THEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM.
We formerly adverted to the distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical
Atheism; and, believing that the _latter_ is the form in which it is
most prevalent, as well as most insidious and plausible, we now propose
to review some recent theories both of Certitude and Skepticism, which
have sometimes been applied to throw doubt on the evidence of Christian
Theism.
The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in the French Institute
announced in 1843 the theory of Certitude as the subject of a Prize
Essay, and issued the following _programme_ as a guide to the
competitors in the selection of the principal topics of discussion:
"1. To determine the character of Certitude, and what distinguishes it
from everything else. For example, Is Certitude the same with the
highest probability?
"2. What is the faculty, or what are the faculties, which give us
Certitude? If several faculties of knowledge are supposed to exist, to
state with precision the differences between them.
"3. Of Truth and its foundations. Is truth the reality itself,--the
nature of things falling under the knowledge of man?--or is it nothing
but an appearance,--a conception, necessary or arbitrary, of the human
mind?
"4. To expound and discuss the most celebrated opinions, ancient and
modern, on the problem of Certitude, and to follow them out into their
theoretical and practical consequences. To subject to a critical and
profound examination the great monuments of Skepticism,--the writings of
Sextus, Huet, Hume, and Kant.
"5. To inquire what are, in spite of the assaults of Skepticism, the
certain truths which ought to subsist in the Philosophy of our times."
Such was the comprehensive _programme_ of the French Institute; and many
circumstances concurred at the time to impart a peculiar interest to the
competition. M. Franck's volume[233] contains the Report of the Section
of Philosophy on the papers which had been prepared, and offers a
careful analysis and critical estimate of their contents. Various other
works[234] not concerned in the competition appeared before and after
it, showing how much the philosophical mind of France had been occupied
with this great theme, while in Britain it was attracting little or no
attention.
This is the most recent discussion, on a great scale, of the theory of
Certitude. But the question, far from being a new or modern speculation,
is as old as Philosophy itself, and has been perpetually reproduced in
every age of intellectual activity. Plato discusses it, chiefly in the
Theætetus, Sophist, and Parmenides; it was agitated by Pyrrho,
Enesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus, with that peculiar subtlety which
belonged to the mind of Greece; and in more recent times it has
reappeared in the writings of Montaigne and Bayle, Huet and Pascal,
Glanville, Hume, and Kant. Even during the middle age, the controversy
between the Nominalists and Realists had an important bearing on this
subject: so that from the whole history of Philosophy we derive the
impression of its fundamental importance, an impression which is
deepened and confirmed by the transcendent interest of the themes to
which it has been applied.
In our present argument, we are concerned with it only so far as it
stands connected with the foundations of Theology, or as the right or
wrong solution of the general question might affect the evidence for the
Being and Perfections of God. We do not propose, therefore, to offer a
full exposition of the philosophy of Certitude, still less to institute
a detailed examination of the various theories which have been
propounded respecting it. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we
merely sketch a comprehensive outline of the subject, and select some of
the more prominent points which have the most direct bearing on the
grounds of our religious belief. Thus much may be accomplished by
considering, _first_, the statement of the problem, and, _secondly_, the
solution of it.
In regard to the _statement_ of the problem, it is necessary, in the
first instance, to ascertain its precise import, by determining the
meaning of the term Certitude. The programme of the Academy very
properly places this question on the foreground, Is Certitude the same
with the highest probability? And it is the more necessary to give
precedence to this part of the inquiry, because it is notorious that
there is a wide difference between the philosophical and the popular
sense of Certitude,--a difference which has often occasioned mutual
misunderstanding between disputants, and a profitless warfare of words.
In the philosophical sense of the term, that only is said to be
_certain_ which is either an axiomatic truth, intuitively discerned, or
a demonstrated truth, derived from the former by rigorous deduction;
while all that part of our knowledge which is gathered from experience
and observation, however credible in itself and however surely
believed, is characterized as _probable_ only. In the popular sense of
the term, Certitude belongs to all those truths, of whatever kind and in
whatever way acquired, in regard to which we have no reason to be in
doubt or suspense, and which rest on sufficient and satisfactory
evidence. A philosopher is _certain_, in his sense of the term, only of
what he intuitively perceives or can logically demonstrate; a peasant is
_certain_, in his sense of the term, of whatever he distinctly sees, or
clearly remembers, or receives on authentic testimony. There is much
reason, we think, to regret the existence of such a wide difference
between the philosophical and the popular sense of an expression, which
must occur so often both in speculative discussion and in the
intercourse of common life. It may be doubted whether the metaphysician
is entitled to borrow the language of society, and to engraft upon it an
arbitrary definition of his own, different from and even inconsistent
with that which it bears in common usage. Nor can he plead necessity as
a sufficient excuse, or the accuracy of his definition as an effectual
safeguard, since, however needful it may be to discriminate between
_different species_ of Certitude, by marking their peculiar
characteristics and respective sources, surely this might be done more
safely and satisfactorily by designating one kind of it as Intuitive,
another as Demonstrative, another as Moral, or Experimental, or
Historical, than it can be by any arbitrary restriction of the _generic_
term to one or two of the many species which are comprehended under it.
No doubt there is a real distinction, and one of great practical
importance, between _certitude_ and _probability_; but this distinction
is not overlooked in the language of common life;--it is only necessary
to determine what truths belong respectively to each: whereas when all
the truths of Experience, and even, in some cases, those of scientific
Induction, are ranked under the head of _probability_ merely, is it not
evident that the language of Philosophy is in this respect at variance
with the prevailing sense of mankind?
