The point of departure of the British Government is altogether

different. Its intentions are admirable. Every farthing which has been

spent--and, it may be feared, often wasted--on the numerous military

expeditions in which the Government of India has been engaged during the

last century would, in the eyes of many, certainly be considered as

expenditure incurred on objects which were of paramount interest to the

Indian taxpayers. Moreover, a whole category of British legislation

connected with fiscal matters has been undertaken, not so much with a

view to increase the revenue as with the object of distributing the

burthen of taxation equally amongst the different classes of society.

Much of this legislation has been perfectly justifiable and even

beneficial. Nevertheless, it should never be forgotten that it is

generally based on the purely Western principle that abstract justice is

in itself a desirable thing to attain, and that a fiscal or

administrative system stands condemned if it is wanting in symmetry. It

was against any extreme application of this principle that Burke

directed some of his most forcible diatribes.[18] It has been already

pointed out that the commendable want of intellectual symmetry which is

the inherited possession of the Englishman gives him a very great

advantage as an Imperialist agent over those trained in the rigid and

bureaucratic school of Continental Europe. But the Englishman is a

Western, albeit an Anglo-Saxon Western, and, from the point of view of

all processes of reasoning, the gulf which separates any one member of

the European family from another is infinitely less wide than that which

divides all Westerns from all Orientals. Even the Englishman, therefore,

is constrained--sometimes much against his will--to bow down in that

temple of Logic, the existence of which the Oriental is disposed

altogether to ignore. Indeed, sometimes the choice lies between the

enforcement on the reluctant Oriental of principles based on

logic--occasionally on the very simple science of arithmetic--or

abandoning the work of civilisation altogether. From this point of view,

the dangers to which the British Empire is exposed by reason of fiscal

measures are due not, as was the case with Rome, to barbarous, but

rather to ultra-scientific finance. The following is a case in point.

The land-tax has always been the principal source from which Oriental

potentates have derived their revenues. For all practical purposes it

may be said that the system which they have adopted has generally been

to take as much from the cultivators as they could get. Reformers, such

as the Emperor Akbar, have at times endeavoured to introduce more

enlightened methods of taxation, and to carry into practice the

theories upon which the fiscal system in all Moslem countries is based.

Those theories are by no means so objectionable as is often supposed.

But the reforms which some few capable rulers attempted to introduce

have almost always crumbled away under the régime of their

successors.[19] In practice, the only limit to the demands of the ruler

of an Oriental State has been the ability of the taxpayers to satisfy

them.[20] The only defence of the taxpayers has lain in the concealment

of their incomes at the risk of being tortured till they divulged their

amount.

Nevertheless, even under such a system as this, the wind is tempered to

the shorn lamb by the fact that Oriental rulers recognise that they

cannot get money from a man who possesses none. If, from drought or

other causes, the cultivator raises no crop, he is not required to pay

any land-tax. The idea of expropriation for the non-payment of taxes is

purely Western and modern. Under Roman law, it was the rule in contracts

for rent that a tenant was not bound to pay if any _vis major_ prevented

him from reaping.

The European system is very different. A far less heavy demand is made

on the cultivator, but he is, at all events in principle and sometimes

in practice, called upon to meet it in good and bad years alike. He is

expected to save in years of plenty in order to make good the deficit in

lean years. If he is unable to pay, he is liable to be expropriated, and

he often is expropriated. This plan is just, logical, and very Western.

It may be questioned whether Oriental cultivators do not sometimes

rather prefer the oppression and elasticity of the Eastern to the

justice and rigidity of the Western system.

