conclude ourselves elected unto eternal life, on the one hand, or
rejected on the other. To determine that we are chosen to salvation,
before we are effectually called, is presumptuously to enter into God’s
secret counsels, which we cannot, at present, have a certain and
determinate knowledge of; but to lay this as a foundation, as to what
concerns the conduct of our lives, is oftentimes of a very pernicious
tendency. If, as the result of this conclusion made, we take
encouragement to go on in sin, this will cut the sinews of all religion,
and expose us to blindness of mind, and hardness of heart, and a greater
degree of impenitency and unbelief, as the consequence of this bold
presumption and affront to the divine Majesty.
Neither, on the other hand, are we to conclude that we are not elected;
for though we may be in suspense about the event of things, and not know
whether we are elected or rejected, this is not inconsistent with our
using endeavours to attain a good hope, through grace; yet to determine
that we are not elected, is to conclude, against ourselves that all
endeavours will be to no purpose; which we have no ground to do, since
it is one thing to conclude that we are in a state of unregeneracy, and
another thing to determine that we are not elected. The consequence of
our concluding that we are in an unconverted state, ought to be our
praying, waiting, and hoping for the efficacy of divine grace, which
extends itself to the chief of sinners, as a relief against despair,
though such can have no ground to say, they are elected; therefore the
safest way, and that which is most conducive to the ends of religion, is
to be firmly persuaded, that though the final state of man be certainly
determined by God, yet this is to be no rule for an unregenerate person
to take his measures from, any more than if it were a matter of
uncertainty, and, in all respects, undetermined by him.
(5.) Let us, according to the apostle’s advice, _Give diligence to make
our calling and election sure_, 2 Pet. i. 10. It is certainly a very
great privilege for us, not barely to know, that some were chosen to
eternal life, but to be able to conclude that we are of that happy
number; and, in order hereunto, we must not expect to have an
extraordinary revelation thereof, or to find ourselves described by name
in scripture, as though this were the way to attain it; for the rule by
which we are to judge of this matter, is, our enquiring whether we have
those marks, or evidences thereof, which are contained therein; and
therefore we are, by a diligent and impartial self-examination, to
endeavour to know whether we are called, or enabled, to perform the
obedience of faith, which God is said to elect his people to; or whether
we are holy, and without blame, before him in love? whether we have the
temper and disposition of the children of God, as an evidence of our
being chosen to the adoption of children, and as such, are conformed to
the image of Christ?
(6.) If we have ground to conclude that we are chosen to eternal life,
this ought to be improved to the glory of God, and our own spiritual
advantage; it ought to put us upon admiring and adoring the riches of
discriminating grace, which is herein eminently illustrated; and such
are under the highest obligation to walk humbly with God, as well as
thankfully; for it is owing to his grace, not only that they are chosen
to eternal life, but that they are enabled to discern their interest in
this privilege.[237]
Footnote 183:
“Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense,
that He _does_, all that is done. ‘Far be it from God,’ says Elihu,
‘that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should
commit iniquity.’ Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are
synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like
what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident
blasphemy.
“Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God _makes_ his creatures do,
whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with
their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as
freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or
to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that
which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are
really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to
evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of
blame.
“Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God
_creates_, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral
evil.
“But this must not be taken for granted, nor hastily passed over:
because, however indisputable, it is disputed. There are some among
us, and some who are deservedly in reputation for wisdom, and general
soundness in the faith; who appear to be of opinion, that God is the
direct Author—the immediate Cause—the proper Creator, of all evil, as
well as of all good—of all sin, as well as holiness, in heart and
life—in thought, word, and deed.
“This opinion, however, notwithstanding my high esteem and particular
friendship for some of the holders of it, I am not yet ready to adopt,
for several reasons.
“1. To suppose that the actions of men, whether virtuous or vicious,
are _created_, seems to confound all distinction between creation and
Providence; or rather, wholly to exclude the latter.
“The work of creation, we used to think, was God’s making creatures
and things, at first; or giving the beginning of existence to matter
and minds, with their various properties, instincts and organizations.
And that God’s works of Providence, were his preserving things already
made, and governing all their operations. But according to this new
philosophy, creation is all; Providence is nothing. For what
preserving and governing of creatures or actions can there be, when
every creature and every action, is every moment created anew? An
action, a thought, or volition, whether good or evil, is a new and
strange kind of creature, or created thing. But, in a theological
view, the question before us is of chief importance, as it respects
moral evil. I add, therefore;
“2. It appears to me, that to suppose God the Creator of sin, whether
in principle or action, is hardly reconcilable with his perfect
holiness. ‘Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet waters
and bitter?’ Can darkness proceed from Him, as its proper source, in
whom there is no darkness at all?