An attempt has sometimes been made to draw a distinction between
_popular_ and _philosophical_ Certitude, or, in other words, between the
unreflecting belief of the many and the scientific belief of the few.
Thus, M. Franck distinguishes Certitude, first of all, from the blind
faith which commences with the earliest dawn of intelligence: then, from
the doubt which supervenes on the initial process of inquiry; and then,
from that half-knowledge, that middle term between doubt and certainty,
which is called _probability_. And M. Javari speaks of Certitude "as the
complete demonstration, acquired by reflection, of the legitimacy of any
judgment, or of the reality of any object: this is definitive and
scientific certitude, which is contrasted with that belief, however
strong, which springs, not from the _reflective_, but the _direct and
spontaneous_ exercise of our faculties."[235] It must be evident that,
according to this definition of the term, Certitude, in the scientific
sense of it, as the product of philosophical reflection, must be the
privilege and prerogative of the few, who have been led by taste or
education to cultivate the study of Psychology; while the vast majority
of men, who are nevertheless as _certain_ of the truths which they
believe, and, to say the very least, as little liable to doubt or
skepticism, as any class of philosophers whatever, must be held to have
no Certitude, just because they have no Science. It seems to be assumed
that Certitude is the creation of Science, the product of reflective
thought; whereas it may be demonstrably shown that without Certitude,
Science would be impossible, and that reflection can give forth nothing
but what it finds previously existing in the storehouse of human
consciousness. It surveys the streams of belief, and may trace up these
streams to their highest springs; but it does not, it cannot, create a
new truth, or give birth to a higher certitude. We have no disposition,
assuredly, to underrate the value of philosophical reflection, or to
disparage the science of Psychology; the former may collect the
materials and the latter may attempt the construction, of a goodly and
solid fabric: but we cannot admit that the certainty of all our
knowledge depends upon either of them, or that it is confined
exclusively to the metaphysical inquirer. Reflection adds nothing to the
contents of human consciousness: it examines our fundamental beliefs,
but originates none of them; it discerns the elements and sources of
certainty, but can neither produce nor alter them. Its sole province is
to examine and report. If Certitude, in the philosophical sense of it,
belongs to the _reflex_, Certainty, in the popular sense, belongs to the
_direct_ and _spontaneous_, operations of the human mind. We see and
believe, we remember and believe, we compare and believe, we hear and
believe, and that, too, with a feeling of confidence which needs no
argument to confirm it, and to which all the philosophy in the world
could impart no additional strength. Certitude is not the creation of
Philosophy, but the object of its study; it exists independently of
Science, and is only recognized by it; and it would still exist as a
constituent and indestructible element of human consciousness were
Metaphysics scattered to the wind.
It appears, again, to have been assumed in some recent treatises, that
Certitude belongs only to that portion of truth the denial of which
would imply a contradiction, or amount to the annihilation of reason. Is
it, then, to be restricted to _necessary_ and _absolute_, as contrasted
with _contingent_ and _relative_ truths? Am I not as _certain_ that I
see four objects before me, as that two and two make four? Yet the
former is a _contingent_, the latter a _necessary_ truth. Is not my
personal consciousness infallibly certain? And yet can it be said to
belong to the head of necessary truth? Surely Certitude is unduly
restricted when we exclude from it many of our surest and strongest
convictions, which relate to truths attested by experience, but the
denial of which would involve no contradiction.
The question has been still further complicated by extreme opinions of
another kind. It seems to have been assumed that there can be no
Certitude, unless we can explain the _rationale_ of our knowledge, and
even account for the objects of our knowledge by tracing them up to
their First Cause, as the ground and reason of their existence.[236]
Now, if the question were, Can you account for your own existence, or
for the existence of the world around you, without having recourse to a
supreme First Cause? we would answer, No: but if the question be, Can
there be any Certitude prior to the idea of God, not deduced from it,
and capable of existing without it? we would answer, Yes: the little
child is certain of its mother's existence before it is capable of
knowing God, and the veriest Atheist is certain of his own existence and
that of his fellow-men, even when he professes to doubt or to disbelieve
the existence of God. It may be true that the essential nature and
omniscient knowledge of God is the ultimate and eternal standard of
truth and certainty, or, in the words of Fenelon, that "il n'y a qu'une
seule verité, et qu'une seule manière de bien juger, qui est, de juger
comme Dieu même;"[237] and yet it may not be true that all our knowledge
is derived by deduction from our idea of God, or that its entire
certainty is dependent on our religious belief. Surely we may be
certainly assured of the facts of consciousness, of the phenomena of
Nature, and of many truths, both necessary and contingent, before we
have made any attempt to explain the _rationale_ of our knowledge, or to
connect it with the idea of the great First Cause; nay, it may be, and
we believe it is, by _means_ of these inferior and subordinate truths
that we rise to the belief of a supreme, omniscient Mind.
