consider that the contrary side of the question, which we are
maintaining, is equally supported by express texts of scripture: thus it
is said _His days are determined, the number of his months are with
thee; thou hast appointed him bounds that he cannot pass_, Job xiv. 5.
than which, nothing can be more express, where he speaks concerning that
decree of God, which respects all mankind, without exception, and sets
forth his absolute sovereignty, and the irreversibleness of his purpose
herein; and the apostle Paul, in reasoning with the Athenians concerning
the decree and providence of God in whom we live, move, and have our
being says, that _he hath determined the times before appointed, and
fixed the bounds of their habitation_, Acts xvii. 26. As he has placed
men upon the earth, by his decree and providence, so he has determined
not only the place where they should live, but the time of their
continuance in the world. This was no new doctrine; for the heathen had
been instructed in it by their own philosophers and therefore the
apostle speaks their sense, especially that of the _stoicks_, about this
matter.[232] When he mentions the times are determined, it is not to be
understood of the seasons of the year, which God has fixed to return in
their certain courses, but the seasons appointed for every work, or for
every occurrence of life; and, among the rest, the time of life, and of
serving our generation therein, as Solomon expressly says, in Eccl. iii.
1, 2. _To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose; a
time to be born, and a time to die._ Several other scriptures might be
brought to the same purpose, as a farther proof hereof, namely, those in
which God has foretold the death of particular persons, 2 Sam. xii. 14.
1 Kings xiv. 12. chap. xxii. 28.
Moreover, if the providence of God is conversant about all the actions
of men, and _the hairs of their head are all numbered_, Matt. x. 30. so
that the smallest changes in life do not come by chance, but are subject
thereto; then certainly the time of life must be subjected to his
providence, who is styled, _Our life, and the length of our days_, Deut.
xxx. 20. He must therefore certainly be considered as the sovereign
Arbiter thereof, which doctrine none that own a providence, can, with
any shadow of reason, gainsay; so that this doctrine is agreeable not
only to several scriptures, but to the very nature and perfections of
God.
This being premised we return to the arguments laid down against it, and
the scriptures cited to give countenance to them. It is certain, that
two contradictory propositions cannot be both true in the same sense;
and the scriptures, which are exactly harmonious, as well as infallibly
true, no where contradict themselves. Therefore we must consider what
answer may be given to the objections before-mentioned; and, that our
work herein may be shortened, we may observe, that the bounds of life
are twofold; either such as men might have lived to, according to the
common course of nature if nothing had intervened to ruin the
constitution, or no disease, or violent death, had broken the thread of
life before; or that time which God has ordained that men shall live,
whether it be longer or shorter: the former of these respects the
lengthening or shortening of life, by the influence of second causes;
and, in this respect, we do not suppose that the terms of life are
immoveably fixed, but that in some, it is longer, and, in others
shorter; for it is certain, that by intemperance, or other methods, men
may shorten their days; or, by laying violent hands on themselves, not
live the time that otherwise they would have done. But if we consider
the over-ruling, or disposing providence of God, as conversant about
this matter, there is nothing happens without the concurrence thereof.
Therefore persons, who shorten their days by intemperance, do this by
the permissive providence of God; though he be not the author of their
intemperance, which is sinful, yet he permits, or determines not to
hinder it, and consequently though he has fixed the bounds of life,
which can neither be lengthened or shortened, yet knowing what men will
do, in a natural way, to shorten them, he determines that this shall put
an end to their lives.[233] And when we read, in scripture, of God’s
_delivering_ him, who dies a violent death, _into his hands_, who is the
immediate cause of it, Exod. xxi. 13. God is not the author of the sin
of the murderer; yet providence is not wholly to be exempted from that
action, so far as it is not sinful, but purely natural, or the effect of
power; and, when this is said to have a tendency to shorten the life of
man, it does not detract from the time that he had in his own purpose
affixed to it. We must also consider, that his decree and providence
respects the means, as well as the end, which are always inseparably
connected, and equally subject thereunto.
