line. When we got past our leading Infantry we came
upon quite a number of Huns and dealt with them. Had then to wait
a little on account of our barrage, but went through a light
barrage. When we got to Blue Line we detached three sections to
run down to Framerville. When they got there they found all the
Boche horse transport and many lorries drawn up in the main road
ready to move off. Head of column tried to bolt in one direction
and other vehicles in another. Complete confusion. Our men killed
the lot (using 3,000 rounds) and left them there; four Staff
Officers on horseback shot also. The cars then ran down to the
east side of Harbonnières, on the south-east road to Vauvillers,
and met there a number of steam wagons; fired into their boilers
causing an impassable block. Had a lot of good shooting around
Vauvillers. Then came back to main road. Two sections of cars went
on to Foucaucourt and came in contact with a Boche gun in a wood
north-east of Foucaucourt. This gun blew the wheels off one car and
also hit three others. However, three of the cars were got away.
Two other cars went to Proyart and found a lot of troops billeted
there having lunch in the houses. Our cars shot through the windows
into the houses, killing quite a lot of the enemy. Another section
went towards Chuignolles and found it full of German soldiers.
Our cars shot them. Found rest billets and old trenches also with
troops in them. Engaged them. Had quite a battle there. Extent of
damage not known, but considerable. Cars then came back to main
road. We were then well in advance of Blue Line. Everything was now
perfectly quiet--no shell-fire of any kind.
"I went a quarter of a mile beyond La Flaque. There was a big dump
there, and Huns kept continually coming out and surrendering, and
we brought quite a lot of them back as prisoners. It was then
about 10.30 a.m. A party of Hun prisoners was detailed to tow back
my disabled car. I saw no sign of any wired system anywhere. Old
overgrown trenches but no organized trench system. I proceeded to
some rising ground near Framerville. Did not go into Framerville,
but could see that the roofs of the houses were intact. Saw no
trace of any organized system of defence of any kind and no troops.
My people saw no formed bodies of troops of any kind during the day
coming towards us, but very large numbers of fugitives hastening in
the opposite direction. Engaged as many of them as could be reached
from the roads. I saw, from the hill, open country with a certain
amount of vegetation on it."
The consternation and disorganization caused by the sudden onslaught of
these cars, at places fully ten miles behind the enemy's front line of
that morning, may be left to the imagination. It was a feat of daring
and resolute performance, which deserves to be remembered.
[Illustration: The Burning Villages--east of Péronne.]
[Illustration: Dummy Tank Manufacture.]
Throughout the whole day, surrenders by the enemy, particularly of
troops in rear or reserve positions, were on a wholesale scale. The
total number of live prisoners actually counted up to nightfall in
the Divisional and Corps Prisoner-of-War Cages exceeded 8,000 and the
Canadians had gathered in at least as many more.
The Australian Corps also captured 173 guns capable of being hauled
away, not counting those which had been blown to pieces. These captures
included two "railway" guns, one of 9-inch and the other of 11.2-inch
bore. The latter was an imposing affair. The gun itself rested on
two great bogie carriages, each on eight axles; it was provided
with a whole train of railway trucks fitted some to carry its giant
ammunition, others as workshops, and others as living quarters for the
gun detachment. The outfit was completed by a locomotive to haul the
gun forward to its daily task of shelling Amiens, and hauling it back
to its garage when its ugly work was done.
The captures of machine guns and of trench mortars of all types and
sizes were on so extensive a scale that no attempt was ever made to
make even an approximate count of them. They were ultimately collected
into numerous dumps, and German prisoners were employed for many weeks
in cleaning and oiling them for transport to Australia as trophies of
war.
But the booty comprised a large and varied assortment of many other
kinds of warlike stores. The huge dumps of engineering material at
Rosières and La Flaque served all the needs of the Corps for the
remainder of the war. There were horses, wagons, lorries and tractors
by the hundred, including field searchlights, mobile pharmacies, motor
ambulances, travelling kitchens, mess carts, limbers, and ammunition
wagons, and there were literally hundreds of thousands of rounds of
artillery ammunition scattered all over the captured territory in dumps
both large and small.
For the next two days all roads leading from the battle area back
towards the Army Cage at Poulainville, where railway trains were
waiting to receive them, were congested with column after column of
German prisoners, roughly organized into companies--tangible evidences
to the civilians of the district, as to our own troops, that a great
victory had been won.
The tactical value of the victory was immense, and has never yet been
fully appreciated by the public of the Empire, perhaps because our
censorship at the time strove to conceal the intention to follow it up
immediately with further attacks. But no better testimony is needed
than that of Ludendorff himself, who calls it Germany's "black day,"
after which he himself gave up all hope of a German victory.
