in order to obtain adequate security for the bond-holders--in whom I am
not in any way personally interested, for I shall certainly not be one
of them--but also in the interests of the Chinese people, it is
essential, before any loan is contracted, to insist on a strict
supervision of the expenditure of the loan funds. That Young China,
partly on genuine patriotic grounds and also possibly in some cases on
grounds which are less worthy of respect and sympathy, should resent the
exercise of this supervision, is natural enough, but it can scarcely be
doubted that unless it be exercised a large portion of the money
advanced by European capitalists will be wasted, and that no really
effective step forward will be taken in the solution of the economic
problem which constitutes the main Chinese difficulty. The very
rudimentary ideas entertained by the Chinese themselves in the matter of
applying funds to productive works is sufficiently illustrated by the
episode mentioned by Mr. Bland, where he tells us that "the Szechuan
Railway Company directors made provision for the building of their line
by the appointment of station-masters"; while the fact that but a short
time ago 1400 German machine guns, costing £500 apiece, which had never
been used or paid for, were lying at Shanghai, indicates the manner in
which it is not only possible but highly probable that the loan funds
under exclusively Chinese supervision would be frittered away on
unproductive objects.
Those, indeed, who have had some practical experience of financial
administration in Eastern countries may well entertain some doubts as to
whether supervision which only embraces the expenditure, and does not
apply to the revenue, will be sufficient to meet all the requirements of
the case. The results so far attained by the more limited scheme of
supervision do not appear to have been satisfactory. Herr Rump was
appointed auditor to the German section of the Tientsin-P'ukou Railway,
but Mr. Bland tells us that "the auditorship on this railway has proved
worse than useless as a preventive of official peculation." On the other
hand, the system of collecting the revenue is in the highest degree
defective. It violates flagrantly a principle which, from the days of
Adam Smith downwards, has always been regarded as the corner-stone of
any sound financial administration. "For every tael officially accounted
for by the provincial authorities," Mr. Bland says, in words which
recall to my mind the Egyptian fiscal system under the régime of Ismail
Pasha, "at least five are actually collected from the taxpayers."
It is, therefore, earnestly to be hoped that the diplomatists and
capitalists of Europe will--both in the interests of the investing
public and in those of the Chinese people--stand firm and insist on
adequate financial control as a preliminary and essential condition to
the advance of funds.
As to whether the recently established Republic is destined to last or
whether it will prove a mere ephemeral episode in the life-history of
China, there seems to be much divergence of opinion among those
authorities who are most qualified to speak on the subject. Mr. Bland's
views on this point are, however, quite clear. He thinks that
Confucianism, and all the political and social habits of thought which
are the outcome of Confucianism, have "become ingrained in every fibre
of the national life," and that they constitute the "fundamental cause
of the longevity of China's social structure and of the innate strength
of her civilisation." He refuses to believe that Young China, which is
imbued with "a doctrinaire spirit of political speculation," though it
may tinker with the superstructure, will be able seriously to shake the
foundations of this hoary edifice. He has watched the opinions and
activities in every province from the beginning of the present
revolution, and he "is compelled to the conviction that salvation from
this quarter is impossible." He thinks that although in Canton and the
Kuang Provinces, which are the most intellectually advanced portions of
China, a system of popular representation may be introduced with some
hope of beneficial results,
... as regards the rest of China, as every educated Chinese knows
(unless, like Sun Yat-Sen, he has been brought up abroad), the idea
of rapidly transforming the masses of the population into an
intelligent electorate, and of making a Chinese Parliament the
expression of their collective political vitality, is a vain dream,
possible only for those who ignore the inherent character of the
Chinese people.
There is, however, one consideration set forth by Mr. Bland, which may
possibly prove, at all events for a time, the salvation, while it
assuredly connotes the condemnation of the present system of government,
and that is that the Chinese Republic may continue to exist by
abrogating all republican principles. According to Mr. Bland this "gran
rifiuto" has already been made. "The actual government of China," he
says, "contains none of the elements of genuine Republicanism, but is
merely the old despotism, the old Mandarinate, under new names." "The
inauguration of the Republican idea of constitutional Government in
China," he says in another passage, "can only mean, in the present state
of the people, continual transference of an illegal despotism from one
group of political adventurers to another, the pretence of popular
representation serving merely to increase and perpetuate instability."