“It is true, God has created many things which are of a _different_
nature from himself; as the bodies of men and beasts, and all parts of
the world of matter: but nothing, I conceive, directly _opposite_ to
his own nature; as is sin. The sun is the immediate cause of the
growth of vegetables; though these are essentially different from the
sun itself: but it is not thus the cause of ice and darkness; which
are no more of a contrary nature to it, than sin is to the nature of
God.[184]
“I am sensible it has been said, there is no more inconsistency with
the holiness of God, in supposing him the efficient, immediate cause
of sin, for necessary good purposes; than in supposing he only permits
it, for wise ends, and so orders things that he knows it will be
committed.
“But these two ways of accounting for the existence of moral evil,
appear to me materially different. There are supposable cases in which
it would be right for a _man_, not to hinder another from sinning,
when he could hinder him; and also to place him in circumstances of
temptation, expecting that he would sin. For instance, a parent may
leave money in the way of a child suspected of being given to theft;
and may conceal himself and let the child steal it; with a view to
correct him, in order to reclaim him, or as a warning to his other
children. All this might be perfectly right in the parent; however
certainly he might know, that the child would be guilty of the
expected crime. But I question whether any case can be supposed in
which it would not be wrong, directly to influence another to do evil,
that good might come. Exciting one to sin by power or persuasion; and
placing one in circumstances of trial, wherein he would be tempted to
sin, without restraining him from it, are surely different things,
although the certainty of his sinning may be the same.
“3. I dare not think that God creates sin, and all kinds of evil,
because this seems plainly contrary to the general current of the holy
scriptures.
“In the first chapter of Genesis, it is said, ‘God saw every thing
that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.’ Of his making two
great lights, we are told; and that he made the stars also: but no
account is there given of his creating darkness. Respecting our own
species, the inspired historian particularly informs us, that ‘God
created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him: male
and female created he them.’ Nor do we find in that book, or in all
the Bible, that he hath since ever created them otherwise. Solomon
three thousand years after the fall, having made diligent search among
men and women, to find out their true character, and the cause of
their so universal depravity, says; ‘Lo, this only have I found, that
_God_ made man upright; but _they_ have sought out many inventions.’
Wicked practices, and deceitful inventions to conceal their
criminality, are ever ascribed in scripture to mankind themselves, or
to other fallen creatures, and never to God, as their efficient cause.
“In the New-Testament, christians are said to be ‘created unto good
works:’ and we read of ‘the new man, which after God, is created in
righteousness and true holiness’. But no where do we read of any one
that was created unto _evil_ works; or after _Satan_ in
unrighteousness and sin. It is written, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, ‘God is not
the author of confusion, but of peace.’ And James i. 13-17, ‘Let no
man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be
tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is
tempted when he is led away of his own lust and enticed.—Do not err,
my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from
above, and cometh down from the Father of lights.’ Can any thing be
more express to teach us, that a distinction ought carefully to be
made between the origin of good and evil; and that we should not
conceive them both alike to come from God?
“For scripture proof that God is not the efficient author of sin, I
will only add, that the fruits of the Spirit, and works of the flesh,
are set in contrast and spoken of as diametrical opposites: whereas,
did God create sinful propensities in men, or directly influence them
to evil actions, the works of the flesh would be as real and immediate
fruits of the divine Spirit, as the holiest exercises of the best
saints.
“4. I see no occasion for the supposition of God’s being thus the
author of all evil: nor any good ends that it can answer.
“Could it be seen how evils might be accounted for, without supposing
them any part of the creation of God; and how God might have an
absolute dominion over all events, without being the immediate cause
of bad things; no good man, I conclude, would wish to conceive of Him
as being thus the proper source of darkness and evil. And indeed, were
it so, that our weak minds were unable to comprehend how God can work
all things after the counsel of his own will, or how natural and moral
evil could ever have been, without believing that God is as much, and
as immediately, the cause of evil as of good; yet it might be more
modest, and more wise, to leave these among other incomprehensibles,
than to have recourse to so bold an hypothesis for the solution of
them. But, I apprehend, there is no need of this hypothesis in order
to account for the existence of evil, or in order to an understanding
belief of the universal government of the Most High.
“Evils, of most if not all kinds, are such negative things—such mere
defects, in their origin at least, as do not need creation, or require
a positive omnipotent cause. This is the case, evidently, with respect
to natural darkness: it is only the want of light. This is the case,
also, with respect to natural death: it is only the cessation, the
loss, the want of life. And this may be the case, with respect to
spiritual darkness, and spiritual death. It has heretofore been the
orthodox opinion, that all moral evil consists radically in privation;
or, that unholiness, at bottom, is the mere want of holiness. And,
notwithstanding all the floods of light, from various quarters, which
have come into the world in this age of new discoveries, possibly this
one old opinion may yet be true. ‘God made man _upright_.’ That is, He
formed him with a disposition impartially just and good: He created in
him a principle of universal righteousness. When man fell, by eating
the forbidding fruit, this principle had not been preserved in perfect
strength and exercise. In consequence of that disobedience, the divine
internal influence was so withdrawn, that this principle was entirely
lost. But we are not told, nor need it be supposed, that any opposite
principle was then created in him. Our first parents had, I believe,
in their original formation, all the radical instincts of nature which
they had after the fall; or which any of their posterity now have.