Some writers seem to confound Certitude with _Infallibility,_ or at
least to hold that there can be no Certitude without it. The _impersonal
reason_ of Cousin, the _common sense_ or _generic reason_ of Lamennais,
and the _authoritative tradition_ of the Church, have all been severally
resorted to, for the purpose of obtaining a ground of Certitude in the
matters both of Philosophy and Faith, such as is supposed to be
unattainable by the exercise of our own proper faculties, or by the most
careful study of evidence. According to these theories, Certitude
belongs to our knowledge, only because that knowledge is derived from a
reason superior to our own,--a reason not personal, but universal; not
individual, but generic. When they are applied, as they have been, to
undermine the authority of private judgment, and to supersede the
exercise of free inquiry; when they are urged as a reason why we should
defer to the authority of the Race in matters of Philosophy and to the
authority of the Church in matters of Faith; when we are told that the
certainty of our own existence depends on our knowledge of God, and that
our knowledge of God depends on the _common consent_ or _invariable
traditions_ of mankind,--we do feel that the grounds of Certitude, so
far from being strengthened, are sapped and weakened by such
speculations, and that we have here a new and most unexpected
application of the Scottish doctrine of Common Sense, such as may be
highly serviceable to the Church of Rome. Protestant writers, indeed,
have sometimes appealed to _common consent_ as a collateral proof,
auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive; but they have
done so merely because they regarded it as a _part of the evidence_,
well fitted to prove what Dr. Cudworth calls "the naturality of the idea
of God," and not because they confounded it with the _faculty_ by which
alone that evidence can be discerned and appreciated. They never
regarded it as the sole ground of certainty either in matters of
Philosophy or Faith. Nor can it be so considered by any thoughtful mind.
For how can I be more assured of an _impersonal reason_ than of my own?
How can I be more certain of the existence and the traditions of other
men, than of the facts of my own consciousness, and the spontaneous
convictions of my own understanding? or how can I be assured that, in
passing from the impersonal reason to the individual mind, from the
generic reason to the personal, the truth may not contract some taint of
weakness or impurity from the vessel in which it is ultimately
contained,--from the finite faculties by which alone it is apprehended
and believed?
The fact is that any attempt to prove the truth of our faculties must
necessarily fail. Did we set ourselves to the task of proving by
argument or by authority that we are not wrong in believing in our own
existence or that of an external world, or did we attempt to establish
the trustworthiness of our faculties by resolving it into the veracity
of God, our effort must needs be as abortive as it is superfluous, since
it involves the necessity not only of proving the fact, but of _proving
the proof itself_, and that, too, by the aid of the very faculties whose
trustworthiness is in question! There are certain ultimate facts beyond
which it is impossible to push our speculative inquiries; certain first
or fundamental principles of Reason, which are in themselves
indemonstrable, but which constitute the ground or condition of all
demonstration; certain intuitive perceptions, which are widely different
from rational deductions, but which determine and govern every process
of reasoning and every form of belief. To deny the _certainty_ of our
intuitive perceptions, merely because we cannot prove by argument the
truth of our mental faculties, would virtually amount to a rejection of
all evidence except such as comes to us only through _one_ channel, and
_that_ the circuitous one of a process of reasoning; while, by the
constitution of our nature, we are qualified and privileged to draw it
fresh, in many cases, at its spring and fountain-head. It may be as
impossible for man to prove the trustworthiness of his intellectual
faculties as it is for the bee to prove the truth of its marvellous
instinct; but, in either case, the reason may be that any such proof is
unnecessary, that it is superseded by the laws of Instinct in the one,
and by the laws of Thought in the other, and that by these laws a better
and surer provision is made for our guidance than any that could have
been found in a mere logical faculty,--a natural and irresistible
authority, which the Skeptic may dispute, but cannot destroy, and which,
however disowned in theory, must be practically obeyed.
It must be evident that the _various meanings_ which have been attached
to the term Certitude must materially affect both the statement and
solution of the general problem, and, more particularly, that they must
have an important bearing on the question, whether the doctrine which
affirms the Being, Perfections, and Providence of God, should be ranked
under the head of _certain_, or only of _probable_, truth. If, in making
use of the term Certitude, I mean to denote by it something different
from the certainty which belongs to the most assured convictions of the
human mind, something that arises, not from the spontaneous and direct
exercise of its faculties, but from a process of reflective thought or
philosophical speculation, something, in short, that is peculiar to the
metaphysical inquirer, and is not the common heritage of the race at
large; then, unquestionably, the problem, as thus understood, must leave
out of view many of the surest and most universal beliefs of
mankind,--beliefs which may be illustrated and confirmed by Philosophy,
but which are anterior to it in respect to their origin, and independent
of it in respect of the evidence on which they severally rest. In the
case of Certitude, just as in the case of every similar term expressive
of a simple, elementary idea, the ultimate appeal must be made to
individual consciousness. No one can convey to another a conception of
Certitude by means of words, apart from an experimental sense of it in
the mind of the latter, any more than he could give the idea of color to
the blind or of music to the deaf. It is because we have had experience
of it in our own breasts that we recognize and respond to the
descriptions which others give of it. Every one knows what it is to be
_certain_ in regard to many things, just because, constituted as he is,
he cannot doubt or disbelieve them. He is _certain_ of his own
existence, of the existence of other men, of the facts of his familiar
consciousness, of many events long since past which are still clearly
remembered, of certain abstract truths which are intuitively discerned
or logically demonstrated. These various objects of his thought may
differ in other respects, and may occasion a corresponding difference in
the _kind_ of Certitude which is conceived to belong to them; but they
all possess the same generic character, and admit, therefore, of being
classified under the same comprehensive category, as objects of our
_certain_ knowledge.
