find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that
understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider
what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine
we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as
though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be
charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called, _A
spirit of slumber_ as it is connected with the idea of their being
rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary
graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and
that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same
sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a
vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted
those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute
of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that
these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not
obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to
one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins
might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this,
that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and
to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus
judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence
thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for
though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of
the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state,
(as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do
not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature,
avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and
hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially
where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without
any impeachment of his providence, deny to those whom he has not chosen
to eternal life, as he might, had he pleased, have denied it to the
whole world, and much more to those who have not improved the common
grace, which they received, but have, through the wickedness of their
nature, proceeded from one degree of sin unto another.
There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a
sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this
doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. _For this cause God shall send them
strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be
damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness_;
the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who,
in the following verse, are represented as not receiving _the love of
the truth_; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived
them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or
inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to
deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means
of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof,
which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled
against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through
the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who
endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only
respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the
corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run
greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And
as for that mode of speaking here used, that _God shall send them strong
delusions_, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design
to delude them.
There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. _So
I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own
counsels_; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves,
and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired,
conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, _brought forth sin_, chap
i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of
condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will,
or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he
might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that
he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously
with the sinful creature.
And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John
xii. 39, 40. _Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said
again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they
should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be
converted, and I should heal them_. The sense which they, who
misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that
no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that
the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not
altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes,
and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause
producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be
converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might
take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this
doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the
explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this
text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before
the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate
cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their
hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and,
through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts.
As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the
mode of speaking here used, when it is said, _He hath hardened their
hearts_, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of
their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would
have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace
to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame
thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial
act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is
there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any
more than there is in the execution thereof?
There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. _The Lord hath made all
things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil_; from
whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose
to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine
purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it
in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend
that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them
wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I
should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from
this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the
world that we infer this from it;[216] and, to give countenance to this
suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;[217] his words are
these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them
forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to
themselves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in
sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of
the glory of his justice on them.”
I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned
and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning,
which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his
day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain
this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an
inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the
writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be
from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and
this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid
as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that
reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what
is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended
hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked
for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this
quotation, is, _God ordained to bring forth into the world the
non-elect, in their corrupt mass_, that is, that persons, who are every
day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so
have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other
divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning
this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following
answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original
sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it;
therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this
quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the
author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the
providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or
leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in
sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of
the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this
quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might
have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this
reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says,
“That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s
decrees, to be merely _Apex Logicus_, as he calls it, _a logical
nicety_;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely,
that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration
of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere
pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but
every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully
committed, and contumaciously continued in by them that come to ripe
years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of
reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast
an odium upon it.
But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said _to
have made the wicked for the day of evil_, the meaning is not that man’s
damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are
some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and
condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a
sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not
be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense
which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have _made all
things for himself_, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some
will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked,
who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is,
that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will,
notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it
be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it
shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote
from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a
sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question,
which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy
Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are
maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the
world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot
refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his
will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public
calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his
wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of
Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his
crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire
to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the
world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public
executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly[218].” So the Assyrian is
said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to be _the rod of God’s anger_, and to be _sent
against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive_, and therein _to
tread them down, like the mire in the streets_[219]. And as to what
concerns the purpose of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend,
this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be
inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the
doctrine of _reprobation_, as in the foregoing argument.
Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of _election_ and
_reprobation_, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations
cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine
perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,
VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be
not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain
greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient
argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify
our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are
maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though
we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is
inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to
themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of
grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not
believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal
purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his
goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If
they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them
since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be
saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew
this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that
this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the
world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said
that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to
attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to
themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on
that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they
will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of
will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he
not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or
restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would
commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent
their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if
men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no
difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to
it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s
fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial
hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he
takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on
God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and
consequently not elected to eternal life.
But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several
instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are
maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to
the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of
their opposition to it; particularly,
1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which
is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained
whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination,
is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue
that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to
intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of
infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every
thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his
determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures,
are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or
rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain
determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are
not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional
purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to
determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to
give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to
determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is
left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally
explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have
done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that
all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that
they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God,
relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as
to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent
this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to
the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own
cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not
disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the
divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of
opposing this doctrine.
Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd
consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that
his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the
event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not
universally allowed of by them; for many are sensible that it is as hard
to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without
inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that,
he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually
necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures
would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and
improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects
fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that
power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his
providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to
assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than
what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent
with the divine perfections.
2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to
infer a mutability in God’s purpose which is all one as to suppose, that
he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in
opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as
these, namely, that _God will have all men to be saved, and come to the
knowledge of the truth_, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine
will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come
to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour’s words,
_How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen
gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your
house is left unto you desolate_, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that
God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the
perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but
to assert him to be dependent and mutable?
3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power
and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we
determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects
of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, _It is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_, Rom.
ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and
when it is said, _We love him, because he first loved us_, 1 John iv.
19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said,
He loved us, because we first loved him; and that humbling question,
which the apostle proposes, _Who maketh thee to differ_, 1 Cor. iv. 7.
should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ.
4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which
cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God’s
purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be
denied, there would not be so great a foundation for admiration, or
thankfulness, as there is, or for any to say, as one of Christ’s
disciples did, speaking the sense of all the rest, _Lord, how is it,
that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world_, John
xiv. 22. Nor is there so great an inducement to humility, as what will
arise from the firm belief, that, when no eye pitied the poor helpless
and miserable sinner, he was singled out of a ruined and undone world,
among that remnant whom God first designed for, and then brought to
glory.
VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the
contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those
scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall
endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different
way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the
main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance
the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally
partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be
saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state;
and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God’s purpose
to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and
consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto,
depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which
may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to
yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so
perfect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it
is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to
bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put
on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation,
there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far
this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already
considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any
foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts,
which are often brought in defence thereof.
One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4.
_Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the
truth_; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9.
_The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should
come to repentance_; and several others, from whence they argue the
universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind,
or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God’s
will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is
to be exploded, as contrary hereunto.