These things being premised, we proceed more particularly to answer the
arguments brought against this doctrine. And,
1. When it is said, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, renders all
means for the preservation thereof unnecessary, that depends upon a
false supposition, namely, that God does not ordain the means as well as
the end. If God had determined that persons shall live, he has
determined to give them the supports of life, and to prevent every thing
that might tend to destroy it; so, on the other hand, when he takes them
away, by a disease, this is ordained by him, as a means conducive
thereunto. If health is to be supported, or recovered, by means, and
thereby life preserved, God has ordained that these means shall be used,
as well as the end attained.
2. As to persons shortening their lives by intemperance, this has a
natural tendency to do it; so that, though God be not the author of the
sin, he certainly knows, before-hand, what methods the sinner will take
to hasten his end, and leaves him to himself; so that, though the sin be
not from God, the punishment, which is the consequence thereof, may
truly be said to be from him, and therefore this was determined by him.
And when it is farther objected, that they, who destroy their health, or
lay violent hands on themselves, cannot be said to sin in so doing,
because they do that which tends to fulfil the divine will, provided God
has determined the fatal event; herein they oppose this doctrine,
without taking the words in the same sense in which it is maintained;
for it is well known, that the will of God is sometimes taken for that
prescribed rule that he has given us, which is the matter of our duty,
in which sense we readily allow, that he that fulfils it, cannot be said
to sin. But, besides this, it is sometimes taken for his purpose to
permit sin; or, to give the sinner up to his own heart’s lusts, to act
that which he hates, and is resolved to punish. In this sense, the
sinner is said to do that which God would not have suffered him to do,
had he willed the contrary; but it is a very groundless insinuation, to
suppose that this exempts him from the guilt of sin.
3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with
our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be
delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are
drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that
God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but
suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise
than by the event; so a person, who prays to be delivered from sickness,
or death, is not to address the divine Majesty, as one who
presumptuously, and without ground, supposes that God has decreed that
he shall immediately die, but as one who hopes, or who has no ground to
conclude otherwise, but that he will make it appear, by answering his
prayer, that he has determined to spare his life. For the secret purpose
of God, relating to the event of things, is no more to be a rule of
duty, inasmuch as it is secret, than if there had been no purpose
relating thereunto; but yet it does not follow from hence, that this
matter is not determined by him.
4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this
objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood
consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced,
whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of
life. As for those _promises_, which God has made of a long life, _to
those that love him, and keep his commandments_, the meaning thereof is
this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or
value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this
none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in
which it is said, that _godliness hath the promise of the life that now
is_, as well as of _that which is to come_, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as
it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that
efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his
commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his
purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has
determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and
to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means
are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose,
then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating
to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him.
As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s _dying before their
time_, or _not living half their days_, these are to be understood
agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying
sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or
the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is
literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their
dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign
Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the
punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was
not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand?
As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which
Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, when sick,
_he had not died_, she does not suppose Christ’s being there, would have
frustrated the divine purpose, for then, he would, doubtless, have
reproved her for it; whereas, in reality, he did not come to visit him,
because he knew that God had purposed that he should die, and be
afterwards raised from the dead; so that this does not argue that he has
not fixed the bounds, or term of life.
Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the
destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from
heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented,
we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof,
but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as
their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them.
The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells
Hezekiah, that _he should die, and not live_; notwithstanding which,
fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted
on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life
and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument
to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, _Set thine
house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live_, he gave Hezekiah to
understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no
skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and
therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a
miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense,
otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed
for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to
have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this
warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he
says, _I will add to thy days fifteen years_, the meaning is only this,
though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving
thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which
might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and
fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life
fifteen years.
_Object._ 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election
and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose
therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and
overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as
necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of
causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself
were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him
to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical
doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it
be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events.
