Although the thunder of the guns of Kirk Kilisse and Lüle Burgas

proclaimed to Europe, in the words of the English Prime Minister, that

"the map of Eastern Europe had to be recast," it is none the less true

that the cause of the Turk was doomed from the moment when Balkan

discord ceased, and when the Greek, the Bulgarian, the Serb, and the

Montenegrin agreed to sink their differences and to act together against

the common enemy. Who was it who accomplished this miracle? Mr. Miller

says, "the authorship of this marvellous work, hitherto the despair of

statesmen, is uncertain, but it has been ascribed chiefly to M.

Venezélos." All, therefore, that can now be said is that it was the

brain, or possibly brains, of some master-workers which gave liberty to

the Balkan populations as surely as it was the brain of Cavour which

united Italy.[82]

Although these and possibly other points will, without doubt, eventually

receive more ample treatment at the hands of some future historian, Mr.

Miller has performed a most useful service in affording a guide by the

aid of which the historical student can find his way through the

labyrinthine maze of Balkan politics. He begins his story about the time

when Napoleon had appeared like a comet in the political firmament, and

by his erratic movements had caused all the statesmen of Europe to

diverge temporarily from their normal and conventional orbits, one

result being that the British Admiral Duckworth wandered in a somewhat

aimless fashion through the Dardanelles to Constantinople, and had very

little idea of what to do when he got there. Mr. Miller reminds us of

events of great importance in their day, but now almost wholly

forgotten: of how the ancient Republic of Ragusa, which had existed for

eleven centuries and which had earned the title of the "South Slavonic

Athens," was crushed out of existence under the iron heel of Marmont,

who forthwith proceeded to make some good roads and to vaccinate the

Dalmatians; of how Napoleon tried to partition the Balkans, but found,

with all his political and administrative genius, that he was face to

face with an "insoluble problem"; of how that rough man of genius,

Mahmoud II., hanged the Greek Patriarch from the gate of his palace, but

between the interludes of massacres and executions, brought his "energy

and indomitable force of will" to bear on the introduction of reforms;

of how the Venetian Count Capo d'Istria, who was eventually

assassinated, produced a local revolt by a well-intentioned attempt to

amend the primitive ethics of the Mainote Greeks--a tale which is not

without its warning if ever the time comes for dealing with a cognate

question amongst the wild tribes of Albania; and of how, amidst the

ever-shifting vicissitudes of Eastern politics, the Tsar of Russia, who

had heretofore posed as the "protector" of Roumans and Serbs against

their sovereign, sent his fleet to the Bosphorus in 1833 in order to

"protect" the sovereign against his rebellious vassal, Mehemet Ali, and

exacted a reward for his services in the shape of the leonine

arrangement signed at Hunkiar-Iskelesi. And so Mr. Miller carries us on

from massacre to massacre, from murder to murder, and from one

bewildering treaty to another, all of which, however, present this

feature of uniformity, that the Turk, signing of his own free will, but

with an unwilling mind--ἑκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ--made on each occasion

either some new concession to the ever-rising tide of Christian demand,

or ratified the loss of a province which had been forcibly torn from his

flank. Finally, we get to the period when the tragedy connected with the

name of Queen Draga acted like an electric shock on Europe, and when

the accession of King Peter, "who had translated Mill _On Liberty_," to

the blood-stained Servian throne, revealed to an astonished world that

the processes of Byzantinism survived to the present day. Five years

later followed the assumption by Prince Ferdinand of the title of "Tsar

of the Bulgarians," and it then only required the occurrence of some

opportunity and the appearance on the scene of some Balkan Cavour to

bring the struggle of centuries to the final issue of a death-grapple

between the followers of aggressive Christianity and those of stagnant

Islamism.

