has recently published (_The Indian Offer of Imperial Preference_) is to
provoke discussion, but "not to lay down any dogma." It is related that
a certain clergyman, after he had preached a sermon, said to Lord
Melbourne, who had been one of his congregation, "I tried not to be
tedious," to which Lord Melbourne replied, "You were." Sir Roper
Lethbridge may have tried not to dogmatise, but his efforts in this
direction have certainly not been crowned with success. On the contrary,
although dealing with a subject which bristles with points of a highly
controversial nature, he states his conclusions with an assurance which
is little short of oracular. Heedless of the woful fate which has
attended many of the fiscal seers who have preceded him, he does not
hesitate to pronounce the most confident prophecies upon a subject as to
which experience has proved that prophecy is eminently hazardous, viz.
the economic effect likely to be produced by drastic changes in the
fiscal system. Moreover, his pages are disfigured by a good deal of
commonplace invective about "the shibboleths of an obsolete Cobdenism,"
the "worship of the fetish of Cobdenism," and "the bigotry of the Cobden
Club," as to whom the stale fallacy is repeated that they "consider the
well-being of the 'poor foreigner'" rather than "our own commercial
interests." Language of this sort can only serve to irritate. It cannot
convince. Sir Roper Lethbridge appears to forget that, apart from those
who, on general party grounds, are little inclined to listen to the
gospel which he has to preach, there are a large number of Unionists who
are to a greater extent open to conviction, and who, if their conversion
can be effected, are, in the interests of the cause which he advocates,
well worth convincing. These blemishes--for blemishes they
unquestionably are--should not, however, blind us to the fact that Sir
Roper Lethbridge deals with a subject of very great importance and also
of very great difficulty. It is most desirable that it should be
discussed. Sir Fleetwood Wilson, in the very statesmanlike speech
delivered in the Indian Legislative Council last March, indicated the
spirit in which the discussion should take place. "The subject," he
said, "is one which in the public interest calls for consideration, not
recrimination." It would be Utopian to suppose that it can be kept
altogether outside the arena of party strife, but those who are not
uncompromising partisans, and who also strongly deprecate Indian
questions being made the shuttlecock of party interests, can at all
events endeavour to approach the question with an open mind and to treat
it dispassionately and exclusively on its own merits.
The main issue involved may be broadly stated in the following terms. Up
to the present time the fiscal policy of the Indian Government has been
based on Free Trade principles. Customs duties are collected for revenue
purposes. A general 5 per cent _ad valorem_ duty is imposed on imports.
Cotton goods pay a duty of 3½ per cent. An excise duty of a similar
amount is imposed on cotton woven at Indian mills. A duty of three annas
a maund is paid on exported rice. Sir Roper Lethbridge and those who
concur with him now propose that this system should undergo a radical
change. The main features of their proposal, if the writer of the
present article understands them correctly, seem to be that the duty on
cotton goods imported from the United Kingdom, as also the
corresponding excise duty levied in India, should be altogether
abolished; that the duties raised on goods--apparently of all
descriptions--imported into India from non-British ports should be
raised; that a preference should be accorded in British ports to Indian
tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, etc.; and that an export duty should be
levied at Indian ports on certain products, notably on jute and lac.
This new duty would not, however, be levied on goods sent to the United
Kingdom.
There does not appear to be any absolute necessity for dealing with this
question at once, but Sir Roper Lethbridge is quite justified in calling
attention to it, for it is not only conceivable, but even probable, that
at no very remote period the Government of India will have to deal with
a problem which, it may readily be admitted, will tax their
statesmanship to the very utmost. It is no exaggeration to say that
since the Crown took over the direct management of Indian affairs no
issue of greater magnitude has been raised. Moreover, although Lord
Crewe had an easy task in showing that in some respects the difficulties
attendant on any solution would be enhanced rather than diminished if
the fiscal policy of the British Government in the United Kingdom
underwent a radical change, it is none the less true that those
difficulties will remain of a very formidable character even if no such
change is effected.
It is essential to bear in mind that the difficulties which beset this
question are not solely fiscal, but also political. This feature is
almost invariably characteristic of Oriental finance, and nowhere is it
more prominent than in India. The writer of the present article can
speak with some special knowledge of the circumstances attendant on the
great Free Trade measures introduced in India under the auspices of Lord
Ripon. He can state very confidently that, although Lord Ripon and all
the leading members of his Government were convinced Free Traders, it
was the political to a far greater extent than the fiscal arguments
which led them to the conclusion that the Indian Customs barriers should
be abolished. They foresaw that the rival commercial interests of India
and Lancashire would cause a rankling and persistent sore which might do
infinite political harm. They wished, therefore, to apply a timely
remedy, and it cannot be doubted that, so long as it lasted, the remedy
was effective. In most respects the fiscal policy adopted then and that
now advocated by Sir Roper Lethbridge and his coadjutors are the poles
asunder. Nevertheless, in one respect they coincide. Sir Roper
Lethbridge places in the forefront of his proposals the abolition both
of the import duty on cotton goods and the corresponding excise duty
levied in India. He is unquestionably right. That is an ideal which both
Free Traders and Protectionists may very reasonably seek to attain. It
is, in fact, the only really satisfactory solution of the main point at
issue. The difficulty is to realise this ideal without doing more than
an equivalent amount of injury to Indian interests in other directions.