Various palliatives have been adopted in India with a view to giving

some elasticity to the working of the Land Revenue system. In Egypt,

where the administration is much less Anglicised than in India, and

where, for various reasons, the treatment of this subject presents

relatively fewer difficulties, it is the practice now, as was the case

under purely native rule, to remit the taxes on what is known as

_Sharaki_ lands, that is to say, land which, owing to a low Nile, has

not been irrigated. It is not, however, necessary to dwell on the

details of this subject. It will be sufficient to draw attention to the

different points of view from which the Eastern and the Western approach

the subject of fiscal administration. The latter urges with unanswerable

logic that financial equilibrium must be maintained, and that he cannot

frame a trustworthy Budget unless he knows the amount he may count on

receiving from direct taxes, especially from the land-tax. The Eastern

replies that he knows nothing of either financial equilibrium or of

budgets, that it has, indeed, from time immemorial been the custom to

leave him nought but a bare pittance when he had money, but to refrain

from any endeavours to extort money from him when he had none.

Another instance drawn, not from the practices of fiscal administration,

but from legislation on a cognate subject, may be cited.

Directly Western civilisation comes in contact with a backward Oriental

Society, the relations between debtor and creditor are entirely changed.

A social revolution is effected. The Western applies his code with stern

and ruthless logic. The child-like Eastern, on the other hand, cannot be

made to understand that his house should be sold over his head because

he affixed his seal to a document, which, very probably, he had never

read, or, at all events, had never fully understood, and which was

presented to him by a man at one time apparently animated with

benevolent intentions, inasmuch as he wished to lend him money, but who

subsequently showed his malevolence by asking to be repaid his loan with

interest at an exorbitant rate.

Here, again, many palliatives have been suggested and some have been

applied, but many of them sin against the economic law, which provides

that legislation intended to protect a man against the consequences of

his own folly or improvidence is generally unproductive of result.

In truth, no thoroughly effective remedy can be applied in cases such as

those mentioned above, without abandoning all real attempt at progress.

Civilisation must, unfortunately, have its victims, amongst whom are to

some extent inevitably numbered those who do not recognise the paramount

necessities of the Budget system, and those who contract debts with an

inadequate appreciation of the _caveat emptor_ principle. Nevertheless,

the Western financier will act wisely if, casting aside some portion of

his Western habit of thought, he recognises the facts with which he has

to deal, and if, fully appreciating the intimate connection between

finance and politics in an Eastern country, he endeavours, so far as is

possible, to temper the clean-cut science of his fiscal measures in such

a manner as to suit the customs and intellectual standard of the subject

race with which he has to deal.

The question of the amount of taxation levied stands apart from the

method of its imposition. It may be laid down as a principle of

universal application that high taxation is incompatible with assured

stability of Imperial rule.[21]

The financier and the hydraulic engineer, who is a powerful ally of the

financier, have probably a greater potentiality of creating an

artificial and self-interested loyalty than even the judge. The reasons

are obvious. In the first place, the number of criminals, or even of

civil litigants, in any society is limited; whereas practically the

whole population consists of taxpayers. In the second place, the

arbitrary methods of administering justice practised by Oriental rulers

do not shock their subjects nearly so much as Europeans are often

disposed to think. Custom has made it in them a property of easiness.

They often, indeed, fail to appreciate the intentions, and are disposed

to resent the methods, of those whose object it is to establish justice

in the law-courts. On the other hand, the most ignorant Egyptian fellah

or Indian ryot can understand the difference between a Government which

takes nine-tenths of his crop in the shape of land-tax, and one which

only takes one-third or one-fourth. He can realise that he is better off

if the water is allowed to flow periodically on to his fields, than he

was when the influential landowner, who possessed a property up-stream

on the canal, made a dam and prevented him from getting any water at

all.

These principles would probably meet with general acceptance from all

who have considered the question of Imperial rule. They are, indeed,

almost commonplace. Unfortunately, in practice the necessity of

conforming to them is often forgotten. India is the great instance in

point. Englishmen are often so convinced that the natives of India ought

to be loyal, they hear so much said of their loyalty, they appreciate so

little the causes which are at work to produce disloyalty, and, in spite

of occasional mistakes due to errors of judgment, they are in reality so

earnestly desirous of doing what they consider, sometimes perhaps

erroneously, their duty towards the native population, that they are apt

to lose sight of the fact that the self-interest of the subject race is

the principal basis of the whole Imperial fabric. They forget, whilst

they are adding to the upper story of the house, that the foundations

may give way.