In the current use both of philosophical and popular language, Certitude
is spoken of in a twofold sense. We speak of a belief or conviction of
our own minds as possessing the character of Certitude, when it is so
strong, and so firmly rooted that it excludes all doubt or
hesitation;--we speak also of an object or event as possessing the same
character, when it is so presented to our minds as to produce the full
assurance of its reality. Hence the distinction between _subjective_ and
_objective_ Certitude. The former is a fact of consciousness; it is
simply the undoubting assent which we yield to certain judgments,
whether these judgments be true or false; it exists in us, and not in
the objects of thought; it denotes a condition of our minds, which may,
or may not, be in accordance with the actual state of things. The latter
is truth or certainty considered _objectively_, as existing in the
objects of our knowledge; it is independent of us and of our
conceptions; it is _as_ it is, whether it be known or unknown to us; our
belief cannot add to its reality, nor can our unbelief diminish or
destroy it. Certitude, considered as a mental state, denotes simply the
strength of our conviction or belief, as distinguished from doubt or
mere opinion; but, considered as an objective reality, it denotes the
ground or reason existing in the nature of things for the convictions
which we cherish. _Subjective certitude_ is not always the index or the
proof of _objective truth_, for men often believe with the strongest
assurance what they find reason afterwards to doubt or to disbelieve;
and the prevalence of many false beliefs, sincerely cherished and
zealously maintained, raises the question, how we may best discriminate
between truth and error? Hence the various theories of Certitude, and
hence also the antagonist theories of Skepticism.
The theories of Certitude may be reduced to _three_ classes. The _first_
places the ground of Certitude in _Reason_; the _second_ in _Authority_;
the _third_, in _Evidence_, including under that term both the external
manifestations of truth, and the internal principles or laws of thought
by which we are determined in forming our judgments in regard to them.
Each of these theories, however, has appeared in various phases in the
history of philosophical speculation. The Individual Reason of
Martineau, the Generic Reason of Lamennais, the Impersonal Reason of
Cousin, the Authority of the Race, and the Infallibility of the Church,
are specimens of these varieties.
The theory which places the principle of Certitude in REASON has assumed
at least two distinct shapes. In the one it discards all authority
except that of private judgment or individual reason; in the other it
appeals to a higher reason, which is said to be impersonal and
infallible, and which is supposed to regulate and determine the
convictions of the human mind. In the former shape, it appears in the
speculations of Martineau; in the latter, it is advocated by Cousin; and
in one or other of these shapes it constitutes the ground-principle of
RATIONALISM. The theory, again, which places the principle of Certitude
in AUTHORITY has also assumed two distinct shapes. In the one it speaks
of a universal consent or Generic Reason, the reason not of the
individual but of the race to which he belongs, and exhibits a singular
combination of the Philosophy of Common Sense as taught by Dr. Reid and
the Scottish School, with the principle of Authoritative Tradition as
taught in the Popish Church; in the other, it refers more specifically,
not to the infallibility of the race at large, but to the infallibility
of a select body, regularly organized and invested with peculiar powers,
into whose hands has been committed the sacred deposit and the sole
guardianship of truth, whether in matters of philosophy or faith. In
both forms it is presented in the writings of M. Gerbet and M.
Lamennais, and in both it is necessary for the full maintenance of the
Popish system of doctrine. The theory, again, which places the principle
of Certitude in EVIDENCE, admits of being exhibited in two very distinct
aspects. In the one, it has been treated as if Evidence were purely
_subjective_, as if it belonged exclusively to thought, and not to the
object of thought, or as if it depended solely on the perceptions of our
minds, and not at all on any objective reality which is independent of
them, and which is equally true whether it be perceived by our minds or
not. In this form it is a theory of Individualism, and has a strong
tendency towards Skepticism. In the other aspect, Evidence is regarded
as the sole and sufficient ground of Certitude, but it is viewed both
_objectively_ and _subjectively_;--_objectively_, as having its ground
and reason in a reality that is independent of our perceptions, and that
may or may not be perceived without being the less true or the less
certain in itself;--and yet _subjectively_ also, as being equally
dependent on certain principles of reason or laws of thought, without
which no external manifestation would suffice to create the ideas and
beliefs of the human mind, since the evidence which is exhibited
externally must not only exist, but must be perceived, discerned, and
appreciated, before it can generate belief: but when perceived, it
produces conviction, varying in different cases in degree, and amounting
in some to absolute certainty, which leaves no room either for denial or
doubt.
Such are the three grand theories of Certitude, and the several distinct
forms or phases in which they have severally appeared. We have no
hesitation in declaring our decided preference for the second form of
the third theory,--that which resolves the principle or ground of
Certitude into EVIDENCE; but EVIDENCE considered both _objectively_ and
_subjectively_,--_objectively_, as that which exists whether it is
perceived or not, and is independent of the caprices of individual
minds, and _subjectively_, as that which must be discerned before its
proper impression can be produced, which must be judged of according to
the laws of human thought, and which, when so discerned and judged of,
imparts a feeling of assurance which no sophistry can shake and no
philosophy strengthen.
According to some recent theories, Certitude belongs to our knowledge,
only because that knowledge is derived from a reason superior to our
own,--a reason not personal, but universal, not individual but generic,
which, although not belonging to ourselves, is supposed to hold
communication with our minds: and if this were meant merely to remind us
of the limitation of our faculties, and of our consequent liability to
error, or even to teach us the duty of acknowledging our dependence on a
higher power, it might be alike unobjectionable and salutary; but when
it is applied to undermine the authority of private judgment and to
supersede the exercise of free inquiry, they have a tendency to excite
suspicion and distrust in every thoughtful mind. The capital error which
pervades all these speculations consists in not distinguishing aright
between the _evidence_ which constitutes the ground of our belief, and
the _faculty_ by which that evidence is discerned and appreciated. The
Generic Reason of Lamennais, as well as the uniform Tradition of the
Church, may constitute, when duly improved, a branch of the objective
evidence for the truth, and as such they have been applied even by
Protestant writers when they have appealed to _common consent_ as a
collateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and conclusive;
but they cannot be regarded as the exclusive grounds of the certainty of
human knowledge, since this arises from the fundamental, universal, and
invariable laws of human thought.