The chief arguments by which Sir Roper Lethbridge defends the special
proposals which he advances are three in number. They are (1) that the
nascent industries of India require protection; (2) that it is necessary
to raise more revenue, and that the suggestions now made afford an
unobjectionable method for achieving this object; and (3) that the
economic facts connected with India afford special facilities for the
adoption of a policy of retaliation.
From a purely economic point of view the first of these three pleas is
singularly inconclusive.
It was refuted by Sir Fleetwood Wilson, whom both Mr. Austen
Chamberlain, in the introduction which he has written to Sir Roper
Lethbridge's book, and Sir Roper Lethbridge himself seem to regard, on
grounds which are apparently somewhat insufficient, as a partial convert
to their views. It may be said without exaggeration that if any country
in the world is likely to benefit by the adoption of Free Trade
principles that country is India. Industries cannot, as Sir Fleetwood
Wilson very truly said, be "encouraged" by means of a protective tariff
without raising home prices. Without going over all the well-trodden
ground on this subject, which must be familiar to all who have taken
part in the fiscal controversy, and without, moreover, denying that
nascent industries have in some countries been successfully encouraged
by the adoption of a protective system, it will be sufficient to say
that, looking at all the economic facts existent in India, the period of
partial transition from agriculture to industries, during which the
process of encouragement will have to be maintained, will almost
certainly last much longer than even in America or Germany, and that
during the whole of that lengthy period the mass of the population, who
are very poor and who are engaged in agricultural pursuits, will not
benefit from the protection, although they will at the same time suffer
grievously from the rise in prices.
The main importance of this argument, however, is not to be derived from
its economic value, but rather from the important political fact that it
is one which finds favour with a large and influential body of Indian
opinion. Sir Roper Lethbridge claims that the leaders of Indian thought
are almost to a man Protectionists, and in his work he gives, as an
example of their views, the very able speech delivered by Sir Gangadhar
Chitnavis in the Calcutta Legislative Council last March.[96] He is
probably right; neither is anything to be gained by ignoring the gravity
of the situation which is thus created. Whether the Indian
Protectionists be right or wrong as to the fiscal policy which is best
adapted to Indian interests, there is no denying the fact that with
Protection flourishing in the self-governing colonies, with the recent
enlargement of the scope and functions of representative institutions in
India, and with the grievance created by the sacrifice of the opium
revenue on the altar of British vicarious philanthropy, it is a serious
matter for the British Government to assert their own views if those
views run diametrically counter to the wishes expressed by the only
representatives of Indian opinion who are in a position to make their
voices heard. Nevertheless, there are two limitations on the extent to
which concessions can or ought to be made to Indian opinion. The first
is based on the necessities of English internal politics. It cannot be
doubted that although Sir Gangadhar Chitnavis and those who agree with
him may perhaps be willing, as a _pis aller_, to accept Sir Roper
Lethbridge's preferential plan, what they really want is not Preference
but Protection against England, and this they cannot have, because, in
Sir Roper Lethbridge's words, "no British Government that offered India
Protection against Lancashire would live for a week." The second
limitation is based on less egotistical and, therefore, nobler grounds.
In spite of recent concessions, India is still, politically speaking,
_in statu pupillari_, neither do the concessions recently made in the
direction of granting self-governing institutions dispense the British
Government from the duty of looking to the interests of the masses, who
are at present very inadequately represented. It must be remembered that
in India, perhaps even more than elsewhere, the voice of the consumer is
hushed, whilst that of the producer is loud and strident.