This is not the place to enter into any lengthy discussion upon Indian

affairs. It may be said, however, that the Indian history of the last

few years certainly gives cause for some anxiety. Attention was at one

time too exclusively paid to frontier policy, which constitutes only

one, and that not the most important, element of the complex Indian

problem.

That the policy of "masterly inactivity," to use the phrase

epigrammatically, but perhaps somewhat incorrectly, applied to the line

of action advocated by Lord Lawrence in 1869, required some

modifications as the onward movement of Russia in Asia developed, will

scarcely be contested by the most devoted of Lawrentian partisans and

followers. That those modifications were wisely introduced is a

proposition the truth of which it is difficult to admit. The portion of

Lord Lawrence's programme which was necessarily temporary, inasmuch as

it depended on the circumstances of the time, was rejected without

taking sufficient account of the further and far more important portion

which was of permanent application. This latter portion was defined in

an historic and oft-quoted despatch which he indited on the eve of his

departure from India, and which may be regarded as his political

testament. In this despatch, Lord Lawrence, speaking with all the

authority due to a lifelong acquaintance with Indian affairs, laid down

the broad general principle that the strongest security of our rule lay

"in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses."[22] The

truth of this general principle was at one time too much neglected.

Under the influence of a predominant militarism acting on too pliant

politicians, vast military expenditure was incurred. Territory lying

outside the natural geographical frontier of India was occupied, the

acquisition of which was condemned not merely by sound policy, but also

by sound strategy. Taxation was increased, and, generally, the material

interests of the natives of India were sacrificed and British Imperial

rule exposed to subsequent danger, in order to satisfy the exigencies of

a school of soldier-politicians who only saw one, and that the most

technical, aspect of a very wide and complex question.

Neither, unfortunately, is there any sure guarantee that the mistakes,

which it is now almost universally admitted were made, will not recur.

Where, indeed, are we to look for any effective check? The rulers of

India, whether they sit in Calcutta or London, may again be carried away

by the partial views of an influential class, or of a few masterful

individuals. It is absurd to speak of creating free institutions in

India to control the Indian Government. Experience has shown that

parliamentary action in England not infrequently degenerates into

acrimonious discussion and recrimination dictated by party passion; in

any case, it is generally too late to change the course of events. Still

less reliance can be placed on the action of the British Press, which

falls a ready victim to the specious arguments advanced by some

strategical pseudo-Imperialist in high position, or by some fervent

acolyte who has learnt at the feet of his master the fatal and facile

lesson of how an Empire, built up by statesmen, may be wrecked by the

well-intentioned but mistaken measures recommended by specialists to

ensure Imperial salvation. The managers of the London newspapers afford,

indeed, be it said to their credit, every facility for the publication

of views adverse to those which they themselves advocate. But it is none

the less true that, during the years when the unwise frontier policy of

a few years ago was being planned and executed, the voices of the

opposition, although they were those of Indian statesmen and officials

who could speak with the highest authority, failed to obtain an adequate

hearing until the evil was irremediable. On the other hand, the views of

the strategical specialists went abroad over the land, with the result

that ill-informed and careless public opinion followed their advice

without having any very precise idea of whither it was being led.