Thus God speaks of the Jews, turning from their iniquities, and his
bestowing pardoning mercy, as the result thereof, as an uncertain event,
when he says, in Jer. xxxvi. 3. _It may be that the house of Judah will
hear all the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, that they may return
every man from his evil way, that I may forgive their iniquity and their
sin._ So when God gave the Jews a sign, immediately before the
captivity, taken from the prophet Ezekiel’s personating one that was
removing his stuff, or household-goods, as signifying, that the nation
in general should soon remove to other habitations, when carried captive
into Babylon, he adds, upon this occasion, _It may be they will
consider, though they be a rebellious house_, Ezek. xii. 3. And the
prophet Zephaniah exhorts the people _to seek righteousness and
meekness_, and, as the consequence thereof, says, _It may be ye shall be
hid in the day of the Lord’s anger_, Zeph. ii. 3. And the apostle speaks
of the uncertainty of the divine dispensations of grace, when he advises
Timothy, _in meekness, to instruct those that oppose themselves, if God,
peradventure, will give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the
truth_, 2 Tim. ii. 25. which is directly contrary to the unalterable
necessity of events, depending upon the divine purpose, according to the
doctrine of election.
_Answ._ 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this
doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable
to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much
to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of
philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on
a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that
many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of
God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a
necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws
of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has
determined.[234] And, had it been universally explained by them in this
sense, it would not have done them much service, who oppose the doctrine
of election, to have compared it therewith; for it would only have
proved the agreeableness of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s
purpose, relating to all events, to the light of nature, as some of the
heathen were thereby instructed in it. But since this does not appear to
be the sense of all the Stoicks about the doctrine of fate, but some of
them understood it in the same sense as it is represented in the
objection, this we cannot but militate against, and assert the doctrine
of election to be very remote from it.
Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, explain
what we mean, when we maintain the necessity of events, as founded on
the will of God. We are far from asserting that there is a necessary
connexion between second causes, and their respective effects, in which
some are produced arbitrarily, by the will of intelligent creatures; and
when we call any thing a necessary cause, producing effects, according
to its own nature, we suppose that this is agreeable to the order, or
course of nature, which was fixed by God. All that we pretend to prove,
is the dependence of things on the divine will, and the necessity of
God’s purposes taking effect; so that that which is arbitrary or
contingent, which might be, or not be, as depending on, or relating to
second causes, is eventually necessary, as it is an accomplishment of
the divine purpose. Therefore we always distinguish between things being
contingent, with respect to us, and their being so, with respect to God;
and, consequently, though _it may be_, or _peradventure_, may be applied
to the apparent event of things, these words can never be applied to the
fulfilling of the divine will; and this leads us to consider the latter
part of the objection; therefore,
2. As to the scripture’s speaking concerning the uncertainty of future
events, in those places mentioned in the objection, these, and all
others of the like nature, in which such a mode of speaking is used, may
be explained, by distinguishing between what might reasonably have been
expected to be the event of things, supposing men had not been given up
to the blindness of their mind, and hearts, to act below the dictates of
reason, without consulting their own safety and happiness, or expressing
their gratitude to God; and what would be the real event of things,
which God was not pleased to reveal, and therefore was unknown to them.
Thus, when the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel represented the repentance
and reformation of Israel as an uncertain event, as well as their
forgiveness, and deliverance from the captivity, connected with it, in
such dubious terms, _It may be they will consider and return, every man
from his evil way_; it implies, that this was what might have been
reasonably expected by men, though it was no matter of uncertainty to
the heart-searching God, who knoweth the end from the beginning, and
perfectly foresees what will be the event of things, which, in various
respects, are under the direction of his providence. Though it could
hardly be thought, by men, that such an admonition should be treated
with such contempt, yet God knew how they would behave themselves; there
was no _peradventure_ with respect to his judgment thereof; he knew that
they would not repent, otherwise he would have inclined their wills, and
effectually have persuaded them to exercise this grace, and thereby have
prevented his expectation, or determination, from being disappointed, or
frustrated.
If it be objected, that, according to this sense of the text, the
prophet’s message to the people would have been to no purpose, and his
ministry, among them, exercised in vain; or that it was contrary to the
wisdom and goodness of God to make this overture to them, when he knew
it would not be complied with.