The whole tale is at once dramatic and dreary, dramatic because it is

occasionally illumined by acts of real heroism, such as the gallant

defence of Plevna by Ghazi Osman, a graphic account of which was written

by an adventurous young Englishman (Mr. W.V. Herbert) who served in the

Turkish army, or again as the conduct of the Cretan Abbot Máneses who,

in 1866, rather than surrender to the Turks, "put a match to the

powder-magazine, thus uniting defenders and assailants in one common

hecatomb." It is dreary because the mind turns with horror and disgust

from the endless record of government by massacre, in which, it is to be

observed, the crime of bloodguiltiness can by no means be laid

exclusively at the door of the dominant race, whilst Mr. Miller's

sombre but perfectly true remark that "assassination or abdication,

execution or exile, has been the normal fate of Balkan rulers," throws a

lurid light on the whole state of Balkan society.

But how does the work of diplomacy, and especially of British diplomacy,

stand revealed by the light of the history of the past century? The

point is one of importance, all the more so because there is a tendency

on the part of some British politicians to mistrust diplomatists, to

think that, either from incapacity or design, they serve as agents to

stimulate war rather than as peace-makers, and to hold that a more

minute interference by the House of Commons in the details of diplomatic

negotiations would be useful and beneficial. It would be impossible

within the limits of an ordinary newspaper article to deal adequately

with this question. This much, however, may be said--that, even taking

the most unfavourable view of the results achieved by diplomacy, there

is nothing whatever in Mr. Miller's history to engender the belief that

better results would have been obtained by shifting the responsibility

to a greater degree from the shoulders of the executive to those of

Parliament. The evidence indeed rather points to an opposite conclusion.

For instance, Mr. Miller informs us that inopportune action taken in

England was one of the causes which contributed to the outbreak of

hostilities between Greece and Turkey in 1897. "An address from a

hundred British members of Parliament encouraged the masses, ignorant of

the true condition of British politics, to count upon the help of Great

Britain."

It is, however, quite true that a moralist, if he were so minded, might

in Mr. Miller's pages find abundant material for a series of homilies on

the vanity of human wishes, and especially of diplomatic human wishes.

But would he on that account be right in pronouncing a wholesale

condemnation of diplomacy? Assuredly not. Rather, the conclusion to be

drawn from a review of past history is that a small number of very

well-informed and experienced diplomatists showed remarkable foresight

in perceiving the future drift of events. So early as 1837 Lord

Palmerston supported Milosh Obrenovitch II., the ruler of Servia,

against Turkey, as he had "come to the conclusion that to strengthen the

small Christian States of the Near East was the true policy of both

Turkey and Great Britain." Similar views were held at a later period by

Sir William White, and were eventually adopted by the Government of Lord

Beaconsfield. An equal amount of foresight was displayed by some Russian

diplomatists. In Lord Morley's _Life of Gladstone_ (vol. i. p. 479) a

very remarkable letter is given, which was addressed to the Emperor

Nicholas by Baron Brunnow, just before the outbreak of the Crimean War,

in which he advocated peace on the ground that "war would not turn to

Russian advantage.... The Ottoman Empire may be transformed into

independent States, which for us will only become either burdensome

clients or hostile neighbours." It may be that, as is now very generally

thought, the Crimean War was a mistake, and that, in the classic words

of Lord Salisbury, we "put our money on the wrong horse." But it is none

the less true that had it not been for the Crimean War and the policy

subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's government, the independence

of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians

would now be in possession of Constantinople. It is quite permissible to

argue that, had they been left unopposed, British interests would not

have suffered; but even supposing this very debatable proposition to be

true, it must be regarded, from an historical point of view, as at best

an _ex post facto_ argument. British diplomacy has to represent British

public opinion, and during almost the whole period of which Mr. Miller's

history treats, a cardinal article of British political faith was that,

in the interests of Great Britain, Constantinople should not be allowed

to fall into Russian hands. The occupation of Egypt in 1882 without

doubt introduced a new and very important element into the discussion.