Such as a principle of self-preservation, a desire of self-promotion,
and a propensity to increase and multiply; together with all the more
particular appetites and passions, subservient to these purposes. All
these are innocent in themselves, though not in themselves virtuous.
But these private instincts, when left to operate alone, without the
governing influence of a public spirit, or a just regard for other
beings, will naturally lead to all manner of iniquity, in heart and
life. To avarice and ambition; to envy and malice; to intemperance and
lewdness; to frauds and oppressions; to wars and fightings.
“There is no need of supposing any other divine agency, than only to
uphold in existence creatures that have lost their virtue, amidst
surrounding temptations, in order to account for all the evil
affections which we ever feel, and for all the external wickedness
that is ever committed. Nor, in order to the holiest creatures losing
their virtue, need any thing more be supposed on God’s part, than only
his leaving them to themselves; or not upholding in them, and
constantly invigorating, a virtuous disposition.
“And as, in this way, we can account for the existence of all manner
of evil; so we can thus understand how it is possible for God to bring
about whatsoever comes to pass, without his being the actor, or maker,
or instigator, of any thing that is not perfectly good. When He does
not cause light, there will be darkness. When He does not make peace,
there will be evil. The darkness takes place according to his
appointment, with the same exactness and certainty, as if He actually
created it; and so does evil of every kind. What He determines to
permit, knowing perfectly the circumstances and dispositions of every
agent concerned, will as infallibly come to pass, as what he
determines to do himself, or to effect by his own positive influence.
The king’s heart, and the rivers of water; the waves of the sea, and
the tumults of the people, are in the hand of the Lord, to all
important intents and purposes, if it be only true that He restrains
them, or lets them run; stilleth them, or suffereth them to rage, just
as he sees fit.
“In this sense, I conceive, it is to be understood, that God forms the
light, and creates darkness; makes peace, and creates evil. He has the
absolute government—the perfect control—the entire superintendency, of
all these things.
“When any folly has been committed or any mischief has been done, some
are ready to say, _It was so ordered_; as if therefore nobody was to
be blamed. But this is a false inference, from just premises. True, it
was so ordered of God; and ordered righteously and wisely: but it was
so ordered by the doer of the mischief also; and ordered carelessly,
perhaps, or wickedly. You will say, It must have been so, and the
actor could not have done otherwise: but, I say, he might have done
otherwise, if he would. It is true, there is a kind of necessity in
the actions of men. They necessarily act according to their own
choice; and they necessarily choose to act according to their own
disposition. Under this kind of necessity God himself acts. It is
impossible for him to do, because it is impossible for him to will
that which is contrary to his own nature. He necessarily wills and
does, what is agreeable to his moral perfections. But such a necessity
as this, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it is
essential to all free agency. Actions which can and do take place,
contrary to the inclination of the agent, are not _his_ actions. He
has no command over them; and therefore can deserve no praise or blame
for them.
“The necessity of acting according to our own minds, is all the
necessity which need be supposed, when we suppose that all our actions
were decreed, and are ordered of God. A creature that acts according
to any laws of nature, and not at perfect random, without any
self-government, acts in such a manner that He who knows what is in
him, may fore-know all his actions; and in such a manner that He in
whose hand his times are, may govern all his volitions. Men follow
their several courses, as freely as the rivers of water, and with a
higher kind of freedom; yet, since they run agreeably to their own
inclination, and cannot do otherwise, a Being omniscient and
omnipotent, can calculate before hand all their motions; can keep them
in the channels decreed for them, and can turn them whithersoever he
will. If any do not comprehend this, yet let them not think they so
fully comprehend the contrary, as to feel certain, that either man
cannot be free, or God cannot govern the world. Certainly the
providential government of God, over the hearts and ways of men,
though most absolute, is not such but that, if they do well, they are
praise-worthy; and if they do not well, the sin lieth at their own
door.
“Neither let it be imagined that the criminality of a bad action is
taken away, or at all extenuated, because it will be over-ruled for
good. Actions are good or evil, according to the nature of them, and
the intention of the agent, and not according to undesigned
consequences. When we act wickedly, and with a wicked mind, its being
productive of happy effects, alters nothing in regard to our
blame-worthiness. In the divine decrees, and in the divine providence,
‘Whatever is, is right:’ but in the conduct of creatures, many things
that are, are not at all the less wrong. God’s governing all things,
so as to make them subserve his wise and holy designs, should not lead
us to think any more favourably of our own, or of our neighbour’s
foolish and sinful actions.”
