being sensible that such-like reproaches, as these we have mentioned,
are brought by many, without duly weighing whether they are well
grounded or no; so that this doctrine is often opposed, in such a way of
reasoning, that the premises, as well as the conclusions drawn from
them, are rather their own than ours; or, at least, if some ideas
thereof may be found in the writings, or taken from the unguarded
expressions, which some who have defended this doctrine, have made use
of; yet they have appeared in such a dress that even they, who are
supposed to have advanced them, would have disowned and rejected them.
If persons who are in another way of thinking, resolve not to lay aside
these misrepresentations, it plainly appears that they are not disposed
to lie open to conviction, and then all attempts to defend this doctrine
will be to no purpose; the preventing whereof has rendered these
prefatory cautions needful.
We shall only add, to what has been said, some rules, by which we desire
that the truth, either of this or the opposite doctrine, may be judged
of.
1. If we do not confirm what we assert, by proofs taken from scripture,
let it not be received; but if we do, whatever may be said of our method
of managing this controversy, the greatest deference ought to be paid to
the sacred oracles: But since it is very common for persons to answer
the arguments taken from one scripture, by producing other scriptures,
which seems to assert the contrary, as desirous to shift aside in the
dispute, and put us upon solving the difficulties which they suppose to
be contained in them; though this is not to be declined, yet a more
direct answer must be given before the doctrine itself is overthrown.
Whether our explication of those scriptures, on which our faith therein
is founded, be just, we shall leave others to judge; and also whether
the sense we give of other scriptures that are brought as objections
against it, be not equally probable with that of those that bring them;
which is all that need be insisted on in such cases.
2. Let that doctrine be received, and the contrary rejected, on which
side of the question soever it lies, that is most agreeable to the
divine perfections, and explains those scriptures, brought in defence of
it, most consistently therewith; which is a fair proposal; and such as
ought not only to be applied to this particular head of doctrine, but to
the whole of religion, as founded on scripture, which is far from
overthrowing the divine glory, the advancement whereof is the great end
of it.
3. Let that doctrine be rejected, as inconsistent with itself, and not
worthy to be believed or embraced, whether it be ours, or the contrary
thereunto, that shall detract from the harmony of the divine perfection,
or pretend to set up, or plead for one, and, at the same time militate
against the glory of another; and I desire nothing more than that our
whole method of reasoning on this subject may be tried by these rules,
and be deemed true or false, agreeably to what is contained therein.
In considering this subject, relating to the decrees of God, as in the
two answers, which we are explaining, we shall proceed in the following
method; and shew,
I. What we are to understand, by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to
pass, according to the counsel of his own will; wherein we shall compare
the decree with the execution thereof, and observe how one exactly
answers to the other, and is to be a rule for our judging concerning it.
II. We shall prove the truth of that proposition, that God hath
fore-ordained whatever shall come to pass, either in time, or to
eternity.
III. We shall then particularly consider intelligent creatures, such as
angels and men, and that both good and bad, with respect to their
present, or future state, as the objects of God’s eternal decree or
purpose, and so shall proceed to speak concerning the decree of
election, and reprobation, as contained in the latter of these answers.
IV. We shall lay down some propositions concerning each of these,
tending to explain and prove them, and that more especially as to what
respects the election and reprobation of men.
V. We shall consider the properties thereof, and how the divine
perfections are displayed therein, and endeavour to make it appear, in
various instances, that the account we shall give thereof is agreeable
thereunto, as well as founded on scripture.
VI. We shall enquire whether the contrary doctrine defended by those who
deny election and reprobation, be not derogatory to, and subversive of
the divine perfections, or, at least, inconsistent with the harmony
thereof; or whether it doth not, in many respects, make God altogether
such an one as ourselves.
VII. We shall endeavour to prove that their reasoning from scripture,
who maintain the contrary doctrine, is not sufficiently conclusive; and
that the sense they give of those scriptures, generally brought to
support it, does not so well agree with the divine perfections, as it
ought to do, but that they may be explained in a different way, more
consistent therewith.
VIII. We shall endeavour to answer the most material objections that are
usually brought against the doctrine that we are maintaining. And,
IX. Shew how it is practically to be improved by us, to the glory of
God, and our spiritual good and advantage.
I. What we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to
pass, according to the counsel of his own will.