It would appear, therefore, that there is need for great care and

watchfulness in the management of Indian affairs. That same

inconsistency of character and absence of definite aim, which are such

notable Anglo-Saxon qualities and which adapt themselves so admirably to

the requirements of Imperial rule, may in some respects constitute an

additional danger. If we are not to adopt a policy based on securing the

contentment of the subject race by ministering to their material

interests, we must of necessity make a distinct approach to the

counter-policy of governing by the sword alone. In that case, it would

be as well not to allow a free native Press, or to encourage high

education. Any repressive or retrograde measures in either of these

directions would, without doubt, meet with strong and, to a great

extent, reasonable opposition in England. A large section of the public,

forgetful of the fact that they had stood passively by whilst measures,

such as the imposition of increased taxes, which the natives of India

really resent, were adopted, would protest loudly against the adoption

of other measures which are, indeed, open to objection, but which

nevertheless touch Oriental in a far less degree than they affect

Western public feeling. The result of this inconsistency is that our

present system rather tends to turn out demagogues from our colleges, to

give them every facility for sowing their subversive views broadcast

over the land, and at the same time to prepare the ground for the

reception of the seed which they sow. Now this is the very reverse of a

sound Imperial policy. We cannot, it is true, effectually prevent the

manufacture of demagogues without adopting measures which would render

us false to our acknowledged principles of government and to our

civilising mission. But we may govern in such a manner as to give the

demagogue no fulcrum with which to move his credulous and ill-informed

countrymen and co-religionists. The leading principle of a government of

this nature should be that low taxation is the most potent instrument

with which to conjure discontent. This is the policy which will tend

more than any other to the stability of Imperial rule. If it is to be

adopted, two elements of British society will have to be kept in check

at the hands of the statesman acting in concert with the moralist. These

are Militarism and Commercial Egotism. The Empire depends in a great

degree on the strength and efficiency of its army. It thrives on its

commerce. But if the soldier and the trader are not kept under some

degree of statesmanlike control, they are capable of becoming the most

formidable, though unconscious, enemies of the British Empire.

It will be seen, therefore, that though there are some disquieting

circumstances attendant on our Imperial rule, the general result of an

examination into the causes which led to the collapse of Roman power,

and a comparison of those causes with the principles on which the

British Empire is governed, are, on the whole, encouraging. To every

danger which threatens there is a safeguard. To every portion of the

body politic in which symptoms of disease may occur, it is possible to

apply a remedy.

Christianity is our most powerful ally. We are the sworn enemies of the

slave-dealer and the slave-owner. The dangers arising from the possible

pauperisation of the proletariat may, it is to be hoped, be averted by

our national character and by the natural play of our time-honoured

institutions. If we adhere steadily to the principle that local revenues

are to be expended locally, and if, at the same time, we give all

reasonable encouragement to local self-government and shun any tendency

towards over-centralisation, we shall steer clear of one of the rocks on

which the Roman ship of state was wrecked. Unskilful or unwise finance

is our greatest danger, but here again the remedy lies ready to hand if

we are wise enough to avail ourselves of it. It consists in adapting our

fiscal methods to the requirements of our subject races, and still more

in the steadfast rejection of any proposals which, by rendering high

taxation inevitable, will infringe the cardinal principle on which a

sound Imperial policy should be based. That principle is that, whilst

the sword should be always ready for use, it should be kept in reserve

for great emergencies, and that we should endeavour to find, in the

contentment of the subject race, a more worthy and, it may be hoped, a

stronger bond of union between the rulers and the ruled.

If any more sweeping generalisation than this is required, it may be

said that the whole, or nearly the whole, of the essential points of a

sound Imperial policy admit of being embodied in this one statement,

that, whilst steadily avoiding any movement in the direction of official

proselytism, our relations with the various races who are subjects of

the King of England should be founded on the granite rock of the

Christian moral code.

Humanity, as it passes through phase after phase of the historical

movement, may advance indefinitely in excellence; but its advance

will be an indefinite approximation to the Christian type. A

divergence from that type, to whatever extent it may take place,

will not be progress, but debasement and corruption. In a moral

point of view, in short, the world may abandon Christianity, but

can never advance beyond it. This is not a matter of authority, or

even of revelation. If it is true, it is a matter of reason as much

as anything in the world.[23]

[Footnote 1: _Italy and Her Invaders_. Thomas Hodgkin, D.C.L. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1892.]

[Footnote 2: Male imperando summum imperium amittitur.--PUBLIUS

SYRUS.]

[Footnote 3: _Decline and Fall_, chap. xx.]

[Footnote 4: Any one who wishes to gain an insight into the fundamental

principles which governed those relations cannot do better than read the

opening chapters of Sorel's _L'Europe et la Révolution Française_.]