SMALLEY’S SERMONS.
Footnote 184:
“There is a vast difference between the sun’s being the cause of the
lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and of the brightness of
gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its
being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by its motion
whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the
occasion of the latter kind of events; but not the proper cause,
efficient, or producer of them.—No more is any action of the divine
Being, the cause of the evil of men’s wills. If the sun were the
proper _cause_ of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these
things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something
might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of
nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred that the sun itself
is dark and cold: but from its being the cause of these, no otherwise
than by its absence, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary.
It may justly be argued that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold
and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment; and
the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with
and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun
to be the fountain of light and heat. So, in as much as sin is not the
fruit of any positive influence of the Most High, but on the contrary,
arises from the withdrawment of his action and energy, and under
certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his
influence, this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation
evil; but on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether holy,
and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange
arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves
them to themselves; and necessarily sin when he does so, that
therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God: as strange
as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is
gone, and never dark when he is present, that therefore darkness is
from the sun, and that his disk and beams must be black.”
_Edwards on the Will._
Page 259. _Boston Ed._ 1754.
Footnote 185:
_Dr. Whitby, in his discourse of election, &c._
Footnote 186:
_See his discourse concerning election, page 36. 37. &c._
Footnote 187:
_See the contrary opinion defended by Whitby in loc._
Footnote 188:
_See Whitby’s discourse, &c. page 40, & seq._
Footnote 189:
_See_ Twiss. Vind. Grat. & de Prædest. _and his riches of God’s love,
against Hord; and also that part of the writings of some others, in
which they treat of predestination_, _viz._ _Beza, Gomarus, Piscator,
Maccovius, Rutherford, Whitaker, and Perkins_.
Footnote 190:
_Among these were bishop Davenant, and other divines, who met in the
synod of Dort; also Calvin, P. Du Moulin, Turrettin, and, indeed, the
greater number of those who have defended the doctrine of
predestination; and there are many others, who, when they treat of it,
seem to wave the particular matter in controversy, as thinking it of
no great importance or that this doctrine may be as well defended,
without confining themselves to certain modes of speaking, which have
been the ground of many prejudices against it, whose prudence and
conduct herein cannot be justly blamed._
Footnote 191:
Ου μονον εξ Ιουδαιων. non solum ex Judæis; _that is, those who are
called from among the Jews, as distinguished from the rest of them
that were rejected_.
Footnote 192:
זגקבצו
Footnote 193:
_See Questions_ lxvii, lxviii, lxxii, lxxv, lxxvi.
Footnote 194:
ειναι ἡμας ἁγιους.
Footnote 195:
_See Prov._ viii. 23.
Footnote 196:
ειναι.
Footnote 197:
_Vid. Grot. in loc._
Footnote 198:
Τεταγμενοι.
Footnote 199:
_Vid. Whitby in loc._
Footnote 200:
_Vid. Beza in loc._
Footnote 201:
_The principal text that Dr. Whitby refers to, as justifying his sense
of the word, is in Acts_ xx. 13. We went to Assos, there intending to
take in Paul, for so had he appointed, minding himself to go afoot;
_the words are_, ουτω γαρ ην διατεταγμενος μελλων αυτος πεζευειν;
_which he understands as though the meaning was, that the apostle was
disposed, in his own mind, to go afoot; but that sense is not
agreeable to the scope of the text, for the meaning of it seems to be
this: That it was determined, ordered, or preconcerted by them, before
they set sail; that Paul should be taken in at Assos, since he was to
go there afoot; so that this makes nothing to that author’s purpose,
but rather to the sense that we have given of the word._
Footnote 202:
_See Grot. in loc._
Footnote 203:
_See Dr. Whitby in loc._
Footnote 204:
_See Quest._ xliv, lxviii.
Footnote 205:
_See Dr. Goodwin, vol. 2. of election._
Footnote 206:
προεθετο.
Footnote 207:
_See page 137._
Footnote 208:
_This is what is meant by that axiom, used by the school-men_,
Decretum Dei, nihil ponit in esse.
Footnote 209:
_Thus the school-men distinguish between_ necessitas consequentis,
_and_ consequentiæ; _so that that, which is not in itself necessary,
is rendered eventually so, as the consequence of God’s purpose, that
it shall be_.
Footnote 210:
“There is no necessity for supposing a predestination to death, in the
same sense as unto life, that is to the means and the consequent end:
For the occurrence of sin may be satisfactorily accounted for on other
principles; though without pretending to the removal of every
difficulty in a subject the entire comprehension of which is probably
unsuited to our present state and faculties.”[211]
SMITH’S LETTERS TO BELSHAM.