Ludendorff in his "Memoirs," republished in the _Times_ of August 22nd,
1919, writes:
"August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history
of the war. This was the worst experience I had to go through....
Early on August 8th, in a dense fog that had been rendered still
thicker by artificial means, the British, mainly with Australian
and Canadian Divisions, and French, attacked between Albert and
Moreuil with strong squadrons of Tanks, but for the rest with
no great superiority. They broke between the Somme and the Luce
deep into our front. The Divisions in line allowed themselves
to be completely overwhelmed. Divisional Staffs were surprised
in their Headquarters by enemy Tanks" [_sic_, our armoured cars
were meant].... "The exhausted [_sic_] Divisions that had been
relieved a few days earlier and that were lying in the region
south-west of Péronne were immediately alarmed and set in motion
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army. At the same time
he brought forward towards the breach all available troops. The
Rupprecht Army Group dispatched reserves thither by train. The
18th Army threw its own reserves directly into the battle from the
south-east.... On an order from me, the 9th Army too, although
itself in danger, had to contribute. Days of course elapsed before
the troops from a further distance could reach the spot.... It
was a very gloomy situation.... Six or seven Divisions that were
quite fairly to be described as effective had been completely
battered.... The situation was uncommonly serious. If they
continued to attack with even comparative vigour, we should no
longer be able to maintain ourselves west of the Somme.... The
wastage of the Second Army had been very great. Heavy toll had
also been taken of the reserves which had been thrown in.... Owing
to the deficit created our losses had reached such proportions
that the Supreme Command was faced with the necessity of having
to disband a series of Divisions, in order to furnish drafts....
The enemy had also captured documentary material of inestimable
value to him.... The General Staff Officer whom I had dispatched to
the battlefield on August 8th, gave me such an account that I was
deeply confounded.... August 8th made things clear for both Army
Commands, both for the German and for that of the enemy."
A hole had been driven on a width of nearly twelve miles, right through
the German defence, and had blotted out, at one blow, the whole of
the military resources which it had contained. The obligation which
was thereby cast upon the enemy to throw into the gap troops and guns
hastily collected from every part of his front, imposed upon him also
an increased vulnerability at every other point which had to be so
denuded.
It was no part of our programme to rest content upon our oars, and
allow the enemy time to collect himself at leisure. The resources of
the Australian Corps had suffered scarcely any impairment as the result
of that glorious day. Such small losses as had been incurred were more
than counter-balanced by the elation of these volunteer troops at this
further demonstration of their moral and physical superiority over the
professional soldiers of a militarist enemy nation.
On that very day all necessary measures were taken to maintain the
battle without pause. But, in order not to interrupt the continuity of
the story of subsequent developments, it will be convenient to mention,
in this place, two events which cannot be dissociated from the great
battle, and which will be memorable to those who participated in them.
The first was an accidental meeting together of a number of
the most distinguished figures in the war. On August 11th, the
Commander-in-Chief was to come to congratulate the Corps and to
thank the troops through their Commanders. I called the Divisional
Generals together at the Red Château at Villers-Bretonneux to meet him
that afternoon. In the meantime General Rawlinson invited his Corps
Commanders to meet him in the same village for a battle conference,
and chose the same hour and a spot in the open, under a spreading
beech, where his Generals sat informally around the maps spread upon
the grass. At this meeting were Rawlinson, Currie, Kavanagh, Godley,
myself, Montgomery and Budworth. The Field Marshal, with Laurence,
the Chief of his General Staff, on their way to the Red Château, soon
arrived. Shortly after Sir Henry Wilson, happening to pass in his car,
also joined the party; and not many moments afterwards there arrived,
again entirely without previous arrangement, Clemenceau and his Finance
Minister Klotz.
Villers-Bretonneux, only three days before reeking with gas and
unapproachable, and now delivered from its bondage, was the lodestone
which had attracted the individual members of this remarkable
assemblage; and the more serious business in hand was perforce
postponed while Rawlinson, Currie and I had to listen to the generous
felicitations of all these great war leaders.
The second event was the visit of His Majesty the King, on August 12th,
to Bertangles, when he conferred on me the honour of Knighthood, in
the presence of selected detachments of five hundred of the men who
had fought in the battle, a hundred from each of my Five Divisions.
A representative collection of guns and other war trophies had been
hauled in from the battlefield to line the avenues by which the King
approached. His Majesty was particularly interested in the German
transport horses, expressing the hope that they would soon learn the
Australian language; a pleasantry which he well remembered when I had
the honour of an audience with him, on the anniversary of that very
day.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] See Map J.