It would require a far greater knowledge of Chinese affairs than any to
which I can pretend to express either unqualified adherence to or
dissent from Mr. Bland's views. But it is clear that his diagnosis of
the past is based on a very thorough acquaintance with the facts, while,
on _a priori_ grounds, his prognosis of the future is calculated to
commend itself to those of general experience who have studied Oriental
character and are acquainted with Oriental history.
[Footnote 66: _High Albania_, p. 311.]
[Footnote 67: See on this subject the final remarks in Mr. Bland's very
instructive chapter xiv.]
VII
THE CAPITULATIONS IN EGYPT
_"The Nineteenth Century and After," July 1913_
During the six years which have elapsed since I left Cairo I have, for
various reasons on which it is unnecessary to dwell, carefully abstained
from taking any part in whatever discussions have arisen on current
Egyptian affairs. If I now depart from the reticence which I have
hitherto observed it is because there appears at all events some slight
prospect that the main reform which is required to render the government
and administration of Egypt efficient will be seriously considered. As
so frequently happens in political affairs, a casual incident has
directed public attention to the need of reform. A short time ago a
Russian subject was, at the request of the Consular authorities,
arrested by the Egyptian police and handed over to them for deportation
to Russia. I am not familiar with the details of the case, neither, for
the purposes of my present argument, is any knowledge of those details
required. The nature of the offence of which this man, Adamovitch by
name, was accused, as also the question of whether he was guilty or
innocent of that offence, are altogether beside the point. The legal
obligation of the Egyptian Government to comply with the request that
the man should be handed over to the Russian Consular authorities would
have been precisely the same if he had been accused of no offence at
all. The result, however, has been to touch one of the most tender
points in the English political conscience. It has become clear that a
country which is not, indeed, British territory, but which is held by a
British garrison, and in which British influence is predominant, affords
no safe asylum for a political refugee. Without in any way wishing to
underrate the importance of this consideration, I think it necessary to
point out that this is only one out of the many anomalies which might be
indicated in the working of that most perplexing political creation
entitled the Egyptian Government and administration. Many instances
might, in fact, be cited which, albeit they are less calculated to
attract public attention in this country, afford even stronger ground
for holding that the time has come for reforming the system hitherto
known as that of the Capitulations.
Before attempting to deal with this question I may perhaps be pardoned
if, at the risk of appearing egotistical, I indulge in a very short
chapter of autobiography. My own action in Egypt has formed the subject
of frequent comment in this country; neither, assuredly, in spite of
occasional blame, have I any reason to complain of the measure of
praise--often, I fear, somewhat unmerited praise--which has been
accorded to me. But I may perhaps be allowed to say what, in my own
opinion, are the main objects achieved during my twenty-four-years'
tenure of office. Those achievements are four in number, and let me add
that they were not the results of a hand-to-mouth conduct of affairs in
which the direction afforded to political events was constantly shifted,
but of a deliberate plan persistently pursued with only such temporary
deviations and delays as the circumstances of the time rendered
inevitable.
In the first place, the tension with the French Government, which lasted
for twenty-one years and which might at any moment have become very
serious, was never allowed to go beyond a certain point. In spite of a
good deal of provocation, a policy of conciliation was persistently
adopted, with the result that the conclusion of the Anglo-French
Agreement of 1904 became eventually possible. It is on this particular
feature of my Egyptian career that personally I look back with far
greater pride and pleasure than any other, all the more so because,
although it has, comparatively speaking, attracted little public
attention, it was, in reality, by far the most difficult and responsible
part of my task.
In the second place, bankruptcy was averted and the finances of the
country placed on a sound footing.
In the third place, by the relief of taxation and other reforms which
remedied any really substantial grievances, the ground was cut away from
under the feet of the demagogues whom it was easy to foresee would
spring into existence as education advanced.
In the fourth place, the Soudan, which had to be abandoned in 1884-85,
was eventually recovered.
These, I say, are the things which were done. Let me now state what was
not done. Although, of course, the number of Egyptians employed in the
service of the Government was largely increased, and although the
charges which have occasionally been made that education was unduly
neglected admit of easy refutation, it is none the less true that
little, if any, progress was made in the direction of conferring
autonomy on Egypt. The reasons why so little progress was made in this
direction were twofold.
In the first place, it would have been premature even to think of the
question until the long struggle against bankruptcy had been fought and
won, and also until, by the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement in
1904, the acute international tension which heretofore existed had been
relaxed.