1. By God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, we do not understand
barely his fore-knowledge of all things, that are, or shall be done in
time, and to eternity, although this be included in, and inseparably
connected with his eternal purpose, since no one can purpose to act
without the foreknowledge thereof; yet more than this is certainly
contained therein; therefore,
2. God’s pre-determining, or fore-ordaining whatsoever comes to pass,
includes not only an act of the divine understanding, but an act of his
sovereign will: It is not only his knowing what shall come to pass, but
his determining, by his own agency, or efficiency, what he will produce
in time, or to eternity. Accordingly, some call the decrees of God his
eternal providence, and the execution thereof his actual providence; by
the former, he determines what he will do; by the latter, he brings his
determinations to pass, or effects what he before designed to do. It
follows therefore,
3. That God’s fore-ordaining whatsoever shall come to pass, is vastly
different from his bringing things to pass: the one is an internal act
of his will; the other, an external act of his almighty power: He
fore-ordained that they should come to pass, and therefore, till then,
they are considered as future; though this determination necessarily
secures the event, unless we suppose it possible for his eternal purpose
to be defeated, which is disagreeable to the divine perfections, as will
farther appear under some following heads. And, on the other hand, when
we consider him, as bringing all things to pass, or producing them by
his power, this renders what was before future, present. With respect to
the former, he decrees what shall be; and, with respect to the latter,
his decree takes effect, and is executed accordingly.
They who treat of this matter, generally consider things, either as
possible or future. Things are said to be possible, with respect to the
power of God, as every thing that he can do, is possible to be done,
though some things, which he could have done, he never will do. As for
instance: He could have made more worlds, had he pleased; or have
produced more men upon earth, or more species of creatures; or have
given a greater degree of perfection to creatures, than he has done, or
will do; for it is certain, that he never acted to the utmost of his
power, accordingly he could have done many things that he will never do;
and those things are said to be possible, but not future.
Moreover, things future are rendered so, by the will of God, or his
having fore-ordained, or determined to produce them; this is what we
call the decree of God, which respects the event, or determines whatever
shall come to pass.
We are now to consider, what we are to understand by God’s
fore-ordaining all things, according to the counsel of his will; which
is a mode of speaking used in scripture, in Eph. i. 11. _Being
predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things
after the counsel of his own will._
1. We are not hereby to understand that the decrees of God are the
result of deliberation, or his debating matters within himself, as
reasoning in his own mind about the expediency, or inexpediency of
things, or calling in the advice of others, as creatures are said to do,
when acting with counsel; for he must not be supposed to determine
things in such a way, since that would argue an imperfection in the
divine mind; _With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and
taught him in the paths of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and
shewed to him the way of understanding?_ Isa. xl. 14. But,
2. It implies, that his decrees are infinitely wise. As what is done
with counsel is said, according to human modes of speaking, to be done
advisedly, in opposition to its being done rashly, or with
precipitation; accordingly all the works of God are done with wisdom,
therefore all his purposes and determinations to do what is done in
time, are infinitely wise, which, according to our way of speaking, is
called the counsel of his will: thus it is said, _He is wonderful in
counsel, and excellent in working_, chap. xxviii. 29.
We are now to consider the object of God’s decree; This, as has been
before observed, is every thing that has, or shall come to pass, and it
may be considered in different respects. There are some things which he
has determined to effect, namely, such as are the objects of his power;
or all things, which have a natural or moral goodness in them, which are
becoming an infinitely holy God to produce: and this includes in it
every thing but sin, which God does not produce, it not being the object
of power: Nevertheless, this must be supposed to be committed by his
permission, and therefore it is the consequence of his decree to permit,
though not, as other things, of his decree to effect; it is one thing to
suffer sin to be committed in the world, and another thing to be the
author of it. But this we shall have occasion to enlarge on, under a
following head.
II. We shall now proceed to prove the truth of what is laid down in this
answer, namely, that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. This
will evidently appear, if we consider the five following propositions in
their due connexion.
1. Nothing comes to pass by chance, with respect to God, but by the
direction of his providence, which we are bound to assert against the
Deists, who speak of God, as though he were not the Governor of the
world. This cannot be denied by any, who think, with any degree of
modesty, concerning, or pay a due deference to the divine perfections,
since God may as well be denied to be the Creator as the Governor of the
world.[183]
2. It follows from hence, that nothing is done without the divine
influence, or permission. The former (as was before observed) respects
things that are good, which are the effects of his power; the latter,
sin. That nothing comes to pass without the divine influence, or
permission, is evident; for if any thing came to pass, which is the
object of power, without the divine influence, then the creature would
be said to exist, or act independently on the power of God; and, if so,
then it would follow, that it would exist, or act necessarily; but
necessary existence is a perfection appropriate to God.