The second of Sir Roper Lethbridge's arguments is based on the alleged
necessity of raising more revenue. He, as also Sir Gangadhar Chitnavis,
take it for granted that this necessity has already arisen. It would be
essential, before taking any practical steps to give effect to the
proposals now under discussion, to ascertain beyond any manner of doubt
whether this statement is correct, and also, if correct, what
alternatives exist to the plan proposed by Sir Roper Lethbridge. Sir
Fleetwood Wilson carefully abstained from pledging himself to the
accuracy of Sir Gangadhar Chitnavis's view on this point. "There is," he
said, "much room for the development of India's other resources, and it
has yet to be shown that there is no room for further economies in our
administration." In the meanwhile, it would tend to the elucidation of
the subject if Sir Roper Lethbridge and those who agree with him would
lay before the world a carefully prepared and detailed estimate of the
financial results which they consider would accrue from the adoption of
their proposals. We are told, for instance, that raw jute to the value
of £13,000,000 is exported annually from Bengal, of which only
£3,000,000 worth is worked up in Great Britain, and that "a moderate
duty" on this article would produce two millions a year. The prospect of
obtaining a revenue of £2,000,000 in the manner proposed by Sir Roper
Lethbridge appears at first sight somewhat illusory. In the first place,
the tax would, on the basis of Sir Roper Lethbridge's figures, amount to
20 per cent, which can scarcely be called "moderate." In the second
place, unless an equivalent export duty were imposed at British ports
it would appear probable that the process of re-export for the benefit
of "the lucky artisans of foreign protected nations" would not merely
continue unchecked, but would even be encouraged, for those artisans
would certainly not be supplied direct from India with the duty-laden
raw material, but would draw their supplies from the jute sent to the
ports of the United Kingdom, which would have paid no duty. Is it,
moreover, quite certain that a duty such as that proposed by Sir Roper
Lethbridge would be insufficient, as he alleges, "to bring in any
competing fibres in the world"? These and other cognate points
manifestly require further elucidation.
The third argument adduced by Sir Roper Lethbridge is based on the
allegation that India is in a specially favourable position to adopt a
policy of retaliation. It is unnecessary to go into the general
arguments for and against retaliatory duties. They have been exhausted
in the very remarkable and frigidly impartial book written on this
subject by Professor Dietzel. It will be sufficient to say that here Sir
Roper Lethbridge is on stronger ground. The main argument against
retaliation in the United Kingdom is that foreign nations, by stopping
our supplies of raw material, could check our manufactures. We are,
therefore, in a singularly unfavourable position for engaging in a
tariff war. The case of India is wholly different. Foreign nations
cannot, it is alleged, dispense with the raw material which India
supplies. There is, therefore, a good _prima facie_ case for supposing
that India has relatively little to fear from retaliation on their part.
It would be impossible within the limits of the present article to deal
fully with all the aspects of this vitally important question. Attention
may, however, be drawn to the very weighty remarks of Sir Fleetwood
Wilson when he speaks of "the great alteration which a tariff war in
India would effect in the balance of our trade, in the arrangements that
now exist for the payment of our external debt, and in the whole of our
exchange policy. This aspect of the question is one of extraordinary
complexity, as well as of no small speculation." On the whole, although
the proposals made by Sir Roper Lethbridge and his associates deserve
full and fair consideration, it is most earnestly to be hoped that party
leaders in this country will insist on their elaboration in full detail,
and will then study every aspect of the question with the utmost care
before giving even a qualified pledge to afford them support. The
situation is already sufficiently difficult and complicated. It is not
improbable that the difficulties and complications, far from being
mitigated, would be increased by the pursuit into the economic
wilderness of the _ignis fatuus_ involved in the idea that it is
possible for a nation to impose a tax on itself and then make the
inhabitants of other countries pay the whole or the greater part of it.
[Footnote 96: It may be noted that Sir Gangadhar Chitnavis's idea of
Preference differs widely from that entertained by Sir Roper Lethbridge.
The former apparently wishes to abolish the excise duty on Indian cotton
goods, but to maintain that levied on similar goods imported from the
United Kingdom, whilst levying a still higher duty on goods from other
countries.]
