CHAPTER XIII

THE MIDDLE AGES

All the end of the Sixth Book of Mr. Wells’s History is taken up with

his judgment on what must properly be called the Middle Ages in

Europe—that is, the period which begins with the great awakening of the

West in the eleventh century and ends with the strains and difficulties

of the fifteenth, to conclude in the crash of the Reformation. It is the

period midway between that great stage of Christendom called the Dark

Ages which ends about the year 1000 and the split of Christendom which

comes after 1500. It covers nearly twenty pages.

It would not be just to criticize the writer for this comparatively

small allotment to what is, in the best judgment of cultivated European

men, the greatest achievement of our race. Mr. Wells would answer that

the Middle Ages were _not_ the greatest period of our race, _nor_ our

race the chief portion of mankind. He has a right to his own theory of

History: to treat the climax of united Christendom as but one episode

(and not a superior episode) in the little we know of human effort and

achievement. He is wrong, but he has a right to be wrong: unless,

indeed, one affirms that no historian may adopt the anti-Catholic view.

The scale, I say, is, in my judgment, warped. I think that an impartial

observer (could such an one be conceived), looking at the world from far

off, himself without religion, and judging things strictly by their

temporal effect, would still say that it was in Europe men did the very

most they ever could do, and that the time they did the most they ever

could do was the 500 years between the year 1000 and the year 1500.

To ask Mr. Wells to see things in that completely detached fashion would

be to ask too much; for he does not seriously pretend to look at the

story of mankind thus detachedly, but rather to interpret it in terms of

Evangelical English Protestantism, gutted of such supernatural doctrine

as it once possessed. I will therefore deal with this chief section of

the human story as briefly as Mr. Wells himself deals with it, although

it certainly deserves a much larger place. For, after all, Mr. Wells’s

whole quarrel is with the Catholic Church; and this was the moment when

the Catholic Church was producing its chief fruits after the long and

desperate siege of the Dark Ages. I think, in decency to such an

opponent, Mr. Wells ought to have made the section more important. But,

on the other hand, I remember that the opponent is an opponent; and if

one regards the Catholic Church as the bane of mankind (which is Mr.

Wells’s hereditary attitude), one would naturally hesitate to emphasize

the centuries of its most _united_ active effect upon our blood.

Three things have impressed Mr. Wells mainly in what he has been told by

his Oxford coaches on this tremendous episode in the human story.

_Firstly_, the spontaneity, energy, and united purpose of the Crusades.

_Secondly_, the apparent futility of the medieval Papacy in handling its

fine opportunity for creating an international (and a merely human)

state.

_Thirdly_, the decline and breakdown of Christendom, inevitably ending

in the shipwreck called the Reformation.

In the first of these points, he is right—though very restricted in

vision. In the second, he is historically quite wrong: the Middle Ages

were not a period in which a particular insufficient and later somewhat

tyrannical institution called “The Papacy” was trying to achieve, or

ought to have tried to achieve, a merely temporal unity, careless of

Catholic doctrine. In the third, he is still more wrong historically.

The Reformation was not an inevitable climax led up to by greater and

greater weakness in Christendom and not to be avoided. It might have

been avoided; and all that it did was very nearly undone again by the

recovery of European sanity after the first delirium of a minority had

passed. The destructive work of the Reformation would have been repaired

altogether but for the shortsightedness (from a European point of view)

of Richelieu in backing up the defeated Protestant Principalities of

Germany against the Empire; due to his considering nothing but the

advantages of the French Royal house and forgetting Christendom.

Mr. Wells is genuinely impressed by the first Crusade. He uses in

connection with it the novel German idiom “will to” crusade, and that is

the highest compliment he can pay it. He is impressed by these great

masses of men going eastward. He calls it a spectacle such as “had never

before been seen in the whole history of the world.” He does not,

indeed, appreciate that the thing was a vast French movement (for he

would not like any great movement to be French); he prefers to think of

it as Norman, under the old Victorian superstition that the Normans,

being vigorous, could not be really French at all. But he admires it,

because it was popular, because it was spontaneous, and, above all,

because it was big. He sees in just perspective the gradual

“officializing” of the Crusades, and he appreciates the fact that the

violent Moslem feeling of the later twelfth century was a reaction

corresponding to the Christian enthusiasm of eighty years before. He

puts the episode of Saladin well. But what I think he does not

appreciate is the way in which medieval civilization continued to hold

the crusading idea. He says in so many words that (by the third Crusade)

the “magic and wonder had gone out of these movements” and that “the

common people had found them out.” He ought to have been told by those

who coached him that, though changing conditions had made united popular

support more and more difficult, yet, right on into the fifteenth

century, the Holy Sepulchre was the ideal goal. Even in England (a

country which had little to do with the Crusades), you have Henry IV

dreaming of it all his life, and you have Henry V, 230 years after the

time when Mr. Wells thinks the ideal had been lost, complaining, as he

died, that he had not retaken the holy places.