As to what respects the latter, namely, sins being committed by divine
permission, it is evident, that if it might be committed without the
divine permission, it could not be restrained by God: and to suppose
that he could not hinder the commission of sin, is to suppose that sin
might proceed to the greatest height, without any possible check or
controul, which would argue a great defect in the divine government of
the world, as it is also contrary to daily experience, as well as
scripture. Certainly he who sets bounds to the sea, and says to its
proud waves, _Hitherto shall ye come, and no farther_, must be supposed
to set bounds to the corrupt passions of wicked men: thus the Psalmist
says, _Surely the wrath of men shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath
shalt thou restrain_, Psal. lxxvi. 10.
Notwithstanding, this does not argue his approbation of sin, or that he
is the author of it; since it is one thing to suffer, or not to hinder,
and another thing to be the author of any thing. Thus it is said, _These
things hast thou done, and I kept silence_, Psal. l. 21. that is, I did
not restrain thee from doing them, as I could have done; so it is said,
_in times past he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways_. Acts
xiv. 16.
3. God never acts or suffers any thing to be done, but he knows,
beforehand, what he will do or suffer. This an intelligent creature,
acting as such, is said do, therefore it must not be denied of him, who
is omniscient, and infinitely wise: He who knows all things that others
will do, cannot but know what himself will do, or what others will do by
the interposition of his providence, or what he will suffer to be done,
before it is acted.
4. Whatever God does, and consequently knows before-hand that he will do
it, that he must be supposed to have before determined to do: This must
be allowed, or else it argues him defective in wisdom. As no wise man
acts precipitantly or without judgment, much less must the wise God be
supposed to do so; concerning whom it is said, that _all his ways are
judgment_, Deut. xxxii. 4.
5. It therefore appears, even to a demonstration, that God before
determined, or fore-ordained, whatever comes to pass, which was the
thing to be proved.
And inasmuch, as he never began to determine, as he never began to
exist, or as he never was without purposes of what he would do;
therefore it is evident, that he before ordained, from eternity,
whatever should come to pass, either in time, or to eternity.
It farther appears, that God fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass,
otherwise he did not determine to create all things before he gave being
to them; and then it could not be said, _O Lord, how manifold are thy
works! in wisdom hast thou made them all_, Psal. civ. 24. There are,
indeed, many admirable discoveries of wisdom, as well as power, in the
effects produced; but to suppose that all this was done without
fore-thought, or that there was no eternal purpose relating thereunto,
would be such a reflection on the glory of this perfection, as is
inconsistent with the idea of a God. Moreover, if herein he designed his
own glory, as he certainly did, since every intelligent being designs
some end, and the highest and most excellent end must be designed by a
God of infinite wisdom; and, if he did all this for his own glory, then
it must be allowed, that it was the result of an eternal purpose: all
which, I am persuaded, will not be denied by those on the other side of
the question, who defend their own cause with any measure of judgment.
To this we may farther add, that to deny that God fore-ordained whatever
comes to pass, is, in effect, to deny a providence, or, at least, that
God governs the world in such a way, as that what he does therein was
pre-concerted. And herein we expect to meet with no opposition from any
but the Deists, or those who deny a God; and if it be taken for granted
that there is a providence, or that God is the Governor of the world, we
cannot but conclude from hence, that all the displays of his glory
therein, are the result of his eternal purpose. This is also agreeable
to what is said concerning him, that _he doth according to his will in
the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth_, Dan. iv.
35. the meaning of which is not barely this, (which is a great truth)
that he acts without controul, inasmuch as his power is infinite: But
that all he does is pursuant to his will; and, indeed, it cannot be
otherwise, if we suppose that the divine power, and will, are so
inseparably connected, that he cannot be said to produce any thing, but
by the word of his power; or when he willeth that any thing should come
to pass, it is not in an efficacious will, as ours is, for want of
power, to effect what we have done. Therefore for God to will the
present existence of things, is to effect them, which seems to be the
reason of that mode of speaking, which was used when he produced all
things at first; he said, let them exist in that form, or perfection,
which he had before designed to give them, and the effect immediately
followed, Gen. i. 3, 6, 9, &c.
Hitherto, I presume, our argument will not be much contested; for the
main thing in controversy is what relates to the divine determination
respecting intelligent creatures, which will be considered under a
following head: What I have hitherto attempted to prove is, the
proposition in general, namely, that whatever God brings to pass, or is
the effect of power, is the result of his determinate purpose. And
herein, I think, I have carefully distinguished between God’s will to
effect, and his will to permit; but that will be farther explained, when
we speak of the decrees of God, with a particular application to angels
and men, under the head of election.