* * * * *
The term Skepticism, again, may denote either a mere _state of mind_,--a
state of suspense or doubt in regard to some particular fact or opinion;
or _a system of speculative philosophy_, relating to the principles of
human knowledge or the grounds of human belief. In the former sense, it
implies nothing more than the want of a sure and satisfactory conviction
of the truth on the particular point in question. Were it expressed in
words, it would simply amount to a verdict of "non liquet." In the
latter sense, it imports much more than this; it is not merely a _sense_
of doubt respecting any one truth, but a _system_ of doubt in regard to
the grounds of our belief in all truth, a subtle philosophy which seeks
to explain the phenomena of Belief by resolving them into their ultimate
principles, and which often terminates--in explaining them away. In both
forms, it has existed, either continuously or in ever-recurring cycles,
from the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry; and while it has seemed
to retard or arrest the progress of human knowledge, it has really been
overruled as a means of quickening the intellectual powers, and
imparting at once greater precision and comprehensiveness to the matured
results of Science.
Theoretical Skepticism may be divided into _three_ distinct branches:
First, Universal or Philosophical Skepticism, which professes to deny,
or rather to doubt the certainty of all human knowledge; secondly,
Partial or Religious Skepticism, which admits the possible certitude of
human knowledge in other respects, but holds that religious truth is
either altogether inaccessible to our faculties, or that it is not
supported by sufficient evidence; thirdly, a mongrel system, which
combines Philosophic Doubt with Ecclesiastical Dogmatism, and which may
be aptly characterized as the Skeptico-Dogmatic theory.[238]
We agree with Dr. Reid in thinking that Universal Skepticism is
unanswerable _by argument_, and can only be effectively met by an
_appeal to consciousness_.[239] It might be shown, indeed, that in so
far as it assumes, however slightly, the aspect of a positive or
dogmatic system, it is self-contradictory and absurd; it might also be
shown that doubt itself implies thought, and thought existence or
reality: but the ultimate appeal must be to the facts of human
consciousness, and the laws of thought which operate in every human
breast. And when such an appeal is made, we can have no anxiety in
regard to the result, nor any apprehension that philosophical skepticism
can ever become the prevailing creed of the popular mind. There is a
risk, however, of danger arising from a different source; it may not be
always remembered that the theory of Skepticism must be universal to be
either consistent or consequent; and hence it may be _partially applied_
to some truths, while it is practically abandoned in regard to other
truths, which are neither more certain nor less liable to objection than
the former. Thus the skeptical difficulties which have been raised
against the doctrines of Ontology are of such a kind that if they have
any validity or force, they bear as strongly against the reality of an
external world and the existence of our fellow-men, as against the
doctrine which affirms the being of God: yet many will be found urging
them against the latter doctrine, who do not profess to have any doubt
in regard to the two former; and it is of paramount importance to show
that this is a partial and therefore unfair application of their own
principles, and that they cannot consistently admit the one without also
admitting the other.
Atheism, in its skeptical form, must either be a mere _sense of doubt_
in regard to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of the being and
perfections of God; or _a speculative system_, which attempts to justify
that doubt by some theory of philosophical skepticism, either partial or
universal. In the _latter_ case, it may be best dealt with by showing
that it affects the certainty of our common knowledge, not less than
that of our religious belief, and that we cannot consistently reject
Theology, and yet retain our convictions on other cognate subjects of
thought. In the _former_ case, it should be treated as a case of
ignorance, by illustrating the evidence, and urging it on the attention
of those who have hitherto been blind to its force; reminding them that
their _not seeing_ it is no proof that it does not exist, and that
_doubt_ itself on such a question, so nearly affecting their duty and
welfare, involves a solemn obligation to patient, candid, and
dispassionate inquiry.
"A skeptic in religion," says Bishop Earle, "is one that hangs in the
balance with all sorts of opinions, whereof not one but stirs him, and
none sways him. A man guiltier of credulity than he is taken to be; for
it is out of his belief of everything that he fully believes nothing.
Each religion scares him from its contrary, none persuades him to
itself.... He finds reason in all opinions, truth in none; indeed, the
least reason perplexes him, and the best will not satisfy him.... He
finds doubts and scruples better than resolves them, and is always _too
hard for himself_.... In sum, his whole life is a question, and his
salvation a greater, which death only concludes, and then he--is
resolved."[240]
This second phase or form of Skepticism, which we have designated as
_Partial_ or _Religious Skepticism_, admits the possible certitude of
human knowledge in other respects, and especially in regard to secular
and scientific pursuits, but holds that religious truth is either
altogether inaccessible to man with his present faculties, or that its
certainty cannot be evinced by any legitimate process of reasoning.