In the second place, the idea of what constituted autonomy entertained
by those Egyptians who were most in a position to make their voices
heard, as also by some of their English sympathisers, differed widely
from that entertained by myself and others who were well acquainted with
the circumstances of the country, and on whom the responsibility of
devising and executing any plan for granting autonomy would naturally
devolve. We were, in fact, the poles asunder. The Egyptian idea was that
the native Egyptians should rule Egypt. They therefore urged that
greatly increased powers should be given to the Legislative Council and
Assembly originally instituted by Lord Dufferin. The counter-idea was
not based on any alleged incapacity of the Egyptians to govern
themselves--a point which, for the purposes of my present argument, it
is unnecessary to discuss. Neither was it based on any disinclination
gradually to extend the powers of Egyptians in dealing with purely
native Egyptian questions.[68] I, and others who shared my views,
considered that those who cried "Egypt for the Egyptians" on the
house-tops had gone off on an entirely wrong scent because, even had
they attained their ends, nothing approaching to Egyptian autonomy would
have been realised. The Capitulations would still have barred the way to
all important legislation and to the removal of those defects in the
administration of which the Egyptians most complained. When the
prominent part played by resident Europeans in the political and social
life of Egypt is considered, it is indeed little short of ridiculous to
speak of Egyptian autonomy if at the same time a system is preserved
under which no important law can be made applicable to an Englishman, a
Frenchman, or a German, without its detailed provisions having received
the consent, not only of the King of England, the President of the
French Republic, and the German Emperor, but also that of the President
of the United States, the King of Denmark, and every other ruling
Potentate in Europe. We therefore held that the only possible method by
which the evils of extreme personal government could be averted, and by
which the country could be provided with a workable legislative machine,
was to include in the term "Egyptians" all the dwellers in Egypt, and to
devise some plan by which the European and Egyptian elements of society
would be fused together to such an extent at all events as to render
them capable of cooperating in legislative effort. It may perhaps be
hoped that by taking a first step in this direction some more thorough
fusion may possibly follow in the future.
As I have already mentioned, it would have been premature to deal with
this question prior to 1904, for any serious modification of the régime
of the Capitulations could not be considered as within the domain of
practical politics so long as all the Powers, and more especially France
and England, were pulling different ways. But directly that agreement
was signed I resolved to take the question up, all the more so because
what was then known as the Secret Agreement, but which has since that
time been published, contained the following very important clause:
In the event of their (His Britannic Majesty's Government)
considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to
assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in
other civilised countries, the Government of the French Republic
will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the
understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to
entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French
Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing
similar reforms in Morocco.
I was under no delusion as to the formidable nature of the obstacles
which stood in the way of reform. Moreover, I held very strongly that
even if it had been possible, by diplomatic negotiations with the other
Powers, to come to some arrangement which would be binding on the
Europeans resident in Egypt, and to force it on them without their
consent being obtained, it was most undesirable to adopt anything
approaching to this procedure. The European colonists in Egypt, although
of course numerically far inferior to the native population, represent a
large portion of the wealth, and a still larger portion of the
intelligence and energy in the country. Moreover, although the word
"privilege" always rather grates on the ear in this democratic age, it
is none the less true that in the past the misgovernment of Egypt has
afforded excellent reasons why even those Europeans who are most
favourably disposed towards native aspirations should demur to any
sacrifice of their capitulary rights. My view, therefore, was that the
Europeans should not be coerced but persuaded. It had to be proved to
them that, under the changed condition of affairs, the Capitulations
were not only unnecessary but absolutely detrimental to their own
interests. Personally, I was very fully convinced of the truth of this
statement, neither was it difficult to convince those who, being behind
the scenes of government, were in a position to judge of the extent to
which the Capitulations clogged progress in many very important
directions. But it was more difficult to convince the general public,
many of whom entertained very erroneous ideas as to the extent and
nature of the proposed reforms, and could see nothing but the fact that
it was intended to deprive them of certain privileges which they then
possessed. It cannot be too distinctly understood that there never
was--neither do I suppose there is now--the smallest intention of
"abolishing the Capitulations," if by that term is meant a complete
abrogation of all those safeguards against arbitrary proceedings on the
part of the Government which the Capitulations are intended to prevent.