The most serious as also the least excusable mistake in British

Near-Eastern policy of recent years has been the occupation of Cyprus,

which burthened us with a perfectly useless possession, and inflicted a

serious blow on our prestige. Sir Edward Grey's recent diplomatic

success is in a large measure due to the fact that all the Powers

concerned were convinced of British disinterestedness.

[Footnote 81: _The Ottoman Empire_, 1801-1913. By W. Miller. Cambridge:

At the University Press. 7s. 6d.]

[Footnote 82: This article was, of course, written before the war which

subsequently broke out between the Bulgarians and their former allies,

the Greeks and the Servians.]

XV

WELLINGTONIANA[83]

_"The Spectator," June 21, 1913_

In dealing with Lady Shelley's sprightly and discursive comments upon

the current events of her day, we have to transport ourselves back into

a society which, though not very remote in point of time, has now so

completely passed away that it is difficult fully to realise its

feelings, opinions, and aspirations. It was a time when a learned

divine, writing in the _Church and State Gazette_, had proved entirely

to his own satisfaction, and apparently also to that of Lady Shelley,

that a "remarkable fulfilment of that hitherto incomprehensible prophecy

in the Revelations" had taken place, inasmuch as Napoleon Bonaparte was

most assuredly "the seventh head of the Beast." It was a time when

Londoners rode in the Green Park instead of Rotten Row, and when, in

spite of the admiration expressed for the talents of that rising young

politician, Mr. Robert Peel, it was impossible to deny that "his birth

ran strongly against him"--a consideration which elicited from Lady

Shelley the profound remark that it is "strange to search into the

recesses of the human mind."

Lady Shelley herself seems to have been rather a _femme incomprise_. She

had lived much on the Continent, and appreciated the greater deference

paid to a charming and accomplished woman in Viennese and Parisian

society, compared with the boorishness of Englishmen who would not

"waste their time" in paying pretty compliments to ladies which "could

be repaid by a smile." She records her impressions in French, a language

in which she was thoroughly proficient. "Je sais," she says, "qu'en

Angleterre il ne faut pas s'attendre à cultiver son esprit; qu'il faut,

pour être contente à Londres, se résoudre à se plaire avec la

médiocrité; à entendre tous les jours répéter les mêmes banalités et à

s'abaisser autant qu'on le peut au niveau des femmelettes avec

lesquelles l'on vit, et qui, pour plaire, affectent plus de frivolité

qu'elles n'ont réellement. Le plaisir de causer nous est défendu."

Nevertheless, however much she may have mentally appreciated the

solitude of a crowd, she determined to adapt herself to her social

surroundings. "C'est un sacrifice," she says, "que je fais à mon Dieu et

à mon devoir comme Anglaise." Impelled, therefore, alike by piety and

patriotism, she cast aside all ideas of leading an eremitic life,

plunged into the vortex of the social world, and mixed with all the

great men and women of the day. Of these the most notable was the Duke

of Wellington.

Lady Shelley certainly possessed one quality which eminently fitted her

to play the part of Boswell to the Duke. The worship of her hero was

without the least mixture of alloy. She had a pheasant, which the Duke

had killed, stuffed, and "added to other souvenirs which ornamented her

dressing-room"; and she records, with manifest pride, that "amongst her

other treasures" was a chair on which he sat upon the first occasion of

his dining with her husband and herself in 1814. It was well to have

that pheasant stuffed, for apparently the Duke, like his great

antagonist, did not shoot many pheasants. He was not only "a very wild

shot," but also a very bad shot. Napoleon, Mr. Oman tells us,[84] on one

occasion "lodged some pellets in Masséna's left eye while letting fly at

a pheasant," and then without the least hesitation accused "the faithful

Berthier" of having fired the shot, an accusation which was at once

confirmed by the mendacious but courtierlike victim of the accident.