To this it may be replied, that the great God is not bound to decline
the asserting his right to man’s obedience, or requiring that which is a
just debt to him, though he knew that they would not comply with his
demand thereof; and, indeed, this objection cannot be maintained,
without supposing, that, when the gospel is preached to man, the glory
of the divine wisdom and goodness therein cannot be secured, unless we
conclude either that God doth not know whether man will embrace it, or
no, which is contrary to his omniscience; or that he determines, that
all, to whom the gospel is preached, shall embrace it, which is contrary
to matter of fact. But there may be a medium between both these, which
vindicates the divine perfections, in ordering that the gospel should be
preached, and thereby asserting his sovereignty, and unalienable right
to their obedience; accordingly, there might be a small remnant among
them, in whom God designed that this message should take effect. And
will any one say, that because the goodness of God was not herein
demonstrated to all, that therefore no glory was brought to that
perfection?
And if it be farther said, that supposing there were some who turned
from their evil ways, the captivity, which was threatened, was not
hereby prevented, and therefore the promise, relating thereunto, did not
take place; to this it may be replied; that as God did not give them
ground to expect this blessing, unless this repentance should be more
universal, than it really was, so he had various ways to testify his
regard to those who should receive advantage by this message, for whose
sake it was principally intended.
As for that other scripture, in which God advises his people to _seek
righteousness and meekness_, and, as the consequence hereof, says, _it
may be ye may be hid in the day of the Lord’s fierce anger_; the meaning
is, that they, who were enabled to exercise these graces, should either
have some instances of temporal deliverance vouchsafed to them; or if
not, that they should have no reason to complain that the exercise
thereof was altogether in vain.
As for that scripture, in which the apostle bids Timothy to exhort those
that oppose the gospel, _if, peradventure, God would give them
repentance to the acknowledging of the truth_; the meaning is, that it
was uncertain to Timothy whether God would give this grace or no; and
therefore he must preach the gospel, whatever were the event thereof:
Nevertheless, it was no matter of uncertainty, with respect to God, who
must be supposed to know what grace he designs to bestow, and therefore
the event of things may be dubious to us, and yet be certain with
respect to him.
_Object._ 4. Another objection, against the doctrine of election and
reprobation, is, that it is altogether inconsistent with the preaching
of the gospel; for if God has determined the final state of man, so that
his purpose cannot be altered, then it is a preposterous thing, not to
say illusory, for grace to be offered to the chief of sinners, which
must certainly argue, that it is impossible to be attained by them; and,
since the overture is universal, we must conclude that God has put all
mankind into a salvable state, and consequently not excluded any from
salvation by his peremptory and unchangeable decree. To what purpose are
the promises of the gospel held forth, to all that sit under the sound
thereof, if it be impossible for them to attain the blessings promised
therein? Or what regard could men be supposed to have to the promises,
if they were not a declaration of God’s purpose? And, on the other hand,
the threatnings denounced would be as little regarded, as an expedient
to deter men from sinning, if their state were unalterably fixed by God,
according to this doctrine of election, as it has been before
considered.
_Answ._ That we may proceed with greater clearness in answering this
objection, we shall first shew what we mean by preaching the gospel,
which is nothing else but a declaration of God’s revealed will, and our
duty pursuant thereunto, which is to be made known, particularly what is
contained in the word of God, relating to the salvation of men, and the
way which he has ordained in order to their attaining it. Therefore,
1. When this salvation is said to be offered in the gospel, we intend
nothing else thereby, but that a declaration is made to sinners, that
there are many invaluable privileges which Christ has purchased for, and
will, in his own time and way, apply to all those whom God has purposed
to save; and, since we cannot describe them by name, and no unregenerate
person has ground to conclude that he is of that number, therefore there
is a farther declaration to be made, namely, that God has inseparably
connected this salvation, which he has chosen them to, with faith and
repentance, and the exercise of all other graces, which, as they are
God’s gift, and to be prayed for, and expected, in a diligent attendance
on all his ordinances; so they are to be considered as the mark and
evidences of their being chosen to salvation, without which, it is
certainly a vain and presumptuous thing for any one to pretend that he
has a right to it, as the object of God’s eternal election.