Capitulations or no Capitulations, the European charged with a criminal
offence must be tried either by European judges or an European jury. All
matters connected with the personal status of any European must be
judged by the laws in force in his own country. Adequate safeguards
must be contrived to guard against any abuse of power on the part of the
police. Whatever reforms are introduced into the Mixed Tribunals must be
confined to comparatively minor points, and must not touch fundamental
principles. In fact, the Capitulations have not to be abolished, but to
be modified. An eminent French jurist, M. Gabriel Louis Jaray, in
discussing the Egyptian situation a few years ago, wrote:
On peut considérer comme admis qu'une simple occupation ou un
protectorat de fait, reconnu par les Puissances Européennes, suffit
pour mettre à néant les Capitulations, quand la réorganisation du
pays est suffisante pour donner aux Européens pleine garantie de
bonne juridiction.
I contend that the reorganisation of Egypt is now sufficiently advanced
to admit of the guarantees for the good administration of justice, which
M. Jaray very rightly claimed, being afforded to all Europeans without
having recourse to the clumsy methods of the Capitulations in their
present form.
In the last two reports which I wrote before I left Egypt I developed
these and some cognate arguments at considerable length. But from the
first moment of taking up the question I never thought that it would
fall to my lot to bring the campaign against the Capitulations to a
conclusion. The question was eminently one as to which it was
undesirable to force the pace. Time was required in order to let public
opinion mature. I therefore contented myself with indicating the defects
of the present system and the general direction which reform should
take, leaving it to those younger than myself to carry on the work when
advancing years obliged me to retire. I may add that the manner in which
my proposals were received and discussed by the European public in Egypt
afforded good reason for supposing that the obstacles to be overcome
before any serious reforms could be effected, though formidable, were by
no means insuperable. After my departure in 1907, events occurred which
rendered it impossible that the subject should at once come under the
consideration of the Government, but in 1911 Lord Kitchener was able to
report that the legislative powers of the Court of Appeal sitting at
Alexandria had been somewhat increased. Sir Malcolm M'Ilwraith, the
Judicial Adviser of the Egyptian Government, in commenting on this
change, says:
The new scheme, while assuredly a progressive step, and in notable
advance of the previous state of affairs ... can hardly be
regarded, in its ensemble, as more than a temporary makeshift, and
a more or less satisfactory palliative of the legislative impotence
under which the Government has suffered for so long.
It is most earnestly to be hoped that the question will now be taken up
seriously with a view to more drastic reform than any which has as yet
been effected.
There is one, and only one, method by which the evils of the existing
system can be made to disappear. The British Government should request
the other Powers of Europe to vest in them the legislative power which
each now exercises separately. Simultaneously with this request, a
legislative Chamber should be created in Egypt for enacting laws to
which Europeans will be amenable.
There is, of course, one essential preliminary to the execution of this
programme. It is that the Powers of Europe, as also the European
residents in Egypt, should have thorough confidence in the intentions of
the British Government, by which I mean confidence in the duration of
the occupation, and also confidence in the manner in which the affairs
of the country will be administered.
As regards the first point, there is certainly no cause for doubt. Under
the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 the French Government specifically
declared that "they will not obstruct the action of government in Egypt
by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation, or
in any other manner." Moreover, one of the last acts that I performed
before I left Egypt in 1907 was to communicate to the British Chamber of
Commerce at Alexandria a letter from Sir Edward Grey in which I was
authorised to state that His Majesty's Government "recognise that the
maintenance and development of such reforms as have hitherto been
effected in Egypt depend upon the British occupation. This consideration
will apply with equal strength to any changes effected in the régime of
the Capitulations. His Majesty's Government, therefore, wish it to be
understood that there is no reason for allowing the prospect of any
modifications in that régime to be prejudiced by the existence of any
doubt as to the continuance of the British occupation of the country."
It is, of course, conceivable that in some remote future the British
garrison may be withdrawn from Egypt. If any fear is entertained on this
ground it may easily be calmed by an arrangement with the Powers that in
the event of the British Government wishing to withdraw their troops,
they would previously enter into communications with the various Powers
of Europe with a view to re-establishing whatever safeguards they might
think necessary in the interests of their countrymen.
As regards the second point, that is to say, confidence in the manner in
which the administration of the country is conducted, I need only say
that, so far as I am able to judge, Lord Kitchener's administration,
although one of his measures--the Five Feddan law--has, not unnaturally,
been subjected to a good deal of hostile criticism, has inspired the
fullest confidence in the minds of the whole of the population of Egypt,
whether European or native. I cannot doubt that, when the time arrives
for Lord Kitchener, in his turn, to retire, no brusque or radical change
will be allowed to take place in the general principles under which he
is now administering the country.