These two positions are in some respects widely different, although they
are often combined, and always conducive to the same result,--the
practical negation of Religion. Many who never dream of doubting the
certainty of human knowledge, in so far as it relates to their secular
or scientific pursuits, are prone to cherish a skeptical spirit in
regard to religious or spiritual truths; and this, not because they have
examined and weighed the evidence to which Theology appeals, and found
it wanting, but rather because they have a lurking suspicion that men,
with their present faculties, are incapable of rising to the knowledge
of supernatural things, and that they could attain to no certainty,
while they might expose themselves to much delusion, by entering on the
inquiry at all. This is their apology for _ignoring_ Religion
altogether, and contenting themselves with other branches of knowledge,
which are supposed to be more certain in themselves as well as more
conducive to their present welfare. In this respect, it is deeply
instructive to remark that Infidelity has been singularly at variance
with itself. At one time, in the age of Herbert, human reason was
extolled, to the disparagement of Divine Revelation; it was held to be
so thoroughly competent to deal with all the truths of Theology, and to
arrive, on mere natural grounds, at such an assured belief in them, that
no supernatural message was needed either to illustrate, or confirm, or
enforce the lessons of Nature: but now, when the lessons of Nature
herself are called in question, human reason is disparaged as
incompetent to the task of deciphering her dark hieroglyphics, and while
she can traverse with firm step every department of the material world,
and soar aloft, as on eagle's wings, to survey the suns and systems of
astronomy, she is held to be incapable alike of religious inquiry and of
divine instruction! There is, indeed, a striking contrast between the
high pretensions of Reason in matters of philosophy, and the bastard
humility which it sometimes assumes in matters of faith.
But there is another, and a still more subtle, form of Partial or
Religious Skepticism. It does not absolutely deny the possibility of
religious knowledge, nor does it dogmatically affirm that man, with his
present faculties, can have no religious convictions; it contents itself
with saying, and attempting to prove, that the certitude of religious
truth cannot be evinced by any legitimate process of reasoning. It
examines the proof, and detects flaws in it. It discusses, with a severe
and critical logic, the arguments that have been employed to establish
the first and most fundamental article of Theology, the existence of
God; and discarding them one by one, it reaches the conclusion that,
whether true or not, it cannot be proved. Strange as it may appear,
these sentiments have been embraced and avowed by men who still continue
to profess their belief in God and Religion. Some have held that proof
by reasoning is impossible, but only because it is superfluous. They
distinguish between _reason_ and _reasoning_; and hold that while the
latter is incompetent to the task of proving the existence of God, the
former spontaneously suggests the idea of a Supreme Cause, and imparts
to it all the certainty which belongs to a direct intellectual
intuition. Others distinguish between the _Speculative_ and the
_Practical_ Reason; and hold that while the former cannot prove by an
unexceptionable argument the existence of God, the latter affords a
sufficient groundwork for religious belief and worship. Others, again,
speak not so much of reason or reasoning, as of _sentiment and
instinct_, as the source of our religious beliefs; and instead of
addressing arguments to the understanding, they would make their appeal
to the feelings and affections of the heart. There is still another
class of writers who resolve all human knowledge, whether relating to
things secular or spiritual, into what they call the principle of faith
(_foi_), and to this class belong two distinct parties who are widely
different from each other in almost everything else. It is important,
therefore, to mark the radical difference between their respective
systems, since it is apt to be concealed or disguised by the ambiguous
use of the same phraseology by both. The one party may be described as
the disciples of a _Faith-Philosophy of Reason_, the other of a
_Faith-Philosophy of Revelation_: the former resolving all our knowledge
into the intuitive perceptions or first principles of the human
intellect, considered as a kind of divine and infallible, though natural
inspiration; the latter contending that in regard at least to the
knowledge of theological truth, human reason is utterly powerless, and
can only arrive at certainty by faith in the divine testimony. The two
are widely different, yet there are points of resemblance and agreement
betwixt them, and on this account they have sometimes been classed
together under a wide and sweeping generalization.
The form of Partial Skepticism to which these remarks apply is perhaps
more common than it is generally supposed to be. On what other
principle, indeed, can we account, at least in the case of religious
men, for the indifference and even aversion with which they turn away
from any attempt to prove by natural evidence the existence and
providence of God? The prevalence of such feelings even within the
Christian community has been admitted and deplored by one of the most
profound spiritual teachers of modern times;[241] and it can only be
explained, where Religion is cherished and professed, on the supposition
that they regard _proof by argument_ as superfluous, either because it
is superseded by the natural instincts and intuitions of the human mind,
or by the authoritative teaching of Divine Revelation. But it ought to
be seriously considered, on the one hand, that the instincts and
intuitions of human reason are not altogether independent of the natural
evidence which is exhibited in the constitution and course of Nature;
and, on the other hand, that Revelation itself refers to that natural
evidence, and recommends it to our careful and devout study.
Besides the theories of Partial Skepticism to which we have already
referred, there is a mongrel system which seems to combine the two
opposite extremes of Doubt and Dogmatism, and which, for that reason,
may be not inaptly designated as _Skeptico-Dogmatic_.[242] Ever since
the era of the Reformation, when the principle of free inquiry, and the
right or rather the duty of private judgment in matters of Religion,
were so strenuously affirmed and so successfully maintained, there has
been a standing controversy between the Popish and Protestant Churches
respecting the rival claims of Reason and Authority as the ultimate
arbiter on points of faith. Extreme opinions on either side were
advanced. One party, repudiating all authority, whether human or divine,
rejected alike the testimony of Scripture and the decrees of the Church,
and, receiving only what was supposed to be in accordance with the
dictates of Reason, sought to establish a scheme of Rationalism in
connection with at least a nominal profession of Christianity. The
opposite party, not slow to detect the error into which extreme
Protestants had fallen, and intent seemingly on fastening that error on
all who had separated themselves from the Catholic Church, affirmed and
endeavored to prove that Rationalism, in its most obnoxious sense, is
inherent in and inseparable from the avowed principles of the
Reformation, and that the recognition of the right of private judgment
is necessarily subversive of all authority in matters of faith. They did
not see, or if they did see, they were unwilling to acknowledge that
Rationalism is a very different thing from the legitimate use of Reason;
and that while the former repudiates all authority, whether human or
divine, the latter may bow with profound reverence to the supreme
authority of the Inspired Word, and even listen with docility to the
ministerial authority of the Church, in so far as her teaching is in
accordance with the lessons of Scripture. It may be safely affirmed that
the Confessions and Articles of all the Protestant Churches in Europe
and America do recognize the authority both of God and the Church, and
are as much opposed to Rationalism, considered as a system which makes
Reason the sole standard and judge, as they are to the opposite extreme
of lordly domination over the faith and consciences of men. But such a
controversy having arisen, it was to be expected that while eager
partisans, on the one side, might unduly exalt and extol the powers and
prerogatives of Reason, the adherents of Romanism, which claims the
sanction of infallibility for her doctrines and decrees, would be
tempted to follow an opposite course, and would seek to disparage the
claims of Reason with the view of exalting the authority of the Church.