Wellington also, Lady Shelley records, "after wounding a retriever early

in the day and later on peppering the keeper's gaiters, inadvertently

sprinkled the bare arms of an old woman who chanced to be washing

clothes at her cottage window." Lady Shelley, who "was attracted by her

screams," promptly told the widow that "it ought to be the proudest

moment of her life. She had had the distinction of being shot by the

great Duke of Wellington," but the eminently practical instinct of the

great Duke at once whispered to him that something more than the moral

satisfaction to be derived from this reflection was required, so he very

wisely "slipped a golden coin into her trembling hand."

For many years Lady Shelley lived on very friendly and intimate terms

with the Duke, who appears to have confided to her many things about

which he would perhaps have acted more wisely if he had held his tongue.

When he went on an important diplomatic mission to Paris in 1822, she

requested him to buy her a blouse--a commission which he faithfully

executed. All went well until 1848. Then a terrific explosion occurred.

It is no longer "My dearest Lady! Mind you bring the blouse! Ever yours

most affectionately, Wellington," but "My dear Lady Shelley," who is

addressed by "Her Ladyship's most obedient humble servant, Wellington,"

and soundly rated for her conduct. The reason for this abrupt and

volcanic change was that owing to an indiscretion on the part of Lady

Shelley a very important letter about the defenceless state of the

country, which the Duke had addressed to Sir John Burgoyne, then the

head of the Engineer Department at the Horse Guards, got into the

newspapers. The Duke's wrath boiled over, and was expressed in terms

which, albeit the reproaches were just, showed but little chivalrous

consideration towards a peccant but very contrite woman. He told her

that he "had much to do besides defending himself from the consequences

of the meddling gossip of the ladies of modern times," and he asked

indignantly, "What do Sir John Burgoyne and his family and your Ladyship

and others--talking of old friendship--say to the share which each of

you have had in this transaction, which, in my opinion, is disgraceful

to the times in which we live?" What Sir John Burgoyne and his family

might very reasonably have said in answer to this formidable

interrogatory is that, although no one can defend the conduct of

Delilah, it was certainly most unwise of Samson to trust her with his

secret. It is consolatory to know that, under the influence of Sir John

Shelley's tact and good-humour, a treaty of peace was eventually

concluded. Sir John happened to meet the Duke at a party.

"'Good-evening, Duke,' said Sir John, in his most winning manner. 'Do

you know, it has been said, by some one who must have been present, that

the cackling of geese once saved Rome. I have been thinking that perhaps

the cackling of my old Goose may yet save England!' This wholly

unexpected sally proved too much for the Duke, who burst out into a

hearty laugh. 'By G----d, Shelley!' said he, 'you are right: give me

your honest hand.'" The Duke then returned to Apsley House and "penned a

playful letter to Lady Shelley."

It is not to be expected that much of real historical interest can be

extracted from a Diary of this sort. It may, however, be noted that when

the _Bellerophon_ reached the English coast "it was only by coercion

that the Ministers prevented George IV. from receiving Bonaparte. The

King wanted to hold him as a captive." Moreover, Brougham, who was in a

position to know, said, "There can be little doubt that if Bonaparte had

got to London, the Whig Opposition were ready to use him as their trump

card to overturn the Government."

The main interest in the book, however, lies in the light which it

throws on the Duke's inner life and in the characteristic _obiter dicta_

which he occasionally let fall. Of these, none is more characteristic

than the remark he made on meeting his former love, Miss Catherine

Pakenham, after an absence of eight years in India. He wrote to her,

making a proposal of marriage, but Miss Pakenham told him "that before

any engagement was made he must see her again; as she had grown old, had

lost all her good looks, and was a very different person to the girl he

had loved in former years." The story, which has been frequently

repeated, that Miss Pakenham was marked with the smallpox, is

untrue,[85] but, without doubt, during the Duke's absence, she had a

good deal changed. The Duke himself certainly thought so, for, on first

meeting her again, he whispered to his brother, "She has grown d----d

ugly, by Jove!" Nevertheless he married her, being moved to do so, not

apparently from any very deep feelings of affection, but because his

leading passion was a profound regard for truth and loyalty which led

him to admire and appreciate the straightforwardness of Miss Pakenham's

conduct. Lady Shelley exultingly exclaims, "Well might she be proud and

happy, and glory in such a husband." That the Duchess was proud of her

husband is certain. Whether she was altogether happy is more doubtful.