XXI
ROME AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT[97]
_"The Spectator," July 19, 1913_
In spite of the obvious danger of establishing doubtful analogies and of
making insufficient allowance for differences, the history of Imperial
Rome can never cease to be of more than academic interest to the
statesmen and politicians of Imperial England. Rome bequeathed to us
much that is of inestimable value, both in the way of precept and
example. She also bequeathed to us a word of ill omen--the word
"Imperialism." The attempt to embody the broad outlines of a policy in a
single word or phrase has at times exercised great influence in deciding
the fate of nations. M. Vandal[98] says with truth, "Nul ne comprendra
la Révolution s'il ne tient compte de l'extraordinaire empire exercé à
cette époque par les mots et les formules." Imperialism, though
infinitely preferable to its quasi-synonym Caesarism, is, in fact, a
term which, although not absolutely incorrect, is at the same time, by
reason of its historical associations, misleading when applied to the
mild and beneficent hegemony exercised by the rulers and people of
England over their scattered transmarine dominions. It affords a
convenient peg on which hostile critics, such as Mr. Mallik, whose work
was reviewed last week in these columns,[99] as also those
ultra-cosmopolitan Englishmen who are the friends of every country but
their own, may hang partisan homilies dwelling on the brutality of
conquest and on all the harsh features of alien rule, whilst they leave
sedulously in the background that aspect of the case which Polybius,
parodying a famous saying of Themistocles, embodied in a phrase which he
attributes to the Greeks after they had been absorbed into the Roman
Empire, "If we had not been quickly ruined, we should not have been
saved." This pessimistic aspect of Imperialism has certainly to some
extent an historical basis. It is founded on the procedure generally
believed to have been adopted in the process by which Rome acquired the
dominion of the world. The careful attention given of late years to the
study of inscriptions, and generally the results obtained by the
co-operation established between historians and those who have more
especially studied other branches of science, such as archaeology,
epigraphy, and numismatics, have, however, now enabled us to approach
the question of Roman expansion with far greater advantages than those
possessed by writers even so late as the days of Mommsen. We are able to
reply with a greater degree of confidence than at any previous period to
the question of how far Roman policy was really associated with those
principles and practices which many are accustomed to designate as
Imperial. The valuable and erudite work which Mr. Reid has now given to
the world comes opportunely to remind us of a very obvious and
commonplace consideration. It is that although Roman expansion not only
began, but was far advanced during the days of the Republic, Roman
Imperialism did not exist before the creation of Roman Emperors, and did
not in any considerable degree develop the vices generally, and
sometimes rightly, attributed to the system until some while after
Republican had given way to Imperial sway. "The residuary impression of
the ancient world," Mr. Reid says in his preface, "left by a classical
education comprises commonly the idea that the Romans ran, so to speak,
a sort of political steam-roller over the ancient world. This has a
semblance of truth for the period of decline, but none for the earlier
days."
The fundamental idea which ran through the whole of Roman policy during
the earliest, which was also the wisest and most statesmanlike stage of
expansion, was not any desire to ensure the detailed and direct
government of a number of outlying districts from one all-powerful
centre, but rather to adopt every possible means calculated to maintain
local autonomy, and to minimise the interference of the central
authority. Herself originally a city-state, Rome aspired to become the
predominant partner in a federation of municipalities, to which autonomy
was granted even to the extent of waiving that prerogative which has
generally been considered the distinctive mark of sovereignty, viz. the
right of coinage. Broadly speaking, the only conditions imposed were
very similar to those now forming the basis of the relations between the
British Government and the Native States of India. These were (1) that
the various commonwealths should keep the peace between each other; and
(2) that their foreign policy should be dictated by Rome. It is often
tacitly assumed, Mr. Reid says, that "in dealing with conquered peoples,
the Romans were animated from the first by a passion for immediate
domination and for grinding uniformity." This idea is not merely false;
it is the very reverse of the truth. The most distinctive feature of
Roman rule during the early period of expansion was its marvellous
elasticity and pliability. Everywhere local customs were scrupulously
respected. Everywhere the maintenance of whatever autonomous
institutions existed at the time of conquest was secured. Everywhere the
allies were treated with what the Greeks termed ἐπιμέλεια, which may be
rendered into English by the word "consideration." Nowhere was the fatal
mistake made of endeavouring to stamp out by force a local language or
dialect, whilst until the Romans were brought into contact with the
stubborn monotheism of the Jews, the easy-going pantheistic ideas
current in the ancient world readily obviated the occurrence of any
serious difficulties based on religious belief or ritual.
That this system produced results which were, from a political point of
view, eminently satisfactory cannot for a moment be doubted. Mr. Reid
says--and it were well that those who are interested in the cause of
British Imperial Federation should note the remark--"In history the
lightest bonds have often proved to be the strongest." The loosely
compacted alliance of the Italic states withstood all the efforts of
Hannibal to rend it asunder. The Roman system, in fact, created a double
patriotism, that which attached itself to the locality, and that which
broadened out into devotion to the metropolis. Neither was the one
allegiance destructive of the other. When Ennius made his famous boast
he did not mean that he spurned Rudiae and that he would for the future
look exclusively to Rome as his mother-country, but rather that both the
smaller and the larger patriotism would continue to exist side by side.
"English local life," it has been truly said, "was the source and
safeguard of English liberty."[100] It may be said with equal truth that
the notion of constituting self-governing town communities as the basis
of Empire, which, Mr. Reid tells us, "was deeply ingrained in the Roman
consciousness," stood Rome in good stead during some of the most stormy
periods of her history. The process of voluntary Romanisation was so
speedy that the natives of any province which, to use the Roman
expression, had been but recently "pacated," became in a very short time
loyal and zealous Roman subjects, and rarely if ever took advantage of
distress elsewhere to vindicate their independence by seeking to cast
off the light shackles which had been imposed on them.