However, he does appreciate and feels the Crusades, especially the first

one.

What he does not understand is the medieval Church, its necessary unity;

and that the Papacy was the condition and guardian of that unity. There

he is altogether wrong. He is out of perspective, and misses the

elements of the affair.

Here, again, I must make myself clear by yet another of what I fear my

readers may call ceaseless repetitions of an obvious principle.

Unfortunately it is not a principle obvious to Mr. Wells, or to the

readers for whom he writes, and it must be repeated again and again, for

it is almost certain to be misunderstood.

The principle is this. We are not primarily concerned in an historian

with his philosophy but with his history. No doubt bad philosophy must

always make bad history. And there is no true history, in the absolute

sense of the word “true,” which is written upon the basis of, or to

prove, a false philosophy. But in ordinary language, when we say “bad

history,” we do not mean “bad philosophy”; we mean a statement of facts

in false proportion: a bad outline. And it is most emphatically a bad

outline which those who coached Mr. Wells have given him of the medieval

historical period. He seems to think of it as something dominated by the

old “Giant Pope” of his traditional Bunyan. He shows some admiration for

the idea of the Papacy uniting Christendom because that subserves his

Comtist ideal of humanity-worship. But what he doesn’t understand at all

is that the real point of issue was not the Papacy—which is the central

organ of the universal Church—but the conception of the universal Church

itself: and of a Church not only universal, but visible and corporate.

To read these pages one would think such an idea of visible, corporate

unity had never existed—and yet it is the whole historical point and

meaning of the Catholic Church: then, now and for ever. He seems to

think that the Papacy was a particular institution doing something on

its own, artificial, like the League of Nations, and through defects in

organization failing to pull it off. But the Papacy was nothing of the

sort. It was original in the foundations of the Church. It remains

dominant in the Church to-day. It is the exemplification of unity, and,

to put it shortly, of the prime historical truth that the Catholic

Church is not a theory, but a thing.

For instance, he gives at great length the quarrel between the Popes and

Frederic the Second. He does not appreciate the elementary point, that

if Frederic the Second had won the Church would have broken up. It was a

life-and-death duel in which religion was at stake; and though naturally

a modern heir of Little Bethel sympathizes with Frederic merely because

he finds Frederic in opposition to “Giant Pope,” yet the historian

should take a larger view. He may dislike our Christian civilization,

and wish it were destroyed. He may rejoice to think how nearly the

successes of Frederic came to destroying it; he may praise Frederic for

“irrigating us” with anti-Christian ideas—notably Moslem—and regret that

our civilization won; but to represent it as a mere struggle between two

sovereigns, Pope and Emperor, is not history at all. It is like making

the struggle between revolutionary France and aristocratic England a

struggle between the tyrant George III against virtuous Republicans; or

the monster Robespierre against the Three Jolly Englishmen of the song.

All through this dealing with the Papacy in the Middle Ages, Mr. Wells

continues to show that intense local Protestant feeling, in which he was

trained, and misses the wide historical view altogether. He does not

recover it by his phrases—which are numerous—upon the grandeur of an

international ideal.

Popes have no international ideal, because the Catholic Church has no

international ideal. There might be no such things as nations (any more

than there were under the Roman Empire): perhaps in the near future

there will again be no such things as nations. But there would still be

a Catholic Church, and there would still be a Papacy.

This provincial attitude towards the Papal position appears in all

manner of phrases scattered up and down this part of Mr. Wells’s work,

as, for instance, that “men of faith and wisdom believe in growth and

their fellow-men; but Priests, even such Priests as Gregory VII, believe

in the false ‘efficiency’ of an imposed discipline.” Here is a phrase

which might have been written by a man in his sleep as to the first

part, and which is composed of mere chapel doctrine as to the

second—“believing in growth and one’s fellow-men” means nothing; nothing

whatsoever. It is gas. And, on the other hand, it is not a special sort

of lurking animal called “Priests,” who believe in the efficiency of an

imposed discipline, it is everyone who ever organized Man for any end

whatsoever; from coming down in time for breakfast to the salvation of

the human race.

I wonder that a man of Mr. Wells’s desire for intellectual distinction

should lend himself to such things.

But the worst historical blunder in all this is the repetition, at this

time of day, that the simple faith of the Dark Ages gradually broke down

through the increasing knowledge and intellectual activity of the Middle

Ages until at last it came to the complete disruption of the

Reformation.