One of the stock anecdotes about the Duke of Wellington is that when on

one occasion some one asked him whether he was surprised at Waterloo, he

replied, "No. I was not surprised then, but I am now." We are indebted

to Lady Shelley for letting us know what the Duke really thought on this

much-debated question. In a letter written to her on March 22, 1820, he

stated, with his usual downright common sense, all that there is to be

said on this subject. "Supposing I _was_ surprised; I won the battle;

and what could you have had more, even if I had not been surprised?"

It is known on the authority of his niece, Lady Burghersh, that the Duke

"never read poetry," but his "real love of music," to which Lady Shelley

alludes, will perhaps come as a surprise to many. Mr. Fortescue,

however,[86] has told us that in his youth the Duke learnt to play the

violin, and that he only abandoned it, when he was about thirty years

old, "because he judged it unseemly or perhaps ill-sounding for a

General to be a fiddler." The Duke is not the only great soldier who has

been a musical performer. Marshal St. Cyr used to play the violin "in

the quiet moments of a campaign," and Sir Hope Grant was a very fair

performer on the violoncello.

It was characteristic of the Duke to keep the fact of his being about to

fight a duel with Lord Winchelsea carefully concealed from all his

friends. When it was over, he walked into Lady Shelley's room while she

was at breakfast and said, "Well, what do you think of a gentleman who

has been fighting a duel?"

It appears that during the last years of his life the Duke's great

companion-in-arms, Blücher, was subject to some strange hallucinations.

The following affords a fitting counterpart to those "fears of the

brave" which Pope attributed to the dying Marlborough. On March 17,

1819, Lady Shelley made the following entry in her diary:

We laughed at poor Blücher's strange hallucination, which, though

ludicrous, is very sad. He fancies himself with child by a

Frenchman; and deplores that such an event should have happened to

him in his old age! He does not so much mind being with child, but

cannot reconcile himself to the thought that he--of all people in

the world--should be destined to give birth to a _Frenchman_! On

every other subject Blücher is said to be quite rational. This

peculiar form of madness shows the bent of his mind; so that while

we laugh our hearts reproach us. The Duke of Wellington assures me

that he knows this to be a fact.

Finally, attention may be drawn to a singular and interesting letter

from Sir Walter Scott to Shelley, giving some advice which it may be

presumed the young poet did not take to heart. He was "cautioned against

enthusiasm, which, while it argued an excellent disposition and a

feeling heart, requires to be watched and restrained, though not

repressed."

[Footnote 83: _The Diary of Frances, Lady Shelley_ (1818-1873). London:

John Murray. 10s. 6d.]

[Footnote 84: _History of the Peninsular War_, vol. iii. p. 209.]

[Footnote 85: Maxwell's _Life of Wellington_, vol. i. p. 78]

[Footnote 86: _British Statesmen of the Great War_, p. 241.]

XVI

BURMA[87]

_"The Spectator," June 28, 1913_

The early history of the British connection with Burma presents all the

features uniformly to be found in the growth of British Imperialism.

These are, first, reluctance to move, coupled with fear of the results

of expansion, ending finally with a cession to the irresistible tendency

to expand; secondly, vagueness of purpose as to what should be done with

a new and somewhat unwelcome acquisition; thirdly, a tardy recognition

of its value, with the result that what was first an inclination to make

the best of a bad job only gradually transforms itself into a feeling of

satisfaction and congratulation that, after all, the unconscious

founders of the British Empire, here as elsewhere, blundered more or

less unawares into the adoption of a sound and far-seeing Imperial

policy.

Political and Literary essays, 1908-1913 · 第 14 / 24 段