Hence arose what has been called POPISH PYRRHONISM,--a system which
attempts to combine Doubt with Dogmatism, and to establish the certitude
of religious knowledge on the sole basis of authority, which is somehow
supposed to be more secure and stable when it rests on the ruins of
human reason. Not a few significant symptoms of a tendency in this
direction have appeared from age to age. It was apparent in some of the
writings, otherwise valuable, of Huet, Bishop of Avranches; some traces
of it are discernible in the profound "Thoughts of Pascal;" but it was
reserved for the present age to elaborate this tendency into a theory,
and to give it the form of a regular system. This task was fearlessly
undertaken by the eloquent but versatile Lamennais, while as yet he held
office in the Church, and was publicly honored as one who was worthy to
be called "the latest of the Fathers." His "Essay on Indifference in
Matters of Faith," exhibits many proofs of a profound and vigorous
intellect, and contains many passages of powerful and impressive
eloquence. We heartily sympathize with it in so far as it is directed
against that Liberalism which makes light of all definite articles of
faith; but we deplore the grievous error into which he has been seduced
by his zeal for the authority of the Church, when he attempts to
undermine the foundations of all belief in the trustworthiness of the
human faculties. In opposition to the claims of private judgment, he
contends for the necessity of a Reason more elevated and more general as
the only ground of Certitude, the supreme rule and standard of belief.
This normal Reason he finds in the doctrine and decrees of an Infallible
Church, wherever the Church is known; but where the Church is yet
unknown, or while it was yet non-existent in its present organized form,
he seeks this more general Reason in the common sense or unanimous
consent of the race at large, and affirms that this is the sole ground
of Certitude, and the ultimate standard of appeal in every question
respecting the truth or falsity of our individual opinions.[243] He
holds that the authority both of the Church and of the Race is
_infallible_; and that its infallibility neither requires nor admits of
proof.[244] With the view of establishing this one and exclusive
criterion of Certitude, he assails the evidence of sense, the evidence
of consciousness, the evidence of memory, the evidence even of axiomatic
truths and first principles, and involves everything except
ecclesiastical authority or general reason in the same abyss of
Skepticism.[245] He ventures even to affirm that "Geometry itself, the
most exact of all the Sciences, rests, like every other, on common
consent!" No wonder, then, that he should also found exclusively on
_authority_ our belief in the existence and government of God.
An intelligent member of his own communion propounds a very different,
and much more reasonable, opinion: "Il n'y a pas d'autorité morale qui
n'ait besoin de se prouver ellemême, d'une maniere quelconque, et
d'etablir sa legitimité. En definitive, c'est a l'individu qu'elle
s'addresse, car on ne croit pas par masse, on croit chacun pour soi.
L'individu reste donc toujours juge, et juge inevitable de l'autorité
intellectuelle qu'il accepte, ou de celle qui s'offre a lui. Nous
n'avons pas a examiner si cette disposition constitutive de l'esprit
humain est bonne ou mauvaise; la seule question que l'on en fait est
vaine et sterile. Nous sommes necessairement aménés par l'observation
physchologique a constater qu'il faut que l'homme croie a la fidelité du
temoignage de ses sens individuels, et à la valeur de sa raison
personelle, avant de faire un pas au-dela."[246]
We think it unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion of this
strange and startling theory, especially as the altered position of the
writer in his relation to the Church before his death may be held to
indicate that to a large extent it had been abandoned by himself. Nor
should we have thought it worthy even of this transient notice, had we
not discerned symptoms of an incipient tendency in a similar direction
among some writers in the Protestant ranks. It should be remembered by
divines of every communion that the rational faculties of man and their
general trustworthiness are necessarily presupposed in any Revelation
which may be addressed to them; and that in Scripture itself frequent
appeals are made to the works of Creation and Providence, as affording
at once a body of natural evidence, and a signal manifestation of His
adorable perfections. It were a vain thing to hope that _faith in God_
may be strengthened by a spirit of _Skepticism_ in regard to Reason,
which constitutes part of His own image on the soul of man.
It is but common justice to add that the speculations of Lamennais, so
far from being sanctioned, were openly censured, by some of the most
distinguished of his fellow-ecclesiastics. Such writers as Valroger,
Gioberti, and the late Archbishop of Paris, gave forth their public
protest against them, and have thereby done much to vindicate their
Church from the imputation of conniving at the progress of Skepticism.
Valroger's testimony is strong and decided: "M. de Lamennais pretendait
que la raison individuelle est incapable de nous donner la Certitude.