[Footnote 5: Ecclesiastes i. 9.]

[Footnote 6: _Life and Letters of Sir James Graham_, vol. ii. p. 328.]

[Footnote 7: Lord Farrer says: "It is the privilege of honourable trade

that, like mercy, it is twice blessed; it blesseth him that gives and

him that takes; each of its dealings is of necessity a benefit to both

parties. But traders and speculators are not always the most scrupulous

of mankind. Their dealings with savage and half-civilised nations too

often betray sharp practice, sometimes violence and wrong. The persons

who carry on our trade on the outskirts of civilisation are not

distinguished by a special appreciation of the rights of others, nor are

the speculators, who are attracted by the enormous profits to be made by

precarious investments in half-civilised countries, people in whose

hands we should desire to place the fortunes or reputation of our

country. When a difficulty arises between ourselves and one of the

weaker nations, these are the persons whose voice is most loudly raised

for acts of violence, of aggression, or of revenge."--_The State in its

Relation to Trade_, p. 177.]

[Footnote 8: It should never be forgotten that, in Oriental countries,

whatever good is done to the masses is necessarily purchased at the

expense of incurring the resentment of the ruling classes, who abused

the power they formerly possessed. Seeley (_Expansion of England_, p.

320) says with great truth: "It would be very rash to assume that any

gratitude, which may have been aroused here and there by our

administration, can be more than sufficient to counterbalance the

discontent which we have excited among those whom we have ousted from

authority and influence."]

[Footnote 9: Juvenal, xiv. 176-8.]

[Footnote 10: "La supériorité des Anglo-Saxons! Si on ne la proclame

pas, on la subit et on la redoute; les craintes, les méfiances et

parfois les haines que soulève l'Anglais l'attestent assez haut....

"Nous ne pouvons faire un pas à travers le monde, sans rencontrer

l'Anglais. Nous ne pouvons jeter les yeux sur nos anciennes possessions,

sans y voir flotter le pavilion anglais." _A Quoi tient la Supériorité

des Anglo-Saxons?_--Demolins. This work, as well as another on much the

same subject (_L'Europa giovane_, by Guglielmo Ferrero), were reviewed

in the _Edinburgh Review_ for January 1898.]

[Footnote 11: _Vie de Turgot_, i. 47. In the debate on the India Act in

1858, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, whose views were generally

distinguished for their moderation, said: "I do most confidently

maintain that no civilised Government ever existed on the face of this

earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious, and more capricious than

the East India Company was from 1758 to 1784, when it was placed under

Parliamentary control."]

[Footnote 12: "It still remains true that there is a large body of

public opinion in England which carries into all politics a sound moral

sense, and which places a just and righteous policy higher than any mere

party interest. It is on the power and pressure of this opinion that the

high character of English government must ultimately depend."--_Map of

Life_, Lecky, p. 184. It will be a matter for surprise if the

ultra-bureaucratic spirit, coupled with a somewhat pronounced degree of

commercial egotism, do not prove the two rocks on which German colonial

enterprise will be eventually shipwrecked.]

[Footnote 13: Butcher, _Some Aspects of the Greek Genius_, p. 27.]

[Footnote 14: _Essays_. "Of Honour and Reputation."]

[Footnote 15: _Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs,

1859-66._ West. 1867. Sir Algernon West was Private Secretary to Sir

Charles Wood, afterwards Lord Halifax, who was the first Secretary of

State for India appointed after the passing of the India Act of 1858,

and, therefore, inaugurated the new system.]

[Footnote 16: See, _inter alia_, Chesney's _Indian Polity_, p. 136.]

[Footnote 17: Perhaps the best-known example is "Salus populi suprema

lex esto," a maxim which, as Selden has pointed out (_Table Talk_,

ciii.), is very frequently misapplied. See also the advice given by the

Emperor Claudius to the Parthian Mithridates (Tacitus, _Ann._ xii. 11).]

Political and Literary essays, 1908-1913 · 第 2 / 24 段