Having endeavoured to prove that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes
to pass, we shall lay down the following propositions relating to his
end and design in all his purposes, together with the nature of things,
as coming to pass pursuant thereunto, and the method in which we are to
conceive of the decree, when compared with the execution thereof.
1. God cannot design any thing, in his eternal purpose, as the highest
end, but his own glory, which is here assigned, as the end of his
decrees. As this is the principal motive, or reason, inducing him to
produce whatever comes to pass; so it must be considered as the end of
his purpose relating thereunto: This is very evident; for since the
divine glory is the most excellent of all things, he cannot, as an
infinitely wise God, design any thing short of it, as the great motive
or inducement for him to act; therefore, whatever lower ends are
designed by him, they are all resolved into this as the principal, to
wit, the advancement of his divine perfections. Though God designs his
own glory as the highest end, yet he has purposed not only that this
should be brought about, by means conducive thereunto, but that there
should be a subserviency of one thing to another, all which are the
objects of his decree, as well as the highest end, namely, his own
glory. As, for instance, he determines that the life and health of man
shall be maintained by the use of proper means and medicine, or that
grace shall be wrought instrumentally by those means, which he has
ordained, in order thereunto: thus his purpose respects the end and
means, together with the connexion that there is between them.
2. According to the natural order of things, the divine purpose is
antecedent to the execution thereof. Therefore it seems very absurd to
distinguish the decree of God, as some do, into antecedent and
consequent, one going before the use of means, the other following, of
which more hereafter: It is certain, that every intelligent being first
determines to act, and then executes his determinations; so that nothing
can be more absurd, than to say, that a person determines to do a thing
which is already done. Therefore we conclude, that God first decreed
what shall come to pass, and then brings it to pass: Accordingly he
first determined to create the world, and then created it; he first
determined to bestow the means of grace on men, and to render them
effectual to the salvation of all who shall be saved, and then he does
this accordingly; so, with respect to his judicial actings, he first
determined by a permissive decree, not to prevent the commission of sin,
though infinitely opposite to his holiness, and then, knowing the
consequence of this permissive decree, or that men, through the
mutability or corruption of their nature, would rebel against him, he
determined to punish sin after it should be committed. Thus the decree
of God is, in all respects, antecedent to the execution of it; or his
eternal providence, as his decrees are sometimes called, is antecedent
to, and the ground and reason of, his actual providence.
3. Though the purpose of God be before the execution thereof, yet the
execution of it is first known by us; and so it is by this that we are
to judge of his decree and purpose, which is altogether secret, with
respect to us, till he reveals it; therefore we first observe the
discoveries thereof, as contained in his word, or made visible in his
actual providence, and from thence we infer his eternal purpose relating
thereunto. Every thing that is first in the order of nature, is not
first with respect to the order of our knowing it: thus the cause is
before the effect, but the effect is often known before the cause; the
sun is, in the order of nature, before the enlightening the world by it;
but we first see the light, and then we know there is a sun, which is
the fountain thereof: or, to illustrate it by another similitude, which
comes nearer the matter before us; A legislator determines first to make
a law, which determination is antecedent to the making, and that to the
promulgation of it, whereby his subjects come to the knowledge thereof,
and act in conformity thereunto; but, according to our method of judging
concerning it, we must first know that there is such a law, and from
thence we conclude, that there was a purpose relating to it, in him that
gave it; Thus we conclude, that though the decree of God be the ground
and reason of the execution thereof, yet we know that there was such a
decree by its execution, or, at least, by some other way designed to
discover this to us.
These things being duly considered, may obviate an objection, which is
no other than a misrepresentation of the doctrine we are maintaining, as
though we asserted, that our conduct of life, and the judgment we are to
pass concerning ourselves, relating to our hope of future blessedness,
were to be principally, if not altogether regulated, by God’s secret
purpose or decree; as though we were first to consider him as
determining the event, that is, as having chosen or rejected us, and,
from this supposition, to encourage ourselves to attend upon the means
of grace; or otherwise that we should take occasion to neglect them;
since it is a preposterous thing for a man, who considers himself as
reprobated, to attend on any of those means, which are ordained to
salvation.
What has been said under the foregoing heads, is sufficient to take away
the force of this objection; but this will be more particularly
considered, when we come to answer several objections against the
doctrine of election: Therefore all I shall add at present is, that
since our conduct and hope is to be governed by the appearances of
things, and not by God’s secret purpose relating to the event thereof,
we are to act as those who have not, nor can have, any knowlege of what
is decreed, with relation thereunto, till it is evinced by the execution
thereof; or, at least, those graces wrought in us, which are the objects
of God’s purpose, as well as our future blessedness; and our right to
one is to be judged of by the other.