Cette pretention est, suivant, nous absurde et funeste. N'est ce pas par
notre raison individuelle que la verité-arrivé a nous et devient notre
bien? Quel moyen plus immediat pourrons-nous avoir de saisir la verité?
Quel principe de connaisance ou de Certitude pourrait-on placer entre
nous et notre raison? Et comment pourrions-nous l'employer, si ce ne'est
avec notre raison? N'est ce pas une contradiction flagrante de vouloir
persuader quelque chose à des hommes que l'on a declarés incapables de
connaitre certainement quoi que ce soit? A quoi bon une methode, une
autorité infaillible, un enseignement Divin, si nous n'avons que des
facultés trompeuses pour user de ces secours? Nous croyons, nous, que la
raison individuelle peut connaitre avec certitude toutes les verités
necessaires à l'accomplissement de notre destinée. Si nous avons besoin
de la Grace, de la Revelation, de la Tradition, et de l'Eglise pour
atteindre le bût supreme de notre vie,--sur une foule de questions
subalternes, nous peuvons arriver a une certitude complete, sans
recourir à aucune exterieure, à aucun secours surnaturel."[247]
Gioberti is equally explicit: "M. de Lamennais dans sa theorie sur la
Certitude, confond les deux methodes, Ontologique et Physiologique; il
les rejette toutes les deux, et leur substitue la seule methode
d'Autorité. Mais la methode d'Autorité est impossible sans un fondement
Ontologique, et c'est une manifeste petition de principe que d'etabler
l'Ontologie sur l'Autorité."[248]
And the late Archbishop of Paris,--the same who fell before the
barricades, a martyr to Charity if not to Truth, and who seems to have
had a wakeful eye on the progress of philosophic speculation,--took
occasion, in a preface to the Abbé Maret's "Theodicée," to declare that
Lamennais' system was obnoxious to the Church, because of its opposition
to the doctrine of Rational Certitude: "Tout le monde sait que le clergé
de France avait repoussé le systeme de M. de Lamennais precisément à
cause de son opposition a la Certitude Rationnelle constanment professée
dans nos ecoles; et tout le monde peu savoir que les Bossuet, les
Fenelon, les Descartes out raisonné, et que nous aussi nous raisonnons
et discutons avec nos accusateurs," ... "preuve irrécusable que LE
RATIONALISME ET LA RAISON SONT DEUX CHOSES FORT DIFFERENTES."[249]
PERRONE has given a similar testimony, and we cannot doubt that the more
thoughtful adherents of Romanism must be sensible of the danger which is
involved in any attempt to combine Rational Skepticism with Dogmatic
Authority.
It were well, however, if they would reconsider their position with
reference to this whole question, in its more general bearings in
conection with their doctrine as to the rule of faith; and weigh, with
candid impartiality, the arguments which have been adduced by Protestant
writers on the subject.[250]
FOOTNOTES:
[233] M. A. FRANCK, "Rapport," Paris, 1847. M. A. JAVARY, "Ouvrage
Couronné par l'Institut," 1847.
[234] M. ED. MERCIER, "De la Certitude, dans ses Rapports avec la
Science et la Foi," 1844. M. A. VERA, "Problème de la Certitude," 1843.
ABBÉ GERBET, "Des Doctrines Philosophiques sur la Certitude, dans leur
Rapports avec les Fondemens de la Theologie." ABBÉ DE LAMENNAIS, "Du
Fondement de la Certitude," 1826. Vols. II. and III. of the "Essai sur
l'Indifference en Matiére de la Religion." 4 vols., 1844.
[235] M. FRANCK, p. 237. M. JAVARI, p. 28.
[236] AMAND SAINTE, "Vie de Spinoza," p. 201. ABBÉ LAMENNAIS, "Essai sur
l'Indifference," IV. 256.
[237] FENELON, "Oeuvres Spirituelles," I. _138_.
[238] SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, "Adversus Mathematicos," that is,
Dogmaticos--teachers of [Greek: mathêmata]. GLANVILLE, "Scepsis
Scientifica." HUME, and MONTAIGNE, "Essays." H. O'CONNOR, "Connected
Essays and Tracts." VILLEMANDY, "Scepticismus Debellatus; seu, Humanæ
Cognitionis Ratio ab imis radicibus explicata; ejusdem Certitudo
adversus Scepticos quosque veteres ac novos invicte asserta." LAMENNAIS,
"Essai sur l'Indifference."
[239] DR. REID, Essays,--"On First Principles," II. 249-252, 293, 300.
SIR WM. HAMILTON, "Reid," pp. 91, 101, 109.
[240] BISHOP EARLE, "Microcosmography," p. 120.
[241] DR. JOHN LOVE, of Glasgow, "Discourses."
[242] COUSIN, "Cours," II. 420, 422. MORELL, "History of Philosophy," I.
251; II. 221, 505, 522. SPINOZA, "Tractatus Theolog.-Polit.," p. 267.
LAMENNAIS, "Essai sur l'Indifference," _passim_.
[243] LAMENNAIS, "Essai," II. 6, 7, 52, 60, 258.
[244] Ibid., II. 9, 97, 110.
[245] LAMENNAIS, "Essai," II. 59, 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 94; IV. 255.
[246] BOUCHITTÉ, "Histoire des Preuves," p. 478.
[247] VALROGER, "Etudes Critiques," p. 574.
[248] GIOBERTI, "Introduction a l'Etude de la Philosophie," I. 592.
[249] MARET, "Theodicée," Preface, p. VIII.
[250] LA PLACETTE, "De Insanabill Romanæ Ecclesiæ Scepticismo."