That sort of thing was already blown upon when Froude was writing a

lifetime ago. To-day it lingers in a local tradition, but it has quite

disappeared—and for ever—from intelligent discussion of that great

religious catastrophe, from which we are at last, perhaps, slowly

recovering.

We all know, of course, what really happened. A civilization bursting

into increasing vigour, the rise of nations and of vernacular

literatures, an expansion of knowledge, all these tended, as does all

growth, to disrupt unity. Something much worse than any good force (and

learning is good), the catastrophe of the Black Death, shook society,

yet unity was preserved. Even the great schism of the fourteenth century

was healed.

The shipwreck called “the Reformation” came, as all shipwrecks come, by

blundering. So little was it inevitable, that once it had taken place

the warning was immediately taken to heart. The Church recovered itself,

only failed by an error of French policy to recover all Europe, is still

(if Mr. Wells will look about him) remarkably alive, and is increasing

its hold upon the intelligence of Europe.

Why, that is the very commonplace of our time! Yet, in these pages Mr.

Wells talks as though he were the contemporary of those worthy gentlemen

who cheered for the victory of Garibaldi in Exeter Hall and thought the

Faith would die with Pio Nono.

Thus he discovers with joy in certain ecclesiastics of the Dark Ages

“the spirit of Jesus still alive in them” (p. 422). He is persuaded that

Salerno (i.e. Physical Science) “cast a baleful light upon Rome” (p.

425). He will have it that the Church “had become dogmatic,” as though

(Great Heavens!) it were not dogmatic in the Earliest Fathers. He will

have it that “Jesus of Nazareth” and His preaching was “overlaid,” and,

worst of all, he’s back at the old nonsense that “Priests”—that is the

organization of the Church—think only about “their own power,” and not

about the Divine, unique thing which it is their business to preserve.

What on earth does Mr. Wells think that the average Catholic from the

beginning (say, in the second century) to the present day has accepted

in the matter of the Hierarchy? Does he think that this vast body called

the Catholic Church (vast in time, as in space, as in numbers) is a pack

of dupes, run by a few supernaturally cunning rogues? That he should

think us wrong and mistaken, subject to illusion in our doctrines, is

fair matter for discussion; but the idea of our being fascinated by

insincere conjurers is asinine.

That word is violent. I will repeat it. For it is exact. It is asinine

to judge of the Hierarchy (Innocent III, Gregory the Great, Anselm,

Langton, Ximenes, Bossuet, Leo XIII—I pick at random) that it is a

conspiracy of charlatans, and of the laity (St. Monica, St. Louis,

Lamoricière, O’Connell, Maritain, St. Francis, Pasteur) that they are

gaping yokels who swallow any tale.

What is this, again (on p. 427), of Catholic “contempt for the

intelligence and mental dignity of the common man”? If there is one

conspicuous contrast between your elementary, half-educated,

pseudo-scientific, “modern thought” and the Catholic Church, it is the

contempt of the former for the common man, and the fact that the latter

is based entirely upon the common man. The former—pseudo-science—is for

ever trying to prevent the common man from getting a drink, marrying,

having children, running his own house, living his own life, criticizing

the mandarins of politics or of sham statistics; the latter—the Catholic

Church—lives its whole life by consulting and realizing the common man.

To attack the Catholic Church as being too subservient to the common man

might be understandable; to attack it as contemptuous of the common man

shows a complete ignorance of its character.

It is in the same spirit that we have (upon p. 429) the remark that the

Catholic Church was, in the Middle Ages, “heading to its destruction.”

It is not destroyed. Really, I do assure you, Mr. Wells, the Catholic

Church is not yet destroyed. Will you not believe me? Must I give you

proof? It is arduous collecting proofs of the obvious.

It is in the same spirit that he says of Wycliffe that he was a much

abler man than St. Dominic.

Now I am sure Mr. Wells has never read a word of either. If he will read

anything proceeding from St. Dominic and anything proceeding from

Wycliffe, and put them side by side, I shall be content. He might as

well say that Proust was a greater writer than Molière.

It is in the same spirit that he tells us Wycliffe translated the Bible

into English “in order that people should judge between the Church and

himself,” not knowing that a vernacular translation of the Bible existed

in French, in German, in Bohemian, and even (probably, or certainly) in

the newly-coalesced English tongue.

It is in the same spirit that he postulates “organized dogma” as in

conflict with the “quickening intelligence and courage of mankind.” How

can intelligence act upon any problem without resulting in organized

dogma? How else did intelligence act on the problems of Astronomy? Is

there no dogma to-day on the rotation of the earth? What on earth has

“courage” to do with lack of dogma? Where is the courage in nourishing

mere doubt in a woolly brain?

A companion to Mr. Wells's "Outline of history" · 第 13 / 16 章